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Two decades into the 21st century, China still faces a plethora of unsettled territorial and boundary 
disputes on its maritime frontier spanning from the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and the South 
China Sea. These disputes cover strategically significant maritime space and involve U.S. treaty 
allies. As China’s power grows and it aspires to exert greater control over its periphery, how China 
handles local incidents arising from these disputes touches on the fundamental question of whether 
its rise will mean peace or instability for the region.  
There is a growing number of incidents arising from these disputes over the past twenty years, 
but China’s way of handling these incidents has varied widely. It has not always adopted an 
assertive, escalatory posture as its power continues to grow, nor has it invariably taken an 
accommodating, deescalatory posture as its good neighborly diplomacy strategy would suggest. 
When will China escalate an incident arising from its maritime disputes and when will it opt for 
deescalation? Should it choose to escalate, how does China calibrate its escalatory measures in 
terms of their nature (nonmilitary or military) and strength (restrained or forceful)?  
To account for the variation, this study develops a two-step theoretical framework to explain 
when, why, and how rising powers such as China choose to escalate or deescalate local incidents 
arising from unsettled maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction disputes. I argue that when deciding 
whether to escalate such incidents, leaders often simultaneously face two types of costs generated 
respectively by domestic and international audiences with oftentimes competing expectations, and 
thus a decision to escalate or deescalate entails a tradeoff between these two types of audience 
costs. Should China choose to escalate, it calibrates escalatory measures based on its assessment 
of one of the two criteria: the likelihood of being presented with a fait accompli by the adversary; 
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or, should it have already been presented with a fait accompli during the crisis, the prospect of 
reversing it through negotiations.  
Several key findings emerge from this study. First, China has not been invariably prone to 
taking an escalatory posture in maritime disputes as its power grows. Rather, its decision of 
escalation or deescalation is a function of the interplay between the pulling and hauling among its 
domestic parochial interests on the one hand and Beijing’s assessment of China’s geopolitical 
environment on the other.  
Second, and counterintuitively, smaller countries can have substantial leverage over rising 
powers, contrasting the long-enshrined Thucydides dictum that “the strong do what they have the 
power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” China cares as much about its 
reputation for resolve as that for its image of nonbelligerency, suggesting that rising powers’ 
understanding of reputation is often two-pronged.  
Third, China has demonstrated a high level of sensitivity to the prospect of the adversary 
engaging in a fait accompli tactic. A fait accompli that China views as irreversibly altering the 
status quo, be that physically or nonphysically, can create strong motivations for China to 







Advisor: David M. Lampton 
Second Reader: Michael S. Chase 
Committee Chair: P. Terrance Hopmann 







I could never have completed my dissertation without the support and encouragement of many 
people. My sincere and deep gratitude goes first and foremost to my advisor and mentor Professor 
David M. Lampton. Throughout my seven years at SAIS, first as an MA student and since 2016 
as a Ph.D. student, Professor Lampton has always been supportive, responsive, and patient, and 
his advice at each stage of my dissertation was highly valuable. A student could not ask for a more 
helpful and gracious advisor. I thank him for his many, many contributions.  
I am fortunate to have an extraordinary dissertation committee. I am deeply grateful for the 
enormous contributions from Professor Michael S. Chase who has profoundly molded my 
understanding of international security and has guided and encouraged my intellectual inquiry 
since my very first day at SAIS. He has always been my go-to source of advice on all manner of 
academic and career issues. I also thank Professor P. Terrance Hopmann, who provided insightful 
comments that have critically shaped my subsequent thinking on this project from the very first 
draft of my prospectus. Dr. Michael D. Swaine’s unparalleled expertise and insights on crisis 
management inspired me to develop this project and made the whole research process both 
rewarding and enjoyable. Dr. Sheila A. Smith’s great questions at my prospectus defense helped 
me refine my research questions at the early stage of my research. 
Although I cannot possibly list everyone I should, let me start by thanking Professor Hanns 
Maull for his immense help and encouragement. As my supervisory faculty member at SAIS 
Europe, Professor Maull always provided prompt and insightful feedback on each of my chapters. 
Given the size of his contributions, I have come to see him as a de facto member of my committee. 
I would also like to thank other faculty members at SAIS for their support and education. I want 
to acknowledge Professor Bruce Parrott who has tremendously influenced the way that I approach 
v 
 
research and teaching. Professor William Brooks kindly connected me with contacts in Japan, 
making my field trip very fruitful. Professor Kent Calder encouraged and supported me in giving 
my first academic conference presentation, which boosted my confidence in pursuing doctoral 
education. Professor Karl Jackson’s expertise in Southeast Asia and passionate teaching style made 
the region another topic of enduring intellectual interest. Toshiko Calder Sansei was generous with 
her time in helping with my Japanese language studies. The staff of SAIS library, China Studies 
Department, and the Ph.D. program always provide prompt and patient assistance. I would like to 
thank them all. 
I am deeply indebted to all my interlocutors in China, Japan, Singapore and the United States, 
whose generosity with their time and candor in discussions tremendously improved the quality of 
my research. I am especially grateful to Professors Wang Jisi and Yu Tiejun at the Institute of 
International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, for providing the key institutional support 
when I conduct fieldwork in China in 2019. I also want to thank the National Institute for South 
China Sea Studies in Hainan for hosting me as a visiting scholar both in 2017 and 2019.  
I would also like to thank SAIS Europe for offering the George L. Abernethy Fellowship, 
which provided me the opportunity to spend the 2019-2020 academic year in Bologna to write my 
dissertation, and the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs for the summer travel grant, 
which enabled me to take the field trip to Japan and Singapore in the summer of 2018. 
On a personal note, many individuals deserve credit for their unwavering support. My special 
thanks to Li Ya’nan, Luo Xi, and Xie Shuyu, who have been my dearest companions since college 
and make Beijing my second home. I would also like to thank my cousin Fang Zheng and former 
colleague Zhang Minyi for their support throughout what was an extremely difficult period for 
family reasons when I was writing my dissertation in Bologna. SAIS friends Cai Yuanchen, Brian 
vi 
 
Carlson, Chen Yali, Gan Zhi, William Hargreaves, Amanda Kerrigan, Li Miaosu, Lin Xiufeng, 
Liu Zongyuan, Meredith Ludlow, Ilaria Mazzocco, Ye Jia’nan, Sun Yun, Wang Yuhan, and Zhang 
Hao all provided vital support and encouragement.  
Most importantly, I wish to thank my mother, Wan Liping, for her unreserved support and 





















































































Table of Contents 
Abstract                                                                                                                                            ii 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                                          iv 
List of Tables                                                                                                                                       ix 
List of Figures                                                                                                                                    x 
List of Maps                                                                                                                                        xi 
Abbreviations                                                                                                                                   xii 
1. Introduction                                                                                                                                  1 
2. Theoretical Framework,  
Methodology, and Alternative Explanations                                                                                32 
3. An Overview of China's Maritime Disputes,  
Defense Strategy, and Maritime Security Actors                                                                            82 
4. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Lease and the Chunxiao Dispute                                                              142 
5. The China Maritime Surveillance Diaoyu/Senkaku Patrol  
and the Fishing Trawler Collision                                                                                              203 
6. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Nationalization  
and the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone                                                           258 
7. Vietnam’s Spratly Cruise, the Tokin Gulf Fatal Shooting,  
and Sansha City                                                                                                                            336 
8. The Scarborough Shoal Standoff and the HD-981 Clash                                                          382 
9. The Luconia Standoff and the Natuna Confrontation                                                                  468 
10. China-South Korea Fishing Clashes in the Yellow Sea                                                                507 
11. Conclusion and Implications                                                                                                        541 







List of Tables 
Table 2.1 A Summary of Measurement of Domestic Audience Costs 
Table 2.2 A Summary of Measurement of International Audience Costs 
Table 2.3 Fait Accompli and Escalatory Measures Calibration 
Table 2.4 A Taxology of Escalatory Measures 
Table 7.1 Sub-regional Multilateral Cooperation Mechanisms between China and Southeast Asia 
Table 8.1 Chinese Media Coverage on the Scarborough Shoal Standoff and the HD-981 clash 
Table 10.1 The Number of Chinese Fishing Vessels Seized by South Korea 
Table 10.2 The Occurrence of Violent Resistance and Resulting Casualties  
Table 10.3 Major Issues Addressed in PRC-ROK Joint Statements/Communiques in 21st Century 























List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Audience Costs Tradeoff Calculation Model 
Figure 2.2 Four Stages of a Crisis 
Figure 3.1: Maritime Militia in the Core Newspapers and PLA Publications since 2000 
Figure 4.1 The East China Sea in the “Propensity to Escalate” Area 
Figure 5.1: The Chinese Public’s Perception on Japan 2005-2011 
Figure 5.2 Japan’s Rare Earth Imports from China 
Figure 5.3 Number of Chinese Government Ship Patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkakus Prior to 
September 2012 
Figure 6.1 Number of Article on People’s Daily and Other Core Chinese Newspapers Referring to 
“Shelving Disputes and Pursuing Joint Development” alongside “Sovereignty Belonging to China”  
Figure 6.2 Chinese MLE Vessels near the Diaoyu/Senkakus from September 2012 to the End of 
2014 
Figure 6.3 The Chinese Public’s Perception on Japan 2012-2018 
Figure 7.1 The South China Sea in the “Propensity to Gridlock” Area 
Figure 7.2 Guangxi, Hainan, and Guangdong Provincial Newspaper Articles with Reference to the 
South China Sea Disputes 
Figure 7.3 Guangxi, Hainan, and Guangdong Provincial Newspaper Articles on Cooperative 
Relations with Vietnam  
Figure 7.4 Guangxi, Hainan, and Guangdong Provincial Newspaper Articles on Cooperative 
Relations with the Philippines  
Figure 8.1 Newspaper Article Frequency on the South China Sea 
Figure 8.2 The Philippines’ fruit exports to China by trade value  
Figure 8.3 Chinese Tourist arrivals in the Philippines 
Figure 8.4 Vietnam’s fruits and rice exports to China by trade value  
Figure 8.5 China-Vietnam and China-Philippines Top Leadership Visits and High-Level 
Exchanges 
Figure 9.1 China’s Rubber Imports from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand 
Figure 10.1 The Yellow Sea in the “Propensity to Deescalate” Area 







List of Maps 
Map 3.1 The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
Map 3.2 The Paracel Islands 
Map 3.3: The Spratly Islands 
Map 4.1 China’s drilling sites in the East China Sea 
Map 6.1 Existing Air Defense Identificaion Zones in the East China Sea 
Map 9.1 The Luconia Shoals 
Map 9.2 The Overlapping Area between Indonesia’s EEZ around Natuna and the Nine-Dash Line 
Map 10.1 Agreed China-ROK Fishery Zones 





















ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone 
AMS Academy of Military Science (PLA) 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
CCG China Coast Guard 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CICIR China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations 
CIIS China Institute of International Studies 
CIMA China Institute for Marine Affairs 
CLCS UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Self 
CMC Central Military Commission 
CMP China Maritime Police 
CMS China Maritime Surveillance 
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation 
CNSC Central National Security Council 
COC Code of Conduct 
COLREGs Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
CPV Communist Party of Vietnam 
CUES Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 
DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
 DPJ Democratic Party of Japan 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
E&P Exploration and Production 
FLE Fisheries Law Enforcement Bureau 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FY Fiscal Year 
GFC Global Financial Crisis 
GOJ Government of Japan 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
INCSEA 1972 US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement 
ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
JCG Japan Coast Guard 
JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 
JMSU Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding 
JSDF Japan Self-Defense Force 
xiii 
 
KCG Korea Coast Guard 
KIG Kalayaan Island Group 
KMT Kuomintang  
LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) 
LSG Leading small group 
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan) 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MLE Maritime Law Enforcement 
MLIT Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (Japan) 
MLR Ministry of Land and Resources 
MMCA U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement 
MND Ministry of National Defense 
MOA Ministry of Agriculture 
MOD Ministry of Defense (Japan) 
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) 
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce 
MPS Ministry of Public Security 
MSA Maritime Safety Administration 
MSS Ministry of State Security 
NIDS National Institute for Defense Studies (Japan) 
NISCSS National Institute for South China Sea Studies 
NDMC National Defense Mobilization Commission 
NDPG National Defense Program Guideline (Japan) 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission 
NDU National Defense University (PLA) 
NOC National Oil Company  
NPC National People’s Congress 
PAP People’s Armed Police 
PBSC Politburo Standing Committee 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan) 
ROK Republic of Korea 
SAR Special Administrative Region 
SCNDM State Commission for National Defense Mobilization 
SDF Self-Defense Force (Japan) 
SIIS Shanghai Institute for International Studies 
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication 
xiv 
 
SOA State Oceanic Administration 
SOE State-owned Enterprise 
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
UN United Nations 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
U.S. United States 
 
- 1 - 
 
1. Introduction  
Two decades into the 21st century, China has settled most of its land borders but still faces a 
plethora of unsettled territorial and boundary disputes on its maritime frontier spanning from the 
Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and the South China Sea. These disputes cover strategically 
significant maritime and air space, and involve U.S. treaty allies including Japan, the Philippines, 
and South Korea. As China’s naval power grows and it aspires to exert greater control over its 
near-sea region,1 how China handles local incidents and foreign challenges arising from these 
disputes touches on the fundamental question of whether China’s rise will mean peace or 
instability for the region.  
While China has been willing to compromise in land border disputes and has less frequently 
used force in maritime disputes since the end of the Cold War,2 the risk of miscalculation and 
inadvertent escalation during maritime incidents cannot be safely ruled out. Maritime disputes are 
dangerous zero-sum conflicts which are particularly “prone to negative spirals of instability,” 
according to Taylor Fravel, because claimants are “especially sensitive to perceived challenges to 
their claims” given the public nature of such claims and because states are required by international 
law to “actively assert and defend their claims.”3 
Moreover, China’s management of maritime incidents and challenges has been rendered 
considerably more complicated as the growing pluralization and decentralization of the Chinese 
political system has brought a wide range of domestic stakeholders into the Chinese foreign policy 
 
1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2020, pp. 44-49, 69-72, 95-103. 
2  M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Ketian Zhang, “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s 
Use of Coercion in the South China Sea,” International Security, vol. 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019), pp. 117-159. 
3 M. Taylor Fravel, “Things Fall Apart: Maritime Disputes and China’s Regional Diplomacy,” in Jacques deLisle and 
Avery Goldstein, eds., China’s Challenges: The Road Ahead (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 
p. 209. 
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process. This is in stark contrast to its handling of territorial and border disputes in the 20th century, 
when the process was dominated by the centralized foreign policy and security establishment.4 
The challenge posed by a less monolithic Chinese political system for crisis management has been 
aptly summarized by Michael Swaine: “During the Maoist era, strong centralized control usually 
guaranteed a single message. Today, a much more complex and amorphous process – which 
involved much more internal consultation and the possibility that different messages exist – can 
slow down reaction time and distort signaling.”5 Furthermore, as China (and other claimants alike) 
strives to bolster its claims by stepping up policing of disputed waters, allowing energy companies 
to explore hydrocarbon resources in claimed areas, incorporating disputed areas into nearby coastal 
localities, and allowing grassroots activists to sail to contested land features, these various 
nonmilitary actors whose activity was once confined to the land and coastal waters have come to 
the forefront of these disputes and come into direct contact with other disputants.6 As a result, 
these actors are playing a more relevant and influential role in crisis prevention and management 
than has traditionally been the case. 
China’s way of handling its maritime disputes has varied widely over the past two decades. It 
has not always adopted an assertive, escalatory posture as its power continues to grow, nor has the 
country invariably taken an accommodating, de-escalatory posture as its good neighborly 
diplomacy and tao guang yang hui (keeping a low profile) strategy would suggest. In the great 
majority of cases, China has escalated incidents in the East China Sea. In the South China Sea, 
 
4 Primarily China’s top leadership, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 
5 Michael D. Swaine, “Understanding the Historical Record,” in Michael Swaine, Zhang Tuosheng and Danielle F.S. 
Cohen, ed., Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2006), p. 34. 
6 By contrast, China’s outstanding border disputes on land with India remains largely closed to involvement of such 
domestic nonmilitary actors. As a result, contingencies in the Sino-Indian land border areas even in the post-Cold War 
era, such as the 2017 Doklam standoff and the 2020 Galwan clash, still largely follow a traditional political-military 
crisis pattern as they involve almost solely the military assets of both sides. 
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China has been more selective in escalating local incidents. In the Yellow Sea, China has 
consistently shunned escalation even though this area has registered the highest frequency of fatal 
clashes among all of China’s maritime disputes. Moreover, in instances where China has chosen 
to escalate, its escalation patterns have varied – Beijing has escalated some incidents with a 
combination of military and nonmilitary means but has employed exclusively nonmilitary 
measures in others. What explains the wide variation in China’s handling of these disputes? Why 
does China de-escalate some maritime incidents and challenges while escalating others? Under 
what circumstance does China undertake an escalation along nonmilitary dimensions instead of 
along the military dimension or a combination of both? To frame all these questions in one simple 
empirical puzzle: when and why does China escalate local incidents and challenges arising from 
its maritime disputes, and in cases where China opts for escalation, how does it calibrate escalatory 
measures? 
Answering these questions can help shed new light on the dynamic and rationale in China’s 
handling of interstate conflict arising from an issue area deemed as involving the country’s vital 
interests. However, a systematic explanation for China’s varying choices of escalation and de-
escalation strategies in maritime disputes is still lacking in the literature. Recent research on 
China’s behavior in these disputes has heavily focused on the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
period when China is seen as becoming more nationalistic and assertive in its conduct of foreign 
and security policy.7 Studies treating China as a unitary actor with a coherent strategic calculation, 
 
7  Aaron Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness,” The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2015), pp. 133–150; and Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China 
Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 81 (2013), pp. 446–459; Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy 
Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 8, 
(2013), pp. 535-553. On the other hand, Alastair Iain Johnston the notion of the Chinese nationalism being on the rise 
and argues China’s assertive foreign policy represents more of a continuity than of a fundamental change. See, Alastair 
Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security, vol. 37, no. 4 (spring 
2013), pp. 7-48; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing,” International 
Security, Vol. 41, No. 3, (2016/2017), pp. 7-43. 
- 4 - 
 
while relevant in understanding China’s behavior in these disputes, prove insufficient in light of 
China’s increasingly fragmented political system and policy process.  On the other hand, analyses 
that emphasize the role of China’s various domestic players, while having considerably enhanced 
our understanding of China’s behavior, often tend to focus on specific incidents, or a particular 
group (or groups) of actors within China’s maritime security system. Very few studies have 
explored how the interplay of China’s various domestic interests and its geostrategic landscape 
has shaped the way that China handles its maritime disputes.  
For the purpose of this study, I use “maritime disputes” to refer to two types of different but 
interrelated issues: 1) sovereignty disputes over offshore islands and other land features, and 2) 
controversies over the delimitation of maritime boundaries and jurisdictional rights to the 200-
nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the up to 350-nautical mile continental 
shelves.8  
While this study focuses on the decision process on the Chinese side, it is noteworthy that any 
crisis arising from contested territory or maritime space involves a dyadic interaction problem. It 
means that every party’s crisis decision and behavior can feed the negative reflexes in the rivaling 
country and thus compound the crisis interactions.9 At the end of the day, it always takes two to 
fight. 
EXPLAINING ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION IN CHINA’S MARITIME DISPUTES  
This study provides a two-step thesis to explain when, why, and how China has escalated or de-
escalated incidents and challenges associated with its maritime disputes.  
 
8 In addition to these two types of disputes, some studies conceive a third type of maritime disputes China has with 
other states, particularly with the United States. Specifically, this type of disputes regards whether China is entitled to 
a legal right under international law to regulate or even restrict the operation of foreign military vessels in China’s 
territorial sea and EEZ. See, for example, Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017). 
9 The author thanks Dr. David M. Lampton for pointing out this issue. 
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The first part of my framework, the “audience cost trade-off calculation thesis,” addresses the 
when and why question. While few students of international relations would disagree that leaders 
tend to balance the costs of escalation against those of backing down in crisis bargaining, analysts 
differ widely on what these costs are and how they are weighed against one another. At one end 
of the spectrum, observers contend that such costs are external. For example, Zhang’s “cost 
balancing theory” posits that the potential costs of using coercion are the economic stakes involved 
in the bilateral relationship and the costs of backing down is a state’s reputation for resolve as 
perceived by third-party countries.10 At the other end, scholars believe that these costs are internal. 
For example, in a recent study, Weiss and Wallace argue that China adopts a rigid approach toward 
its maritime and island disputes because these disputes are central to the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) regime’s survival prospect (high centrality) and represent an issue area that both elites and 
masses refuse to compromise (low heterogeneity). 11  In a similar vein, Tokyo University’s 
Takahara Akio argues that whether and when China would take a hardline approach against Japan 
is a function of how stable Chinese leaders’ domestic power base is.12  
I challenge both approaches and stake out a middle ground by arguing that decisions to escalate 
or back down are not driven by sources at the domestic or international level alone; rather, decision 
makers often simultaneously face two types of costs generated respectively by two sets of 
audiences with distinct and oftentimes competing expectations.13 The first type is the political 
 
10 Zhang, “Cautious Bully.” 
11 Jessica Chen Weiss and Jeremy L. Wallace, “Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal 
International Order,” (2021), vol. 75, special issue 2, pp. 635-664. 
12 Akio Takahara, “The Development of Japan-China Relations in the Period of Stability in Cross-Strait Relations,” 
Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2015, pp. 119-144. 
13 In the case of China, the most important foreign policy decider is the head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
who concurrently chairs the CMC and serves as the president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Politburo 
Standing Committee (PBSC) of the CCP’s Central Committee, as the CCP’s “collective leadership mechanism,” has 
been the highest decision-making body in the post-Mao era. However, the importance of the PBSC seems to have 
declined under Xi Jinping, who since took office 2012 as China’s top leader has moved to centralize decision-making 
power. Alice L. Miller, “The 18th Central Committee Leadership with Comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary,” 
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costs that leaders may incur at home if they choose to de-escalate, a move which would likely be 
perceived by their domestic audience as backing down on prior pledges to defend national honor 
and sovereignty.  The second type is the diplomatic and geostrategic costs that a state may incur 
internationally should it choose to escalate, a move which would likely poison bilateral relations 
with the adversary and be perceived by other international stakeholders as reneging on the state’s 
commitment to nonbelligerency. A decision to escalate or de-escalate entails a tradeoff between 
these two types of costs. When the potential domestic costs of de-escalation outweigh the 
anticipated international costs of escalation, it would put pressure on leaders to engage in an 
escalation to avoid incurring backlash at home; conversely, if the anticipated international costs 
exceed the potential domestic political costs, it incentivizes the leadership to de-escalate conflict 
to avoid derailing relations with the adversary and/or precipitating third-party counterbalancing.  
The second part of my framework explains how escalation, once chosen, is calibrated in terms 
of its nature (nonmilitary or military) and strength (restrained or forceful). In calibrating an 
escalatory move, leaders must decide how much risk they are willing to take to protect the interests 
at stake without triggering unwanted upward spirals or even military conflict. Existing studies posit 
that leaders tend to formulate their responses and take risks commensurate with the level of issue 
salience or the importance of the interests at stake.14 While issue salience and the importance of 
interests do significantly influence the cost-benefit calculation in interstate crisis, in protracted 
 
China Leadership Monitor, Issue 48, Fall 2015; Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution: The Reign of Xi 
Jinping,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 3 (May/June 2018), pp. 60-74. 
14 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Clashes at Sea: Explaining he Onset, Militarization, and Resolution of Diplomatic 
Maritime Claims,” Security Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2020, pp. 637-670; Donald Nuechterlein, “National Interests and 
Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making,” British Journal of International 
Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, Oct. 1976, p. 248; Thomas W. Robinson, “National Interests,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., 
International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1969), 
pp.184-185; Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, pp. 183-184; Stephen D. Sklenka, “Strategy, National 
Interests, and Means to an End,” Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic 
Studies Institute), Oct. 2007. 
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conflict over territories and boundaries, the stake associated with any specific dispute often 
remains relatively fixed over a substantial period of time. As such, issue salience or importance of 
interests alone cannot satisfactorily explain variation in a country’s escalation behavior toward the 
same adversary in a particular dispute, or variation in a country’s escalation strategies when 
simultaneously dealing with multiple rivaling claimants involved in a single dispute.  
Building on prospect theory which underscores loss aversion in human psychology, I argue 
that how a state calibrates its escalatory measures is based on its perception of whether a fait 
accompli created by the adversary during the crisis can be reversed through negotiations, or the 
likelihood that the adversary will resort to such a tactic. Accordingly, four possible scenarios can 
be predicted.  
When presented with a fait accompli, a state can seek to undo it by negotiating with the 
adversary for a reversal or by forcing a reversal should the adversary refuse to negotiate. The first 
possible scenario is when a state calculates that there remains a chance to negotiate for a reversal. 
Under this circumstance, the state may calibrate its escalatory response to signal resolve and 
extract the best possible deal without closing the door to negotiations. As such, the escalation may 
be strong in nonmilitary dimensions but restrained in the military dimension. A restrained military 
escalation preserves a degree of plausible deniability and is relatively easy to be quietly called off 
to avoid hampering the negotiation process.  
A second possible scenario is when leaders conclude that a fait accompli cannot be reversed 
through negotiation. Under this circumstance, leaders may become more risk acceptant and tend 
to employ strong military and nonmilitary escalatory measures to force a reversal or recoup the 
state’s perceived loss. Strong military escalation can be risky, highly confrontational, and 
relatively difficult to revoke – a classical commitment tactic through which a state gets itself into 
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a position where it cannot retreat by staking its national honor and reputation on an overtly 
unyielding posture.15 
When a state is not (yet) presented with a fait accompli but fears that the adversary is likely to 
engage in such a tactic during the crisis, the state is likely to launch a nonmilitary escalation to 
deter the adversary from pursuing such a tactic while probably holding back on military measures 
to control risks of unwantedly militarizing the conflict. Thus, a third possible scenario is when a 
state sees a high probability of being presented with a fait accompli. Under this circumstance, a 
state may undertake a strong nonmilitary escalation to signal resolve and warning.  
The last possible scenario is when a state concludes that the probability of confronting a fait 
accompli is low. In that case, leaders may choose to make a relatively moderate, symbolic 
nonmilitary escalation to convey dissatisfaction. 
The two-step framework recognizes bounded rationality in decision making, which concedes 
that due to cognitive or motivational constraints people do not maximize expected utility in all 
decisions even if they intend to.16 The notion of bounded rationality stands in contrast to the 
classical comprehensive rationality which presumes that decision makers have a given utility 
function that ranks all alternatives, assess outcomes of these alternatives, and consistently choose 
the utility-maximizing option.17 As such, to deduce comprehensively rational choice in a given 
situation, “we need to know only the choosing organism’s goals and the objective characteristics 
of the situation” and “absolutely nothing else about the organism,” whereas to deduce the 
 
15 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 2008 edition, pp. 
49.  
16 Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York, NY: Wiley, 1957); Herbert A. Simon, “Human Nature in Politics: 
The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Jun. 1985), 
pp. 293-304; Herbert A. Simon, “Rationality in Political Behavior,” Political Psychology, Special Issue: Political 
Economy and Political Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar. 1995), pp. 45-61. 
17 Bryan D. Jones, “Bounded Rationality,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 297-321; Herbert A. 
Simon, Model of Boundary Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 1997), Vol. 3, pp. 291-294. 
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boundedly rational choice requires that “we must know the choosing organism’s goals, the 
information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences from 
the information it possesses.”18 Indeed, predictions derived from comprehensive rationality are 
often not consistent with how people actually behave, consequently spurring the scholarly search 
for alternative explanations such as prospect theory and organization theory (including the 
bureaucratic politics model) that conform with the notion of bounded rationality.19  Bounded 
rationality is straightforward and compelling. For a myriad of reasons such as knowledge, beliefs, 
information, time constraint, and groupthink, decision makers’ cognitive abilities are quite limited 
and can by no means know all the alternatives with clear assessments of associated outcomes. 
Moreover, when there is a misalignment of interests, decision makers may be motivated to choose 
the alternative that maximizes their own gains but is suboptimal to the state.  
ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
The remainder of this chapter reviews the existing literature to set the context in which my study 
is situated.  
In Chapter 2, I elaborate on my proposed theoretical framework and explain how variables are 
operationalized, followed by a set of testable hypotheses derived from the framework. This chapter 
then addresses data sources, concluding with a discussion of methodological issues and competing 
explanations.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of China’s maritime disputes, maritime defense strategy, and 
the actors in the Chinese maritime security system. 
 
18 Simon, “Human Nature in Politics,” p. 294.  
19 Bryan D. Jones, “Bounded Rationality,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, 1999, p. 297; Jack Levy, 
“Introduction to Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology, vol. 13, no. 2, Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political 
Psychology, Jun. 1992, p. 173; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 2nd edition, pp. 19-20. 
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Chapter 4 tests my theoretical framework by tracing China’s handling of two major maritime 
incidents arising from its disputes with Japan in the East China Sea in the first decade of the 21st 
century, the 2002-2004 Diaoyu/Senkaku lease and the 2004-2008 Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field 
issue. The clear dominance of the potentially huge domestic audience costs in Beijing’s calculation 
during this period explains China’s strong propensity to escalate maritime incidents. China 
launched nonmilitary escalation in both cases by unleashing grassroots activism, permitting mass 
anti-Japanese protests, and by approving regular patrols in the East China Sea. At the peak of the 
gas field dispute, after Japan granted drilling permission to a Japanese company – a move that 
Beijing saw as creating a fait accompli – China responded with a restrained military escalation by 
deploying a fleet of Chinese warships to demonstrate its resolve without quitting the bilateral gas 
talks. The continuation of negotiations suggested the Chinese calculation that the possibility of 
reversing the fait accompli remained. 
Chapter 5 traces China’s handling of two major incidents in the East China Sea during and 
immediately after the 2008 financial crisis, the first Chinese patrol within the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
territorial sea in December 2008 and the 2010 fishing trawler collision. In the instance of 2008 
patrol, Beijing’s high stakes in maintaining the much-improved Sino-Japanese relations at the time 
created strong incentives for a rare de-escalation in the East China Sea. During the 2010 collision, 
Beijing faced renewed compromise-averse pressures as its maritime security actors pushed for an 
expansion of patrols in contested waters and popular nationalism surged following China 
emergence from the global economic meltdown as the world’s second largest economy. Tokyo’s 
threat to subject the Chinese skipper to Japan’s domestic laws raised the prospect of creating a fait 
accompli in the legal dimension. To deter Japan from taking this path, Beijing launched a strong 
nonmilitary escalation by elevating its diplomatic protests to the very top level, regularizing 
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maritime rights patrols in the East China Sea, imposing an unofficial ban of its rare earth exports 
to Japan, and taking Japanese nationals working in China as political hostage. 
Chapter 6 examines China’s handling of the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization crisis spanning 
from 2012 to late 2013. Concerns about potential domestic costs overwhelmingly dominated 
China’s calculation and created strong incentives to escalate. After failing to deter Japan from 
making a state purchase of the islets and being presented with the GOJ’s decision of nationalization 
as an irreversible fait accompli, Beijing undertook a forceful nonmilitary escalation along with a 
moderately strong military escalation to compel Japan to reverse the done deal. After failing to 
force a reversal, Beijing doubled down on the military escalation by declaring an East China Sea 
air defense identification zone (ADIZ) to compensate for what it saw as China’s loss. 
Chapter 7 examines China’s handling of three incidents arising from its disputes in the South 
China Sea in the first decade of the 21st century, the 2004 Vietnamese cruise tour to the Spratlys, 
the 2005 fatal shooting of Vietnamese fishermen in Tokin Gulf, and China’s planned establishment 
of Sansha Municipality in late 2007. Following the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, the strategic importance that China attached to 
good neighborly diplomacy and regional economic integration with Southeast Asia forestalled the 
emergence of broad-based compromise-averse pressures in China and tilted Beijing’s cost tradeoff 
calculation toward attaching greater importance to the international costs. The domination of 
concerns about potential international costs created incentives for China to de-escalate in both 
instances.  
Chapter 8 compares China’s handling of two high-profile maritime incidents in the 2010s, the 
2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff and the 2014 HD-981 incident. China’s growing domestic 
attention to the maritime disputes during this period altered Beijing’s cost tradeoff calculation. In 
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the Scarborough Shoal standoff, domestic audience prevailed over concerns about the potential 
geopolitical costs following ambivalent reactions from ASEAN and the United States. As a result, 
Beijing undertook a strong nonmilitary escalation through economic sanctions and seizure of the 
shoal to prevent the detention of Chinese fishermen by the Philippines and to deter Manila from 
submitting the dispute for international arbitration, which in the Chinese perception would create 
a fait accompli in the legal dimension. During the HD-981 incident, by contrast, the unequivocal, 
unanimous pushback from ASEAN and the United States increased China’s potential international 
costs, which – combined with lower compromise-averse pressure at home – pushed China’s costs 
tradeoff calculation back to the international end and prevented a Chinese escalation. 
Chapter 9 examines China’s handling of two maritime incidents in the period leading up to the 
2016 arbitration ruling, the 2015 the Luconia Breaker standoff and the 2016 Natuna confrontation. 
Against the backdrop of the looming arbitration and China’s unfolding Maritime Silk Road 
initiative in the region, international audience costs clearly dominated China’s calculation and 
prompted a de-escalatory posture in both incidents. 
Chapter 10 tests my framework by tracing China’s handling of fatal maritime incidents with 
South Korea in the Yellow Sea in past two decades the 21st century. China’s high security and 
economic stakes in a positive China-ROK relationship, in combination with the absence of broad-
based compromise-averse pressures, create strong incentives for Beijing to persistently prevent the 
bilateral relationship from being derailed by maritime frictions.  
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of this study, explores its implications 
for crisis management and international relations theory, and presents an outlook of these disputes 
for the maritime future of the Asia-Pacific. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, I set the context of my research by reviewing four groups of existing literature 
pertaining to the subject: (1) China’s nonmilitary actors and “gray zone coercion” strategy in 
maritime disputes; (2) China’s crisis management and decision-making processes; (3) Chinese 
nationalism; and (4) China’s approach towards territorial disputes. Through this review, I will 
demonstrate that my study sits squarely at the unexplored intersection of the extant research.  
Previous Research on Nonmilitary Actors in China’s Maritime Disputes 
Whereas it should be acknowledged that the employment of nonmilitary means and involvement 
of nonmilitary actors in interstate disputes is neither uniquely Chinese nor an invention by China,20 
the Chinese nonmilitary actors have essentially garnered more international attention as compared 
to their counterparts from other claimant states, due to their rapid modernization and expansion, 
as well as the geographically vast and strategically vital waters involved in China’s maritime 
disputes. More importantly, it magnifies the uncertainty over what a rising China means to the 
security and stability in Asia-Pacific, as the growing standoffs and clashes at sea in the past decade 
become commonly interpreted as indicators of a growing Chinese irredentism and a fundamental 
change in China’s traditional position of shelving disputes and pursing joint development as 
articulated by Deng Xiaoping. 
Existing studies on China’s nonmilitary actors and their role in maritime disputes generally 
contend that Beijing’s growing employment of nonmilitary coercion is driven by a revisionist 
agenda and that nonmilitary actors are Beijing’s major tactical vehicle to incrementally alter the 
status quo while minimizing the risk of triggering a major war. In a 2014 testimony before the 
 
20 As noted by Michael Mazarr, the idea and practice of nonmilitarized coercion, or “gray zone coercion,” has existed 
for thousands of years. It’s the tools that are relatively recent and contributes to growing intensity of gray zone conflict. 
Michael Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Strategic Studies Institute, 
US. Army War College, 2015), pp. 3-5. 
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U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Bonnie Glaser characterizes China’s 
strategy as “salami-slicing,” which employs “a steady progression of small steps, none of which 
by itself is a casus belli” to seek favorable change to the status quo in maritime territorial disputes.21 
Dubbing China’s incremental, nonmilitary means as “gray zone” tactics between war and peace, 
Michael Mazarr posits in a 2015 study that such tactics are driven by measured revisionist intent, 
an approach of strategic gradualism and availability of unconventional tools.22 A 2017 CSIS report 
similarly portrays China’s nonmilitary actors as principal tools in Beijing’s pursuit of a “gray-zone 
coercion” strategy in maritime disputes.23 A 2019 study by the China Maritime Studies Institute 
of the Naval War College argues that Beijing leverages nonmilitary means to increase its control 
over the sea areas within the first island chain while avoiding provoking a kinetic response from 
other regional stakeholders.24 
Some China observers argue that the growing activism of China’s nonmilitary actors is more 
a symptom of China’s increasing fragmentation of authority, pluralization of policy actors, 
bureaucratic competition and chronic poor interagency coordination than an output of a coherent, 
calculated Chinese grand strategy. Linda Jakobson, for example, argues in a 2014 study that 
“despite Xi Jinping’s image as a strong leader, persistent systemic problems in China, alongside 
the decade-long trend of fractured authority, leave substantial room for various actors to push their 
own agendas” under the general banner of safeguarding China’s maritime rights.25 
 
21 Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Grand Strategy in Asia: Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission,” Mar. 13, 2014. 
22 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, p. 4. In 2010, the term “gray area” is used in the U.S. Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report. U.S. Department of Defense, Feb. 2010, p. 73.  
23 Michael Green, et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence 
(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), May 2017, pp.21-34. 
24 Peter Dutton, “Conceptualizing China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. 
Martinson, ed., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operation (Annapolis, MD: China Maritime Studies Institute and the 
National Institute Press, 2019), pp. 31-33. 
25 Linda Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Actors, Lowy Institute Report, Dec.11, 2014, p. 9. 
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Still more work on this topic, however, tends to zoom in on one or some subgroups and take 
an institutional or sectorial perspective. While these very specific studies barely offer any general 
explanations for variation in China’s crisis behavior in maritime disputes, I will review these 
studies by category to set the context in which my study is situated. 
Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) Agencies 
One group of studies focuses specifically on the evolving institutional structure and capabilities of 
China’s civilian MLE forces. Lyle Goldstein’s 2010 monograph Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea 
spearheaded this type of analysis. Goldstein finds that despite the diverse MLE agencies and the 
large total quantity of patrol vessels China possesses, China constantly suffers from a relative 
weakness in coast guard capacities.26 Aside from modernization processes and economic factors 
that contribute to this weakness, Goldstein observes that “the balkanization of maritime 
enforcement entities in China has severely inhibited the coherent development of Chinese coast 
guard entities.” These MLE agencies “duplicate one another in certain functions, fail to coordinate 
effectively in others, and are individually too weak to achieve fundamental breakthroughs in 
maritime governance.”27 In a similar vein, the International Crisis Group also finds in a 2012 report 
that both functional overlapping and interagency competition have incentivized the MLEs’ 
assertive and poorly coordinated behavior at sea.28  
Following Beijing’s decision in 2013 to merge four of its five MLE agencies into a unified 
China Coast Guard (CCG) under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), the central question for 
researchers on this subject becomes how effectively the reorganization mitigates China’s fractured 
maritime security system. Lyle Morris, concurring with Goldstein’s observation, notes in his 
 
26 Lyle Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime 
Enforcement Capabilities (RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2010), p. 24. 
27 Ibid., pp.25-26. 
28 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (I) (Asia Report No. 223), Apr. 23, 2012, pp. 19-21. 
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analysis that this restructuring “signals intent…to create a unified Chinese coast guard by aligning 
an under-coordinated civilian maritime law enforcement bureaucracy.” 29  In a 2015 analysis 
assessing the initial outcomes of the restructuring, Ryan Martinson reported that “[f]ront-line units 
remained intact, with little personnel integration” and that tactical-level coordination was still poor 
due to the lack of a unified rank structure and joint training between unit with different 
backgrounds.30 Jakobson even discloses that the 2013 merge, in addition to putting the CCG under 
a complex dual chain of command under SOA and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), created 
an institutional structure that separates the leadership of the CCG from that of the SOA and in 
effect made the head of former outrank that of the latter. This institutional arrangement resulted in 
a heated internal power struggle and further weakened the intended coordination that the 
restructuring had sought to achieve.31  
Recent studies increasingly focus on the issue of the militarization of China’s MLE forces. In 
a 2019 study, Ryan Martinson argues that following the 2013 consolidation, the China Maritime 
Police (CMP), part of China’s armed police,32 was put in a leading role in the CCG’s maritime 
rights operations and resulted in a pronounced trend of militarizing the new coast guard. This trend, 
according to Martinson, portended the 2018 decision to formally place the CCG under the 
 
29 Lyle S. Morris, “Taming the Five Dragons? China Consolidates its Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,” China 
Brief, vol. 13 Issue. 7, Mar. 28, 2013. 
30 Ryan D. Martinson, “From Words to Actions: The Creation of the China Coast Guard,” a paper for the China as a 
“Maritime Power” Conference, Jul. 28-29, 2015, Arlington, VA, pp. 39-44. 
31 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Actors, p. 18; Linda Jakobson, “The PLA and Maritime Security Actors,” 
in Phillips Saunders and Andrew Scobell, ed., PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policy Making (CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 300-324. 
32 The CMP was founded under the auspice of the Border Control Department of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), 
which remained placed under the dual-leadership of the CMC and the State Council through the MPS until 2018. The 
institutional structure of each of the MLE agencies is detailed in Chapter 3. 
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command of the PAP.33 Joel Wuthnow at the U.S. National Defense University notes that the 2018 
transfer indicates a closer operational relationship between the CCG and the PLA Navy.34 
Maritime Militia 
Another growing body of literature scrutinizes China’s maritime militia. Andrew Erickson and 
Conor Kennedy argue in a series of studies that China supplements the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) and the MLE with a “third sea force” – the maritime militia which draws on 
thousands of Chinese fishermen and fishing vessels in the coast areas.35 According to Erickson 
and Kennedy’s description, China has consolidated a joint maritime defense system which closely 
integrates the militia with the military and law enforcement forces.36 Erickson and Kennedy also 
contend that the maritime militia, operating “directly under the PLA chain of command,” has 
participated in high-profile maritime incidents including the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, 
and the 2014 HD-981 confrontation.37  
Taking a legal perspective, James Kraska and Michael Monti argue that the difficulty in 
distinguishing legitimate civilian fishing vessels and militia boats supporting military operation 
poses a critical challenge to US naval forces, which under customary international law governing 
 
33 Ryan D. Martinson, “Militarizing Coast Guard Operations in the Maritime Gray Zone,” in Erickson and Martinson, 
China’s Maritime Gray Zone, p. 103. 
34 Joel Wuthnow, China’s Other Army: The People’s Armed Police in an Era of Reform (Washington DC: Institute 
for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Press, 2019), pp. 15. 
35 Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty Pt. 
3,” Center for International Maritime Security, April 26, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s 
Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2,” Center for International Maritime Security, 
April 10, 2017; Andrew Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds A Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for 
International Maritime Security, March 25, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea 
Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report No. 1, China 
Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, March 2017, pp. 1-22; Conor M. Kennedy and 
Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding A New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” 
Center for International Maritime Security, September 1, 2016. 
36 Kennedy and Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, p. 4. 
37 Ibid., pp. 6-9. 
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the conduct of naval warfare are obligated to avoid the use of force against China’s maritime militia 
ships “so long as they are not integrated into the order of battle.”38  
In a rebuttal to the maritime militia argument that portrays fishery incidents as part of a 
deliberate militia tactic, Hongzhou Zhang and Sam Bateman argue that the maritime militia 
narrative has “securitized” fishery disputes by linking such disputes with “highly sensitive military 
operations” and the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea.39 Instead, according to 
Zhang and Bateman, Chinese fishermen are generally “self-motivated economic actors” who go 
after high-value marine species and have an ultimate goal of making profits. Furthermore, Zhang 
and Bateman argue that local authorities, delegated with the jurisdiction of administering fisheries, 
also have a vested interest in advocating for and adopting aggressive fishery policies to boost local 
economies.40  
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
Still other studies examine the role of China’s SOEs, in particular, the National Oil Companies 
(NOCs). Investigating the deployment of the oil rig HD-981 to a disputed block in the Paracels, 
Erica Downs contends that the decisions to deploy the oil rig were unlikely made exclusively by 
government officials; rather, argues Downs, the relevant oil company’s leadership might have 
business and personal incentive to facilitate the deployment.41 Three motivations are identified by 
Downs for the leadership of the NOCs to deploy the oil rig: 1) China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) have long viewed 
 
38 James Kraska and Michael Monti, “The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia,” International Law 
Studies, vol. 91, 2015, pp. 450-467. 
39 Securitization is defined here by Zhang and Bateman as “the positioning through speech acts of a particular issue 
as a threat to survival, which in turn enables emergency measures and the suspension of “normal politics” in dealing 
with that issue. Hongzhou Zhang and Sam Bateman, “Fishing Militia, the Securitization of Fishery and the South 
China Sea Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 39, no. 2 (2017), p. 465. 
40 Ibid., pp. 295-298. 
41 Erica Downs, “Business and Politics in the South China Sea: Explaining HYSY981’s Foray into Disputed Waters,” 
China Brief, vol. xiv, issue 19, Jun. 19, 2014. 
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deep-water areas of the South China Sea as a critical source of future business growth; 2) China’s 
NOCs have consistently shown more interest in exploring the disputed waters than government 
bureaucracies; 3) the involving NOC leadership was probably seeking to boost their political 
credentials by drilling in disputed waters.42  
In her 2014 study, Jakobson not only highlights CNOOC as “a prominent maritime security 
actor” but also underscores its role as a major collaborator with other actors including Hainan 
provincial government, the CCG and the Ministry of Agriculture.43 In a 2016 report, International 
Crisis Group similarly contends that both economic and political interests served as key incentives 
for NOCs’ growing interest and exploration activity in the disputed areas.44 
Local Authorities 
Economic interest is the most commonly cited driver in extant studies that brings in local 
authorities and often puts them at odds with the central government which heeds more on the 
broader strategic priorities. In an early study, Zha Daojiong noted that a combination of economic 
and political interests had driven Hainan’s quest for fishery resources in the South China Sea, 
sometimes even at the expense of Beijing’s interests and objectives. 45  In a study on the 
establishment and development of the Sansha City, Jakobson argues that “[t]here is a constant push 
and pull going on between central and local authorities.” 46  The development-centered local 
officials, according to Jakobson’s report, “often do not consider the foreign policy ramifications 
 
42 Ibid. 
43 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Actors, p. 25. 
44 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Water (Asia Report No. 275), Jan. 
26, 2016, pp. 5-6. 
45 Daojiong Zha, “Localizing the South China Sea Problem: The Case of China's Hainan,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 
14, Issue 4 (2001), pp. 575-598 
46 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Actors, pp. 33-35. For studies detailing the Sansha city per se, see, 
Zachary Haver, Sansha City in China’s South China Sea Strategy: Building a System of Administrative Control (New 
Port, RI: U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 2021). 
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of their actions” and “often ‘report after the fact,’” bypassing the MFA.47 Likewise, the Crisis 
Group reports that local authorities in coastal regions, driven primarily by economic interests 
including fisheries and tourism, have played an important role in the maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea.48 In a recent study, Audrye Wong characterizes three main mechanisms of influence – 
trailblazing, resisting, and carpetbagging – that Hainan uses in pushing through tourism in the 
Paracels, the establishment of Sansha, and aggressive local legislation affecting the South China 
Sea.49 Li Mingjiang specifies three roles that Hainan has played in the South China Sea: an “avid 
defender” of the Chinese claims, an “active definer” of Chinese interests in the disputes, and a 
“helpful participant in asserting China’ national security” in the area.50 
Zhang and Bateman also argue in their paper on fishery disputes that the rapid outward 
expansion of Chinese fisheries, albeit being driven by economic incentives, is in large part 
attributable to local authorities’ encouragement. With fishery a key sector contributing to the local 
economy and employment, Hainan “has a vested interest in exploiting abundant fishery resources 
in waters near the Spratlys” and thus has lobbied Beijing to “strongly react to fishery activities by 
other countries in the disputed waters.” 51 
Studies by Erickson and Kennedy, on the other hand, underscore local governments’ crucial 
role in drafting and funding the maritime militia, usually in close collaboration with the local PLA 
command headquarters.52 
 
47 Ibid., p. 34. 
48 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV), p.9; International Crisis Group, Stirring up the 
South China Sea (I), p. 22. 
49 Audrye Wong, “More than Peripheral: How Provinces Influence China’s Foreign Policy,” China Quarterly, vol. 
235, Sept. 2018. 
50 Mingjiang Li, “Hainan Province in China’s South China Sea Policy: What Role Des the Local Government Play?” 
Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 11, Issue 4, 2019, pp. 623-642. 
51 Zhang and Bateman, pp. 295-297. 
52 Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, p. 3; Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China 
Builds A Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1.” 
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Fishermen 
While much of the existing research and debate focuses on China’s strategy of mobilizing its 
fishermen into the maritime militia, fishermen as a societal group separate from the militia receives 
relatively less scholarly attention.  
In her extensive study on China’s fishery industry, Tabitha Mallory argues that “China’s 
handling of the South China Sea [territorial] disputes is based on the norms and rules of fishery 
conservation, as conservation is the stated reason for patrols,” although it remains “uncertain the 
degree to which indirectly asserting sovereignty over the region is an ulterior motive versus an 
unintended consequence of Chinese fisheries law enforcement in the area.”53 
Existing Research on China’s Crisis Behavior, Territorial Disputes, and Nationalism 
This section reviews three groups of extant literature on China’s crisis management, approach 
toward territorial disputes, and the Chinese nationalism.  
Crisis Behavior 
In a seminal study examining five major political-military crises between China and the United 
States,54 Michael Swaine et al. identify six basic sets of variables that influence states’ crisis 
behavior,55 and apply a framework of eight requirements to assess how management of a crisis 
affects the likelihood of a successful outcome.56 Swaine et al. conclude that while positive features 
 
53 Tabitha Grace Mallory, China, Global Governance, and the Making of a Distant Water Fishing Nation (Baltimore, 
MD: PhD Diss. Johns Hopkins University, 2013), p.171. 
54 These five major crises include the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 
embassy bombing, and the 2001 EP-3 incident. 
55 The six variables include: 1) elite perceptions and belief; 2) domestic politics and public opinion; 3) decision-making 
structure and process; 4) information and intelligence receipt and processing; 5) international environment; 6) 
idiosyncratic or special features. Michael Swaine, “Understanding the Historical Record,” in Swaine et al., ed., 
Managing Sino-American Crises, p.10. 
56 The eight requirements are: 1) maintain direct channels of communications and send signals that are clear, specific, 
and detailed; 2) focus on limited objectives and employ means on behalf of such objectives; sacrifice unlimited goals; 
3) preserve military flexibility and civilian control, escalate slowly, and respond symmetrically; 4) avoid ideological 
or principled lock-in positions that encourage zero-sum approaches to a crisis and limit options or bargaining room; 
do not confuse moral or principled positions with conflicts of interest; 5) exercise self-restraint and do not respond to 
all provocative moves; 6) avoid extreme pressure, ultimatums or threats to the adversary’s core values; and preserve 
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of past Sino-American crisis behavior exist in both countries and some negative ones have 
disappeared, other negative features persist. These include “a strong sense of mutual distrust, 
continued signaling problems, the tendency to display resolve through decisive action, and a 
proclivity to fall into the commitment trap.” Complicating the situation are emergent features such 
as “growing popular nationalistic pressures and a more complex decision-making process in 
China.”57 In particular, Swaine et al. contend that in crises closely related to issues of territorial 
integrity and national sovereignty, which are “closely associated with regime legitimacy and 
leadership survival” and “are clearly recognized as such by the Chinese people,” it can be very 
difficult for the Chinese leaders to “maintain limited objective and means” in crisis bargaining.58  
Two recent works scrutinize the management of Sino-Japanese crises in the East China Sea. 
Richard Bush conducts a parallel examination of the Chinese and Japanese crisis decision-making 
institutions, which reveals astonishing similarity in the two countries’ institutional weakness in 
conducting effective crisis management. Bush pinpointed five factors that contribute to the 
institutional weakness: 1) collective decision-making process that requires consensus building; 2) 
the heavy influence of personalities and personal relations in influencing decision making; 3) 
bureaucratic politics; 4) the balkanized intelligence systems; 5) lack of interagency coordination.59  
Sheila Smith’s research, on the other hand, focuses on the interplay of Japan’s domestic politics 
and the crisis dynamic in Sino-Japanese relations. Smith contends that “Japan’s fragmented and 
bureaucratically driven government,” in particular the under-coordination between Japan Coast 
 
the adversary’s option to backdown in a “face-saving” manner; 7) divide large, integrated, hard-to-resolve disputes 
into smaller, more manageable issues, thereby building trust and facilitating trade-offs; 8) think ahead about the 
unintended consequences of one’s actions. Ibid., pp.4-10. 
57 Michael Swaine, “Implications, Questions, and Recommendations,” Swaine, et al., ed., Managing Sino-American 
Crises, p. 424. 
58 Ibid., pp. 427-428. 
59 Richard Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2010), pp. 189-190. 
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Guard (JCG) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), has significantly undermined Japan’s 
capabilities to cope with crises such as the 2010 fishing trawler collision.60 Furthermore, emerging 
foreign policy actors on the Japanese side, specifically activists, domestic interest groups, 
opposition politicians, and local authorities, are narrowing the scope of the Japanese government’s 
response to the complexity of a rising China and its ability to compromise.61  While Bush and 
Smith take different perspectives, both highlight a key point – when managing a crisis with Tokyo, 
Beijing is dealing with an opponent whose crisis management system suffers from most of the 
problems that China has.  
Drawing on prospect theory, He Kai proposes a “political survival-prospect model” to explain 
China’s crisis behavior, which, according He’s theory, is “a function of Chinese top leaders’ 
calculations regarding their ‘political survival’ status.” Such calculations are affected by three 
variables: the severity of the crisis, leaders’ domestic authority, and international pressure.62 Based 
on a congruence test on four sets of comparative cases, He claims that “when Chinese leaders 
enjoy the prospect of a surplus of political survival during a foreign policy crisis, they are more 
likely to de-escalate the crisis…If they face the prospect of a deficit of political survival, they are 
more likely to escalate the crisis to take a risk-acceptant policy with the hope of reversing the 
disadvantageous situation.”63 
While existing literatures generally tend to focus on when and how China escalates a crisis, 
very few scholarly works examine when and how China de-escalates a crisis. In a rare study on 
 
60 Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015), pp.210-212, p. 249. 
61 Ibid., p. 256. 
62 He Kai, China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), p.17. The four sets of comparative cases are: the Yinhe incident and the Taiwan 
Strait crisis; the embassy bombing incident and the EP-3 collision; the Impeccable incident and the 2010 fishing 
trawler incident; the Scarborough Shoal standoff and the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization. 
63 Ibid. 
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China’s crisis de-escalation behavior based on a survey experiment, Kai Quek and Alastair Iain 
Johnston find that even in a high-stake crisis such as a (hypothetical) militarized clash over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Beijing still can manage to back down while minimizing its public 
opinion cost at home by adopting face-saving tactics such as a threat of economic sanctions on the 
opponent, invocation of China’s own peaceful identity, an offer of mediation by the United Nations, 
and underscoring the economic costs of war. By contrast, a US deterrence threat will tie Beijing’s 
hands and impose a heavy domestic cost on the Chinese leaders if they choose to back down.64  
Territorial Disputes 
In a groundbreaking study, Taylor Fravel argues that internal threats best explain China’s 
willingness to cooperate in territorial disputes, and China’s own declining bargaining power best 
explains its willingness to resort to force in territorial disputes. Fravel also shows that China has 
been more willing to compromise and has indeed made concessions in every land border dispute, 
but not in any homeland disputes, and in only one offshore island dispute.65 With respect to 
offshore island disputes, Fravel argues that China prefers to delay rather than to cooperate. Except 
for the transfer of White Dragon Tail (Bailongwei) Island in Tonkin Gulf to North Vietnam in the 
1950s, China has never entered sovereignty talks with other claimants concerning these disputed 
areas. Fravel attributes China’s seizure of the Paracels in 1974 from the Republic of Vietnam 
(South Vietnam), and clashes with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) over the Spratlys in 
1988 and 1994, to Beijing’s perception of its declining claim strength in these areas.66  
Extending Fravel’s work, Andrew Chubb demonstrates that China’s behavior in the South 
China Sea demonstrates a long-term trend of increasing assertiveness with four turning points in 
 
64 Kai Quek and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Can China Back Down? Crisis De-escalation in the Shadow of Popular 
Opposition,” International Security, vol. 42, no. 3 (winter 2017/18), pp.7-36. 
65 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pp.10-69. 
66 Ibid., pp.267-299. 
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1973, 1987, 1992, and 2007, each of which witnesses a significant increase in Chinese activity and 
the introduction of new methods to assert claims. Moreover, Chubb argues that the surges in 
Chinese assertiveness in 1973, 1987, and 1992 were primarily “opportunistic responses to 
favorable geopolitical circumstances” whereas the latest surge which starts from 2007 and is still 
ongoing is driven by China’s decades-long maritime administrative and law enforcement 
capabilities buildup.67 
In an early study, Allen Carlson argues that the priority given to domestic economic 
development has motivated Beijing since the late 1970s to adopt an overall moderate and 
cooperative posture, aiming to “cement the status quo along each of China’s main contested 
international boundaries.” Meanwhile, Carlson highlights a persistent bifurcation in China’s 
attitude toward land and maritime disputes.68 Carlson concludes that China “will not cede any of 
its maritime claims in the near future but is also unlikely to use force to alter the territorial status 
quo in the region.”69 
An earlier study by Chien-peng Chung focuses on the role of domestic pressure groups in Sino-
Japanese-Taiwan, Sino-Soviet, and Sino-Indian territorial disputes. Chung argues that whether the 
claimants and their own domestic audience are on the same page regarding how to settle a dispute 
can exert critical influence on negotiation outcomes. If “preferences and priorities between state 
governments and articulate sectors of their society are far apart…it will be exceedingly difficult 
for any government leaders or negotiator to compromise.”70  
 
67 Andrew Chubb, “PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Measuring Continuity and Change, 1970-2015,” 
International Security, Vol. 45, No. 3, (Winter 2020/21), pp. 79-121. 
68 Allen Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 49, 80-90. 
69 Ibid., p. 90. 
70 Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes (New York, NY: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 148. 
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Chinese Nationalism 
Based on her study of Chinese anti-foreign street protests since the 1980s, Jessica Chen Weiss 
provides a parsimonious theory explaining the variation in China’s management of street protests 
in diplomatic crises – Beijing would allow protests to signal its confrontational intention, and 
would suppress them when seeking to convey a conciliatory message.71 James Reilly similarly 
argues that Chinese policy makers have adopted a mixed strategy of selectively tolerating popular 
protests and restraining nationalistic activism. This strategy aims to balance the need to respond to 
outbursts of popular fury over Japan policy with the imperative to maintain social stability and 
avoid “irreparable harm” to Sino-Japanese relations.72  
Earlier studies perceive Chinese popular nationalism as an outcome of top-down party-line 
propaganda as well as bottom-up radical discourses. Some studies perceive nationalistic public 
opinion as a driving force for Chinese leaders and foreign policy bureaucrats to take a tough line 
in international bargaining.73 Other scholars argue that popular opinion is relevant in China’s 
foreign policy making “to the extent that elites or sub-elites can mobilize broader support…to 
support their policy position.” In other words, the influence of popular nationalism over Chinese 
foreign policy is more pronounced when there is a division among the top elites.74  
Still other scholarly inquiries, while examining nationalism as an explanatory variable for 
China’s foreign policy, seek to refine the concept of Chinese nationalism by discerning different 
strands underneath the umbrella term. Michel Oksenberg perceives China’s foreign policy in the 
 
71  Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
72 James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 8. 
73  See, for example, Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (CA: University of 
California Press, 2005); Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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Matter?” in David M Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp.151-190. 
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mid-1980s as best characterized by relatively healthy “confident nationalism,” distinguished from 
other types of nationalism—self-righteous/aggrieved, xenophobic/isolationist, rigid/militant, and 
ultra/expansionist nationalism. 75  Likewise, Allen Whiting identifies an emerging current of 
“assertive nationalism” in China’s foreign policy in the 1980s in its strained relations with Japan, 
the United States and Great Britain.76 In the 1990s, Whiting expanded the assertive nationalism 
concept to develop a spectrum of affirmative, assertive and aggressive nationalism, which I will 
elaborate on in the next section and incorporate into my own theoretical framework. 77  More 
recently, William Callahan describes the nationalistic sentiment in the general Chinese public as 
“pessoptimist nationalism”—a curious mix of optimism about the country’s direction of 
development and global role with pessimism about social ills emerging in the process of rapid 
economic development and China’s international environment.78 
Gaps 
The extant studies are significant in their contributions to the intellectual discourse on what a rising 
China means to the security and stability in Asia-Pacific. They also yield generalizable knowledge 
to analyze sovereignty disputes and crisis management in other regions. However, there are several 
gaps to be filled.  
I identify four shortcomings in the crisis management literature. First, many of the existing 
studies, drawing on the traditional crisis management approach derived from the Cold War 
experience, tend to focus heavily on state-to-state and military-to-military interactions, as well as 
on the (in)effectiveness of civilian leaders’ control over the military in a crisis. While this 
 
75 Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Confident Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 65, no. 3, 1986, pp. 501-523. 
76 Allen S. Whiting, “Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 8 (Aug. 1983), pp. 
913-933. 
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traditional approach makes perfect sense for research on China’s handling of political-military 
crises in the 20th century, it fails to take into account new foreign policy actors, especially 
nonmilitary actors increasingly at the forefront of disputes, have become wild cards in times of 
crisis that cannot be dismissed.  
Second, for extant studies that do take China’s nonmilitary actors into consideration, most tend 
to focus on the period starting from 2010, when these actors began to play a pronounced role in 
the South China Sea. Few studies scrutinize these nonmilitary actors’ growing activism during the 
first decade of the 21st century. According to China’s official account, China Maritime 
Surveillance (CMS) under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) initiated “maritime rights 
protection enforcement activities” (海洋维权执法行动) in disputed waters as early as in 1999-
2001, and first expanded the geographical scope of its operations during 2001-2006.79  
Third, the studies on China’s nonmilitary actors and their role in maritime disputes are also 
flawed by their focus on actors whose parochial interests favor assertive maritime policies. Little 
research explores the issue of whether there are Chinese domestic stakeholders whose interests do 
not favor the pursuit of an assertive posture in maritime disputes or question whether the pro-
assertiveness actors invariably support an assertive posture across the cases. 
Fourth, not every local incident involving nonmilitary actors escalates into a major interstate 
crisis. Some do; others do not. Most existing research on the nonmilitary actors’ role provides little 
explanation as to under what circumstances such a local incident would escalate, gridlock, or de-
escalate. He Kai’s research, although seeking to explain when and why China may choose to 
escalate or de-escalate a crisis, does not differentiate crises associated with maritime disputes from 
 
79 China Institute for Marine Affairs [CIMA, 国家海洋局海洋战略发展研究所], China Ocean Development Report 
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other types of political-military crises. Maritime disputes are in nature different from pure 
accidents such as the embassy bombing and the EP-3 incident, as the former present a major source 
of protracted rivalry in which one crisis often sets the context for, and sometimes even critically 
shapes, the subsequent crises.  
On territorial disputes, existing literature, albeit very insightful and useful to analyze China 
behavior in territorial disputes, also suffers from important shortcomings. First, the period covered 
in many early studies spans from 1949 to mid-1990s, and therefore it is not surprising that they 
focus almost solely on the traditional foreign policy actors. This arguably leaves out most of new 
foreign policy actors who only began to play an important role in China’s maritime territorial 
disputes from the late-1990s to early-2000s. For sure most of these studies were finished around 
the mid-2000s, and therefore should not be held accountable post hoc for failing to foresee 
subsequent development. But this missing piece arguably undermines these studies’ explanatory 
power to China’s behavior toward maritime disputes in the past two decades.  
Second, due to the fact that most nonmilitary actors are missing from the big picture, 
projections of China’s future behavior in maritime disputes also at least partially misses the target. 
Fravel concludes his research, for example, with the prediction that a potential source of instability 
in the offshore islands disputes is the PLAN: “As PLAN continues to modernize and expand its 
fleet, it will likely increase the number of patrols in the South China Sea and its presence in the 
disputed waters.”80 In light of China’s maritime frontier in the 21st century, however, it is the 
nonmilitary actors that have been assigned the primary responsibility of asserting and safeguarding 
China’s sovereignty claims in maritime disputes.81 Similarly, Carlson’s “no concession, no war” 
 
80 Ibid., p.316 
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prediction, while valid given the reality, casts little light on how to cope with a “gray zone” strategy 
that falls between peace and war.  
Third, although Chubb’s study does address the nonmilitary actors and China’s employment 
of a “gray zone” strategy, it characterizes China’s behavior in the South China Sea since 2007 as 
a continuity of assertiveness. Yet, even within this pattern of continuity, China’s way of handling 
incidents during this period has varied widely. Assertiveness alone cannot explain why China has 
constantly vacillated between an escalatory posture that prioritizes “safeguarding sovereign rights” 
(weiquan) and a de-escalatory posture that emphasizes “maintaining stability on the periphery” 
(weiwen), which bewilders as many foreign observers as Chinese analysts.82 
The literature on Chinese nationalism suffers from inadequacies as well. First, existing 
literature focuses mostly on street protests and internet campaigns. These two forms of 
nationalistic outburst are feasible and valid lenses to examine Chinese nationalism in the reform 
era. That said, the literature largely fails to investigate how the surging nationalism affects Chinese 
nonmilitary actors’ contact with foreign actors at sea, or whether the nonmilitary actors’ impulsive 
actions and the domestic popular sentiment feed into each other in times of crisis.  
Second, antiforeign street protests are in large part a popular response to a perceived foreign 
provocation. In this sense, street protests are reactive, and management of such protests are ad hoc. 
By contrast, nonmilitary actors can both respond to a perceived foreign provocation and initiate an 
incident at sea, highlighting the need for both ex-ante crisis prevention and ex-post crisis 
management.  
Third, much of the literature on China’s antiforeign protests, such as Weiss’s study, assumes a 
clear signal can be conveyed in international bargaining by turning on or off domestic protests. In 
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other words, this set of literature assumes domestic and international arenas are safely insulated 
and only connected through the Janus-like state, who can, with a relatively high degree of latitude, 
maneuver public opinion and control when to send what type of signal.  This assumption itself is 
critically flawed not only because Beijing’s on-off switch may not exert effective control on 
nonmilitary actors on the front line of the maritime disputes but also because the growing influence 
of societal forces, especially the Internet and the media, makes clear signaling a challenge for all 
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2. Theoretical Framework, Methodology, and Alternative Explanations 
This chapter elaborates on my theoretical framework. I first conceptualize the term “crisis” by 
reviewing how this concept has been traditionally defined in the literature and how it has been 
refined in the post-Cold War era. In doing so, I clarify the way this term will be used in the context 
of this study. Then I explain the theoretical foundation and operationalization of my proposed 
framework and define the key terms. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of my methodology, 
data sources, and an examination of competing explanations. 
CONCEPTUALIZING CRISIS 
Crisis is one of the most frequently defined concepts in international relations, especially in the 
field of crisis studies that flourished in the Cold War era. In a 1962 research project, Wiener and 
Kahn, listing twelve defining characteristics of international crisis, defined crisis as “a situation 
involving significant actual or potential international conflict in either a novel form or an abruptly 
changing level.” 83  Oran Young refines the concept of international crisis as “a process of 
interaction occurring at higher levels of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of events and 
characterized by: a sharp break from the ordinary flow of politics; shortness of duration; a rise in 
the perceived prospects that violence will break out; and significant implications for the stability 
of some system or subsystem (or pattern of relationships) in international politics.”84 Likewise, 
Charles Hermann refers to crisis as “a situation that (1) threatens the high-priority goals of the 
decision-making unit; (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the situation 
 
83 The 12 characteristics of international crises are: (1) turning points are perceived; (2) decisions and actions are 
required; (3) threats, warnings, or promises are seen; (4) the outcomes will shape the future; (5) events converge; (6) 
uncertainties increase; (7) control over events decreases; (8) urgency increases; (9) information becomes inadequate 
(10) time pressures increase; (11) interrelations among actors are changed; (12) international tensions increase. 
Anthony J. Wiener and Herman Kahn, Crises and Arms Control (New York, NY: Hudson Institute, 1962), pp. 8-12. 
84 Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining during International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1968), p. 15. 
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is transformed; and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit when it occurs.”85 
Snyder and Diesing define international crisis as “a sequence of interactions between the 
governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war” that involve 
“the perception of a dangerously high probability of war.” Highlighting two criteria – conflict of 
interest and conflict behavior – Snyder and Diesing claim that a crisis is inherently characterized 
by “a deep conflict of interest between the parties” and must be initiated by one of the parties with 
“some form of conflict behavior.”86  
Variance in minor criteria notwithstanding, these definitions similarly underscore some basic 
characteristics of crisis: unexpectedness in its occurrence, threat to the parties’ national interests, 
time pressure on the leadership to make responses, inadequate information and increased 
uncertainty in decision making, and most importantly, the heightened risk of military conflict or 
even war in the process. 
A rethinking of the concept came about during the post-Cold War era, as nuclear deterrence, 
growing global interdependence as well as the enormous human and socioeconomic costs 
associated with war cast serious doubts on war as a feasible foreign policy tool. Scholars modified 
the concept to distinguish it from the notion of full-blown political-military crisis commonly used 
in traditional crisis studies literature. “Near crisis,” as first conceptualized by James Patrick in the 
early 2000s, refers to a conflict that approaches the intensity of an international crisis, in which 
“each involved actor perceives a threat to basic values and a finite time for response but not an 
increased probability of military hostilities.”87 Michael Swaine similarly characterizes a near crisis 
 
85 Charles F. Hermann, Crisis in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1969), p. 29. 
86 Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, pp. 6-7. Emphasis in original text. 
87 Quoted by Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Concepts and Methods in the Study of International Crisis Management,” in 
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as a situation where “there is no realistic probability of military conflict despite the existence of a 
conflict of interest and time pressure,” while in a full political-military crisis “the parties involved 
are aware (or believe) that a threat of significant military conflict exists.”88 The continuum of 
political conflict developed by Kathleen McNamara, although not formulated strictly in the post-
Cold War context, also sheds some light on our reconceptualization of crisis. The continuum runs 
from no conflict, low-, moderate-intensity conflict and to high-intensity conflict. According to 
McNamara, low-intensity political conflict is indicated through a variety of diplomatic, rhetorical, 
and symbolic ways such as confrontational statements by leadership, diverging positions and 
actions on key geopolitical issues, divisive debates and votes in multilateral organizations, 
impositions of penalties, or sanctions by one state on another. Low-intensity conflict contrasts 
moderate-intensity political conflict which entails more dramatic diplomatic actions such as the 
recall of ambassadors and the expulsion of states from international organizations, and high-
intensity conflict that involves overtly hostile actions such as military postures and armed 
conflict.89 
Meanwhile, crises arising from sovereignty and boundary disputes are in nature different from 
those caused by pure accidents in that the disputes represent a major source of what crisis studies 
scholars have characterized as “protracted conflicts.” According to Edward Azar’s definition, 
protracted conflicts are “hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic 
outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity…[T]he stakes are very 
high…[T]hey linger on in time…[and] are not specific events or even clusters of events at one 
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point in time; they are processes.”90 The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project similarly 
defines protracted conflict as “conflict situations of extended duration, fluctuating interaction, 
spillover of hostility into all aspects of relations, strong forces tending to restore equilibrium, and 
indefinite continuation.”91 While the concept of protracted conflict might not capture the dynamic 
of each individual crisis, it offers a critical insight that crises arising from protracted conflicts are 
in essence not – and thus cannot be treated as – isolated events. Even though crises may last only 
a short period of time, implications of such crises may linger on, coloring the mutual perceptions 
of the rivaling parties and shaping their subsequent interactions over the dispute. 
Drawing on the reconceptualization of crisis and the protracted conflict concept, this study 
uses “crisis” to refer to an event that is intrinsically a “near crisis” involving low-intensity political 
conflict in most cases and sometimes moderate or high-intensity conflict below the threshold of 
military conflict. I use this term interchangeably with bilateral crisis, diplomatic crisis, and 
interstate crisis.92  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, OPERATIONALIZATION, AND SCOPE CONDITION 
For analytical clarity, I disaggregate the development of a crisis into four stages, crisis prevention, 
crisis containment, crisis management, and post-crisis learning.93 I explain propositions for each 
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of the four stages. Specifically, the crisis containment stage deals with the question of when and 
why a state chooses to escalate or contain a local incident, and the crisis management stage deals 
with the question of how escalation, once chosen, is calibrated both in terms of its nature 
(nonmilitary or military) and strength (restrained or forceful).  
Crisis Prevention: Explaining Occurrence of a Local Incident 
To prevent the occurrence of a crisis, a state must in the first place have the capabilities and 
political will to prioritize this goal. Any explanation of why crisis prevention fails is essentially 
addressing the question: under what circumstances would the priority of crisis avoidance be 
overridden?   
Local actors’ unauthorized, impulsive behavior is commonly identified by scholars as a 
primary cause of crisis prevention failure. Analyzing the rationale for the 1972 US-Soviet Incident 
at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), Sean Lynn-Jones argues that the “excessive zeal or incompetence 
of local naval commanders” bore the primary responsibility for the occurrence of naval incidents, 
as leadership was usually “less anxious to play the kind of game…than peppery young ship 
captains were.”94 Moreover, the organizational distance between policy makers and implementers 
can be further compounded by geographical distance. As Phil William notes, “Considerable 
differences of perspective and judgement may arise between decision-makers in the capitals and 
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officials directly caught up by events in the immediate locality of the crisis.”95  The 1988 Sino-
Vietnamese skirmish on Johnson Reef and the PLA’s seizure of the Mischief Reef in 1994 are 
both cases where the local Chinese military commanders took actions without receiving 
authorization from Beijing.96  
Impulsive behavior in disputed sea areas is even more difficult to prevent than incidents in 
undisputed waters. During an encounter in disputed sea areas, actors from each of the claimant 
states often harbor the strong belief that they are taking defensive actions against foreign 
encroachment. For the same reason, the actors’ behavior is often perceived and applauded at home 
as patriotic. Even if restrictions on impulsive or unauthorized actions may be quietly adopted after 
the initial praise, leaders may be reluctant to openly denounce such behavior to discourage similar 
actions in future for fear of encountering domestic criticism.  
Bureaucratic and interest group politics is perceived by crisis studies literature as another major 
cause of crisis prevention failure. Examining the origins of the 1898 Anglo-French Fashoda crisis 
and the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese crisis in Korea, Richard Ned Lebow argues that an interstate 
crisis may be provoked by elites, bureaucratic actors, or a political coalition in the expectation that 
the crisis will enhance their domestic standing or undermine that of their adversaries.97  
Related to bureaucratic and interest group politics, poor interagency coordination is pinpointed 
by scholars as an important source of crisis avoidance failure. This line of logic is well captured 
in the fragmented authoritarianism model developed in the field of China studies in the 1980s.98 
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Politics and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China (CA: University of California Press, 1992); Kenneth Lieberthal and 
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This model states that authority below the peak of the Chinese political system is highly 
fragmented, where information is compartmentalized, and bureaucracies operate in relative 
isolation from one another. This stove-piped system suffers from the chronic problem of poor 
interagency coordination, and the control that Beijing can exercise over its functional and 
geographic bureaucracies has been commonly overstated. A key foreign policy implication arising 
from the fragmented authority inside the Chinese political system is the problem that “the left hand 
does not know what the right hand does.” 99  Notwithstanding the creation of various policy 
coordination bodies,100 recent incidents such as China’s testing of its anti-satellites weapon in 2007 
and its test flight of the J-20 in 2011 have exposed the fact that the country’s interagency 
coordination mechanisms remain poorly structured.101  This fracture is further compounded if 
factoring in emerging foreign policy actors such as the business sector, local authorities, and 
societal forces, all of whom can now engage in and influence policy areas where little space 
previously existed for their participation.102 
The priority of crisis prevention might be overpowered by the factors discussed above, even 
with the presence of various preventive mechanisms at both multilateral and bilateral levels to 
regulate actors’ encounters at sea. The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGs), a multilateral convention adopted in 1972 by the International Maritime 
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Organization (IMO), remains the primary maritime collision prevention mechanism on the high 
seas and in international waterways in the post-Cold War era.103 COLREGs might be jettisoned, 
nonetheless, by vessels of rivaling claimants during an encounter in disputed waters, as each side 
assumes jurisdiction over the area, sees its own presence as legitimate, and perceives its behavior 
toward the other – however dangerous and aggressive it actually is – as an inherently defensive 
action. The US-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), a bilateral collision 
prevention mechanism signed into effect in 1998 to “promote safe maritime practices” of the two 
countries’ military actors,104 did not prevent the 2001 EP-3 incident. The multilateral Code for 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES),105 and the bilateral US-China MOUs on the rule of behavior 
for air and maritime encounters,106 both signed in 2014, draw heavily on the language and technical 
specifics of INCSEA and COLREGs. However, the mechanisms cannot prevent all the dangerous 
encounters in the west Pacific.107 Moreover, unlike INCSEA, which not only constrained the two 
superpowers’ military vessels from dangerous maneuvers but also extended provisions in 1973 to 
cover the two superpowers’ nonmilitary vessels such as merchant and fishing ships,108 neither 
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CUES nor the MOU has expanded to cover nonmilitary actors despite the fact that these actors 
have been increasingly involved in maritime incidents in the region.109  
Crisis Containment: Explaining Escalation or De-escalation Through Cost Trade-offs 
Crisis prevention fails when a local incident occurs. Although a straightforward reading of history 
should make the dangers of escalation clear and crisis containment the preferred immediate goal 
to pursue, escalation is not uncommon. Then how does a state decide when to escalate and when 
to de-escalate? Both escalation – defined as moves that increase the intensity and/or scope of 
conflict – and de-escalation – defined as moves that reduce the intensity and/or scope of conflict 
– come with costs. 110 On the domestic end, leaders are under pressures to defend the country’s 
sovereignty, honor, and dignity; on the international end, states strive to maximize bargaining 
gains while avoiding derailing relations with the adversary and/or precipitating third-party 
counterbalancing. A decision to escalate or de-escalate entails a weighing and trade-off between 
the potential costs at the two levels. As such, an incident presents the involved parties with a 
classical two-level game where there is a constant imperative for decision makers to maneuver and 
strike a balance between the international and domestic arenas.111  
There are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that leaders consider and compare the 
two types of costs in crisis decision making. As Alastair Smith notes, having both domestic and 
foreign audiences, leaders need to “simultaneously balance these internal and external 
constraints.”112 Likewise, in a study of a major crisis between China and the United States in 1999 
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after the latter mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, Wu Baiyi, a senior 
researcher at the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), observes that successful solutions to 
international crises always require a “clever balance between domestic and foreign policy 
calculations.”113  
This section elaborates on the micro-foundation and operationalization of the two types of 
audience costs. 
Domestic Audience Costs and Operationalization 
In an interstate crisis, domestic constituencies tend to impose substantial political costs on leaders 
for “the international loss of credibility, face and honor,” thus generating domestic audience costs, 
as James Fearon argues in a seminal study.114 While studies on audience costs traditionally tend to 
focus on democracies where domestic audience can punish leaders through elections,115 a growing 
body of literature has demonstrated that authoritarian leaders who are held accountable to powerful 
elites and interest groups even if not to the voting public are not immune to the dynamic of 
domestic audience costs.116 Indeed, precisely because the price of losing power is often greater for 
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leaders in nondemocracies than in democracies, concerns about domestic audience costs weigh 
heavily on authoritarian leaders in a crisis.117  
In this study, I adopt Fearon’s classic definition of domestic audience costs but relax the “going 
public” strategy – i.e., leaders issuing open, explicit threats – as the necessary cost generating 
mechanism for two reasons. First, as critics of audience cost theory have convincingly argued, 
instead of making unambiguous ultimatums, leaders often tend to couch threats in more general 
language in crisis diplomacy to preserve diplomatic latitude.118 This observation also applies to 
China, whose crisis signaling has consistently followed a “carefully calibrated hierarchy” of 
official protests, authoritative press comments, leadership statements, implicit, and lastly explicit 
warnings.119  Second, preexisting open commitments that leaders have made can serve as an 
alternative cost generating mechanism. According to a recent study by Fjelstul et al., leaders 
reneging on preexisting alliance commitments during foreign crises do incur domestic political 
costs, because the constituents are concerned about damaging the nation’s reputation as a credible 
ally. 120  This cost generating mechanism is likely to hold also in interstate crises involving 
sovereignty and jurisdiction disputes. Leaders usually tend to openly iterate their commitments to 
defend national honor and security to boost their patriotic credentials. Inaction or backing down in 
times of crisis would likely be seen by their domestic audience as reneging on such preexisting 
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commitments, damaging the nation’s reputation for resolve in its dealing with foreign powers, and 
reflecting the incompetence of the leadership, thereby inflicting political costs on leaders.  
The potential domestic audience costs that the leadership may incur are predominantly shaped 
by the size of the compromise-averse coalition at home. I develop the “compromise-averse 
coalition” concept based on two commonly used concepts in IR theory: the “win-set” concept 
developed in Putnam’s two-level game theory; and the “coalition logrolling” concept in Jack 
Snyder’s domestic interests logrolling theory. According to Putnam, the domestic “win-set” must 
be big enough for leaders to secure domestic acceptance of any deal coming out of international 
bargaining. 121  The compromise-averse coalition is conceptualized by inverting the “win set” 
concept and refers to a domestic coalition of preferences and interests opposing what is perceived 
to involve an unacceptable compromise.  
The logic of “coalition” is akin to the “coalition logrolling” concept elucidated in Jack Snyder’s 
seminal study. According to Snyder, groups that derive their parochial interests from a domestic 
political climate created by intense international competition tend to drive state policy and advance 
their interests by “pooling their power in a coalition.”122 Such interest groups, though probably 
weak individually in that the narrowness and specialization of their interests normally results in 
their authority to harness state policy for their own ends being inadequate, retain at least some 
political advantages due to their ability to organize collective action, a partial monopoly of 
information, and close ties to the state. Coalition logrolling is mostly to succeed in what Snyder 
calls “cartelized systems,” where “power assets are concentrated in the hands of parochial groups” 
and each has “very narrow interest focused in a specific economic sector or bureaucratic sphere.” 
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As such, the parochial interests have both “organizational and motivational advantage” to form 
political coalitions and rationalize their preferred policies under the banner of the general interests 
of the whole society.123  
How applicable is the coalition logrolling concept, then, to contemporary authoritarian regimes 
such as China? Snyder contends that logrolling coalitions are most likely to occur and succeed in 
cartelized political systems, such as pre-1945 Germany and Japan, but is more often constrained 
in both democracies and unitary political systems. In unitary systems such as the Soviet Union, 
the high level of power concentration in the hands of a single predominant leader or a unitary 
oligarchy gives the ruling elite “a relatively encompassing view of the state’s interests and an 
incentive to keep…logrolling in check.”124 In light of Snyder’s typology, the applicability of 
logrolling theory to authoritarian regimes essentially hinges on where a specific authoritarian 
regime fits in the typology.  
China’s one-party system seems to fall somewhere between, and thus demonstrates a mix of 
attributes of, a unitary system and a cartel one – as Snyder acknowledges, the typology he develops 
is ideal and real systems “are likely to be hybrids that entail some unique consequence of their 
own.”125 On the one hand, the Chinese system is unitary in the sense that the PBCS resembles a 
single oligarchy group (Jiang and Hu eras) within which decisions are made through a collective 
interactive process among its members, or political power is highly concentrated in the hands of a 
predominant leader (Mao, Deng and Xi eras).126 On the other hand, the contemporary Chinese 
political system is not strictly unitary but indeed highly fragmented, as already discussed in 
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preceding paragraphs. Therefore, the Chinese political system is arguably cartelized to some extent 
as a result of the growing concentration of power assets including material resources, 
organizational strengths and information in the hands of parochial interests such as bureaucracies 
and SOEs.127  
The implications of the synthesis of the unitary and cartel attributes in the Chinese system are 
three-fold. First, there are parochial interests in the Chinese political system that have both 
motivational and organizational advantage for coalition formation, lobbying, and logrolling. 
Second, coalitions may actively capitalize on the external environment to rationalize their 
preferred policies and to prevail over conflicting interests by competing for leaders’ endorsement. 
Third, the top leadership, be that a predominant leader or an oligarchic collective decision-making 
group, would be incentivized to keep in check the coalitions when their policy agendas are seen as 
clearly contravening the country’s priorities. 
To gauge the audience costs, I disaggregate the domestic audience that leaders face into three 
strata, whose capabilities of imposing costs are ranked in order from the highest to the lowest: 1) 
at the top, the party-state’s leadership; 2) below the top, bureaucratic, business, and intellectual 
elites; and 3) the general public.128 
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At the top, a decision to de-escalate would likely incur limited internal criticism and resistance 
if there is a strong consensus within the leadership prioritizing crisis containment in order to 
maintain a positive bilateral relationship with the adversary and/or avoid galvanizing third-party 
counterbalancing. By contrast, the presence of compromise-averse pressure within the leadership 
means that the consensus is weak if not utterly absent, and a decision to de-escalate may be 
attacked by the compromise-averse faction as a failure to defend national dignity and security. 
Under such circumstances, de-escalation would be politically costly and even risky to pursue. 
Leadership disunity may also open the window for influence from the other two strata to be 
injected into the decision-making process. As observed by Hermann and Hermann, in political 
systems where a single group retains the decision-making power, the effectiveness of out-group 
factors is dependent upon whether or not a prompt in-group consensus can be reached on the issue, 
because with a consensus in place “members of the group do not look elsewhere for either 
recommendations or support for their positions.”129  
Below the top lies the stratum encompassing bureaucratic, business, and intellectual elites. The 
elite stratum constitutes the bulk and the most active part of compromise-averse coalition in several 
ways. First, this stratum has seen both a proliferation and a pluralization of participating actors. 
By “proliferation,” I mean the quantitative increase of actors in this layer; and “pluralization” 
refers to the diversification of elites and the diffusion of authority and socioeconomic resources 
among them. In other words, the elite stratum has been “thickening” as bureaucracies, businesses, 
and intellectuals with a diverse range of interests and policy agendas become actively participating 
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in the foreign policy process.130 This also provides the basis for an increasingly cartelized political 
system in which parochial interests are motivated to coalesce and logroll to advance their own 
interests.  
Second, leadership’s growing reliance on expert knowledge and the resulting increased 
specialization on foreign policy issues, though a sign of a higher level of professionalization, 
implies an increased level of information monopolies and greater issue framing power wielded by 
the elites. Interest groups with specialized knowledge can conveniently utilize their reputation for 
expert knowledge to frame and justify their policy preferences in terms of national interests.131 
The fact that elite stratum is far better informed about foreign policy issues than the public and 
probably even the top leadership also makes the elites less susceptible to information maneuvering 
tactics that leaders tend to employ to mitigate domestic costs of backing down.132 In other words, 
the costs imposed by this stratum are exogenous in large measure.  
Moreover, the elites’ issue framing power might be magnified when it comes to territorial 
issues specifically. As Gibler and Hutchison argue, the symbolic importance of territory invites 
intense attention from the population socialized “with myths and legends, signs and symbols, 
education, and religion” that equate particular territory with ethnic and national groups. This 
process of “group socialization” not only “reaffirms that threats to territory will be equated with 
threats to the population” but also constrains opposing voices because “to do otherwise would 
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risk…being labeled as traitorous.”133 As a result, issue framing could be particularly powerful by 
exploiting both information monopolies and the symbolic importance attached to contested 
territory.  
In addition, when there are other contentious issues between the rivaling parties in addition to 
the contested territory or border, compromise-averse elites could frame these issues in a 
compelling way to establish what Thomas Schelling calls an “interdependence of commitment,” 
namely, “we have to react here [the territorial issue] because, if we did not, they would not believe 
us when we say that we will react there [other salient issues].”134 The logic of interdependent 
commitments or issue linkage is also is also in line with quantitative evidence. As Mitchell and 
Thies have shown, rivaling claimants with multiple contentious bilateral issues are more likely to 
militarize the territorial dispute as “the handling of one issue may lead to further challenges of the 
status quo on the same issue or other issues.”135 
Third, elites in this stratum possess a wide range of communication and propaganda tools that 
enable them to engage in both upward lobbying that targets the top leadership and downward 
opinion shaping that targets the general public. As the top leadership increasingly relies on expert 
inputs for formulating foreign policies and strategy, elites have both institutionalized channels of 
influence, such as policy briefings and analyses, as well as informal channels based on personal 
relationships and patronage, to conduct upward lobby.136 On the other hand, the sought-after expert 
analysis on hot-button foreign policy issues also gives the elites great advantage in utilizing media 
of mass communication to peddle their policy agendas and influence the popular opinion. 
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As within the leadership, not all elites necessarily share the same priorities or policy 
preferences. Some may prefer de-escalation while others may argue for escalation, which means 
that the compromise-averse elites may need to outcompete rivaling interests to pull the policy in 
their desired direction. As Graham Allison puts it, “the chess pieces are moved…according to the 
power and performance of proponents and opponents of the action in question.”137 Therefore, 
when elite interests widely diverge on whether to escalate, the compromise-averse pressure might 
be balanced or even neutralized by competing interests, reducing the potential political costs 
should leaders choose to de-escalate. Conversely, when elite interests converge against 
compromise, de-escalation would likely be costlier to pursue and harder to follow through. 
The third layer is the general public. While conventional wisdom refers to nationalism as a 
powerful force shaping public opinion on interstate disputes and subsequent responses, a largely 
ignored question is: nationalism defined in reference to whom? In other words, who is the outgroup? 
To the extent that countries distinguish friends from foes, the type of nationalistic sentiments 
associated with a specific outgroup can play a critical role coloring the popular perception and 
interpretation of that party’s behavior during a conflict. In this regard, the typology developed by 
Whiting on nationalism is useful both for conceptualization and operationalization purposes. On 
one end of the spectrum is affirmative nationalism that “centers exclusively on ‘us’ as a positive 
ingroup referent with pride in attributes and achievements,” fostering healthy patriotism and 
having minimal implications for diplomacy. On the other end is aggressive nationalism which 
“identifies a specific foreign enemy as a serious threat that requires action to defend vital interests, 
arouses anger and mobilizes behavior,” with potentially significant foreign policy implications. 
Between the two extremes is assertive nationalism that perceives “a negative out-group who 
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challenges the in-group’s interests and possibly its identity,” and its impacts on foreign policy can 
become significant to the degree that it resembles aggressive nationalism.138 Conversely, these 
differing strands of nationalism vary in their potential of mobilizing the public, generating varying 
levels of domestic pressures on decision makers. Other things being equal, aggressive nationalism 
is the costliest for leaders to go against. Decision makers may have the desire to curtail public costs 
of backing down. A strong leadership consensus prioritizing crisis containment can empower 
decision makers to steer the public discourse and perceptions, thereby limiting the impacts of 
popular pressure.139  
In measuring the costs, I assign binary values to leadership consensus on the priority of crisis 
containment (strong or weak), and elite interests against compromise (converge or diverge). For 
grassroots nationalism, I assign three values (affirmative, assertive, and aggressive). The level of 
domestic audience costs is the net outcome between those that want to escalate and those that do 
not (Table 2.1).  
International Audience Costs and Operationalization 
Whereas domestic audience costs capture the potential costs that leaders would incur for a decision 
to de-escalate, international audience costs reflect the potential costs a state would incur for a 
decision to escalate. I develop the concept of international audience costs by extending a variant 
of audience cost theory – the costs for fighting after promising not to. In a recent study, Jack Levy 
et al. suggest that domestic constituents tend to punish their leaders “for backing into military 
conflicts after publicly promising to stay out as well as for backing out of prior military threats.”140  
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Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
140 Jack S. Levy, et al., “Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory,” 
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 59, issue 4, 2015, pp. 988-1001. 
- 51 - 
 
Table 2.1 A Summary of Measurement of Domestic Audience Costs 
 
Kai Quek likewise argues that leaders face “Type II audience costs” – contrasting the traditional 
“Type I audience costs” as defined by Fearon – should they renege on a prior commitment to 
nonbelligerency.141 Extending Levy and Quek’s work, I argue that when a state’s territory and 
border are at stake, the domestic audience is unlikely to punish the leaders for fighting; rather, the 
costs for belligerency are more likely to be imposed by the international audience.  
International audience costs stem from two sources. The first source derives from the bilateral 
relationship of the rivaling disputants. An escalatory posture can disrupt the flow of bilateral 
diplomacy, foster mistrust, and hamper ongoing cooperation on other bilateral issues, thereby 
creating costs that a state must be willing and able to bear. However, a state may have major stakes 
in maintaining a positive relationship with the adversary. Such stakes can involve security interests 
if a state is grappling with internal or external threats posed to its survival, as Fravel has argued.142 
Security stakes can also involve a state’s other vital interests though not necessarily as fundamental 
as its survival. A country may need the adversary’s collaboration in forging a regional response to 
 
141 Kai Quek, “Type II Audience Costs,” Journal of Politics, Aug. 2017, vol. 79, no. 4, pp.1438-1443.  
142 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation. 
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security challenges deemed as critical to the former’s security interests. A state may have high 
political stakes in the relationship if it needs the adversary’s diplomatic support on international 
issues that the former attaches great importance to, if the other party is an ideological ally whose 
survival represents an important source of legitimacy for the state, or if the state’s leadership have 
invested substantial political capital in building the bilateral ties. Economic stakes may also 
incentivize a state to adopt a conciliatory posture. Insofar as a state is unwilling or cannot afford 
to forego such stakes, the importance of maintaining the bilateral relationship makes de-escalation 
more attractive than escalation.  
The second source lies in the perception of a state’s intentions by third-party countries. As 
Stephen Walt argues, states tend to balance against threats rather than against power alone.143 This 
seems particularly true for rising powers whose growing aggregate power might unsettle 
neighboring countries as well as the established powers and galvanize counterbalancing coalitions. 
The need to establish an image and reputation for nonbelligerency thus drives rising powers’ 
formulation of geo-strategies. Wilhelmine Germany under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck is an 
illustrative case in this regard.144  
In measuring international audience costs, I assign binary values to the status of bilateral 
relationship (high stake or low stake) and the probability of third-party counterbalancing (high or 
low). The level of international audience costs is the net outcome of the two dimensions (Table 
2.2). 
Two clarifications are necessary before proceeding. First, the concept of international audience 
costs deals with the second order issue of what the state subjectively thinks other regional  
 
143 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 5. 
144 Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 
70 -99.  
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Table 2.2 A Summary of Measurement of International Audience Costs 
 
stakeholders would think about its response, rather than the first order question of what inference 
other stakeholders would draw from the state’s response to the incident. The subjective belief about 
the justice of defending one’s own territories might lead the state to believe in the righteousness 
of its own actions, therefore underestimating the impact of a strong response on other stakeholders’ 
threat perception. This perceptual gap and the associated danger of miscalculation is famously 
captured by Robert Jervis: “[A]ctions that one believes to be only the natural consequence of 
defending one’s vital interests can appear to others as directed against them… when an actor 
believes he is not a threat to another, he usually assumes that the other knows he is not hostile.”145 
Second, by underscoring a state’s concerns about its international reputation for 
nonbelligerency, I am not arguing that countries do not pay attention to another dimension of 
reputation: reputation for resolve. Statesmen indeed take pains to establish such a reputation.146 
However, the field of security studies traditionally tends to overemphasize the “hawkish” 
dimension of reputation while underappreciating how the “dovish” dimension has shaped states’ 
crisis behavior. As Brutger and Kertzer have noted, the concept of reputation is widely understood 
in fundamentally different ways, “with hawks concerned about the negative reputational 
 
145 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1976), pp. 354-355. 
146 Thomas C. Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Keren Yarhi-Milo, Who 
Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton university Press, 
2018); Oriana Skyler Mastro, The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to peace Talks in Wartime (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2019); Danielle L. Lupton, Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in 
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020). 
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consequences of inconsistencies, and doves equally concerned with the negative reputational 
consequences of belligerence and interventionism;” and as such, reputations are multidimensional 
in the sense that “actors can have reputations for multiple traits simultaneously,” as opposed to 
canonical models of reputation costs in bargaining literature which treat reputation “as 
synonymous with reputation for resolve.”147 In the same vein, Jervis et al., note in a recent study 
that scholarship in security studies remains “almost myopically focused on resolves” and still 
“refers to reputation and credibility as single entities” rather than specifying in the first place 
“credibility and reputation for what.”148 Moreover, Jervis et al. underscore the prospect of trade-
off dynamics involved in the pursuit of reputation, as “different types of reputation can cut in 
different directions under some circumstances” and “raises a broader question about when these 
kinds of trade-offs emerge and how policymakers analyze them.” In addition, trade-offs may also 
arise “with respect to the audience for different types of reputation.”149 By incorporating the 
understudied “dovish” dimension of reputation into the study of rising powers and addressing the 
trade-off dynamic that ensues, my theoretical framework redresses the imbalance in the security 
studies literature. 
When DAC meet IAC 
A decision to escalate or de-escalate a local incident is a result of the tradeoff between two types 
of competing audience costs: domestic audience costs, which reflects the potential costs for a 
decision to de-escalate a local incident, and international audience costs, which captures the 
potential costs for a decision to escalate.  
 
147 Ryan Brutger and Joshuar D. Kertzer, “A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs,” International Organization, 
vol. 72, no. 2, summer 2018, p. 694. 
148 Robert Jervis, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and Don Casler, “Redefining the Debate over Reputation and Credibility in 
International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship,” World Politics, World Politics, vol. 73, no. 1, 2021, 
pp. 167-203. 
149 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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Bringing together the two components, the audience costs trade-off thesis posits that: 1) when 
the anticipated domestic audience costs outweigh the potential international audience costs, leaders 
would be tempted to launch an escalation to avoid domestic backlash; 2) when the potential 
international costs exceed the anticipated domestic costs, leaders are likely to de-escalate to 
preserve a positive relationship with the adversary and/or to forestall third-party counterbalancing; 
3) when the trade-off is not immediately obvious, there might be a period of gridlock before 
subsequent developments render the trade-off clearer (Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1 Audience Costs Tradeoff Calculation Model 
 
Crisis Management: Explaining Escalation Patterns through the Logic of Loss Aversion 
Should a state decide to escalate, it needs to calibrate escalatory measures both in terms of nature 
(military or nonmilitary) and strength (forceful or restrained). In selecting escalatory measures and 
determining how forceful the escalation should be, a state is simultaneously pursuing two mutually 
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opposing goals – signaling its resolve to protect its interests at stake while avoiding unwanted 
consequences.150  
Traditional crisis bargaining and escalation literature view means of escalation as 
unidimensional, namely, in the military dimension. Herman Kahn’s classic “escalation ladder” 
model conceives a 44-rung escalation ladder, ranging from “ostensible crisis” at the bottom to all-
out “spasm or insensate war” at the top.151 Although the escalation ladder captures a number of 
possible graduated increases in the level of pressures that leaders can exert on the other party 
without precipitating an unwanted rapid escalation, the shortcoming of this model is apparent. It 
is “limited to nuclear or potential nuclear crises,” “overly refined,” and “not comprehensive 
enough to be applicable to other kinds of crises.”152 In the same vein, Morgan, Mueller and 
Medeiros developed the concepts of “vertical escalation,” which refers to “an increase in the 
intensity of armed conflict or confrontation,” and “horizontal escalation,” which refers to 
“expanding the geographic scope of a conflict.”153 These terms, despite their new wording and 
simplified escalation patterns, are in essence still within the scope of traditional military crisis 
escalation.  
Escalation can be and has been undertaken along both military and nonmilitary dimensions. 
According to Zartman and Faure, conflict can be escalated by expanding and increasing means, 
ends, space, parties, risk, costs, commitment, etc.154 Yung and McNulty summarized coercive 
 
150 Alexander L. George, “A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management,” Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: 
Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 23. 
151 Kahn, On Escalation, pp. 39-43. 
152 James A. Robinson, “Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories,” in Charles F. Hermann, ed., International 
Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 20 
153 In addition to vertical and horizontal escalations, the authors also mentioned a third pattern, namely, “political 
escalation” as an umbrella term for fuzzy cases that “occur along lines that do not easily into either [vertical or 
horizontal] category.” Morgan, et al., Dangerous Thresholds, p.18.  
154 William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, eds., Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge 2005), pp. 7-8. 
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tactics into nine broad categories: paramilitary actions, military actions, economic actions, 
coalition diplomacy, negotiation action, dispute management, legal actions, informational actions, 
and administrative actions. But Yung and McNulty’s typology does not exclude positive 
inducement such as joint development deals and confidence building measures.155 More recently, 
Zhang develops a spectrum of coercive countermeasures ranging from diplomatic sanctions, 
economic sanctions, gray-zone coercion to military coercion, arguing that whether a state uses 
military or nonmilitary coercion is predicated on the level of regional backlash against its decision 
to use coercion.156 But Zhang’s military-nonmilitary dichotomy does not capture the more oft-seen 
situations in which nonmilitary and military measures are employed in combination. Also, it is too 
static to explain real world crises where states often keep adjusting the type(s) and strength of 
escalatory measures as crisis evolves. Building on Zhang’s work, Chubb develops a typology that 
groups assertive actions in maritime and territorial disputes into four categories: declarative 
assertiveness, demonstrative assertiveness, coercive assertiveness, and use of force.157 But like 
Zhang, Chubb’s typology does not explain how nonmilitary and military measures of different 
strengths are combined and employed. 
Building on prospect theory, I argue that a state’s escalation strategy is a function of whether 
it thinks it is likely to be presented with a fait accompli, or, should it already be presented with one 
during the course of crisis, whether the fait accompli can be reversed through negotiations.  
 
155 Christopher D. Yung and Patrick McNulty, “An Empirical Analysis of Claimant Tactics in the South China Sea,” 
Strategic Forum, no. 289, Aug. 2015, p. 2. 
156 Zhang, “Cautious Bully,” pp. 121-122. 
157 Chubb, “PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” p. 88. 
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Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion 
Derived from psychological models, prospect theory posits that people tend to be risk averse when 
facing sure gains but risk acceptant when facing sure losses.158 Specifically, prospect theory has 
several crucial implications for human behavior. First, people tend to measure gains or losses in 
terms of the change relative to some neutral reference point rather than in terms of the final 
absolute asset. In other words, how people frame losses and gains is contingent on how they pick 
their “reference point.”159 Second, people often – although not necessarily always – pick the status 
quo as their “reference point” and it creates a bias toward the status quo.160 When facing a change 
in the status quo, people accommodate more quickly to the new status quo caused by gains than 
the one caused by losses. 161  Third, people are more sensitive to losses. The pain of losing 
something they have is greater than the pleasure generated by gaining a comparable thing that they 
do not possess.162  
Decision makers are no exception to the tendency of loss aversion and status quo bias.163 The 
propositions derived from prospect theory have been employed to explain instances of risk-taking 
crisis decisions such as the Iran hostage crisis and counterproductive military interventions in 
 
158 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica, 
vol. 46, no. 2, March 1979, pp. 263-292; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “The Psychology of Preferences,” 
Scientific American, 1981, pp. 160-173; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” 
American Psychologist, April 1984, pp. 341-350. A good summary of the prospect theory and its implications for 
international relations can be found in Levy, “Introduction to Prospect Theory,” pp. 171-186. 
159 Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” p. 274-279. 
160 The status quo bias was first observed and supported by evidence found in consumer and investment behavior. 
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
vol. 1, no. 1, 1988, pp. 7-59; Jack L. Knetsch and J.A. Sinden, “Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: 
Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Display in Measures of Value,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 99, 
no. 3, 1984, pp. 507-521; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, no. 4, 1991, p. 1046. 
161 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, no. 6, 1990, pp. 1325-1348;  
162 Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” p. 274-279; Richard Thaler, “Toward a Positive Theory of 
Consumer Choice,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 1, no. 1, 1980, pp. 39-60. 
163 Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” in Barbara Farnham, ed. Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: 
Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 39. 
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peripheral regions by great powers such as the Korean War, which cannot be satisfactorily 
explained by rational choice theory.164 
Importantly, in interstate conflict and bargaining, the mentality of loss aversion and status quo 
bias implies that it is usually more difficult for a state to compel the adversary to reverse a fait 
accompli that is already done (which is likely to be construed as a loss) than to deter the adversary 
from creating one (which is to deny the adversary a prospective gain).165 When one party opts for 
a fait accompli tactic and signals that what is done cannot be undone through negotiation, then 
reversing the fait accompli becomes not only difficult but also highly risky because both sides are 
simultaneously driven by loss aversion when facing the new status quo. As Jervis notes, a fait 
accompli creates different reference points that the parties use to define what the status quo is. The 
party that gains from the fait accompli will quickly accommodate to the new status quo and stand 
firm to maintain it, whereas the other side seeks to restore the status quo ante and recoup its loss. 
Thus, each side will be strongly incentivized not to yield but to compel the other side to retreat,166 
resulting in a classical competition in resolve and risk-taking.  
Fait Accompli: An Expanded Definition 
In this study, I define a fait accompli as a unilateral action taken by a claimant to alter the status 
quo physically, politically, and/or legally in its favor and put the other party in the situation of 
 
164 Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2001); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the 
Periphery (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004). For other scholarly work on the application of 
prospect theory to the IR field, see, Farnham, ed. Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks; Janice Gross Stein, “Facing 
Impediments: Prospecting,” in I. William Zartman, ed., How Negotiations End: Negotiating Behavior in the Endgame 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 221-237. On China, see, He Kai, China’s Crisis Behavior.  
165 Jack Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International 
Conflict,” International Political Science Review, vol. 17, no. 2, 1996, p. 191. A similar analysis of the logic and 
measures of deterrence and compellence can be found in Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 69-91. 
166 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University press, 1989), p. 171. 
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either accepting the new status quo or undertaking an escalatory retaliation to resist the perceived 
loss.167 In territorial and border disputes, states are often tempted to engage in fait accompli tactics 
to strengthen their positions.168 Traditionally, a fait accompli is created through the physical loss 
or gain of contested territories and changes in the local military balance, as Taylor Fravel argues.169 
While the traditional definition certainly remains relevant for analyses of contemporary maritime 
disputes, it does not capture scenarios that disputants may perceive as creating faits accomplis but 
entail little physical changes to the contested area. Since contemporary international law requires 
states to actively assert their claims,170  disputants tend to legitimate their claims through the 
employment of nonphysical means in addition to consolidating their claims through physical 
means. For example, states can demonstrate their exercise of sovereign rights by enforcing 
domestic laws in disputed areas, transferring the property ownership of the contested territories, 
granting rights to develop natural resources in the disputed areas, and establishing administrative 
units that encompass contested areas. These actions, albeit entailing no immediate physical 
changes, can be viewed by the rivaling claimant(s) as creating faits accomplis in favor of the 
initiator in a legal or political sense and paving the way for physical changes. Therefore, I expand 
the fait accompli concept to incorporate the non-physical dimension.  
Two defining characteristics of faits accomplis are the alteration of the status quo, which means 
the action leads to what the rivaling claimant(s) can claim as a change to the existing state of the 
 
167 My definition draws on several recent scholarly writings theorizing this concept. Dan Altman, “The Evolution of 
Territorial Conquest After 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norms,” International Organization 74, 
Summer 2020, pp. 490-522; Dan Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their 
Adversaries,” International Studies Quarterly (2017) 61, pp. 881-891; Ahmer Tarar, “A Strategic Logic of the Military 
Fait Accompli,” International Studies Quarterly (2016) 60, pp. 742-752. 
168 Daniel W. Altman, Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis (Cambridge, MA: PhD diss. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015), p. 61; Altman, “The Evolution of Territorial Conquest After 1945,” pp. 
510-511. 
169 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pp. 28-31. 
170 Fravel, “Things Fall Apart,” p. 209. 
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dispute, and the unilateral nature of the action, which means that the alteration of the status quo is 
imposed on the other party.171 Therefore, exchanges of diplomatic protests, verbal iterations of 
claims, confrontations and clashes between rivaling claimants without resulting in a physical, 
political, and/or legal change to the status quo, are not considered as faits accomplis in this study. 
Moreover, a fait accompli can be one of the many small steps designed to incrementally weaken 
the rivaling party’s claims, or a single major move to alter the status quo such as a sudden seizure 
of the disputed territory.172 In addition, each party to a dispute can employ a fait accompli tactic 
during the action-reaction process and thus be the initiator and the defender simultaneously. 
Existing scholarly work notes that whether a fait accompli tactic would be successful is a 
function of the level of loss that the adversary would accept,173 but the question of where the 
acceptable level of loss sits is left unspecified. Indeed, unless lacking the necessary means to resist 
the much stronger rival,174 a state especially a great power is unlikely to just swallow the loss 
without resistance, as prospect theory suggests. Presented with a fait accompli and the resulting 
loss that cannot possibly be reversed through negotiation, a state tends to be risk acceptant and 
undertake forceful escalatory measures with the objectives of compelling for a return to the status 
quo ante, recovering its loss, and deterring the adversary from making further advancement. 
Accordingly, measures employed tend to be highly confrontational, risky, and sometimes 
militarized. A strong military escalation may ensue along two separate pathways. First, the state 
may outright resort to force to restore the status quo ante – using force to retake the lost area is 
perhaps most effective in achieving these goals. The Britain-Argentina Falklands War and the 
 
171 Altman, Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis, p. 21. 
172 Van Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Operation: Gray Zones, Redlines, and Conflicts before War,” Naval War 
College Review, Vol. 70, No. 30 (Summer 2017), pp. 44-45. 
173 Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion,” p. 882. 
174 Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1996), p. 114. 
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India-Pakistan Kargil War are both telling cases in this regard.175 Second, the state can undertake 
militarized actions below the threshold of war to signal resolve to defend its interests, such as 
increasing and/or regularizing its military presence near the contested area, declaring a more 
assertive military strategy encompassing the area, raising the level of combat readiness of its troops 
on the frontline, and/or explicitly drawing a redline against further unilateral actions by the 
adversary.  
While undertaking a strong military escalation, the state can choose to supplement it with 
forceful countermeasures in nonmilitary dimensions to strengthen its position in the dispute, inflict 
extra pain on the adversary, and to garner international support for the country’s position while 
de-legitimizing that of the opposing party. For example, following Argentina’s invasion of the 
Falkland Islands, Britain undertook a laundry list of strong nonmilitary countermeasures against 
Argentina along with a military response, among which are a complete trade and arms sale 
embargo, freezing of all Argentine financial assets in Britain, severance of diplomatic ties with 
Argentina, and rallying international support through multilateral platforms especially the 
European Economic Community to support and match Britain’s sanctions.176  
But some faits accomplis can be reversed through negotiations – either directly between the 
rivaling parties or with third-party interventions. A fait accompli may be created and used as a 
bargaining chip, and its negotiability can be signaled through an offer to open or continue talks 
over the dispute, as the willingness to talk can signal conciliatory intentions whereas refusal to 
 
175 On the Falklands War, see, Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: War and 
Diplomacy (New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2004), vol. 1&2. On the Kargil War, see, for example, Ashley J. Tellis, 
C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo. Medby, Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons 
from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450.html, accessed Jan. 20, 2020. 
176 Lisa Martin, “Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict,” International Security, 
vol. 16, no. 4, spring 1992, pp. 143-178; Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. 2, pp. 90-
102. 
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engage in communication conveys a contentious approach.177 For example, during the 1962 Sino-
Indian war, after launching the first phase of offense, China offered to pull back provided that 
India agreed to return to the negotiating table to settle the two countries’ border disputes.178 When 
negotiating for a reversal, a state needs to bargain hard and even engage in coercive diplomacy, 
which combines warnings with political-diplomatic moves and/or “symbolic use of limited 
military action” to signal threats of punishment in the event of noncompliance.179 The U.S. push 
for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula after the 1956 Suez Crisis through a combination 
of diplomatic condemnation, threats to cut off aids and impose economic sanctions, and a 
campaign for UN action may be considered as an instance of successful reversal through 
negotiations.180 As such, should a state seek to reverse a fait accompli through negotiations, it may 
employ strong nonmilitary measures in combination with restrained military moves to push the 
adversary to undo its action without breaking off the talks. 
When not presented with a fait accompli, a state may seek to deter the adversary from 
attempting one, especially if the latter threatens to engage in such a tactic. While a state may find 
military actions necessary to preempt or prevent the adversary from physically altering the status 
quo, the broadened definition of fait accompli that incorporates nonphysical actions now 
introduces a need for commensurate responses. When the adversary threatens with a political or 
legal fait accompli, for example, by enforcing domestic law in disputed areas, even a restrained 
military response would be disproportionate at best and aggressive at worst. Under such 
 
177 Mastro, The Costs of Conversation, p. 4. 
178 Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (New York, NY: Random House, 1970), pp. 372-375. 
179 Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in Alexander L. George and William 
E. Simons, ed., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), second edition, pp. 10-11. 
180 Warren Bass, A Surprise Out of Zion? Case Studies in Israel’s Decisions on Whether to Alert the United States to 
Preemptive and Preventive Strikes, from Suez to the Syrian Nuclear Reactor (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
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circumstances, a state may opt for a strong, exclusively nonmilitary escalation to demonstrate 
resolve and generate a credible deterrence.  
Lastly, when the adversary indicates its willingness to contain the crisis and refrains from 
actions and remarks that suggest a tendency to create a fait accompli, a state may conclude that the 
possibility of being presented with a fait accompli is relatively low. As such, the state may employ 
more restrained, symbolic nonmilitary measures to simply convey its dissatisfaction.  
Table 2.3 summarizes four ideal types of predicted escalatory patterns.  
Table 2.3 Fait Accompli and Escalatory Measures Calibration 
 
A Taxology of Escalatory Measures 
To measure the strength of escalation, I develop a typology of countermeasures which fall under 
seven broad categories. 
1. Escalatory measures in the diplomatic dimension, or “diplomatic sanctions” as some 
scholars refer to them.181 Diplomacy represents the central channel of communication in 
most interstate frictions and crises. Escalation in this dimension can signal various levels 
of pressuring by controlling the scope and duration of diplomatic disengagement and the 
level at which diplomatic protests are made. A state may also engage in “hostage diplomacy” 
by arbitrarily detaining and using the adversary’s citizens as bargaining chips. 
 
181 Tara Mauller, “Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of Diplomatic Sanctions,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
33, Issue3, 2010, pp. 61-79. 
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2. Escalatory measures in the economic dimension. Contrary to some scholars’ belief that 
economic sanctions minimize the risk of escalation because they are strictly nonmilitary,182 
economic sanctions targeting essential communities or industries can have strategic 
implications and even provoke a major escalation. The fact that the de facto U.S. oil and 
gasoline embargo against Japan triggered the Pearl Harbor attack is a telling case. 
Therefore, as diplomatic sanctions, escalatory measures in the economic dimension can 
signal various levels of pressuring by selecting the targeted commodities or industries. 
3. Escalation through public mobilization. A state can demonstrate its resolve and tie its hands 
by adopting a permissive approach toward antiforeign protests, petitions, media 
propaganda, and nationalist activism.183 
4. Escalation in the administrative dimension entails domestic bureaucratic and institutional 
arrangements a state makes to demonstrate it effective control and administration of the 
contested area.  
5. Escalation in the law enforcement dimension refers to the use of maritime law enforcement 
or domestic law enforcement agencies to bolster a state’s bargaining position in disputes. 
States can employ maritime law enforcement or other paramilitary agencies to police the 
contested areas as a way of consolidating control.  
6. Escalation in the legal dimension refers to actions that a state takes to legitimize its claims 
under international or domestic law.  
 
182 Zhang, “Cautious Bully,” p. 121. 
183 James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict 
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7. Escalation in the military dimension refers to the use of military means to back a state’s 
claim. Actions can range from a show of force and deploying military assets in the 
contested area to the use of force. 
Table 2.4 provides a taxology of escalatory measures.  
Post-Crisis Learning: Explaining Reoccurrence of Crisis 
Leaders learn from past events, for better or worse.184 In protracted conflict such as territorial 
disputes, a preceding crisis is often a building block and sets the context for a subsequent crisis.185 
The way policy makers internalize and institutionalize their crisis learning can critically shape how 
the next crisis starts and will be handled. Russell Leng’s “realpolitik experiential learning” (REL) 
model predicts that recurrence of crises may contribute to a learning process conducive to 
hardening perception and eventually a greater chance of conflict. According to Leng, realpolitik 
thinking leaders who suffered a diplomatic defeat in a prior crisis tend to attribute the result to 
inadequate demonstration of resolve and would be tempted to resort to a more coercive posture in 
a subsequent crisis; decision makers who achieve a diplomatic victory in a preceding crisis tend to 
repeat the same strategy in the next round of confrontation. The combined effect is to make each 
successive encounter more contentious and to increase the likelihood of military conflict.186  
 
 
184 For examples of scholarly works on learning process, see, Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles, or Setting of 
American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: the Use and Misuse 
of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception; Richard E. Neustadt, Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: the Uses of History for Decision-makers (New 
York: Free Press, 1986); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1992). 
185 Ja Ian Chong and Todd H. Hall, “One Thing Leads to Another: Making Sense of East Asia’s Repeated Tensions,” 
Asian Security, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 20-40. 
186 Russell J. Leng, “When will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurring Crisis,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 27 (Sep. 1983), 379-419; Russell J. Leng, Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crisis: The Soviet-
American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistan Rivalries (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 
4-37.  
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Table 2.4 A Taxology of Escalatory Measures 
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As compelling as it might sound, Leng’s model is incomplete. An immediate diplomatic 
victory in a crisis may generate long-term implications and alter the state’s security environment 
in a way that renders the same strategy too costly to pursue in a subsequent crisis. Likewise, a 
diplomatic defeat in a prior crisis may not justify a more coercive posture in a subsequent crisis if 
other interests at stake dictate a different approach. As such, not all protracted conflicts resemble 
an upward spiral of confrontation as predicted by Leng’s model. Moreover, crises, even those 
arising from protracted conflict, are often unintentionally triggered – unexpected in occurrence, 
disruptive in nature, unpredictable in the process of management, and carry the potential for 
inadvertent military conflict.187 Unintentional crises are more likely to prompt post-crisis policy 
reassessment that tends to put more emphasis on preventing recurrence rather than on “winning” 
the crises. 
Whatever lessons a state learns from a crisis must be institutionalized in “organizational 
routines and procedures” in the first place to formulate and implement the prescriptive policies in 
future.188 Leadership’s support is indispensable for creating a political environment to channel 
learning into policy making and implementation. “Changes in political conditions that facilitate 
the implementation of policies based on learning,” as Jack Levy notes, “are not exogenous;” on 
the contrary, leaders may need to “actively promote their ideas among key governmental elites and 
social groups to create a coalition around those ideas.”189 With institutionalized learning in place, 
political will is necessary to implement it for both confidence rebuilding and prevention of 
recurrence.  
 
187 Richard Ned Lebow divides crises into two broad categories: those intentionally started and those triggered by 
accident. Under the former category, there are three types of crises: brinkmanship, justification of hostility crises, and 
spinoff crises. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
188 Jack Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization, vol. 48, 
no. 2, (Spring 1994), p. 311. 
189 Ibid., p. 300. 
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Conversely, the institutionalization and implementation of post-crisis learning may stall as a 
result of faltering leadership support or insufficient political will. Even with leadership support 
and political will, the compromise-averse coalition may still muster sufficient political clout in the 
post-crisis phase to block the implementation. The compromise-averse coalition may be 
strengthened inadvertently by the hardliner rhetoric of the rivaling state’s leadership when 
communicating with their own constituents. As Mayer has cautioned, leaders need to be careful in 
resorting to hardliner rhetoric when seeking to sell an interstate deal to their domestic hardliners – 
“factions abroad may also be listening.”190  
Scope Condition 
My framework has an important scope condition:  it has limited explanatory power when the core 
issue of the unsettled territory in question is essentially political and legal. For instance, the core 
of the Taiwan issue is the island’s pursuit of a status as de jure independent state. Beijing has left 
no doubt that it will resort to force should Taiwan create a fait accompli to cross the redline toward 
de jure independence. 
Draw together Theories 
The preceding section discussed the micro-foundations for each stage of a crisis. Figure 2.2 is a 
stylized model of the four stages. A number of hypotheses and observable implications can be 
derived from each stage.  
H1 (Crisis Prevention): A local incident is likely to be precipitated if actors take unauthorized 
impulsive actions, interagency coordination is poor, or if actors pursue parochial interests in 
ignorance of the risk of crisis. 
 
190 Frederick W. Mayer, “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal 
Side-payment,” International Organization, vol. 46, autumn 1992, p. 817. 
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a) Elites express concerns about the difficulty of curbing impulsive, unauthorized, or 
parochial interest-driven actions. 
b) Local actors acknowledge actions without authorization or with only vague 
authorization. 
c) Foreign states express concerns about dangers posed by impulsive, unauthorized, or 
parochial interest-driven actions. 
Figure 2.2 Four Stages of a Crisis 
 
H2-A (Crisis Containment): A state tends to contain an incident if its anticipated international 
audience costs is greater than the potential domestic audience costs.  
a) The leadership consistently consider the importance of containing potential fallout 
from an incident. 
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b) Elites reject the necessity and strategic value of a firm response. Concerns that an 
escalation will profoundly jeopardize bilateral relations with the adversary and/or 
precipitate third-party counterbalancing are expressed in discourses. 
c) Popular reaction is moderate and demonstrates minimal mobilization power. 
d) Bilateral relations with the adversary involve what the state views as high-stake issue 
areas. 
e) International stakeholders make a collective pushback against the state. 
H2-B (Crisis Containment): A state tends to escalate an incident if its expected domestic 
audience costs is higher than the anticipated international audience costs.  
a) The leadership does not prioritize crisis containment because they either are divided 
with respect to the priority of maintaining positive relations with the adversary or 
prioritize other policy objectives over crisis containment. 
b) Elites concur on the necessity and strategic value of escalation. Concerns that a de-
escalation may be interpreted as a sign of weakness and/or jeopardize the state’s claims 
in the long run are expressed in discourses. 
c) Popular reaction is intensely hostile and demonstrates strong mobilization power. 
d) Bilateral relations with the adversary involve multiple contentious issues. 
e) International stakeholders fail to make a collective pushback against the state. 
H2-C (Crisis Containment): Should a state not see a clear cost tradeoff immediately following 
the occurrence of an incident, it may allow a standoff on the front line and a diplomatic 
gridlock until developments of the situation render a clearer tradeoff to determine its response 
accordingly. 
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a) Leaders are initially ambivalent on whether to prioritize crisis containment or to stand 
up to the perceived foreign challenge. 
b) Elites diverge and debate on the necessity and strategic value of a firm response. 
c) Popular reaction is assertive and demonstrates some mobilization power. 
d) Bilateral relations with the adversary lack both high-stake and contentious issue areas. 
e) International stakeholders demonstrate ambivalence toward the state’s behavior. 
H3-A (Crisis Management): When a state is presented with a fait accompli that cannot be 
reversed through negotiation with the adversary, it tends to launch a forceful escalation in 
both military and nonmilitary dimensions.  
a) The state demands a reversal of the fait accompli. 
b) The adversary refuses to undo the done deal. 
c) The issue of reversing the fait accompli is not open to negotiation.  
H3-B (Crisis Management): When a state is presented with a fait accompli that it sees as being 
reversible through negotiation, it tends to undertake an escalation that is strong in nonmilitary 
dimensions but restrained in the military dimension. 
a) The state demands a reversal of the fait accompli. 
b) The adversary does not explicitly refuse to consider a reversal. 
c) Bilateral negotiations take place in which the issue of reversing the fait accompli is part 
of the negotiation agenda. 
H3-C (Crisis Management): When a state is not presented with a fait accompli but perceives 
such a probability, it tends to launch a forceful nonmilitary when the probability is high and a 
restrained one when the probability is low. 
a) A state warns against the prospect of being presented with a fait accompli. 
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b) The adversary takes moves that are interpreted as indicating a tendency to engage in a 
fait accompli tactic. 
H4 (Post-Crisis Learning): Institutionalization and implementation of post-crisis learning is 
more likely to be ineffective when leadership support falters, political will is insufficient, 
and/or a broad-based compromise-averse coalition resists the implementation.  
a) Post-crisis institutionalization is interpreted as a compromise  
b) Leaders incur domestic backlash for making the compromise. 
c) Compromise-averse elites refuse, tacitly or otherwise, to support post-crisis 
institutionalization. 
d) The adversary expresses concerns about the lack of follow-through. 
METHODOLOGY, DATA SOURCES, AND COMPETING EXPLANATIONS 
To test my propositions, I adopt a case study approach using process tracing. A case study approach 
is suitable for this project, as this method is often “the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus 
is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.”191 Process tracing enables the 
researcher to trace the causal chain(s) between an independent variable(s) and the dependent 
variable(s).192  
I select five cases from the East China Sea dispute: the 2002-2004 Diaoyu/Senkaku lease and 
Baodiao landing, 2004-2008 Chunxiao/Shirakaba offshore gas field dispute, the 2008 CMS patrol 
inside the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea, the 2010 fishing trawler collision, and the 2012-2013 
Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization and declaration of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
 
191 Robert K. Yin, Case Studies Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 2nd 
edition, p. 1. 
192  Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 206. 
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Zone (ADIZ). I select seven cases from the South China Sea dispute: the 2004 Vietnamese tourism 
cruise to the Spratlys, the 2005 Sino-Vietnamese fatal clash in the Tonkin Gulf, the 2007 Sansha 
city episode, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, the 2014 HD-981 incident, 2015 China-
Malaysian standoff in the Luconia Shoal, and the 2016 China-Indonesian fishing clash in the 
Natuna. I survey all fatal clashes between China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea in the past 
two decades. These cases reflect wide variation in China’s escalation/de-escalation decisions and 
escalation strategies, enabling within-case comparisons and cross-case analysis to pinpoint factors 
shaping China’s decisions. 
I focus on the past two decades in this study for two reasons. First, by limiting the time span 
to a twenty-year window, it controls for the potential confounding variable created by fundamental 
changes in a state’s policy toolkit over a longer span of time. Comparing cases in which a state did 
not employ a specific policy tool simply because it did not have it, with cases in which the state 
has the tool but refrains from using it, is comparing apples with oranges. Second, it controls the 
external circumstance by factoring in key inter-state arrangements and international ocean 
governance mechanisms which critically shape how China and its neighbors handle their maritime 
disputes in the 21st century: the 1982 UN Convection on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into 
force in the mid-1990s, the DOC was signed in 2002, and the PRC’s three existing bilateral fishery 
agreements with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam were all concluded around 2000.  
Audience costs are difficult to measure in a large part because they involve subjective 
judgments that leaders make about 1) the domestic backlash they will face in the event of a de-
escalation, and 2) the likelihood that an escalation will profoundly alter other states’ threat 
perception of the country. As records of China’s decision-making process in these incidents remain 
unavailable to outside observers, I utilize a combination of both Chinese and non-Chinese 
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language primary sources to trace how China evaluates and responds to incidents and challenges 
arising from maritime disputes.  
Several groups of Chinese-language materials are utilized. The first group is China’s central 
government documents, including remarks by leaders and senior officials, official memoirs, 
statements and white papers released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry (MFA), and the biannual 
defense white papers. These materials have a high level of authoritativeness and thus can serve as 
reasonable proxies for the beliefs of decision makers. The second group includes quasi-
authoritative sources, including the People’s Daily, the PLA Daily, as well as analyses produced 
by the central government-affiliated think tanks such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS), the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) under the auspice 
of the Ministry of State Security, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) under the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry, and by institutions affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) including 
the National Defense University (NDU) and Academy of Military Science (AMS). These materials 
supplement the first group as credible reflections of Chinese assessment of its external security 
environment. The third group includes publications by various domestic stakeholders, such as 
newspapers, professional journals, gazetteers, and yearbooks published by line agencies, local 
authorities, and businesses. Materials in this group are key to examining the variety of policy 
agendas promoted by parochial interests. The last group includes popular media reports and polling 
data to fathom the Chinese public’s perceptions and attitudes. 
In addition to the four groups of Chinese-language sources, I use two methods to mitigate 
potential systematic bias. First, I supplement the Chinese sources with non-Chinese language 
materials from other regional stakeholders, including government statements and reports, personal 
memoirs, policy analyses and scholarly writings, and media reports. Second, I draw on semi-
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structured interviews conducted in China, Japan, Singapore, and the United States with 
government and military officials, former and current, policy analysts, and scholars to mitigate 
potential bias introduced by missing data.  
Alternative Explanations 
In this section, I examine competing explanations for the varied Chinese behavior in maritime 
disputes, and explain why these theoretical perspectives, albeit important and insightful, do not 
provide satisfactory explanations to wide variation in China’s escalation/de-escalation decisions 
or escalation strategies. 
Offensive Realism and Strategic Culture 
Offensive realism posits that as a state’s power grows, its propensity for using force in interstate 
conflict increases accordingly.193 The school of strategic culture arguments similarly contends that 
the Chinese strategic culture is dominated by realpolitik thinking and tends to see interstate 
competition as a zero-sum game. This line of argument predicts that China’s tendency to use force 
grows as its capabilities improve, and thus a stronger China will demonstrate a greater propensity 
to act in a more conflictual manner when in a crisis.194 According to this school, the influence of 
hard realpolitik thinking has an impact on China’s crisis behavior in territorial disputes. Among 
the eleven foreign-policy crises between 1949 and 1985, territorial disputes were “crucial drivers” 
in many of them and China resorted to violence in eight of these crises; moreover, in those crises 
primarily related to territory or territorial security, Beijing used force in 80 percent of the cases as 
a “key conflict-management technique.”195  
 
193 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001) 
194 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
195 Ibid., p. 256. 
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A major shortcoming of offensive realism and the strategic culture school is that it suggests a 
positive correlation between growth of power and increase in the propensity for using force in a 
crisis. This is not supported by quantitative data in the first place. Sampling 707 militarized 
interstate disputes from 1816 to 1970, Mesquita et al. have shown that “there is not a simple linear 
or even monotonic relationship between power distributions and the likelihood of war, or 
negotiated disputes resolution” in a crisis.196  
Moreover, even within the realm of realism, the impact of the power variable on a state’s 
tendency to use force remains indeterminate. Some empirical evidence, in line with the logic of 
power transition theory and hegemonic war theory, 197  suggests a significant power disparity 
between the rivaling parties in sovereignty disputes would likely lower the probability of the much 
stronger side using force, because the much weaker adversary does not pose a threat and the control 
over disputed area is only of minimal strategic importance.198  
In addition, the offensive realism approach seems to discount the prospect that a state’s 
growing power can diversify its policy instruments. While some of newly added tools can be 
coercive in nature and create an escalation when employed, growing power also means that the 
state has more resources for inducements. Leaders and elites of the rivaling claimant might be 
bought off and physical frictions between the rivaling parties can be reduced or quietly defused 
before escalating into interstate crises.  
 
196 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow and Ethan R. Zorick, “Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation” 
American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1, Mar. 1997, pp. 15-27. 
197 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1985); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
198 Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1996), p. 114; Paul R. Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, ‘Issue Indivisibility and Territorial 
Claims,’ GeoJournal 64, (2005), 282. 
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Diversionary Conflict 
Diversionary conflict arguments claim that leaders confronted with domestic dissatisfaction tend 
to adopt aggressive foreign policy or even enter a conflict with another state. Scapegoating an out-
group for domestic problems not only diverts internal discontent but also mobilizes support for the 
leadership by creating “rally around the flag” effects.199  
However, this school of theory is flawed in two ways. First, from the short-term perspective, 
after popular emotions are mobilized, there is an equal risk that the public may turn against the 
state if it is unable to deliver a diplomatic victory.200 In other words, it is a flawed assumption that 
leaders must believe – and have the ability to ensure – that an external conflict can mitigate internal 
discontent rather than aggravating it. Second, this line of argument has difficulty in predicting 
which adversary/adversaries a state would choose to pick a fight with. For example, should the 
choice be based on the history of hostility and militarized conflict, then we may expect China tends 
to escalate incidents involving Japan or Vietnam, with whom China has fought protracted bloody 
wars. Should the choice be based on the adversary’s relations with the United States, we would 
expect to observe much similarity in China’s handling of disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and 
South Korea. But empirically China has employed clearly differing escalation/de-escalation 
strategies toward the three rivaling claimants. 
Issue Salience 
Some scholarly work suggests that states are more likely to escalate a dispute if the contested 
territory is an issue of high salience measured in terms of strategic, economic, demographic, or 
 
199 Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful 
Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
200 Weiss, Powerful Patriots, pp. 39-40. 
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symbolic importance.201 I agree that issue salience can play a role. For example, the East China 
Sea disputes involve symbolic values that China’s other maritime disputes arguably do not carry. 
However, issue salience does not provide a satisfactory explanation for variation in a country’s 
behavior in a particular dispute, because in protracted conflict over territories and boundaries 
factors affecting issue salience are likely to remain constant for a relatively substantial period. 
Thus, issue salience alone cannot satisfactorily explain variation in a country’s escalation behavior 
toward the same adversary in a particular dispute, or variation in a country’s escalation strategies 
when simultaneously dealing with multiple rivaling claimants involved in a single dispute. 
Leadership 
Leadership is a critical variable in decisions about escalation or de-escalation. All things being 
equal, a leader incapable of securing a strong consensus within the top leadership that prioritizes 
crisis containment is politically more constrained in the pursuit of de-escalation. However, as in 
the variable of issue salience, the leadership variable alone, which usually remains constant for a 
substantial period, cannot explain variation in a state’s crisis behavior during a specific leader’s 
tenure. Moreover, a leader’s power position can shift over time, which may in turn affect his or 
her capabilities of securing a consensus. Simply labeling individual leaders as strong or weak does 
not capture such temporal shift in a leader’s power position. As such, who the leader is matters 
less than the extent to which a leader is empowered to secure a consensus when an incident takes 
place. 
 
201 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Clashes at Sea: Explaining the Onset, Militarization, and Resolution of Diplomatic 
Maritime Claims,” Security Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2020, pp. 637-670; Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pp. 
28-29. 
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Window of Opportunity 
One may argue that a state may escalate a dispute should it see a window of opportunity resulting 
from a sudden decline in the adversary’s material power. The opportunist incentive, according to 
this thesis, applies only to states in an inferior position.202 Plausible as it appears, the opportunist 
incentive thesis cannot explain variation in the escalation/de-escalation decisions of a state which 
is more powerful than most of its rivaling claimants.  
Deterrence 
Another alternative explanation for a state’s avoidance of using force in sovereignty and 
jurisdiction disputes is deterrence.203 Yet deterrence, according to Schelling, is in essence a passive 
strategy, meaning that the deterrer waits after “trigging the tripwire” while the choice of whether 
to take overt hostile action is left to the opponent.204 In this sense, deterrence is static as well as a 
constant which cannot explain variation in a state’s escalation patterns below the threshold of war.  
Tit-for-Tat 
Lastly, one may argue that a state’s decision of escalation or not can simply be explained as a 
process of reciprocity to the adversary’s action. That is, a state escalates the dispute when the 
adversary behaves aggressively and de-escalates accordingly when the adversary signals intentions 
for cooperation. This “reactive assertiveness/cooperation” thesis, albeit theoretically robust and 
sound as a strategy in a repeated game,205 has two shortcomings when it comes to explaining real 
world crises. First, it cannot explain cases where a state unilaterally de-escalates even as the 
adversary remains unyielding or cases where a state takes advantage of the adversary’s cooperative 
 
202 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pp. 33-34. 
203 Taylor Fravel, “Explaining China’s Escalation over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands,” Global Summitry, vol. 2, no. 
1, 2016, p. 26. 
204 Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 70-72. 
205 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984). 
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posture and escalates the dispute. Second, this thesis cannot predict the conditions under which 
either or both of the parties would probably change tack instead of allowing the tit-for-tat spiral to 
continue. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlines a two-step framework to explain when, why, and how states escalate local 
incidents arising from maritime territorial and boundary disputes. I argue that leaders make a 
tradeoff between their perceived domestic and international audience costs when deciding whether 
to escalate or de-escalate. In cases where decision makers opt for escalation, their assessment of 
the likelihood of being presented with a fait accompli during the crisis, or the probability of 
reversing a fait accompli through negotiation, explains the nature (military or nonmilitary) and 
strength (restrained or forceful) of escalatory measures they would employ. In the chapters that 
follow, I test the framework by tracing the process of how decisions to escalate or de-escalate were 
made and comparing the selection of escalatory measures both within and across cases in which 
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3. China's Maritime Disputes, Defense Strategy, and the Maritime Security Actors 
This chapter lays out the historical and institutional context of China’s maritime disputes. The first 
section presents an overview of the disputes. The second part examines China’s evolving maritime 
defense strategy and the role of the Chinese military in these disputes. The third part surveys the 
various nonmilitary actors involved in these maritime disputes, as well as mechanisms that Beijing 
has set up or revamped to facilitate interagency coordination.  
MARITIME DISPUTES: ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
China has a length of over 18,000-km mainland coast, more than 5,000 islands in the Chinese 
territorial waters, and a combined length of 14,000-km island coasts. Except for the Tonkin Gulf 
and White Dragon Tail Island (both with Vietnam), none of China’s maritime disputes has been 
solved, leaving Beijing an oceanic periphery replete with geopolitical flashpoints.206 The East and 
South China Seas entail both disputes over the ownership of offshore land features and 
controversies over maritime boundary delimitation, whereas the Yellow Sea involves only issues 
on maritime boundary delimitation. It is noteworthy that disputes on offshore islands and those on 
maritime boundary delimitation are conceptually distinct but practically related issues.  
The East China Sea 
The East China Sea involves two types of maritime disputes: the Sino-Japanese dispute on 
sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and the controversies over maritime boundaries 
involving China and Japan.207 As a result of the rivaling claimants’ historical narratives and 
 
206 Information Office of the State Council of PRC, The Development of China’s Marine Programs, July 1998, 
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/6/index.htm, accessed June 8, 2018; China Institute for Marine Affairs, State 
Oceanic Administration [国家海洋局海洋发展战略研究所], China’s Ocean Development Report [中国海洋发展
报告] (Beijing: Hai Yang Chu Ban She, 2007), p. 83. 
207 Taiwan (ROC) also claims sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. South Korea is also in a sense involved 
in the East China Sea controversies, as a Japan-ROK bilateral agreement signed in 1974 (and ratified in 1978) to 
conduct joint development in the East China Sea was protested by Beijing for infringing on China’s continental shelf. 
Junnosuke Ofusa, “Japan-South Korea Oil Treaty Ratified,” New York Times, Jun. 15, 1978, 
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nationalistic rhetoric, the two types of disputes have now become closely intertwined—and, not 
infrequently, largely mixed up—with one another.  
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
Located 140 kilometers northeast of Taiwan and roughly the same distance from the Ryukyu 
Islands, the Diaoyu/Senkakus are comprised of eight uninhabited islets (Map 3.1). Both China and 
Japan stake claims over the islands on the basis of historical ties.208  
Map 3.1 The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
 
After the end of World War II, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands had not come into dispute between 
China and Japan until in the 1970s.209 The San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951 included 
two provisions that are particularly relevant to today’s disputes over the islets. Article 2 of the 
treaty mandates that Japan renounce all right and claim to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. Article 
3 entitles the United States, which had occupied Japan since its surrender in 1945, to sole 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/06/15/archives/japansouth-korea-oil-treaty-ratified-oil-presence-confirmed-
terms.html, accessed May 1, 2020. 
208 State Council Information Office, the People’s Republic of China, “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,” 
September 2012, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043212.htm, accessed 
April 27, 2018; MOFA, “Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands,” November 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/senkaku/fact_sheet.html, accessed April 27, 2018. 
209 Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier, p. 163. 
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administrative authority over the Japanese southwestern islands, including the Ryukyu Islands and 
Daito Islands.210 These two articles left unspecified the issue of whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands would be renounced as part of Taiwan or be administered by the U.S. occupation 
authorities as part of Ryukyus.  
Beijing issued a declaration in 1958 on its territorial sea, for the first time specifying its claims 
to offshore land territories. While explicitly including Taiwan and its surrounding islands, Penghu, 
the Pratas, Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, and Spratlys, the Declaration did not mention the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus by name.211 This notable omission, according to some scholars, is probably 
because “the PRC did not want to alienate Japan or some Japanese political parties at that time by 
raising a claim to the islands by name.” By using the vague term “Taiwan and its surrounding 
islands,” Beijing could make a sound interpretation that it was not excluding the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus.212  
On the other hand, the Ryukyu government under the occupation authorities announced a 
decision in 1969 to incorporate the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands into its administrative territories.213 
This decision, according to some Japanese scholars, provides Tokyo with “a basis for Japanese 
sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.”214  
The islands first became a prominent sovereignty issue in the early 1970s when the Sino-
Japanese normalization and America’s reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration unfolded 
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211 Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier, pp. 44-48. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sea [中华人民共和国政府
关于领海的声明], September 4, 1958, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/diaoyudao/chn/flfg/zcfg/t1304542.htm, accessed 
May 4, 2018.  
212 Ibid. 
213 Smith, Intimate Rivals, p. 108. 
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roughly in parallel. In June 1971, the United States and Japan signed the Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty, which stipulated the return of Ryukyu and the Daito Islands to Japanese administration.215 
In response to this treaty, Beijing issued a statement in December, claiming territorial sovereignty 
over the Diaoyu/Senkakus. Specifically, the PRC contended that the islets belonged to Taiwan, 
and therefore, like Taiwan, were an integral part of the Chinese territories.216 In return, Japan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in March 1972 rejecting China’s claim.217 The 
dispute and the resulting diplomatic bickering, however, were kept at bay at that time by the desire 
for normalization in both Beijing and Tokyo.  
The sovereignty dispute again became a major point of contention in 1978 when the PRC and 
Japan were finalizing a peace and friendship treaty. The treaty negotiation almost came to an 
impasse after Tokyo indicated in March that it saw “no need to discuss their [the Diaoyu/Senkakus] 
ownership with any other country” and a fleet of approximate 100 Chinese fishing vessels 
appeared near the islands on April 12. These fishing ships, bearing signs claiming China’s 
sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkakus, entered the waters around the islands. A confrontation with 
Japan’s Maritime Safety Agency (renamed Japan Coast Guard in 2000) patrol ships ensued. No 
shots were fired, although reportedly at least half of the Chinese boats and their crews were 
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the People’s Republic of China [ 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 外 交 部 声 明 ], Dec. 30, 1971, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/diaoyudao/chn/flfg/zcfg/t1304543.htm, accessed May 4, 2018. Taipei issued a response to 
Okinawa Reversion Treaty in June 1971, claiming sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Republic of China, A List of the Statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [外交部歷年來就釣魚臺
主 權 問 題 之 聲 明 一 覽 表 ], 
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=C641B6979A7897C0&sms=60ECE8A8F0DB165D&s=F2FA00B
AE6D1EBD5, accessed   May 4, 2018. 
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armed.218 The standoff was quickly defused and kept out of the bilateral negotiation as a result of 
the shared imperative in both capitals to conclude the treaty.219 In October 1978, two months 
following the conclusion of the treaty, Deng Xiaoping visited Tokyo where he stated that the 
dispute should be settled by future generations in a way acceptable to both parties – suggesting an 
attempt to reconcile the different outlooks by agreeing to disagree.220 Deng’s policy line, later 
reframed as one of “shelving disputes and pursing joint development,” formed China’s basic 
position in handling maritime disputes with its other neighbors in the subsequent decades – until 
it was challenged in the 2010s by hardliners, which I elaborate in Chapter 6. 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute remained a back-burner issue in the broad PRC-Japanese 
relations in the 1980s and 1990s, with one exception in 1992 when China enacted its Law on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. In this law, China explicitly includes the Diaoyu/Senkakus 
as part of its offshore territories.221 In response to this law, Tokyo lodged official protests and 
openly denied that there had been any bilateral agreement to shelve the issue and even that there 
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Maritime Boundary Disputes 
 
Both China and Japan ratified UNCLOS in 1996. The two countries’ disputes over their maritime 
boundaries in the East China Sea essentially involve disagreement in three dimensions: EEZ, the 
continental shelf, and the use of disputed islands as basepoints for such claims.223 
The first dimension concerns the question where the EEZ boundary should be drawn. China 
insists a 200-nautical mile EEZ. In 1998, Beijing enacted its Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and the Continental Shelf, Article 2 of which states that China’s EEZ extends to “200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”224 On the other 
hand, Japan, while claiming 200 nautical miles EEZ, contends that since the width of the East 
China Sea is less than 400 nautical miles, neither country can claim a full 200-nautical miles EEZ. 
On this basis, Japan proposed an equidistance line that roughly splits the East China Sea in half.225 
The second dimension of disagreement is on where the continental shelf of the East China Sea 
ends. China invokes the principle of natural prolongation in determining the boundary of its 
continental shelf.226 In its submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS), China backs its position with geomorphologic data showing that its continental 
shelf terminates at the Okinawa Trough.227 Japan contends that the geographical feature of the 
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Okinawa Trough was only a minor gap of a single sea-bed and thus “cannot be interpreted as 
having any particular legal implication,”228  and thus the equidistance line should be used to 
demarcate the boundary of the continental shelf.229 
Taking these two dimensions together, the complication here is that “the boundaries for the 
EEZ and continental shelf will not necessarily be the same.”230 The continental shelf boundary that 
China insists it possesses extends beyond 200 nautical miles, while its EEZ can be only up to 200 
nautical miles. Japan, on the other hand, wants but one line – the equidistance line – for the 
boundaries of both EEZ and continental shelf. 
An additional, less discussed dimension that can further complicate the disputes is the 
disagreement on baselines. UNCLOS makes offshore islands more attractive because coastal states 
can use them as basepoints to push maritime boundaries to the maximal extent. Some Japanese 
scholars argue that as Japanese territory, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands entitle Japan to a territorial 
sea, an EEZ and potentially an extended continental shelf.231 While both China and Japan claim a 
territorial sea extending from the Diaoyu/Senkakus,232 Tokyo’s use of the islands as basepoints to 
claim an EEZ and an extended continental shelf is unacceptable to Beijing. 
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The South China Sea 
Like the East China Sea, the South China Sea entails both disputes on the sovereignty of offshore 
land features and on maritime boundaries. As part of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan 
renounced its claims on the Spratlys and Paracels without designating any recipient(s) for the two 
island groups. This created the root of the disputes. 
The Paracels, Spratlys, and Scarborough Shoal 
China’s first official statement regarding the South China Sea islands came in August 1951, when 
China’s Premier Zhou Enlai issued a statement declaring PRC’s sovereignty over the Paracels and 
Spratlys, as well as the Pratas and Macclesfield Bank.233  
Both China and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracels, which is located 150 nautical 
miles southeast of Hainan and 240 nautical miles from Da Nang and has traditionally been 
frequented by fishermen from both countries (Map 3.2).234 After the Japanese withdrawal, the 
PLAN controlled Woody Island in the northeast Amphitrite Group in 1950, which the KMT 
abandoned after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War. In the western Crescent Group, the French 
and Vietnamese force occupied Prattle Island by the mid-1950s. Following its 1958 Declaration 
on China’s territorial sea, Beijing established a “Xisha, Nansha, and Zhongsha Islands Office” on 
Woody Island in March 1959 for the administration of the island groups it claimed in the South 
China Sea.235 From 1959, South Vietnam began to challenge the Chinese presence by sending 
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naval vessels to the Paracels to arrest and evict Chinese fishermen operating in the area. 236 
Tensions continued to build throughout the 1960s as competitions for the island groups and 
maritime resources intensified.237 The 1974 naval clash in the Paracels resulted in China’s control 
of the entire archipelago, which I elaborate in the next section on the role of the PLA. 
Map 3.2 The Paracel Islands 
 
Source: The University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection. 
Five parties aside from China lay competing claims to the Spratly Archipelago that consists of 
over 100 land features scattered in an area of approximately 410,000 square km (Map 3.3).238 Like 
China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the Spratlys in their entirety based on historical discovery and 
usage. The Philippines claims what it calls the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), which encompasses 
some notable land features in the Spratly archipelago including the Reed Bank, Mischief Reef, Itu 
Aba, Second Thomas Shoal, and Fiery Cross Reef.239 Malaysia also claims part of the features in 
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the southern Spratlys based on the argument that they fall within the Malaysian continental shelf 
boundary. Brunei stakes its claim on one reef short of occupation. Its extensive claims 
notwithstanding, the PRC, lacking naval power projection capabilities, could not establish a 
permanent physical presence in the Spratlys until in the 1980s, when all the islands permanently 
above the high-tide line were seized by other claimants in a growing competition for hydrocarbon 
and other marine resources, leaving only semi-submerged land features unoccupied.240  
Map 3.3: The Spratly Islands 
 
Source: adapted from Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/95685289/, accessed May 4, 2020.  
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Islands of Dispute,” National Historical Commission of the Philippines, Sept. 4, 2012, http://nhcp.gov.ph/planting-
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240 The Chinese decision to establish its permanent physical presence in the Spratly came in 1987. At that time, 
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In addition, China and Philippines have contested the sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, 
which – along with Macclesfield Ban – is subsumed under what China calls “Zhongsha Islands.” 
During the first three decades of the Cold War, Scarborough Shoal remained largely below the 
radar in the South China Sea disputes. In 1983, China renamed the shoal Huangyan Islands. 
Bilateral tensions began to rise in the 1990s following Philippine’s declaration of its 200 nautical 
miles EEZ, inside which the Scarborough Shoal is located. The first open friction between Beijing 
and Manila over the shoal occurred in April 1997 after two Philippine Congressmen planted a 
Filipino flag on the atoll and Philippine warships blocked Chinese fishermen’s access to the 
area.241  
Maritime Boundary Disputes 
China and the other five disputants to the Spratlys also claim overlapping EEZs and/or continental 
shelves in the South China Sea waters. Moreover, Indonesia, though not a claimant to the islands, 
also claims an EEZ that overlaps with China’s U-shaped dash line north and east of its Natuna 
Island, an area reportedly rich in fish and hydrocarbon resources.242 For decades, China has been 
reluctant to officially clarify the legal grounds on which it bases its boundary claims in the South 
China Sea. In 1947, the KMT government published a map in which the South China Sea was 
graphed as enclosed by a U-shape dashed line comprised of nine major segments and two minor 
ones near the Natuna Island. 243  The U-shaped line has thenceforth presented “an unagreed, 
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indefinite or uncertain boundary.” 244  Specifically, it remains unclear “whether China claims 
sovereignty to the entire area, above and below sea level, within the historic line or only the islands 
inside the line.”245 
China’s only settled maritime disputes are the sovereignty over the White Dragon Tail Island 
and the boundary in the Tonkin Gulf, both with Vietnam. China transferred the island to North 
Vietnam in 1957, reportedly in the purpose of aiding the latter in its conflict with the United 
States.246 Hanoi broached negotiations on a maritime boundary in the Gulf in 1973, which soon 
deadlocked on how the division line should be drawn.247 Also at stake in the dispute were the rich 
fishery resources. Before the talk could make any progress, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, 
which led to China’s war with Vietnam in 1979 and disrupted the negotiation.  
Negotiations resumed in 1992 after Beijing and Hanoi normalized their relations. The talk was 
meticulously separated from the more contentious sovereignty disputes on the Spratlys and 
Paracels to allow the parties to pick the low-hanging fruit first and foster a political atmosphere of 
good will.248 The two sides reached an agreement in 2000 to delimit their maritime boundary, 
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following the conclusion of a land border treaty in 1999. According to this agreement, China was 
entitled to 46.77 percent of the Gulf area and Vietnam to the remainder.249  
Yellow Sea 
The Yellow Sea is a gulf bounded on the west and northwest by China and on the east and northeast 
by the Korean Peninsula. Unlike the East and South China Seas, the Yellow Sea involves only an 
unsettled maritime boundary and related jurisdictions over marine resources.  
The distance between China and the Korean Peninsula across the Yellow Sea is less than 400 
nautical miles, creating overlapping areas as China and the two Koreas claim their respective EEZs 
and continental shelves.250 The key disagreement between China and South Korea is the method 
of how the boundary should be delimited. China insists on the ‘equitable principle’ that factors in 
the natural prolongation of land territory, while South Korea maintains the equidistance line be a 
basis for the delimitation.251 The overlapping area between China and South Korea also includes 
a submerged reef, the Socotra (Suyan in Chinese and Ieodo in Korean). Since the reef cannot be 
claimed as territory under UNCLOS, it does not constitute a territorial dispute between the two 
countries but one associated with their unsettled boundary. 252  
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Although the maritime dispute between China and South Korea is in essence minor in 
comparison with the East and South China Sea, fishery disputes and violent clashes between 
Chinese fishermen and South Korea’s Coast Guard have become a pronounced problem between 
the two countries since the implementation of the PRC-ROC fishery agreement.253  
CHINA’S MARITIME DEFENSE STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE PLA IN THE DISPUTES 
With a maritime periphery replete with unresolved disputes, near-seas defense has been and will 
remain a top priority in China’s maritime security strategy. Meanwhile, China has incrementally 
moved away from a relatively navy-centric approach toward a multi-agent, division-of-labor 
method in safeguarding its maritime sovereignty and interests. While it used to be the major 
fighting force in those disputes in the 20th century, the PLA in the 21st century has been 
increasingly conceived as the backup force in China’s “military-law enforcement-civilian joint 
defense” concept that puts nonmilitary actors on the first line. This section examines China’s 
evolving maritime defense strategy and the role of the PLA. 
From Coastal Defense to Near-Seas Defense: The PLA as the Major Fighting Force 
“Coast defense” remained China’s maritime security strategy since 1949 till the early 1980s.254 
During this period, aside from fending off small-scale harassment of the coastal areas by the 
Taiwan-based Kuomintang (KMT) forces, the Chinese navy was almost put on the backseat in the 
national defense strategy as China saw its gravest security threat come from Soviet Union. Even 
in the early 1980s when more resources were invested in building naval capabilities, the central 
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aim was to counter a potential Soviet amphibious invasion from China’s coastal waters. 
Consequently, the navy maintained a miniscule capability, comprised of mostly small, ill-equipped 
naval vessels with “a limited radius of operations and poor sustainability.”255  
That said, the PLA Navy (PLAN) was arguably the major, if not the sole, fighting force that 
Beijing could employ in this period to assert its maritime claims. The 1974 naval clash in the 
Paracels, initiated in November 1973 when a patrol vessel from South Vietnam (RVN) rammed a 
Chinese fishing boat and took the Chinese fishermen into custody in Da Nang, resulted in China’s 
control of the entire archipelago.256 China initially protested in January 1974 and warned against 
further RVN infringement. Saigon responded by sending a destroyer escort ship to the Paracels, 
shelling the Chinese fishing vessels while attempting to regain control of the islands in the Crescent 
Group.257 China then dispatched two antisubmarine chasers on January 16. Both sides continued 
to send reinforcements into the Paracels. The PLA flotilla was much smaller and overpowered by 
the RVN vessels, and was under a clear order from Beijing to adhere to “persuasion,” and not to 
“fire the first shot” but to “only return fire if attacked.” The first clash erupted on January 19 after 
the RVN vessels launched an assault on the Chinese ships in an attempt to eject the latter from the 
Crescent Group. The PLAN returned fire, sinking one RVN minesweeper and seriously damaging 
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several Vietnamese ships.258 After this engagement, Beijing decided to take advantage of the 
momentum created by the victory to drive the remaining RVN forces out of the Crescent Group.259 
As China saw its continental frontier increasingly stabilized and the security threat from the 
Soviet Union declined in the 1980s, the “main strategic direction” of the PLA’s planning and 
modernization gradually shifted to preparing for fighting limited, local wars on the country’s 
maritime periphery.260 Marking a fundamental departure from Mao’s coastal defense strategy, 
Deng Xiaoping and his followers in the military began to articulate in the late 1970s the concept 
of “near-seas defense.”261 Near seas are defined by senior PLA leaders as encompassing the first 
island chain stretching from Kurile Islands through the Islands of Japan, Ryukyu Archipelago, 
Taiwan, the Philippines to Borneo Island, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China 
Sea, and waters adjacent to the outer rims of the first island chain and the north Pacific.262 Under 
this definition, China’s maritime defense perimeter was extended from coastal waters out to 
between 200 to 400 nautical miles.263 All the contested offshore land features fall within this 
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defense boundary, which consequently increased the salience of these disputes in China’s maritime 
security strategy. A survey of authoritative PLA writings from 1987 to 2005 reveals that most 
analyses of maritime security published by PLAN or PLA sources underscore the prominence of 
sovereignty disputes over the offshore land features.264  
With fundamental changes underway in China’s assessment of its maritime interests and 
defense strategy in the context of the evolving global ocean regime, Beijing started to establish its 
military presence in the Spratlys – driven by a growing sense of urgency to curtail Vietnamese 
encroachment and reverse China’s disadvantaged position in the disputes. Tensions rose between 
Beijing and Hanoi when the former decided in 1987 to construct an oceanic observation station on 
Fiery Cross Reef. The construction, initiated in January 1988, set off a race of land seizure and a 
series of confrontations between Vietnamese and Chinese warships in the Spratlys. In March, a 
confrontation on Johns Reef escalated into a naval skirmish. The battle lasted less than one hour 
and ended with all the Vietnamese vessels being sunk or damaged by the PLAN.265 While it 
remains unclear who fired the first shot, according to some Chinese sources, the local PLAN force 
fired on the Vietnamese vessels before obtaining authorization from the General Staff Department 
(GSD), and for this reason, the Central Military Committee (CMC) – the supreme command of the 
Chinese military) – rejected a request from the local PLAN unit to launch an assault to seize 
Vietnam-occupied features following the combat.266 Newly disclosed sources appear to confirm 
this account. According to a recount by Chen Weiwen, the local PLA commander overseeing this 
battle, the basic guideline Beijing issued to the PLA regarding the “struggles over the Spratly” 
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expressly stated: “Don’t provoke. Don’t fire the first shot. Don’t look weak. Don’t suffer loss. 
Don’t lose face. If the enemy occupies our islands, forcefully repel him.”267 After the battle broke 
out, Chen received 26 telegraphs from his supervisory units ordering the frontline soldiers to 
refrain from behavior that could further escalate the situation.268  
China’s seizure of Mischief Reef in 1994 came in the context of an intensified competition for 
offshore hydrocarbon resources in the region.269 It was not until February 1995 that the Philippines 
became aware of the PLA construction on this reef. Tensions between China and the Philippines 
over the Mischief Reef were quickly contained before spiraling into a military clash. Although 
Manila made a military gesture by beefing up its garrison on the KIG, diplomacy was “the only 
realistic option available to the Philippines.” ASEAN as a group also stepped in by raising the 
issue with China in April.270 Some scholars suggested that the PLA might have seized the land 
feature without authorization from the Chinese central government, as the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry responded to Manila’s protest by stating that Beijing “had learned from local fishing 
administrative departments” about the facilities set up on Mischief Reef to provide shelter for the 
Chinese operating in the area.271 The Politburo Standing Committee, China’s highest decision-
making body, was also reportedly caught off guard by the seizure.272  
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For much of the Cold War era, the PLAN remained essentially what Geoffrey Till calls a “navy 
as the coast guard” that is “primarily designed, planned, prepared and constructed to protect and 
enforce the national rights, as conferred by the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, 
within the 200-mile limit of national [economic] waters.”273 When UNCLOS came into effect, 
Chinese naval strategists tended to see it as “increasing the scope of China’s sovereignty and thus 
the maritime area to be administered and secured from external threats.”274 This circumstance, they 
argued, required that the PLA now must not only prepare for wartime tasks of defeating foreign 
aggression from the sea and safeguarding the country’s land territories, but also shoulder 
peacetime responsibilities of protecting three million square kilometers of “maritime national 
territory” that incorporates the Chinese EEZ and continental shelf.275 In addition, the PLAN is also 
expected to protect China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) and conduct strategic nuclear 
deterrence.276 These strategic tasks presented an impetus for transforming the Chinese navy into a 
strategic service that possesses more substantial naval capabilities and can operate independently 
within a much larger geographical boundary than what was mandated by coastal defense.277  
As the PLA put more emphasis on building technology-intensive fighting capabilities and 
preparing for a Taiwan scenario throughout the 1990s, safeguarding maritime territories and 
jurisdictional waters in the near seas became gradually conceived as a mission area of shared 
responsibilities between the PLA and nonmilitary state actors. In its 2000 Defense White Paper, 
China for the first time explicitly described its frontier defense as being run on “a joint military-
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civilian land and sea border management system, headed by the military and with a sharing of 
responsibilities between the military and the civilian authorities.” 278  This statement was 
corroborated by a report released in 2013 by the National Institute for Security Studies (NIDS) 
under Japan’s Defense Ministry, which noted the shift of maritime law enforcement 
responsibilities from the PLAN to MLE agencies began in 2001.279  
Near-Seas Defense, Far-Seas Protection: The PLA on the Second Line of Maritime Disputes 
China’s growing reliance on SLOCs for energy imports and goods exports in the early 2000s 
created a strong incentive for Beijing to develop naval capabilities to protect its strategic 
waterways that lie beyond China’s territorial borders.280 Moreover, critical naval chokepoints 
along China’s major maritime routes including the Hormuz and Malacca Straits highlight further 
still the country’s strategic vulnerability to a potential disruption of energy supply due to piracy, 
terrorism, or a blockade by another state such as the US, Japan, or even India.281  
Concerns over China’s SLOC security and expanding overseas interests stimulated Beijing’s 
reassessment of the role and missions of the PLA. In a speech delivered at an enlarged meeting of 
the CMC in 2004, Hu laid out four “new historic missions” that the PLA is expected to shoulder 
“in the new stage of the new century.” Of the four tasks, the most significant one in terms of 
operational doctrine and strategic planning is the mandate for the PLA to “provide a powerful 
strategic support for safeguarding China’s national interest.”282 According to the speech, sea, space, 
and cyberspace had become important domains of China’s national security as the country’s 
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security interests gradually went beyond the scope of its own territorial land, seas and airspace; 
therefore, the PLA “must broaden its definition of national security” to include safeguarding 
China’s interests in these new domains. 283 In the maritime domain specifically, such a transition 
requires the PLA to make more investment to build blue-water capabilities to conduct low-
intensity and noncombatant operations in far-flung regions. Reflecting this shift in its definition of 
national security interests, China’s 2004 Defense White Paper explicitly prioritized resource 
allocation to the PLA Navy (along with the Air Force and the Second Artillery).284  
As the PLAN aspired to build greater power projection capabilities, sovereignty enforcement 
responsibilities in the near seas were incrementally spun off to MLE agencies. Since 2005, China 
“has rarely employed naval vessels as its frontline response to maritime territorial disputes, 
preferring to keep PLAN force in the background roles,” and in that stead, has employed MLE 
agencies as the first-response frontline units for maritime disputes and contingencies.285 The 2013 
NIDS China Security Report provides a similar observation that since 2005 most interruptions 
against foreign military activities in China’s EEZ have been conducted by MLE agencies, not the 
PLAN.286 As I elaborate in Chapter 4, China’s maritime law enforcement forces also successfully 
capitalized on the Sino-Japanese offshore gas field disputes in the mid-2000s and lobbied the 
central government to give a greenlight to regularize patrols in the East China Sea. Writings by 
Chinese scholars at the time also began to float the idea that the civilian law enforcement forces 
should be designated a greater role in safeguarding the country’s maritime claims, based on the 
rationale that employing lightly armed, civilian-nature law enforcement ships at the forefront 
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lowers the risk of a direct confrontation between the PLAN and foreign vessels, thus reducing the 
risk of escalation and sustaining a stable peripheral environment conducive to China’s continuous 
economic development.287 
The trend of moving toward a division of labor between the PLA and MLE agencies became 
clearer in China’s defense documents coming out at the time. Discussing the responsibilities 
sharing between the military and the local authorities,” the 2006 Defense White Paper states,  
The PLA is the main force for defending China’s borders and coasts…The border 
public security force is tasked with safeguarding security and maintaining social 
order in border and coastal areas…Since China launched its reform and opening-
up program, the state has consolidated border and coastal law-enforcement 
functions in organizations responsible for public security, customs, inspection and 
quarantine, maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, marine affairs and 
environmental protection.288 
The PLAN’s move into the open sea is further facilitated by the improvement in the cross-
Taiwan Strait relationship as well as the continued vulnerability of China’s SLOCs to transnational 
threats. Following his victory in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT 
candidate, took steps to reconcile with Beijing. While maintaining a robust anti-access/area-denial 
(A2/AD) capability and deterring Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence remain one 
of the PLA’s core missions, the great reduction in cross-strait tensions following Ma’s 
inauguration substantially freed up the PLA’s hands to “move beyond Taiwan” and meet the “new 
but limited requirements for protection of the sea lanes…humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, 
and expanded naval diplomacy.”289 In 2008, the PLAN dispatched its anti-piracy fleet to the Gulf 
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of Aden to tackle international piracy that posed a constant threat to Chinese ships in the region, 
marking the first time in China’s modern history when the PLAN forces were “deployed 
operationally beyond its immediate maritime periphery.”290  In its 2008 Defense White Paper 
released in early 2009, Beijing uttered for the first time a requirement for the PLA to conduct 
military operations other than war (MOOTW) such as tasks of counter-terrorism, search and rescue, 
and international peacekeeping.291  
This trend, as it continues, has led to the recognition among China’s leaders that the PLAN 
must transform its focus from a single point on near-seas defense to a combination that also 
incorporates far-seas protection. The mandate for naval and overall maritime transformation was 
made clear in the 2015 Defense White Paper:  
[T]he PLA Navy will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the 
combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’ and build a 
combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure...The 
traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned…It is necessary 
for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with 
its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty 
and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and 
overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to 
provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.292  
With a broader definition of national interest and the corresponding need for the PLAN to 
perform a wider range of maritime security functions, the division of labor between the PLAN and 
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the MLE forces also became increasingly clear with respect to “who should be responsible for 
what,” leading to a greater functional bifurcation between the navy and the MLE agencies.293 A 
comparison of how the relations between the PLA and its civilian counterparts are described in the 
defense white papers is revealing on this score. While the 2010 White Paper still describes the 
responsibility sharing system featuring “the PLA as the mainstay, the coordination and cooperation 
of other relevant forces, and the extensive participation of the militia, the reserve forces and the 
people in the border and coastal areas,”294 the 2013 White Paper unequivocally states that the 
PLAN is expected to play a supporting role in safeguarding maritime rights and interests in 
peacetime: “[T]he PLAN provides security support for China’s maritime law enforcement, 
fisheries, and oil and gas exploitation. It has established mechanisms to coordinate and cooperate 
with law-enforcement organs of marine surveillance and fishery administration, as well as a joint 
military-police-civilian defense mechanism.”295 
As Beijing adopted the approach of putting “naval forces on the second line, and coast guard 
on the first line,”296 the PLA’s involvement in maritime disputes became secondary and indirect, 
conceding the primary and direct role to its MLE partners.297 As Taylor Fravel noted, “China has 
not sought to actively defend its claims through use of its armed forces, especially the PLAN” but 
instead used the navy “largely through general displays of presence” to signal resolve and 
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“underscore China’s ability to defend its claims by force, if necessary.”298 Deployed over the 
horizon, the PLAN in the first place enables MLE and other civilian actors such as fishermen and 
national oil companies to expand the scope of their activities and establish a constant presence in 
contested areas. According to a senior PLA official, in the East China Sea the PLA keeps a distance 
of 70 nautical miles from the frontline coast guard vessels.299 In the event of a confrontation, the 
PLA can weigh in as a backup force as well as an ultimate security guarantor for the nonmilitary 
agencies. The presence-without-interference approach is reportedly perceived within the PLA as 
having stabilizing effect through deterrence.300 This viewpoint seems to be also shared by civilian 
researchers.301  
Despite being on the second line operationally, the PLA played a vital role behind the scenes 
in lobbying for a centralized, more effectively coordinated maritime security system. Not only did 
the PLA propose to consolidate MLE agencies into a centralized bureaucracy, but also to create a 
leading small group or supra-ministry commission as a cross-system integrator. These proposals 
were adopted by Beijing with the creation of the Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group 
in 2012, and the merger of four MLE forces into a unified China Coast Guard and the creation of 
the National Oceanic Commission – both in 2013.302 Moreover, a few even pushed for putting the 
consolidated MLE agency under the command and control of the PLA,303 which was not adopted 
in the 2013 MLE consolidation reorganization but eventually materialized in the 2018 
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restructuring. In addition, the PLA also provides crucial logistical support for MLE agencies, 
including professional training, joint exercises, and transfers of decommissioned naval vessels.304  
NONMILITARY ACTORS 
This section provides an overview of the nonmilitary actors involved in China’s maritime disputes 
as well the policy coordination mechanisms created or revamped to facilitate coordination among 
these actors.  
Cross-System Integrators 
In managing a traditional crisis situation, three basic groupings are involved but horizontal 
coordination between them is difficult without the top leadership weighing in: the State Council 
handles diplomacy through the MFA; the party manages propaganda and relations with foreign 
political parties; and the PLA is in charge of military affairs.305 New cross-system integrators have 
been created or existing ones been empowered with the objective to facilitate coordination among 
China’s various actors in maritime affairs – before the 2013 reorganization there were 16 state-
level bureaucracies, including the PLAN and the five MLE agencies, with differential but 
considerably overlapping jurisdictions on maritime affairs.306  
Central Leading Small Groups 
Management of maritime disputes falls primarily under the purview of two Leading Small Groups 
(LSGs): the short-lived Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group, and the Central 
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), which was set up in 1981 as a supra-ministerial 
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mechanism to coordinate bureaucracies involved in China’s foreign relations and advise the 
leadership on policies. 
The Maritime Rights Protection LSG was established in 2012 and presided by Xi Jinping – 
reportedly a direct response to Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.307 This 
group was tasked to formulate strategies to advance China’s maritime rights and interests, 
coordinate policies among the numerous bureaucracies with various jurisdictions over maritime 
affairs, and handle growing maritime frictions with other claimants. Members of this LSG include 
senior officials from, among others, the MFA, State Oceanic Administration (SOA), the Ministry 
of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), and the PLAN.308 The Maritime 
Rights Protection LSG appeared to have essentially operated within the broad functional scope of 
the FALSG, which had long been in charge of Chinese foreign policy overall and contained nearly 
all of the foremost members of the Maritime Rights Protection LSG. The Central Foreign Affairs 
Office (FAO), the standing institution performing administrative functions for FALSG, also 
functioned as the administrative institution for the Maritime Rights Protection LSG.309  
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2013, reprinted on iFeng, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2013_03/02/22650849_0.shtml, accessed: June 27, 
2017.  
309 Jakobson and Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, p. 5; “State Councilor Yang Jiechi Appointed Director 
of FALSG Office” [国务委员杨洁篪任中央外事领导小组办公室主任], Oriental Morning Post [东方早报], Aug. 
26, 2013, https://www.guancha.cn/politics/2013_08_26_168286.shtml, accessed Oct. 7, 2018; Ruo Zhuo [若拙], “An 
Overview of China’s Foreign Policy System” [中国外交系统人事盘点], Shanghai Observer [上观], Sept. 24, 2014, 
https://web.shobserver.com/news/detail?id=433, accessed Oct. 7, 2018. On the evolution of the FALSG, see, Lu Ning, 
“The Central Leadership, Supra-ministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” 
Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in an Era of Reform, pp. 45-47. 
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Secretiveness in the work of this LSG and the consequent lack of open-source information on 
its activity, combined with its short period of existence, made it very difficult for external observers 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the LSG as a coordination body. Some Chinese interlocutors with 
access to the top foreign policy advisory bodies state that the LSG convened briefing meetings 
roughly on a monthly basis, and the frequency might change depending on “the situation at sea.” 
The meetings were intended only for the bureaucracies on the LSG to “keep each other informed,” 
as none of them had the authority to dictate others’ policy or activity.310 Other sources implied that 
this LSG might be an outgrowth of hardliners’ dissatisfaction with the relatively moderate MFA. 
A source within the SOA claimed that the LSG has gradually taken over the MFA’s traditional 
role as the primary coordinator in maritime incidents because the latter was seen as “not neutral.”311 
This viewpoint corroborated open-source information. For example, an article published by 
Shanghai Party Committee’s official media on the establishment of the LSG criticized the 
“defensive mentality” of some MFA policy implementers – “every time when we want to take 
some actions, the first thing they consider is whether that will irritate the foreign state.”312 
The Maritime Rights Protection LSG existed for only five years before its absorption into the 
FALSG in the institutional restructuring in March 2018. As part of the restructuring, the FALSG 
was elevated to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission reportedly with “a broader range of 
functions, more formalized institutional arrangements, more effective coordination, and higher 
decision-making authority.”313 While this elevation was clearly intended to strengthen the Party’s 
 
310 Author’s interview, Beijing, July 2017. 
311 Author’s interview, Shanghai, June 2017. 
312 Li, “Decode Central Maritime Rights Protection Office.” 
313 Yue Huairang [岳怀让], “Leadership of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Unveiled” [中央外事工作委员
会出炉], The Paper [澎湃新闻], May 15, 2018, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2131634, accessed 
Jan. 23, 2021. 
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control on foreign policy and enhance interagency coordination, 314  the precise functional 
difference between the FALSG and the Commission especially in time of interstate crisis has been 
unclear.  
Central National Security Council 
Beijing announced in January 2014 that it would establish the Central National Security Council 
(CNSC), a high-power body chaired by Xi Jinping and used as a key vehicle to enhance policy 
coordination between various national security bureaucracies in times of both internal and external 
crisis.315 The CNSC is reportedly “in charge of making overall plans and coordinating major issues 
and major work concerning national security.”316 According to an account, the CNSC overlaps 
extensively with FALSG in terms of the bureaucracies represented at the table.317 
On the maritime front specifically, it remains unclear whether and, since its establishment, how 
the CNSC has actually functioned as a cross-system integrator in decision-making, especially in a 
major diplomatic crisis such as the HD-981 clash. This is likely due to the priority given to 
domestic affairs. Knowledgeable sources have admitted that the CNSC has primarily focused on 
internal security while foreign policy takes the backseat,318 to the dismay of some proponents who 
had envisioned a robust US NSC-style institution.319 
 
314 Ibid. 
315 For scholarly writings on the origin, evolution, operation and/or assessment of the effectiveness of this institution 
as a cross-system integrator in crisis management, see, David M. Lampton, “Xi Jinping and the National Security 
Commission: policy coordination and political power,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2015, vol. 24, no. 95, pp. 
759-777; You Ji, “China’s National Security Commission: theory, evolution and operations” Journal of Contemporary 
China, 2016, vol. 25, no. 98; Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-management Theory and Practice 
in China;” Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, “Installing a Safety on the ‘Loaded Gun’? China’s institutional 
reforms, national Security Commission, and Sino-Japanese (in)stability,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2016, vol. 
25, no. 98, pp. 197-215. 
316  “Xi Jinping to lead national security commission,” China Daily, Jan. 24, 2014, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/24/content_17257409.htm, accessed Oct. 5, 2018. 
317 Erickson and Liff, “Installing a Safety on the ‘Loaded Gun’?” p. 210. 
318 Cited in Lampton, “Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission,” p. 772. This citation is corroborated by this 
author’s interviews with Chinese security experts, Beijing, July and August 2017. 
319 Author’s interviews, Beijing, August 2017. 
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National Ocean Committee 
 
The National Ocean Committee was set up in March 2013 at the annual meeting of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) as a “high-level consultation and coordinating body” tasked to 
“formulate oceanic development strategies and coordinate important oceanic affairs.”320 Launched 
on the heels of the formation of the Maritime Rights Protection LSG, the committee’s relationship 
with the LSG and other maritime affairs related institutions remains unclear, except that the LSG 
is a CCP Central Committee organ with a focus on “maritime rights protection” while the latter is 
conceived as a State Council institution responsible for “formulating national ocean development 
strategies and comprehensively coordinating maritime affairs.”321 The SOA was designated to 
manage the commission’s day-to-day work. 
As of the 2018 reorganization, the committee, once touted as the “real strong hub” coordinating 
China’s maritime related programs and bureaucracies,322 was still far from becoming operational. 
Even whether this institution came into operation after the announcement is a question that 
remained unanswered. Some sources suggested the institution was aborted not long after the NPC 
announced its establishment. One knowledgeable source inside the SOA stated: “The SOA wanted 
the coordination committee but failed,” which the source attributed to the bureaucracy’s lack of 
necessary political clout and prestige.323 
 
320 The national People’s Congress of PRC, “China to restructure oceanic administration, enhance maritime law 
enforcement,” Mar. 10, 2013, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Events/2013-03/10/content_1774480.htm, 
accessed Oct. 8, 2018. 
321 The National People’s Congress of PRC, “Comment;” Takungpao [大公报], “Foreign Affairs, National Security 
and Maritime Rights Three in One, Safeguarding China’s Maritime Rights and Interests” [外事安全海权三办合一，
确保中国海洋权益], Sept. 6, 2013, http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2013-09/1887233.html, accessed Oct. 
7, 2018.   
322 Ye Hailin [叶海林], “The ‘Low-Profile’ State Ocean Commission is the Strong Command Center for Maritime 
Rights Protection” [“静悄悄 ”的国家海洋委员会才是维护海权的坚强中枢 ], People, Mar. 14, 2013, 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0314/c40531-20788795.html, accessed May 26, 2018. 
323 Author’s interview, Shanghai, June 2017. 
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State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense 
The State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense (CBCD), initially established in 1991 as the 
State Commission of Border Defense, was renamed in 2005 to include the ocean component, a 
move that implied the growing importance of the maritime front by placing it under a unified 
defense mechanism with the land frontier. This commission, according to the description in 
China’s 2006 Defense White Paper, is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC 
and is charged to coordinate China's border and coastal defenses. Below the national-level 
commission, “[a]ll military area commands, as well as border and coastal provinces, cities and 
counties, have commissions to coordinate border and coastal defenses within their respective 
jurisdictions.”324 
The commission’s recent leadership structure may shed some light on this mechanism’s move 
toward enhancing coordination among the foreign affairs, military, and MLEs on maritime defense 
by assembling senior officials from these bureaucracies. Open-source information dating back to 
2015 shows that Kong Quan, a senior Chinese diplomat in the MFA and the deputy director of the 
FAO, and Meng Hongwei, then Vice Minister of Public Security and the inaugural Director 
General of the China Coast Guard (CCG), both served as deputy directors of the CBCD under 
Chang Wanquan, then Defense Minister and director of the CBCD.325 
Beyond the personnel arrangements, it remains unclear how effective the CBCD as a 
coordination mechanism has been. According to writings by officers at the PLA Navy’s 
Headquarters Department and Naval Command College, CBCD at various levels, as “institutions 
 
324 Information Office of the State Council of PRC, “China’s National Defense in 2010.” 
325 The Paper [澎湃新闻], “FAO Deputy Director Kong Quan Appointed as Deputy Director of the BSDC” [中央外
办 副 主 任 孔 泉 任 国 家 边 海 防 委 员 会 副 主 任 ], Aug. 6, 2015, reprinted on Sohu, 
http://news.sohu.com/20150806/n418301640.shtml, accessed Oct. 7, 2018; People, “Liu Cigui Met Deputy Director 
of the BSDC Kong Quan” [ 刘 赐 贵 会 见 国 家 边 海 防 委 员 会 副 主 任 孔 泉 ], Aug. 4, 2015, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0804/c117005-27409076.html, accessed Oct. 7, 2018. 
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for consulting and coordination,” lack the necessary authority to develop into a unified planning, 
coordination, administration and control system to overcome the fragmentation in China’s 
traditional coastal defense.326 At the state-level, moreover, the CBCD national working conference 
has not been fully routinized. In the reform era, only four national working conferences have been 
held (respectively in 1979, 1994, 2010 and 2014) – another indicator that the CBCD is far from 
able to function as a mature coordination mechanism. 
The National Defense Mobilization Commission 
The National Defense Mobilization Commission (NDMC), like the CBCD, is put under the joint 
leadership of the State Council and the CMC.327 Below the central government, NDMC also has 
local organizations at provincial, prefecture and county levels, with joint leadership structures 
mirroring that at the state level. The NDMC from the provincial down to county levels are dual 
hatted as the local People’s Armed Force Committee, whose daily work is performed by the 
People’s Armed Force Departments (PAFDs) at the same level.328 Following the PLA’s 2016 
reorganization, a National Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD) has been established under 
the CMC to oversee the provincial-level military districts (MDs) and take charge of the PLA’s 
 
326 Wu Jianhong [吴建红], Huang Chunyu [黄春宇] and Liu Changlong [刘昌龙], “Thoughts on Advancing Coastal 
Defense Construction Work under the New Circumstances” [新形势下推进海防建设工作的思考], National Defense, 
2015, issue 12, p. 71. 
327 The premier of the State Council chairs the SCNDM, with a CMC member serving as the vice chairman of the 
organization. The National Defense Mobilization Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国防动
员法 ], the National People’s Congress of the PRC, Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2010-
02/26/content_1544853.htm, accessed Oct. 8, 2018; “Organization Structure: The State Commission for National 
Defense Mobilization,” The State Commission for National Defense Mobilization [ 中 国 国 防 动 员 网 ], 
http://www.gfdy.gov.cn/org/2016-09/28/content_7281555.htm, accessed Oct. 19, 2018; Dennis J. Blasko, The 
Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), second 
edition, p. 42. 
328 State Council and Central Military Commission, “Notice by the State Council and CMC on Establishing State 
Commission for National Defense Mobilization” [国务院、中央军委关于成立国家国防动员委员会的通知], Nov. 
29, 1994, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2011-08/12/content_7081.htm.  
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territorial administrative responsibilities including mobilization work. The head of the NDMD is 
appointed as the secretary general of the NDMC.329 
The primary function of the NDMC is to organize national defense mobilization and to 
coordinate “relations between economic and military affairs, the military and the government, and 
manpower and materials support in defense mobilization” so the shift from peacetime to war can 
be made efficiently.330 In the maritime disputes, the NDMC appears to have played a primary role 
in recruiting and administrating the maritime militia through the PAFDs (elaborated later in this 
section). 
Actors below the Top 
Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies (MLEs): Pre-2013 
Prior to the 2013 consolidation, jurisdictions over China’s maritime affairs were primarily divided 
among five MLE agencies: the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), the Fisheries Law 
Enforcement Bureau (FLE), the Maritime Police of the Border Control Department (CMP), the 
Maritime Anti-Smuggling Police, and the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA). The five 
agencies were placed under different line ministries tasked to carry out a specified set of functions 
in maritime governance. Within each of the agencies, below its state-level institutions, there were 
numerous enforcement forces at local levels. This vast and highly balkanized ocean administrative 
system, operating with overlapping jurisdictions and limited coordination, had long suffered from 
pronounced inefficiency and resource waste.331  
 
329 “The National Defense Mobilization Department after the PLA reorganization” [军改后的国防动员部], China 
Daily, Nov. 25, 2016, https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/2016jungai/2016-11/25/content_27481907.htm, accessed Jan. 23, 
2021.  
330 “Organization Structure: The State Commission for National Defense Mobilization.” 
331 Discussion on the problem of institutional balkanization and the call for a unified MLE force emerged in the 1980s 
and continued through the 1990s and 2000s. See, for example, Yang Jinsen [杨金森], “Basic Problems in Ocean 
Administration II” [海洋管理的基本问题(二)], Ocean Development and Management, 1987 (1), pp. 48-53; Zhang 
Haifeng and Yang Jinsen [张海峰、杨金森], “Build China into a Marine Economic Power by 2020” [到 2020 年把
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China Marine Surveillance 
Established in 1983 under the SOA of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), the CMS was 
tasked primarily to patrol and monitor China’s near seas, and conduct constabulary missions 
including marine environmental enforcement and island usage.332  The CMS had a two-layer 
central-local structure. The national component, comprised of the CMS headquarter, the North 
China Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea Corps, is subject to direct command and control 
by the SOA.333 The geographical division of the jurisdiction between the three regional branches 
was designed to mirror that between the PLA Navy’s North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets.334 
The local component consists of over 200 units ranging from provincial down to county levels. 
The local units are placed under the direct control of local governments while receiving 
“operational guidance” from the corresponding CMS regional branch.335 
The CMS had long played a prominent role in the East China Sea disputes. As a PLA Navy 
source puts it, “CMS’s East China Sea Corps, and FLE’s South China Sea Bureau, these two units 
are particularly ‘brave’ when conducting tasks at sea.”336 Defined as an “enlisted PLA reserve” 
subject to “paramilitary administration,” the CMS reportedly began to conduct around 2000 what 
later became widely-known as “maritime rights protection patrols” and law enforcement activities 
 
我国建成海洋经济强国], Pacific Journal [太平洋学报], 1997 (4), pp. 66-74; Li Peizhi [李培志], “The Stats of 
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Armed Police Force Academy [武警学院学报], vol. 20, no. 1, Feb., 2004; Xu Kuanyou [徐宽宥], “Consolidation and 
Construction China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Forces” [论我国海上执法力量的整合与构建]，Journal of the 
Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy, vol. 21, no. 1, Feb. 2005; Bai Junfeng [白俊丰], “Vision for the 
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pp. 35-38. 
332 CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 2012, p. 341. 
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334 Teng Zuwen [滕祖文], “Sea Area Administrative Branches’ Jurisdiction and Status in Ocean Administration” [海
区海洋管理局在海洋行政管理中的行政管辖定位], China Ocean News [中国海洋报], no. 1557, Nov. 21, 2006, 
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335 CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 2012, pp. 340-341; CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 2007 [中
国海洋发展报告 2007], Hai Yang Chu Ban She [北京：海洋出版社], 2007, p. 286. 
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vis-à-vis encroaching foreign vessels.337 The bureaucracy routinized its patrols in the East China 
Sea in 2006, and reportedly extended regular patrol to encompass the whole South China Sea in 
2009.338 Corresponding to its responsibilities to patrol the vast sea areas, the CMS had a relatively 
modernized flotilla of patrol vessels and patrol aircraft.339  
Fisheries Law Enforcement Bureau 
Originating in the 1950s as part of the Ministry of Aquatic Production and transferred to the Bureau 
of Fisheries under the MOA in 1988, the FLE was responsible for administering national fishery 
industry and ports, protecting fish resources, and safeguarding national fisheries rights and 
interests. 340  Similar to the CMS, the fisheries enforcement system also had a two-layer 
organizational structure comprised of national and local components. The state-level component 
oversaw its three regional branches which were responsible for patrolling China’s claimed EEZ 
and implementing China’s three bilateral fishery agreements: the China-ROK agreement in the 
Bohai-Yellow Sea Branch’s jurisdiction, the Sino-Japanese agreement in the East China Sea 
Branch’s jurisdiction, and the Sino-Vietnamese agreement in the South China Sea Branch’s 
jurisdiction. The state-level agency was also responsible for reviewing and coordinating 
 
337 CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 2012, p. 341. Emphasis added.  
338 Xinhuanet [新华网], “China Broke through the Japanese Defense Line surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, Japan 
Intentionally Plays Down the Right Protection Nature of China’s Operation” [中国突破钓鱼岛日方防线, 日本刻意
淡化维权色彩 ], Dec. 12, 2008, reprinted on People [人民网 ], http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8508391.html, 
accessed May 16, 2018; Xinhuanet, “China Faces Grave Circumstances on its Maritime Frontier: CMS vessels pull 
out of the Diaoyu Islands, FLE Steps In” [中国海洋形势严峻: 海监船撤出钓岛，渔政介入], Nov. 9, 2011, reprinted 
on Phoenix [凤凰网], http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/detail_2011_05/09/6252773_0.shtml, accessed May 14, 2018.  
339 As of 2012, the CMS reportedly had a total of 266 vessels, 26 of which were over 1,000 tons in displacement with 
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fixed wind aircraft, and one helicopter. CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 2012, p. 341; “CMS’s East China 
Sea Branch Beefs up Patrols around the Diaoyu Islands” [中国海监东海总队加强我国钓鱼岛等海域巡航执法], 
Legaldaily.com.cn [ 法 制 网 ], Sept. 16, 2012, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2012-
09/16/content_3844923.htm?node=5955, accessed May 15, 2018; SOA South China Sea Branch, “CMS South China 
Sea Division Acquired Another ‘Sharp Sword’” [ 中 国 海 监 南 海 总 队 再 添 “ 利 剑 ”], May 9, 2011, 
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enforcement patrols proposed by the regional branches. 341  Local-level fisheries enforcement 
agencies demonstrated great variance in organizational structure across regions.342 Like CMS, 
FLE has invested heavily to modernize its fleets, in particular through acquiring helicopter-
carrying-capable patrol vessels with large displacement and equipped with satellite 
communication systems.343  
Another major mission of the FLE is to promote “informatized administration” of the fishery 
industry. A major project is the subsidized installation of China’s indigenous Beidou Navigation 
Satellite System on fishing ships. This project is jointed financed by the PLA’s General Armament 
Department and MOA. The fishery industry reportedly contributed to the largest share in Beidou’s 
civilian subscription market.344 The FLE was also responsible for subsidizing the installation and 
upgrade of radio communication equipment on fishing ships and land-based fishery 
communication network stations.345 
China Maritime Police of the Border Control Department 
The CMP was founded in 1951 under the auspice of the Border Control Department of the People’s 
Armed Police (PAP), which was placed under the dual leadership of the CMC and the State 
 
341 CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 2012, p. 345; CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 2010, [中国海
洋发展报告 2010] (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe, 2010), pp. 449-450; He, A Study on Establishing China’s Coast 
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displacement and capable of carrying two helicopters. CRNNT [中国评论新闻网], “China Has ‘Paramilitary’ 
Maritime Law Enforcement Forces” [中国怎无“准军事”海上执法力量], Dec. 14, 2012, http://hk.crntt.com/crn-
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鉴 2012] (Beijing: Zhongguo nongye chubanshe, 2012), p. 60; China Fisheries Yearbook 2013 (Beijing: Zhongguo 
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Council (through the MPS) until 2018.346 Traditionally the sole armed MLE force,347 the CMP’s 
primary mission was to combat piracy, smuggling, human trafficking and other crimes at sea. 
Before 2013, the CMP was frequently referred to as China’s coastguard in government documents 
and writings, and its enforcement vessels were painted with coastguard bow numbers. Similar to 
the U.S. Coast Guard, the CMP was militarily trained and organized, and legally recognized as 
part of the armed force.348  
Like CMS and FLE, the Maritime Police also had a multi-layer force structure deployed in 
coastal regions, including 10 provincial corps and 20 municipal divisions.349 Although the MPS 
defined the CMP’s geographical jurisdiction as to encompass China’s inner waters, territorial seas, 
contiguous waters, EEZ and continental shelf,350 due to the constraints imposed by the institution’s 
lack of large vessels, the area that the CMP could actually cover was China’s territorial sea.351 
Maritime Anti-Smuggling Police 
The Maritime Anti-Smuggling Police is responsible for counter-smuggling and port control, 
among other missions including revenue collection and customs control. The Maritime Anti-
Smuggling Police had a dual-leadership structure, in which it was under the supervision and 
administration by the General Administration of Customs (GAC) while accepting “operational 
 
346 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York: 
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347 Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring up the Sea, p. 6. 
348 Bernard Moreland, “US-China Civil Maritime Operational Engagement,” in Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, 
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guidance” by the MPS.352 The anti-smuggling enforcement agency had a modest size of personnel 
and speedboats for counter-smuggling tasks, making it the smallest dragon in terms of 
manpower.353 
Maritime Safety Administration 
The Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) under the Ministry of Transport is the only state-level 
MLE agency left intact in the 2013 institutional merger. The MSA is responsible for registration 
and administration of vessels in Chinese ports, research and rescue, maritime traffic control and 
accident investigation.354 Aside from releasing information on locations and times of no-entry 
zones ahead of naval drills, MSA is rarely known for active involvement in China’s maritime 
disputes. The MSA’s primary role as a marine safety agency is widely cited as the rationale in the 
decision to keep MSA outside of the reorganization.355 Some credible Chinese sources also suggest 
that the MSA was left intact due to the agency’s strong resistance.356 
China Coast Guard: 2013-2018 
 
In order to bolster China’s maritime law enforcement capabilities by addressing the institutional 
balkanization, in March 2013 the State Council consolidated the CMS, FLE, CMP, and anti-
smuggling force into a unified China Coast Guard (CCG) under the SOA, which was promoted to 
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GAC was co-established by GAC and MPS. It is a bureau housed in the GAC and affiliated with the MPS at the same 
time, subject to the dual-leadership of GAC and MPS.” [设在海关总署的走私犯罪侦查局由海关总署、公安部共
同组建，既是海关总署的一个内设局，又是公安部的一个序列局，实行海关与公安双重垂直领导 ],  
http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab49689/info431895.htm, accessed May 18, 2018.  
353 Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring up the Sea, p. 18. 
354 Ibid., p. 9. 
355 Peng Mei, et al., “The Birth of China Coast Guard Puts an End to ‘Five Dragons Ruling the Sea’” [中国海警局亮
剑 ： 中 国 海 警 局 诞 生 终 结 “ 五 龙 治 海 ”], People Digest [ 人 民 文 摘 ], issue 9, 2013, 
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmwz/html/2013-09/01/content_1307445.htm, accessed May 19, 2018.  
356 Nong Hong, “China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Reform and its Implication on the Regional Maritime Disputes,” 
CSIS-Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), Apr. 1, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-maritime-law-
enforcement-reform-and-its-implication-on-the-regional-maritime-disputes/, accessed May 26, 2018. Nong Hong is a 
senior researcher affiliated with China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies. 
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a vice-ministerial level bureaucracy.357 The CCG, comprised of a headquarters, three regional 
branches, and coast guard corps in China’s eleven coastal provinces, was placed under a dual 
leadership of the SOA and MPS. In the meantime, the restructuring plan introduced the National 
Ocean Committee, which did not materialize. 
The reorganization was also conceived as an endeavor to play down the paramilitary nature of 
– or in the words of some U.S. analysts, to “civilianize” – the coast guard force by placing it under 
the SOA, thereby lowering the risk of escalation in the event of a confrontation or clash with 
foreign vessels.358 The China Coast Guard was granted with great latitude in using non-lethal 
forces, such as water cannons and ramming, but was subject to strict restrictions on the use of 
firearms. While such restrictions are rarely explicitly admitted by those at the top of the maritime 
bureaucratic hierarchy or spelled out in state-level documents, discussion among policy 
implementers at lower levels suggested that there was a clear bottom-line regarding the nonuse of 
firearms. In maritime rights protection operations, wrote a faculty member at the Maritime Police 
Academy in a 2017 article, “[i]n general, the use of force does not involve firearms such as guns 
or deck-mounted cannons…By employing a diverse range of means, including oral warning, water 
cannon and/or ramming, we seek to create a situation in a confrontation to our advantage. But such 
confrontations should be controllable…avoiding fatal damages…and thus preventing 
escalation.”359   Chinese officials tasked to draw up operational directives admitted that “the 
 
357 State Council of PRC, “State Council Circular on the Primary Responsibilities, Internal Institutions, and Staffing 
Provision of the State Oceanic Administration” [国务院办公厅关于印发国家海洋局主要职责内设机构和人员编
制规定的通知 ], Jun. 9, 2013, http://www.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/fwjgwywj/gwyfgwj/201307/t20130709_26463.html, 
accessed May 13, 2018. 
358 Morris, “Blunt Defenders of Sovereignty,” p. 86; He, et al., A Study on Establishing China’s Coast Guard, p. 15. 
359 Li Shixiong [李世雄], “Study on China Coast Guard’s Push Tactic” [海警舰船挤推战术研究], Journal of the 
Armed Police Academy [武警学院学报], vol. 33, no. 9, Sept. 2017, pp. 17-18. Emphasis added. 
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directive to avoid the use of lethal weapons was not made at the provincial level…so presumed 
this had been decided by the center.”360  
As a remedy intended to over institutional fragmentation, the 2013 consolidation had only a 
modest effect, as it left most existing problems unresolved while creating new complications. 
Internal power struggle between Liu Cigui, Director and Party Secretary of the SOA, and Meng 
Hongwei, the inaugural director of the CCG and Deputy Director of the SOA, became a prominent 
issue arising from CCG’s dual leadership structure. Parachuted from his prior position as vice 
minister of the MPS into his new job, Meng was a full-minister level official outranking Liu, who 
was only vice-minister level. Moreover, Meng reportedly staffed senior positions in the CCG with 
his own deputies from the MPS, in effect sidelining senior officials from the other three MLE 
agencies.361 An SOA source bluntly characterized this leadership arrangement as “grasping power 
from the SOA” (夺权海洋局).362 The power struggle at the top obstructed the growth of solidarity 
among rank and file. The personnel of the former four dragons, relocated to the SOA headquarter 
compound, could hardly get along with each other “like fire and water,” according to a 
knowledgeable source connected with China’s security establishment.363 
The power struggle and internal tensions hampered the already-slow restructuring process. 
Media reports, government sources and academic writings continue to refer to maritime law 
enforcement fleets by their former agencies,364 indicating the huge backlog of consolidation below 
 
360 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, p. 29. 
361 Ibid., p. 18. 
362 Author’s interview, Shanghai, June 2017. 
363 Private conversation, Washington DC, April 2016. 
364 Liu Bin, Tan Chang and Huang Shengchun [刘斌、谭畅、黄圣淳], “China Coast Guard’s First Anniversary: No 
Longer Fighting Alone” [中国海警局组建一年观察，执行任务不再单打独斗了], South Weekend [南方周末], Oct. 
9, 2014, http://www.infzm.com/content/104611, accessed May 27, 2018; “Ministry of Agriculture and State Oceanic 
Administration Launched Joint Special Enforcement Operation in 2017 Nationwide Fishing Moratorium” [农业部、
中国海警局联合启动 2017 全国海洋伏季休渔专项执法行动], China Fisheries [中国水产], 2017 (6), pp. 2-3. 
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the center. Speaking to a group of foreign scholars during a closed-door discussion in 2017, Rear 
Admiral Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at China’s National Defense 
University, admitted that the MLE forces “wear in the same uniform but still have different 
mindsets, sleep in same bed but still have different dreams.”365 
China Coast Guard: 2018 Transfer to the PAP and the 2021 Coast Guard Law 
In January 2018, China removed the PAP’s dual leadership and put it under the sole control of the 
CMC. In April, the CCG was transferred from the civilian control of the State Oceanic 
Administration (SOA) to the PAP to tackle the internal intensions that remained an outstanding 
problem following the 2013 merger. This transfer of the CCG thus stripped the agency of its 
civilian cover and made it officially one of China’s armed forces, raising the concern that the CCG 
personnel would have more latitude to act aggressively in disputed waters.366 Almost three years 
into the restructuring, the standoffs and clashes between CCG ships and vessels from Malaysia 
and Vietnam seem to imply increased Chinese coercion at sea.367 Yet, a full assessment of the 
implications of the reorganization for crisis prevention and management is still constrained by the 
short period of time as well as the scarcity of details on these incidents especially in Chinese-
language sources. 
 
365 Author attended the discussion as an observer. Conference notes, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, Jun. 
28, 2017.  
366 “In and out in the PAP reform: issues related to leadership, management and command are hopefully resolved” [武
警改革的出与进：领导管理和指挥问题有望化解], Xinhua, Apr. 6, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-
04/06/c_1122642541.htm, accessed Jan. 25, 2021; Lyle Morris, “China Welcomes its Newest Armed Force: the Coast 
Guard,” War on the Rocks, Apr. 4, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/china-welcomes-its-newest-armed-
force-the-coast-guard/, accessed Jan. 26, 2021. 
367 Lye Liang Fook and Ha Hoang Hop, “The Vanguard Bank Incident: Development and What Next?” ISEAS, 
Perspective, no. 69, Sept. 4, 2019; “Update: China risks flare-up over Malaysian, Vietnamese gas resources,” CSIS-
AMTI, Dec. 13, 2019, https://amti.csis.org/china-risks-flare-up-over-malaysian-vietnamese-gas-resources/, accessed 
Apr. 20, 2020; Nguyen Thanh Trung, “The Cauldron Boils Over: Vietnam vs. China,” CSIS-AMTI, Apr. 20, 2020, 
https://amti.csis.org/the-cauldron-boils-over-vietnam-vs-china/, accessed Jan. 26, 2021. 
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The organizational streamlining notwithstanding, the CCG still suffered from the lack of a 
solid legal foundation to clearly define its enforcement authority, a flaw that some Chinese law 
experts and maritime law enforcement officers warned would leave critical ambiguity. Following 
the 2013 merger, the CCG had to derive its legal foundation from the old legal bases designed for 
the CMS, Maritime Police, FLE, and Anti-Smuggling Police respectively.368 The ambiguous legal 
foundation in turn resulted in the absence of a standardized procedure to guide the coast guard’s 
use of force. Under what circumstances to use force, what types of force, and when to escalate the 
level of force are all critical legal questions that were left unaddressed following the consolidation. 
The primary law that had been used by the CCG to standardize the use of force is the “Regulations 
of the People’s Republic of China on Use of Police Implements and Arms by the People’s Police,” 
which contained but generic provisions on the procedure of using weapons and had not been 
updated for over two decades since its enactment in 1996. The “Regulations on Use of Weapons 
by the Border Control Forces” and its supplemental provisions, which used to provide a procedure 
of reviewing and approving the use of force, ceased to be in effect since 2014.369 These legal issues 
remained after the 2018 decision to transfer the CCG to the PAP.  
In a move clearly intended to address the legal ambiguity, China passed a law in January 2021 
which for the first time explicitly specified the conditions under which the CCG personnel would 
be allowed to gradually escalate the level of force employed in their encounters with foreign 
vessels.370 The law laid out a guideline for CCG personnel to use force in a gradualist fashion. 
 
368 Zhang Nianhong [张念宏], “Analysis of the Collision Type Law Enforcement of the China Coast Guard” [中国海
警船冲撞方式执法问题探析], Chinese Journal of Maritime Law [中国海商法研究], vol. 28, no. 2, Jun. 2017, p. 47. 
369 Xu Ying [徐荧], “Rules on China Coast Guard’s Procedure of Using Force in Law Enforcement” [我国海警执法
武力使用的程序规制], Journal of China Maritime Police Academy [公安海警学院学报], vol. 16, no. 5, Oct. 2017, 
p. 3. 
370  Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China [ 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 海 警 法 ], Jan. 23, 2021, 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-01/23/content_5582024.htm, accessed Jan. 24, 2021. The discussion on China’s 
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Clause 46 of the law outlines four conditions for using “police equipment” (警械): 1) when forcing 
the other vessel to stop during the course of boarding, inspection, interception, and pursuit; 2) 
when expelling or towing away the vessel by force; 3) when encountering obstruction or harm in 
the course of enforcing the law; 4) when handling other situations that need to stop crimes on the 
scene. In the Chinese legal lexicon, “police equipment” seems to refer to nonlethal means such as 
water guns/cannons and tear gas, among others.371 Clause 47 stipulates two conditions for using 
hand-held weapons: 1) when evidence shows the vessel carries criminal suspects or illegally 
carries weapons, ammunitions, materials related to state secrets, narcotics, etc., and refuses to 
comply with orders to stop; 2) when foreign vessels enter sea areas under China’s jurisdiction to 
conduct illegal production operations, refuse to comply with orders to stop or resist boarding, 
inspection by other means, and other measures have failed to stop these illegal activities. Clause 
48 specifies three scenarios for using ship- and air-borne weapons in addition to hand-held 
weapons: 1) when conducting counterterrorism operations at sea; 2) when handling serious violent 
incidents at sea; 3) when law enforcement vessels or aircraft are attacked by weapons or other 
dangerous means. Following the clauses outlining the guideline for escalation, Clause 50 
underscores that CCG personnel should reasonably assess the necessary level of force employed 
to avoid or reduce unwanted casualties.  
Authorizing maritime law enforcement personnel to use force on foreign vessels is a common 
practice adopted by coast guards in the region, and China’s coast guard law does not represent a 
deviation or outlier in this regard. For example, Japan revised its Coast Guard Law in 2001, 
 
Coast Guard Law draws primarily on Shuxian Luo, “China’s Coast Guard Law: Destabilizing or Reassuring?” The 
Diplomat, Jan. 27, 2021. 
371 “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Use of Police Implements and Arms by the People’s Police 
(effective)” [ 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 人 民 警 察 使 用 警 械 和 武 器 条 例  ( 现 行 )], Jan. 1, 1996, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=12049&CGid=, accessed Jan. 26, 2021.  
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authorizing its coast guard personnel to use weapons against foreign vessels within Japanese 
waters in situations deemed as reasonable and necessary.372 South Korea authorized its coast guard 
officers in 2016 to use firearms including handguns and onboard cannons against Chinese fishing 
vessels operating illegally in Korean waters should the situation be deemed threatening. 373 
Likewise, Vietnam’s new coast guard law passed in 2018 grants its maritime law enforcement 
personnel greater latitude to open fire at sea.374  
Whereas China’s coast guard law represents an integral step toward clarifying and 
standardizing the operations of the CCG, it has fueled unease in the region about increased risks 
of incidents at sea and escalation, in large part due to the huge gap in maritime capabilities between 
China and other claimants and the application of the law to waters China sees as under its 
jurisdiction.  
Local Authorities 
A major implication of the post-Mao decentralization in the Chinese political system is that 
localities enjoy greater autonomy and authority not only in domestic policies but also in foreign 
relations.375 The fact that provincial leaders are granted the same administrative rank as ministers 
provides the provinces considerable autonomy in taking actions that might well have important 
foreign policy repercussions. Meanwhile, coastal provinces became increasingly involved in 
China’s ocean administration, despite variance in extent and means across regions. The 
 
372 Richard J. Samuels, “‘New Fighting Power!’ Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” 
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/2008), p. 95; Japan Coast Guard Law [海上保安庁法 ], 
https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=323AC0000000028, accessed Jan. 27, 2021. 
373  Ju-min Park, “South Korea vows greater force against China fishing boats,” Reuters, Oct. 10, 2016, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-fishermen-idUSKCN12B09O, accessed Jan. 27, 2021. I 
elaborate on China-South Korea fishery conflict in the Yellow Sea in Chapter 10. 
374  “Vietnam weighs law for coast guard to open fire to protect sovereignty,” Reuters, Apr. 11, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-vietnam-coast-guard/vietnam-weighs-law-for-coast-guard-to-
open-fire-to-protect-sovereignty-idUSKBN1HI1JU, accessed Jan. 27, 2021.  
375 Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process” in Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese 
Foreign and Security Policy in an Era of Reform, pp. 19-24. 
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geographical area over which local authorities could exercise jurisdiction, according to a 2002 
State Council document, spans from the local coastal line to the outer limit of the territorial sea.376 
Hainan represents a notable exception to this geographical scope as the province was granted with 
administrative authority over the South China Sea and entitled to greater latitude in adopting local 
legislation.377  
Local legislation and enforcement are perhaps the most common, albeit often indirect, way of 
local involvement in maritime disputes. 378  From 2011 through 2012, five Chinese 
provinces/municipalities passed maritime border security regulations as guidelines for local 
enforcement operations. Hainan, for example, authorized its enforcement agencies to board, 
inspect, detain, and expel foreign vessels found conducting activities in violation of China’s 
sovereignty in the South China Sea. 379  Even local regulations that appear to be completely 
domestic in nature are sometimes intended to generate foreign policy implications. Hainan’s 2016 
ban on the trade and processing of corals and giant clams, for example, was intended primarily to 
curb Chinese fishermen’s giant clams poaching in the South China Sea,380 a cause of constant 
frictions between China and other littoral states in the area including the high-profile Scarborough 
Shoal standoff in 2012. Enforcement was enabled by the large body of local-controlled MLE forces. 
 
376 CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 2011, p. 97; State Council, “State Council General Office Notice on 
Delimiting Provincial and County oceanic Administrative Boundaries” [国务院办公厅关于开展勘定省县两级还与
行 政 区 域 界 限 工 作 有 关 问 题 的 通 知 ], Feb. 11, 2002, 
http://www.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/fwjgwywj/gwyfgwj/201211/t20121105_5259.html, accessed Oct. 1, 2018.  
377 Guangxi is also entitled to the privilege due to its status as an ethnic-minority autonomous region. CIMA, China 
Ocean Development Report 2011, p. 96. 
378 In 2011, CIMA’s China Ocean Development Report for the first time devoted a whole section detailing the evolving 
local legislation in oceanic administration, pp. 96-107.  
379 The other four provinces are Shandong, Shanghai, Hebei and Zhejiang. CIMA, China Ocean Development Report 
2013, pp. 39-40. 
380 Author’s interview, Singapore, August 2018; Chinanews, “Hainan bans giant clam trade, tens of thousands to lose 
jobs,” Jan. 5, 2017, http://www.ecns.cn/cns-wire/2017/01-05/240291.shtml; Xinhuanet, “Hainan completely bans the 
sales of coral, giant clams and relevant products” [海南全面禁售珊瑚礁、砗磲及其制品 ], Jan. 3, 2017, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2017-01/03/c_135950789.htm. Both accessed Oct. 1, 2018.  
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The SOA began in 2009 to delegate greater enforcement authority to provincial-level CMS 
agencies to shift some fiscal burden from the central government to coastal locales. The FLE 
quickly followed the suit.381 The numerous local MLE forces seem to have not been incorporated 
into the CCG but are left to the discretion of local authorities for “future consolidation.”382  
Local authorities are involved in the maritime disputes also through their lobby activities to 
the central government in pursuit of their parochial – primarily economic – interests. Provinces at 
times diverge on their economic priorities and therefore may advocate for divergent or even 
conflicting policy options with respect to how to manage maritime disputes and China’s relations 
with rivaling claimants. For example, the importance of the marine fishery and hydrocarbon 
resources to the local economy gives Hainan a vested interest in forcefully lobbying for a tougher 
Chinese stance on the South China Sea and for the provision of more national resources for local 
maritime militia to support the fishery sector.383 On the other hand, Guangxi, with a stake in 
expanding sub-regional economic cooperation, has actively lobbied for maintaining cordial 
relations with ASEAN, especially Vietnam – a much less studied aspect in provinces’ involvement 
in China’s maritime disputes that I elaborate on in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Local authorities are also responsible for financing other nonmilitary actors, especially the 
militia. However, available information indicates that local funding for militia is more likely 
nominal than substantial, an issue I examine more closely in the maritime militia segment.  
 
381 Ryan D. Martinson, “Power to the Provinces: The Devolution of China’s Maritime Rights Protection,” China Brief, 
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protection/, accessed Sept. 24, 2018.  
382 Peng Mei, et al., “The Birth of China Coast Guard Puts an End to ‘Five Dragons Ruling the Sea;’” Southern 
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The National Oil Companies (NOCs) 
China’s three state-owned oil companies, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), overseen by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) under the State Council and backed by the powerful National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), have been influential actors in China’s foreign policy following the 
liberalization and decentralization in the Chinese energy sector.384  
The NOCs derive their political clout not merely from their strategic importance to China’s 
energy security but also from their direct access to China’s decision-making and bureaucratic 
apparatus, primarily enabled through the nomenklatura system, which functions as a revolving 
door for the Communist Party cadres to transfer between positions in the party-state and those in 
central SOEs. This system, while aiming to keep the Party’s grab on the most important SOEs, has 
in effect enhanced SOE executives’ influence on government policies.385 A number of China’s 
senior central and provincial leaders formerly served in NOC management positions.386  
Although CNPC by size is the largest of the three NOCs, CNOOC is the most important one 
in China’s competition with other claimants in the disputed waters for hydrocarbon resources, not 
merely because it is China’s largest offshore oil and gas producer. More importantly, from its 
incipiency in 1982 to 2004, CNOOC enjoyed the exclusive rights to conduct offshore oil 
exploration and production (E&P) as well as to oversee offshore joint development projects with 
 
384 Erica Downs, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies – Energy Security Series: China (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution, 2006), p. 16; Kong, China’s International Petroleum Policy 
385 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?” China Quarterly, 
vol. 211, Sept. 2012, pp. 624-648. 
386 Downs, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies – Energy Security Series: China, p. 22; International Crisis Group, 
Stirring up the South China Sea (IV), p. 9. 
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foreign businesses.387 As a result, CNOOC for a substantial period was the only energy corporate 
player involved in China’s maritime disputes. Even after losing its monopoly, it remains a 
prominent frontline actor in these disputes. Sinopec and CNPC are late comers but increasingly 
influential in the rivalry for hydrocarbon resource in the disputed waters. 
Maritime Militia 
The Chinese militia is characterized as “an armed mass organization composed of civilians 
retaining their regular jobs…a component of China’s armed forces, and an auxiliary and reserve 
force of the PLA.”388 Once conceived as a major component in the concept of “People’s War,” the 
militia in contemporary Chinese military planning is primarily tasked to assist the PLA “by 
performing security and logistics functions in war.” 389  With respect to border defense 
responsibilities, the militia is tasked to “coordinate with the troops and public security departments 
to strengthen administration of the border regions and protect the security of the frontiers.”390 In 
the maritime domain, the militia is comprised of citizens working in the marine economy who are 
traditionally trained to perform public security tasks including search and rescue, anti-crime, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime border protection and patrol, and 
auxiliary military tasks necessary to support the PLAN in wartime.391  
 
387 CNOOC, “Our History,” http://www.cnooc.com.cn/col/col6171/index.html, accessed Oct 2, 2018; Li Guoqiang 
[李国强], “Prospecting and Developing South China Sea Oil and Gas Resources” [南海油气资源勘探开发的政策
调 适 ], China International Studies [ 国 际 问 题 研 究 ], issue 6, 2014, http://www.ciis.org.cn/gyzz/2014-
11/20/content_7385361.htm, accessed Oct. 2, 2018. 
388 Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, “Regulation on Militia Work” [中华人民共和国
民兵工作条例], Dec. 1990, http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2016-02/12/content_4618055.htm, accessed June 3, 
2018.  
389 As of 2010, about 60 percent of the PRC militia reportedly had been assigned to anti-aircraft artillery, engineering, 
chemical defense, communications, and information units. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, p. 29. 
390 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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Press, 2010), p.79. 
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Mobilization orders to the militia are passed through the line from the provincial-level Military 
Districts (MDs) down to local People’s Armed Force Departments. 392  MD is responsible for 
mobilization preparations for militia units in its province. Military sub-districts (MSDs) at 
prefecture and city levels (in some cases county-level as well) formulate mobilization plans 
accordingly, and conscript and train the militia. Below the MSDs, PAFDs at county, district and 
township levels are responsible for meeting local conscription requirements as set forth by their 
supervisory MSD and MD, and for providing peacetime command for local militia units. Aside 
from the MD-PAFD line, the CBCD and SCNDM systems also have their respective local organs 
from province through county. There seems to be significant cross-over between the three lines, 
given that they all share responsibilities for the militia administration, mobilization, and border 
defense.393 
As tensions ratchet up on China’s maritime periphery, the role of maritime militia as a tool of 
asserting Chinese sovereignty attracted growing attention, especially following Xi Jinping’s trip 
to Hainan in April 2013. During his trip, Xi Jiping toured Tanman, a small fishing village in 
southern Hainan where local fishing fleets were organized into an active maritime militia company 
operating all over the South China Sea, including in the disputed waters.394 When meeting with 
the maritime militia leaders, Xi reportedly encouraged them to master modern equipment, 
proactively collect information in distant waters, and support the construction of islands and 
reefs.395 Xi’s tour and words unleashed a nationwide drumbeat for building the maritime militia 
 
392 This paragraph mainly draws upon Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, pp. 40-41. 
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into a genuine third arm in China’s “military-law enforcement-civilian joint defense” strategy and 
allowing it to play a greater role in the maritime disputes (Figure 3.1). Being both civilians and 
soldiers, according to the rationale, the maritime militia can be deployed to strengthen control and 
administration of China’s “maritime territory” while avoiding the political and diplomatic 
ramifications that could otherwise be incurred with the involvement of the military.396  
Figure 3.1: Maritime Militia in the Core Newspapers and PLA Publications since 2000397 
 
Nevertheless, there is a set of issues that must be addressed before the maritime militia can 
effectively function as the third arm in China’s joint defense strategy. The central issue is to clarify 
the command-and-control relations. While the maritime militia traditionally work within the MD-
PAFD, CBCD and NDMC lines, a broadening range of missions requires the militia to effectively 
collaborate with other nonmilitary actors such as the MLE agencies and NOCs.398 Thus arises the 
questions of who has the authorization to review and approve maritime militia’s participation in 
what types of maritime rights protection operations, who commands the militia under what 
 
396 He Zhixiang [何志祥], “On the Four Integrations in Maritime Militia Construction” [谈海上民兵建设 “四纳入”] 
National Defense, 2013, issue 4, pp. 36-37.  
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titles including the exact phrase “maritime militia.” 
398 Erickson and Kennedy, “China's Maritime Militia,” p. 10.  
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circumstances with how much authorization, and who is responsible for paying for militia 
expenditures.399  
The often understudied if not overlooked expenditure issue introduces more complexity into 
the administration and employment of maritime militia, as funding for the militia seems far from 
being guaranteed. As of 2010, only about 2-3 percent of China’s defense budget was used to fund 
militia training and equipment, and additional funding came from local governments.400 Local 
funding alone is far from adequate to cover the militia expenditure. A guideline issued by Hainan 
in 2014 stated that the provincial and county (city, prefecture) governments each would be 
responsible for 50 percent of the province’s maritime militia expenditure. For the year of 2014, 
the provincial government earmarked 28 million RMB for maritime militia construction.401 This 
budget appears miniscule in the light of the costs that militia construction and deployment would 
generate. According to a 2014 estimate, for a fishing boat of 50-ton displacement to participate in 
one-week militia training, it would cost over 100,000 RMB to cover the crew’s lodging and 
compensate for the ship’s lost income.402 Available evidence indicates that local authorities are 
likely receiving compensation from the central government through substantial transfer payment. 
According to the 2018 budget report that Hainan Department of Finance submitted to the 
provincial people’s congress, in FY 2017 Hainan received 18.01 billion RMB in transfer payment 
 
399 Wang Zhiping [王治平]and Wang Yongjian [汪勇健], “Some Thoughts on Militia’s Participation in Maritime 
Rights Protection Struggle” [民兵参加海上维权斗争的几点思考], National Defense, 2013, issue 6, pp. 54-55. Some 
PLA officials propose to “standardize” the command and control relations based on the type of tasks the militia 
perform at sea. See, for example, Xu Haifeng [徐海峰], “Adapt to the New Situation, Comprehensively Standardize 
Maritime Militia Construction” [适应新形势，全面规范海上民兵建设], National Defense, 2014, issue 2, pp. 65-
66. 
400 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, p. 29. 
401 Wang Cheng [王承] and Chen Daofan [陈道凡], “Hainan Announced Guideline on Strengthening the Building of 
Maritime Militia” [海南省出台加强海上民兵建设的意见], National Defense, 2014, issue 3. 
402 Liao Gangbin [廖刚斌], Wang Pai [王牌] and Xiong Rui [熊睿], “Problems and Solutions in Constructing 
Maritime Militia Units” [海上民兵分队建设存在的问题与对策], National Defense, 2014, issue 8, pp. 14-15. 
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from the Ministry of Finance that “factors in the province’s expenditure on maritime 
administration and ocean areas.”403 Moreover, a “whoever uses the militia pays the bill” approach 
was proposed to share the burden and became a common practice.404 But fund for the militia 
remains an outstanding problem. A 2017 National Defense article explicitly complained about 
having no channels to guarantee fund. According to this article, when the maritime militia is 
assigned to a task, the fund issue was usually solved by “the county paying a bit, the city 
compensating a bit, and the province subsidizing a bit.” This way of solving the fund problem 
meant that “the more tasks you perform, the more you pay.”405 
A direct result from funding inadequacy is that the government organs may not have strong 
economic leverage to exert effective control over profit-driven fishermen. Surveys conducted by 
Hainan authorities in 2015 showed that 42 percent fishermen prioritized material benefits from 
their participation in the maritime militia. Some fishermen admitted that they would quit militia 
activity for not receiving economic compensation or justified their absence from maritime rights 
protection operations with fishing work at sea.” 406  Sources familiar with Hainan’s fishery 
community note that each fishing ship participating in maritime rights protection activity receives 
a daily compensation of 500 RMB, which is “too petty compared to the profits that could be made 
 
403 Department of Finance, Hainan Province, “Report on Hainan Province’s Implementation of FY 2017 Budget and 
the Proposed FY 2018 Budget” [海南省 2017 年预算执行情况和 2018 年预算草案的报告], Jan 26, 2018, 
http://mof.hainan.gov.cn/czt/zwxx/czyjs/201803/t20180301_2562925.html, accessed Oct 2, 2018.  
404 Xu, “Adapt to the New Situation, Comprehensively Standardize Maritime Militia Construction;” Kou Zhenyun [寇
振云] and Feng Shi [冯时], “’Four Musts’ in Strengthening Maritime Militia Construction” [加强海上民兵建设 “四
要”], National Defense, 2016, issue 5, p. 42. Erickson and Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” p.12. 
405 Qin Jinghao [秦景号], “Study on the Issues in Militia’s Participation in Maritime Rights Protection Operations” 
[民兵参加海上维权斗争行动问题研究], National Defense, 2017, issue 4, p. 81.  
406 Yang Jianbo [杨建波], “Closely Base on the Reality in South China Sea Rights and Interests Struggle, Improve 
Maritime Militia’s Political Work” [紧贴南海权益斗争实际，做好海上民兵整治工作], Journal of Political Work 
[政工学刊], 2015, issue 3, pp. 44-45. 
- 134 - 
 
from a day at sea just fishing, and even more so when compared with the huge profits from giant 
clam poaching.”407  
The marketization of China’s fishery sector has also weakened the organizational control over 
militia fishing ships. In the pre-reform era, state fishing corporations and fishing communes, which 
were under either state or provincial control and possessed the bulk of China’s trawlers and seiners, 
constituted a vast network of effective controls reaching down to the individual level.408 Such firm 
control could no longer sustain in the reform era when the fishery sector becomes fully marketized. 
In the 2000s, coastal provincial military districts widely reported problems in tracking and 
controlling militia fishing ships.409 
Given the unclear command and control relations, funding inadequacy, and weakened 
organizational control, it is practically difficult to develop an accurate assessment as to what extent 
Chinese fishermen act independently or under directions from Chinese authorities. There have 
been cases in which civilian fishing ships have participated in maritime rights protection missions 
in collaboration with MLE forces and/or PLAN, indicating that the maritime militia does exploit 
the “perceived advantages in their role as both military personnel and citizen marine workers.”410 
However, viewed in light of available evidence emerging in authoritative Chinese-language 
sources, much of which are writings by PLA commanders and officers deeply involved in the 
militia work, it seems over-the-top to portray the maritime militia as a body of force that has 
 
407 Author’s interview, Singapore, August 2018. 
408 Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Seapower (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press), 1982, pp. 216-221. 
409 Dong Shiwu [董世武], Liu Xiantuan [刘贤团] and Wang Quanwen [王全文], “Build Strong Maritime Reserve 
Forces-Investigation on Maritime Militia Construction II (The Training Episode)” [铸就海上后备劲旅-海上民兵建
设系列调查之二（训练篇） ], China Militia, 2003, issue 9, p. 34; Zhang Qihong [张齐红 ], “The Primary 
Dimensions that should be Controlled when Strengthening Maritime Militia Construction” [加强海上民兵建设应把
握的主要环节], National Defense, 2003, issue 10, pp. 30-31; Zhang Jian [张健], Deng Weiyu [邓伟余] and Zhao 
Jicheng [赵继承], “After 40 Pre-Registered Fishing Vessels Were Sold” [40 艘预编渔船被卖掉之后], China Militia, 
2006, issue 10, pp. 26-27.  
410 Erickson and Kennedy, “China's Maritime Militia,” endnote 13. 
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systemically conducted deceptive missions at sea in close collaboration with the PLA and the MLE 
forces. Rather, the coordination seems to be, as a knowledge source characterizes it, “loose and 
diffuse” at best, and to achieve a close coordination “takes long time.”411 
Fishermen and the Bilateral Fishery Agreements 
Fishing disputes represent a constant source of tensions between China and its maritime neighbors. 
Massive overfishing and coastal water pollution have led to the depletion of fishing stocks in 
China’s proximate fishing grounds, driving Chinese fishermen to venture into more distant areas 
including the contested waters. In pursuit of rich fish stocks, Chinese fishing ships sometimes 
simply ignore “regulations that deem an area off-limits either due to territorial disputes or a 
temporary moratorium with the aim of conserving fishing.”412 Encounters at sea between Chinse 
fishermen and maritime enforcement personnel from rivaling claimant countries have at times 
resulted confrontations or even violent clashes. China has concluded bilateral fishery agreements 
with Japan, Vietnam, and South Korea that lay out co-management mechanism to reduce fishing 
conflict in the bordering waters.  
Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement 
Both China and Japan had traditionally fished in the East China Sea. In 1975, both countries 
signed their first government-level fishery agreement. 413  To incorporate changes brought by 
UNCLOS to international ocean governance, the two countries reached a new fishery agreement 
in 1997, which, effective from July 2000, delineated a Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) 
encompassing the overlapping EEZ and established a joint fisheries committee to co-manage the 
PMZ. Both sides agreed that within the PMZ, each side would administrate its own nationals and 
 
411 Author’s interviews, Washington DC, June 2018; Tokyo and Singapore, August 2018. 
412 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actor, p. 23. 
413 Since 1949, the two countries had reached nongovernmental fishery agreements in 1955, 1963 and 1965 prior to 
normalizing relations in 1972. The 1975 agreement was revised and renewed in 1978 and 1985. 
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fishing vessels. The two sides also agreed to grant reciprocal fishing access to nationals of the 
other party in their undisputed EEZs.414 
Most notable is the exchange of notes between the two countries’ representatives, which are 
attached to the agreement as an appendix. In the notes, China and Japan agreed not to apply 
domestic fisheries law to citizens of the other party operating in waters south of 27°N and west of 
125°30’E,415  an area encompassing the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as well as its territorial and 
contiguous waters.416 The islands and its waters, however, are in effect excluded from the scope 
of the agreement, because Article 1 of the agreement specified that “[w]aters to which this 
agreement is applicable are the exclusive economic zone of the People’s Republic of China and the 
exclusive economic zone of Japan.”417 This exclusion, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, became a 
point of contention between Beijing and Tokyo during the 2010 fishing trawler collision. 
Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement 
China and Vietnam signed the Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin along 
with their maritime boundary delimitation agreement in 2000. Unlike China’s provisional fishery 
agreements with Japan and South Korea, the Sino-Vietnamese agreement is a permanent one based 
on a settled maritime boundary. According to this agreement, a three-layer structure comprised of 
a Common Fishery Zone (CFZ), a Transitional Fishing Zone (TFZ), and a buffer zone was 
established to address fishing conflict in the gulf. In the CFZ which straddles the demarcation line 
and stretches 30.5 nautical miles on each side into the two countries’ EEZs, fishing vessels from 
both countries are allowed to operate under the supervision of a bilateral joint committee. Each 
 
414 The Fisheries Agreement between the People’s Public of China and Japan [中华人民共和国和日本国渔业协定], 
Nov. 11, 1997, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/t556672.shtml, accessed Feb. 
22, 2018; Mallory, China in Global Fisheries, p. 153. 
415 The Fisheries Agreement between the People’s Public of China and Japan. 
416 The coordinates of the Diaoyu/Senkakus are 25°46’N, 123°31’E. 
417 The Fisheries Agreement between the People’s Public of China and Japan. Emphasis added. 
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party exercises jurisdiction in its own waters on the nationals and fishing ships from both sides. 
The TFZ, a four-year temporary arrangement, designate an area in which both parties gradually 
reduce fishing in the other country’s EEZ.418  
The buffer zone is an area stretching 10 nautical miles south along the division line of the two 
countries’ bordering territorial seas and extending 3 nautical miles on each side of the division line, 
which is intended for preventing fishery disputes should one party’s small fishing boats illegally 
enter the other’s territorial sea by mistake. The agreement stipulates that each country, if it finds 
in its own waters in the buffer zone small fishing boats from the other party conduct fishing 
activities, may issue a warning or take necessary actions to order the ships to leave that water area, 
but the party shall demonstrate restraints in doing so and avoid detention, arrest, punishment or 
use force.419 The buffer zone and its relevant clause is also distinctive in that no similar clause has 
been included in China’s other two bilateral fishery agreements. This buffer zone arrangement, 
with an emphasis on “no use of force,” was probably made in light of “small vessels lacking the 
technology to indicate whether they have crossed onto the wrong side” and the past armed fights 
involving fishermen from the two sides, according to some analysts.420 
China-South Korea Fishery Agreement 
China and South Korea concluded a provisional five-year fishery agreement in 2000, renewed 
annually since 2006. Like the Sino-Japanese fishery agreement, China and South Korea agree to 
establish a joint fishery committee to co-manage fishing operations in a PMZ carved out in the 
 
418  The Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Fishery 
Cooperation in the Beibu Bay [中华人民共和国政府和越南社会主义共和国政府北部湾渔业合作协定], China-
ASEAN Center [中国-东盟中心], http://www.asean-china-center.org/2000-12/25/c_13356744.htm, Dec. 25, 2000, 
accessed June 10, 2017.  
419 Ibid. 
420 Mallory, China in Global Fisheries, p. 160; Author’s interview, Singapore, August 2018. 
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Yellow Sea. The agreement also set up two TFZs on both sides of the PMZ that became absorbed 
into respective countries’ EEZs over the course of four years.421 
This agreement notwithstanding, there has been a rise in violent clashes between Chinese 
fishermen and South Korean maritime law enforcement personnel in in the past two decades, as I 
examine in detail in Chapter 10. The Yellow Sea indeed presents an intriguing case in two ways: 
first, the maritime dispute per se is perhaps the least contentious of the three seas, but the area has 
seen the highest frequency of fatal incidents; second, given the high frequency of fatal clashes, 
China’s propensity to de-escalate incidents in the Yellow Sea has been much clearer and stronger 
than in other disputed waters.  
Societal Actors: Media, Netizens, and Nationalist Activists 
While most day-to-day foreign policy issues are managed by technocrats at MFA and remain in 
large part under the radar of public opinion, the general public can become highly charged when 
it comes to sensitive issues such as those related to sovereignty and territorial integrity, and China’s 
relations with specific countries especially Japan and the United States. 422  Moreover, the 
commercialization of the Chinese media and the rapid spread of the Internet have tremendously 
increased the difficulty for Beijing to control information and manage grassroots pressures in times 
of crisis.  
Media commercialization has revolutionized the Chinese media sector in two ways. First, 
greater authority over programming and content has been delegated to lower levels in the media 
 
421 The Fisheries Agreement between the People’s Public of China and the Republic of Korea  [中华人民共和国政
府 和 大 韩 民 国 政 府 渔 业 协 定 ], Nov. 20, 2000, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/t556669.shtml, accessed Feb. 22, 2018. 
422 Susan Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy,” in Susan Shirk, ed., Changing Media, Changing China 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 225-226. 
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hierarchy, thus reducing the state’s intervention in media’s business decisions.423 Second, the 
primary goal of the media shifts from propaganda to making profits through advertising revenues 
and increased sales. As a result, commercial media tend to pander to the audience’s growing 
interest in global affairs and compete one other for eyeballs by “dramatizing international news 
events, exaggerating threats, and emphasizing conflict over cooperation.”424  
Meanwhile, the rapid spread of Internet use in China has considerably accelerated the speed at 
which international news travels, while at the same time providing platforms for public discourses 
and mass mobilization on foreign policy issues.425 By allowing netizens to interact through posts, 
responses and information sharing, the Internet enables “civic participation on a large scale that is 
impossible by any other means” in China, and in quite a few cases serves as “an action-oriented 
medium” for organizing anti-foreign street protests and online petitions. 426  The Internet also 
provides a space for sharing information that may otherwise be withheld from publicity in the 
traditional media, which is in general an easier target for state control and censorship. 
In addition, private citizens have come to the frontline of the maritime disputes. Specifically, 
since early 2000s, the PRC’s “Baodiao” (“Defending the Diaoyu Islands”) nationalists have been 
actively involved in the East China Sea disputes.427 Although Beijing permitted Baodiao voyages 
 
423 Daniela Stockmann, “What Kind of Information Does the Public Demand? Getting the News during the 2005 Anti-
Japanese Protests,” Shirk, ed., Changing Media, Changing China, p. 177. 
424 Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy,” p. 226. 
425 In 2005 there were 94 million Internet users in China. This figure quadrupled by the end of 2009 to 384 million 
and continued to grow exponentially. The number doubled in 2017, reaching 772 million, which makes up over half 
of the Chinese population. Junhao Hong, “The Internet and China’s Foreign Policy Making: The Impact of Online 
Public Opinions as a New Societal Force,” Lin Su and Yufan Hao, ed., China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal 
Force and Chinese American Policy (Florence: Routledge, 2017), p. 94; Cyberspace Administration of China [中华
人民共和国国家互联网信息办公室] and Office of Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission [中共中央网络安全和
信息化委员会办公室], “Chinese netizens reach a total of 772 million, Benefiting the Whole Population through the 
spread of the Internet Made New Progress” [中国网民规模达 7.72亿，互联网惠及全民取得新进展], Jan. 31, 2018, 
http://www.cac.gov.cn/2018-01/31/c_1122340463.htm, accessed Oct. 16, 2018. 
426 Hong, “The Internet and China’s Foreign Policy Making,” p. 95. 
427 Long before the PRC’s Baodiao groups came to the frontline of the East China Sea disputes, Baodiao activists from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan have undertaken a number of protest voyages to the Diaoyu/Senkakus in the 1980s and 1990s.  
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in 2003 and use the grassroots activism to demonstrate the domestic pressure that it faces, Chinese 
public security authorities maintained constant surveillance and restrictions on the Baodiao 
activists as any detention, injury or death of activists during encounters with the Japanese might 
well bode for an outburst of popular anti-Japanese emotions. Moreover, Beijing was worried that 
should any activists be detained by the Japanese government, it would provide Japan with an 
opportunity to assert its sovereignty claims to the Diaoyu/Senkakus by subjecting foreign citizens 
to its domestic laws.428 The Baodiao movement in Hong Kong also has been subject to increasing 
control by Beijing through the Special Administrative Region (SAR) authorities. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an overview of China’s maritime disputes in the East China Sea, South 
China Sea, and the Yellow Sea, and examines China’s evolving maritime defense strategy that has 
led to a gradual division of labor between the PLAN and the MLE agencies. Despite the various 
cross-system integrators that Beijing has set up or restructured, interagency coordination within 
the maritime security system remains a persistent challenge. At the same time, a growing number 
of subnational and societal actors with a diverse range of interests become actively involved in 









428 Author’s interviews, Shanghai and Beijing, June and July 2018. 





The East China Sea: A Highly Combustible Flashpoint 
 
 
In the East China Sea, either we have no problem, or when there are problems, they 
are bound to be big ones …The East China Sea is a highly combustible flashpoint. 
Once it is inflamed, a firestorm is only to be expected.429 
– Senior Colonel Zhou Bo 
Director of Security Cooperation Center  
Office for International Military Cooperation, Central Military Commission 
 
 
The Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea are comprised of four broad 
categories: territorial disputes, natural resources disputes, maritime boundary 
delimitation disputes, and military competition. The Diaoyu Islands dispute entails 
all the four types of disputes. For this reason, the dispute over the sovereignty of 
the Diaoyu Islands is the focal point as well as the flashpoint in the East China Sea 
controversies…Once we lose the Diaoyu Islands, what we will lose is not merely 
several square kilometers’ territories, but our jurisdiction over 220,000 square 
kilometers’ sea areas as well as our national dignity.430 
– Yu Zhirong 
Former Deputy Commander 
The China Maritime Surveillance East China Sea Corps 
 
 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku situation is potentially more dangerous than the South China 
Sea one and not just because the area is crowded with the ships and planes from the 
two countries that could collide at any time. Relations with Japan have always been 
a focal point of popular nationalism.431 
– Susan Shirk  
Chair of the 21st Century China Program  
Research Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego  
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4. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Lease and the Chunxiao Dispute 
In the post-Cold War era, China maintained a primarily conciliatory posture with Japan throughout 
the 1990s. Yet starting from the early 2000s, China and Japan became embroiled in continued 
tensions caused by their disputes over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the 
unsettled maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, which at times were compounded by the 
bilateral controversies over the wartime history. For most of the time during the past two decades, 
the East China Sea falls in the “propensity to escalate” area above the 45-degree borderline in the 
cost tradeoff model where domestic audience costs clearly prevail over international audience 
costs under most circumstances (Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 The East China Sea in the “Propensity to Escalate” Area 
 
This chapter traces China’s handling of two major incidents arising from the East China Sea 
disputes during the first decade of the 21st century, the 2002-2004 Diaoyu/Senkaku lease and the 
2004-2008 Chunxiao (which Japan later renamed as Shirakaba) gas field dispute. The disputes 
surfaced as bilateral relations took a downturn amid controversies over the wartime history and 
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Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine since his 
inauguration in 2001. The prevalence of domestic audience costs over international audience costs 
best explains China’s strong propensity to escalate in both episodes. At the top, the protracted 
leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao during this period and the two leaders’ 
divergent standpoints on Japan made a leadership consensus on maintaining good relations with 
Tokyo difficult to come about. Below the top, elite voices calling for a more strategic and moderate 
approach – or in its original term, a “new thinking” – towards Japan came under strong criticism 
by hardliners. Meanwhile, bureaucratic actors with institutional interests in supporting an assertive 
maritime policy began to capitalize on the flareup in the East China Sea to advance their own 
policy agenda. At the grassroots level, a string of bilateral controversies attracted wide public 
attention and easily inflamed the intense anti-Japanese sentiment that has been deeply ingrained in 
the Chinese national narrative. Popular backlash, along with the hardliner voices, forcefully 
silenced the “new thinking” advocates.  
 On the other hand, the deterioration of the Sino-Japanese relationship came at a time when 
Beijing entertained an optimistic outlook on its regional diplomacy and security environment. 
China had considerably improved its relations with the United States following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, worked closely with other regional stakeholders on critical issues in the neighborhood, 
and had actively participated in multilateral institutions in the region. The Chinese narrative of 
seeking “peaceful rise” was gaining some currency in the international community. Against this 
backdrop, the Sino-Japanese relationship stood out as an exception rather than the rule in China’s 
foreign relations; as such, from the Chinese perspective, a forceful response to Japan’s moves in 
the East China Sea would unlikely incur high geopolitical costs. Based on this tradeoff calculation, 
China escalated both the Diaoyu/Senkaku lease and the Chunxiao dispute during this period.  
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When information surfaced in late 2002 that Japan had been leasing part of the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus from the islands’ private owner, there was no fait accompli that Beijing 
perceived as truly having to be reversed or a likely fait accompli that needed to be deterred. 
Therefore, China undertook a restrained – or at most moderately strong – escalation along 
nonmilitary dimensions in the island lease dispute by lifting bans on Baodiao voyages originating 
from mainland China and allowing small-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations.  
In contrast, China responded to the 2004-2008 offshore gas field disputes with a combination 
of a strong nonmilitary escalation and a restrained military escalation. When facing a growing 
probability that Japan would permit its own oil companies to drill in the disputed area, China 
adopted escalatory measures that constituted a forceful nonmilitary escalation, including allowing 
the CMS to initiate maritime rights protection patrols in the area and unleashing nationwide anti-
Japanese protests. After Japan granted drilling permission to a Japanese oil company, which 
presented Beijing with a fait accompli, China then escalated the dispute militarily by dispatching 
a flotilla of PLA Navy warships to sail in the waters near the gas fields. This move, which was 
quickly denied by Beijing as targeting the gas field disputes and never recurred thereafter, was 
arguably a restrained demonstration of China’s resolve with the aim of rolling back the fait 
accompli and deterring further ones while avoiding disrupting the ongoing bilateral gas talks.  
In mid-2008, Beijing struck a deal with Tokyo on jointly developing the Est China Sea energy, 
which represented a major compromise by China on its longstanding position regarding joint 
development in the East China Sea. However, this deal, which was rushed through by the Chinese 
leadership and sidestepped key compromise-averse domestic stakeholders, soon proved to be 
untenable in the face of strong internal opposition and resistance. As a result, the deal virtually 
aborted without implementation. 
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2002-2004: THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU LEASE  
The tiny, uninhabited Diaoyu/Senkaku islands had fueled a protracted tussle between Chinese and 
Japanese nationalists. During the 1990s, contrasting the active Baodiao (“defending the 
Diaoyu/Diaoyutai”) movements in Hong Kong, Taiwan and even among overseas Chinese 
diasporas,432 Beijing had consistently restricted grassroots Baodiao activism in mainland China 
and had prevented protest voyages originating from the PRC territories, knowing clearly that such 
activism would alienate Japan at a time when China needed it most. A higher priority for Beijing 
at that time was to break out of the post-Tiananmen isolation and to forge ahead China’s reform 
by continuing and expanding its engagement with the international community, to which Japan 
was the most sympathetic G7 member. In addition, Beijing also persistently suppressed anti-
Japanese street protests over the island dispute during this decade.433 At the beginning of the 21st 
 
432 The movement of Baodiao was initiated by the ROC’s overseas diasporas in the early 1970s on the eve of U.S. 
reverting Okinawa to Japan. A surge of Baodiao activism was triggered in the 1990s when the Nihon Seinensha, a 
Japanese right-wing nationalist organization, applied to Japan’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) to register a 
lighthouse the organization built on Uotsurijima in 1978. Street protests erupted in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Baodiao 
activism surged again in 1996 when seven Seinensha activists landed on Kitajima to build a lighthouse on this island 
and applied for official recognition. In September, Baodiao activists sailed from Hong Kong to the Diaoyu/Senkakus 
to demolish the lighthouse. During this expedition, David Chan, one of the activists, was accidentally drowned. On 
October 6, the day on which Chan’s funeral was held, Baodiao activists from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan 
undertook another protest voyage, marking the first successful Chinese landing. Action Committee for Defending the 
Diaoyu Islands [ 保 釣 行 動 委 員 會 ], “A Chronology of Baodiao Events” [ 歷 年 保 釣 事 件 記 載 ], 
http://www.diaoyuislands.org/fwl/1.html, accessed Dec. 20, 2018; Edward A. Gargan, “Man Drowns during a Protest 
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century, the bilateral relationship continued to improve as both countries strived to manage their 
disputes in the East China Sea. The Sino-Japanese fishery agreement took effect in July 2000. In 
February 2001, the two sides concluded a mutual prior notification mechanism for marine 
scientific research activities, an issue that Tokyo had long worried about and pushed for in the face 
of growing Chinese activities in the region.434  
The relationship began to sour after Koizumi took office in April 2001 and started visiting the 
controversial Yasukuni shrine to fulfill his election campaign promise.435 Koizumi made his first 
visit on August 13, 2001 – apparently in an attempt to curtail the potential diplomatic fallout that 
such a visit could have caused had it fallen on August 15, the Japanese surrender anniversary. 
China protested the visit but noted that Koizumi had avoided the “most sensitive date,” namely, 
August 15.436 The two countries attempted to patch up the relationship by having Koizumi visit 
Beijing two months later. During his trip to Beijing, Koizumi visited the Marco Polo Bridge – the 
site where Japanese Imperial Army initiated the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937 – and delivered 
a speech there in which he clearly stated his apology and regret for the Chinese suffering inflicted 
by Japan’s aggression.437 During their summit, Chinese President Jiang Zemin told Koizumi that 
continuing Yasukuni visits would have major consequences for the bilateral relationship.438 
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Unlike his predecessors who ceased visiting Yasukuni upon Beijing’s protests while serving 
as prime minister,439 Koizumi paid a second visit in April 2002. This time the visit took a toll on 
the Sino-Japanese relationship. China’s Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing summoned Japanese 
Ambassador Anami Koreshige on the same day to lodge a strong protest, suggesting China’s 
perception of insincerity in Koizumi’s apology. 440 A few days later, the PLA suspended Japan’s 
Defense Agency Director General Nakatani Gen’s planned visit to Beijing.441 In August, Koizumi 
cancelled his upcoming trip to Beijing, where he was scheduled to attend ceremonies 
commemorating the 30th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. 
Against this backdrop of the renewed historical wounds, in December 2002 Japanese media 
revealed that since April the Government of Japan (GOJ) had secretly leased three of the five 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islets: Uotsurijima, Minami-Kojima and Kita-Kojima. Tokyo rationalized the use 
of leasing as a measure intended to prevent third-party purchase of or illegal landing on the 
islands.442  Koizumi’s spokesperson Misako Kaji claimed that the lease was meant to “avoid 
disputes with neighboring countries.”443 By the same token, a Japanese scholar in international law 
described the leasing as a “soft approach” because it involved “no more than an issue of land-use 
rights;” in contrast, it would have been “too harsh” had the GOJ made a purchase of the islands444 
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– a hypothetical scenario that unfortunately materialized a decade later and triggered the most 
serious crisis between the two neighbors since their normalization.   
But Beijing was not convinced by Tokyo’s explanation, insisting that the lease was a move 
with the aim of enabling a greater role for the GOJ in the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes. According to 
Gao Zhiguo, then head of the China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA) under the SOA, “Before, 
it had to do with the right-wingers – and their actions are not official. But now the [Japanese] 
government has leased the islands and the nature of the dispute has been changed 
fundamentally.” 445  The Chinese foreign ministry criticized the lease as “null and void” and 
protested against Japan’s “violation of China’s sovereignty.”446 On January 5, 2003, China’s Vice 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi summoned Japanese Ambassador Anami to lodge another protest over 
the lease. Calling the lease “unacceptable to China,” Wang demanded that Japan “correct its 
action.”447  
Tensions further intensified after information surfaced on January 8 that the GOJ had been 
leasing a fourth of the disputed islands, Kuba, since 1972.448 Drawing more ire from Beijing, 
Koizumi made a surprise visit to the Yasukuni shrine on January 14 – the third one since his 
inauguration.  
The Cost Trade-off: Domestic End Prevailed 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku leasing issue represented the first major diplomatic incident that China had 
with Japan after the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration took office in November 2002 at the 16th 
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Party Congress. The new leadership started their term with a clear understanding that forging a 
stable periphery was of utmost importance to China’s continued development and modernization. 
The Party Congress report, building on Deng Xiaoping’s good neighborly diplomacy, framed 
Beijing’s peripheral policy as one of “maintaining benign relations with neighbors, treating 
neighbors as partners” (与邻为善，以邻为伴).449 In an article published in February 2003 in the 
party’s top policy journal Qiu Shi, Wang Yi, then China’s Vice Foreign Minister, fleshed out what 
the peripheral policy articulated at the Party Congress meant for China’s management of relations 
with its neighbors. Coming to the Sino-Japanese relationship specifically, Wang wrote: “While 
continuing to urge Japan to squarely face the history issue… [China and Japan] will strive to 
identify and enhance the two countries’ new common interests, strengthen bilateral coordination 
and cooperation, draw upon our respective advantages, and share the responsibilities of 
rejuvenating Asia.”450  
The Hu-Wen administration soon began to signal its willingness to move beyond thorny 
bilateral issues and reconcile with Japan. In May 2003 Hu held his first meeting with Koizumi in 
St. Petersburg. This meeting was remarkable for Hu’s complete lack of mention of the Yasuku or 
Diaoyu/Senkaku leasing issue. With only a passing reference to the “unfortunate past,” Hu instead 
highlighted his involvement in “Sino-Japanese friendship work” in the 1980s and the 2000-year 
history of positive interactions between the two countries, telling Koizumi that friendship and 
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cooperation remained the mainstream of the bilateral relationship.451 Hu stressed his strong desire 
that Japan would properly handle the history and Taiwan issues, both of which were vital to the 
political foundation of the bilateral relationship.452 The fact that Hu elevated the history issue to 
the same level of importance as Taiwan implied that at the time there was virtually as little room 
for Hu to compromise on Japan as he could on Taiwan. In September, Wu Bangguo, officially 
number two Party leader (outranking Wen Jiabao) and Chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the NPC, paid an official visit to Japan and attended the reception in Tokyo celebrating the 25th 
anniversary of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty.453 During his trip, 
Wu explicitly told NHK and Nikkei, “The new Chinese leadership upholds a friendly Japan 
policy.”454  
Their aspiration to stabilize the relationship notwithstanding, the Hu-Wen leadership was 
facing an audience costs tradeoff calculation clearly dominated by the domestic end.  
High Domestic Audience Costs: Constrained New Leadership, Thwarted “New Thinking”  
At the top, with the presence of deep divisions within the Chinese leadership in the early years of 
the Hu-Wen administration, a strong clear consensus prioritizing the maintenance of a healthy 
Sino-Japanese relationship was hard to come by.455 While stepping down in 2002 as the party chief, 
Jiang Zemin managed to maintain his influence on decision-making not only by retaining the 
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chairmanship of the powerful CMC but also by filling the Politburo and its Standing Committee 
with his close allies. 456  As a result, Hu Jintao’s diplomacy toward Japan was profoundly 
constrained by the presence of a strong Jiang faction, even though Hu, unlike Jiang who had 
traumatic wartime experience and was widely believed to harbor strong antagonism against Japan, 
did not have personal burden and had clearly signaled his intention to build a future-oriented 
relationship with Japan.457  
Below the top, the compromise-averse coalition forcefully asserted its dominance over 
moderate voices in a year-long grand debate around the issue of whether or not China should adopt 
a “new thinking” toward Japan, namely, a moderate perception and policy toward Japan. The grand 
debate was initiated in December 2002 when Ma Licheng, a senior commentator at the People’s 
Daily, penned a long article explicitly calling for a “new thinking” toward Japan. Criticizing “the 
tyranny of [nationalistic] public opinion under the banner of ‘patriotism’” which had led to verbal 
attacks and even physical assaults on Chinese celebrities labeled as being pro-Japan, Ma cautioned 
against the potential dangers of the worsening Sino-Japanese mutual perceptions. What made Ma’s 
“new thinking” particularly controversial to Chinese eyes was his assertion that the issue of Japan 
apologizing for its history of aggression “has already been resolved” and that China should stop 
being obsessed with the issue of how the apology was expressed or made. Moreover, Ma contended 
that China should be ready to accept Japan’s aspiration of becoming a political and military great 
power.458  
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Ma’s argument was supported by Shi Yinhong, a renowned IR scholar at Renmin University 
who was appointed as an advisor to the State Council in 2011. In an article published in April 2003, 
Shi approached this issue from a strategic viewpoint, arguing that engagement with Japan would 
be a vital step to improve China’s overall external security environment by concentrating on the 
prevention of Taiwan independence and balancing against pressures from the United States. To 
repair relations with Japan, Shi offered five policy prescriptions for the Hu-Wen leadership: 1) 
stop pressuring Japan with the history issue and be satisfied with Japan’s apology for the time 
being; 2) continue to expand economic ties with Japan, and express gratitude for Japan’s provision 
of ODA to China; 3) build mutual trust and stop overreacting to the small probability of a revival 
of Japanese militarism; 4) welcome Japan’s participation in regional security, political, and 
economic affairs as a great power; and 5) support Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council.459 In a follow-up article, Shi further contended that China should not allow itself 
to be held hostage to history and the Chinese foreign policy should be driven by pragmatic strategic 
considerations rather than by emotions.460  
In light of the Hu-Wen administration’s clear interest in improving relations with Japan, the 
“new thinking” discourse was perceived by Japanese observers as being initiated and used by the 
new leadership as a “trial balloon” on Japan policy.461 Information from interviews with Chinese 
interlocutors implied that this discourse had at least received acquiescence “from the top.” As 
explained by a knowledgeable Japan expert, “without the greenlight from the top, it is very unlikely 
that such a discussion would allowed be initiated by someone associated with the People’s 
 
459 Shi Yinhong [时殷鸿], “Sino-Japanese engagement and diplomatic revolution” [中日接近与外交革命], Strategy 
and Management, 2003, issue 2, pp. 71-75. 
460 Shi Yinhong, “Strategic thinking on Sino-Japanese relations” [关于中日关系的理性思考], World Economics and 
Politics, 2003, issue 9, pp. 10-11. 
461 See, for example, Hiroyuki Sugiyama, “People’s Daily slams anti-Japan rhetoric,” Yomiuri Shimbun, Dec. 12, 2002.  
- 153 - 
 
Daily.”462 This explanation is consistent with other scholarly accounts. According to James Reilly, 
both Ma and Shi “had informal discussions with officials” both before and after their “new thinking” 
essays were published. Hu Jintao reportedly said in a closed-door meeting that China should 
improve ties with Japan, as this would provide greater leverage vis-à-vis the United States. 463 At 
the same time, however, the Hu-Wen leadership seemed to have carefully avoided leaving any 
definitive indication of the “new thinking” discourse being officially sanctioned – most likely out 
of concerns about potential backlashes against the new leadership. A Japan expert personally 
acquainted with Ma recalled when he asked Ma in private whether he (Ma) was instructed by the 
top to initiate the debate, Ma “neither admitted nor denied” it.464 
Ma and Shi soon came under ferocious attacks by hardliners in the Chinese foreign policy 
community, populist intellectuals as well as by the general public. Lin Zhibo, another senior 
commentator at the People’s Daily, published two lengthy articles in mid-2003 rebutting the “new 
thinking.” Asserting that “[t]here is no extreme or narrow-minded nationalism in China,” Lin 
contended that radical expressions made by the Chinese public was “an emotional illustration” of 
the Chinese people’s opposition to “Japan’s new militarism and its anti-Chinese words and deeds” 
and were only intended to “defend our national dignity and interests.”465 Lin also took on Shi’s 
argument, contending that Japan would not strengthen Sino-Japanese relations to balance against 
the U.S. as Shi would hope because the U.S.-Japanese relationship in essence resembled one 
between “the master and his servant.” On the history issue, Lin claimed, the pragmatism that Shi 
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advocated “sacrifice[s] principles for material benefits” and would only further embolden the 
Japanese right-wingers.466  
In June, Jin Xide, a prominent Northeast Asia expert at CASS, criticized the “new thinking” 
advocates in an interview for “completely neglecting the important premise that China’s Japan 
policy cannot be insulated from the Chinese people’s feeling.” The Chinese public’s strong 
sentiments toward Japan, Jin asserted, were “not up to the decision by any individual or 
administration.”467 Taking an even more radical approach than Lin and Jin, Zhang Ruizhuang, a 
Berkeley-trained IR scholar at Nankai University, bluntly called the “new thinking” discourse “a 
siege on nationalism, a killing of national spirit, a suppression of national sentiments, and a 
distortion of national characteristics.”468 In September, at a CASS conference to launch a new book 
coauthored by Lin and Jin on the “new thinking” discourse, Zhu Shaowen, a Japan-educated 
economist at CASS, stated plainly that “China does not need ‘new thinking’ – Japan does.”469  
Attacks on the “new thinking” advocates from the general public was even more fierce, as the 
Chinese popular perceptions of Japan rapidly deteriorated over the course of the debate. Apart 
from the Yasukuni controversies, a series of high-salience incidents at the time considerably 
intensified the grassroots anti-Japanese sentiments. In August 2003, 36 Chinese workers were 
infected by chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese Imperial Army in Qiqihar, Heilongjiang 
Province. In September, a group of some 400 Japanese tourists was reported to have engaged 
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Chinese prostitutes in Guangdong. In October, a risqué skit by three Japanese students and one of 
their teachers at Northwestern University in Xi’an provoked massive anti-Japanese protests by 
local students. A biannual nationwide survey conducted by the Institute of Japanese Studies of 
CASS in the falls of 2002 and 2004 reported that respondents either having “no favorable view” 
or an “unfavorable view” toward Japan rose from 43.3 in 2002 percent to 53.6 percent in 2004.470  
In this context of worsening popular perceptions of Japan, the “new thinking” advocates were 
disparaged by the general public as “traitors” and “thieves selling out the nation.” Moreover, Ma 
Licheng’s home address and phone number were publicized on the Internet. A few netizens even 
threatened to burn down his residence and sent him death threats.471 As of summer 2003, Ma had 
to take an early retirement from the People’s Daily, left Beijing, and became a commentator at the 
Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV.472 Shi Yinhong was also under attacks by the public, and soon 
became silent and refrained from openly discussing his views on the “new thinking” discourse.473 
At the same time, China’s Japan experts began to request being quoted anonymously by the media 
in order to avoid being attacked by the public. As observed by Liu Xiaobiao, a researcher at CASS, 
in the wave of strong popular reactions to the “new thinking” debate, “[a]nyone expressing 
moderate or critical views at odds with the extreme nationalism would be denounced.”474 Some 
moderates attempted to steer the discussion back to a healthy, impassionate manner. Feng Zhaokui, 
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a veteran Japan hand at CASS, cautioned, “the period of war and confrontation between China and 
Japan is long gone; and therefore, we should not label people who care about China’s national 
interests and speak up on the thorniest issues in Chinese foreign policy as ‘traitors’ or ‘thieves that 
sell out the country.’”475 
During the course of the debate, quite a few of Japan’s actions further aggravated the 
vulnerability of the “new thinking” advocates as well as undermined the Hu-Wen leadership’s 
ability to endorse a moderate Japan policy. Following Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit in January 2003, 
Lin Zhibo wrote sarcastically: “What an irony that shortly after some people claimed that ‘the 
issue of apology has been resolved,’ Koizumi made a record-breaking visit to the Yasukuni shrine 
for the third time. What does it tell? It shows that Japan, by its own words and deeds, has made it 
clear to the world: the issue of apology and repentance has not been resolved yet.”476 Koizumi’s 
fourth Yasukuni visit on the New Year’s Day 2004, coming on the heels of the Hu-Wen 
administration’s overture to improve relations with Japan, was seen as a blatant disregard for the 
new Chinese leadership’s goodwill. Tang Jiaxuan, then State Councilor and China’s top-ranking 
diplomat, criticized Koizumi’s 2004 visit in his memoir, “Regrettably, Prime Minister Koizumi 
did not carefully think about and understand President Hu’s words [at the St. Petersburg 
meeting].”477 At that point, even some moderates in the “new thinking” debate began to change 
their positions, which were rendered increasingly untenable by Koizumi’s insistence on visiting 
the shrine. Feng Zhaokui deplored in the last of the four articles he penned for the debate, “You 
cannot clap with one hand…Japan needs a new thinking on China as much as China needs it 
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conversely on Japan…now the ball is in Japan’s hand and it is time for the Japanese government 
to make a political response.”478 
By early 2004, the “new thinking” discourse had been effectively muzzled by the chorus of 
voices from foreign policy hardliners, populists and the nationalistic public. The downfall of the 
“new thinking,” which reflected the potentially huge domestic costs that the Hu-Wen leadership 
might incur should they opt for a moderate Japan policy, seemed to have major implications for 
Beijing’s management of bilateral incidents in this period. 
While some scholars remain skeptical of whether and how domestic audiences in China can 
effectively channeled their opinion into – and thus exert influence on – the Chinese foreign policy 
process,479 the “new thinking” debate indicates that the Chinese policy makers are attentive to 
signs of potential domestic costs which were revealed in the discourse. James Reilly reports that 
during the debate, the Chinese Foreign Ministry convened several times with a number of experts 
to receive updates. In these discussions, Foreign Ministry officials claimed that they were “closely 
monitoring the Internet discussion.”480 Interviews with Chinese government and academic sources 
largely confirmed Reilly’s accounts. As acknowledged by a former MFA diplomat, the strong 
public reactions to the “new thinking” discourse generated substantial pressures on Beijing when 
formulating its subsequent Japan policy.481 Another Japan expert observed: “Even though the Hu-
Wen leadership had the intention to improve relations [with Japan], willingness [from the top] 
alone was not enough to make the change. Opposition from domestic politics and the public was 
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too huge to overcome. Facing the great popular pressures, people tended to refrain from saying 
anything positive about Japan – Japan bashing became politically correct…To a substantial extent, 
the public opinion as reflected in this grand debate shaped the overall direction of China’s Japan 
policy in the whole Hu-Wen era: extremely difficult to make any compromise, kept talking tough 
at least.”482  
Reassuring the International Community: China’s Commitment to “Peaceful Rise” 
As of the beginning of the 21st century, China had successfully broken out of its post-Tiananmen 
diplomatic isolation and established an overall reputation as a pro-status-quo, engaging, and 
increasingly sophisticated and constructive player in the international arena.483 Asian countries 
were looking on China as an accommodating and increasingly vital neighbor offering great 
economic opportunities. 484  Meanwhile, there was a growing concern in the international 
community that China’s rapid emergence might destabilize the region as well as the international 
order – the “China threat theory” in the Chinese foreign policy lexicon. In order to counter the 
growing “China threat” rhetoric, Beijing in 2003 began to articulate its commitment to “peaceful 
rise” (later reworded as “peaceful development”) and made it a basic principle of Chinese foreign 
and security policy.485 
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When the Diaoyu/Senkaku leasing episode occurred, the potential international audience costs 
appeared to be low on several key fronts should China choose to make an escalatory response.  
The U.S. front was of the utmost importance in China’s calibration of its Japan policy; and 
indeed, the China-U.S.-Japan triangle was considered by Beijing as, according to the annual 
bluebook published by the MFA-affiliated China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), “the 
most crucial exogenous factor” in shaping the direction of the Sino-Japanese relationship.486  
The broad U.S.-China relations were quite cordial at the time, or in the words of U.S. Secretary 
of State Colin Powell, “the best they have been since President Nixon's first visit [in 1972],”487 
despite heightened tensions between Beijing and Washington in the first several months of the 
Bush administration.488 In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the resulting shift in Washington’s 
national security priorities, Beijing aptly grabbed the opportunity to stabilize relations with 
Washington. 489  Being one of the very first countries condemning the attacks and offering 
condolences to the U.S., China also cooperated with the U.S. by leveraging its special ties with 
Pakistan to secure Islamabad’s cooperation in the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.490 
Washington reciprocated by listing the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Muslim 
separatist organization founded by pro-Xinjiang-independence Uyghur militants, as an 
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international terrorist organization with links to Al Qaeda. This move, while reassuring Beijing on 
the Xinjiang issue, signaled that the U.S. was treating China “as a partner in the War on Terror.”491 
The positive momentum in U.S.-China relations was sustained into the Hu-Wen era as the two 
countries expanded their cooperation on major regional issues central to their security interests 
including North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs and the provocative cross-strait policies 
adopted Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian.492  
In this context, even though China watched warily as the Bush administration started to revamp 
the U.S.-Japan alliance for the post-Cold-War world that in effect encouraged Japanese 
rearmament,493 the Chinese leadership did not view the U.S. front as a major source of geopolitical 
costs specifically in the event of a Diaoyu/Senkaku contingency. Moreover, Washington had long 
been reluctant to clarify whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands fell within the scope of the 1960 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as defined by Article 5 of the document. 494  In 1996 when the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute flared up between Japan on the one hand and Hong Kong and Taiwan on 
the other, then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale told the New York Times that 
Washington “takes no position on who owns the islands” and that “American forces would not be 
compelled by the treaty to intervene in a dispute over them.”495 Calls for a U.S. clarification 
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emerged as the policy community in Washington drew up plans for rejuvenating the alliance. In 
2000, a study group led by Richard Armitage, who served as Deputy Secretary of State in Bush’s 
first term, at the U.S. National Defense University released a report (a.k.a. the first Armitage-Nye 
report), recommending that Washington should “reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan 
and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands.”496 While 
the Bush administration took its cue from the Armitage-Nye report in strengthening the alliance, 
it did not follow the recommendation of the report to reaffirm the application of the treaty to the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus. Up until 2004, Washington had never made – and had indeed “been resisting” 
making – a clear official statement confirming the application of the treaty to the contested islets, 
despite Tokyo’s consistent push for a “symbolic statement” to clarify Washington’s treaty 
obligations in a Diaoyu/Senkaku scenario.497  
The Diaoyu/Senkaku issue indeed caught the United States in a complex predicament in two 
ways. First, in the context of U.S.-Japan alliance, it caught Washington in a classical alliance 
security dilemma.498 To clearly reaffirm the coverage of the islands by the treaty would risk 
emboldening Japan and even entrapping the U.S. in a Sino-Japanese conflict over the uninhabited 
islets. However, to rigidly evade such a reaffirmation would likely risk America’s reputation as a 
credible ally while encouraging Chinese adventurism. As plainly put by a former U.S. government 
official, “You want to have a certain amount of deterrence there to dissuade adventurism…but at 
the same time you don’t want to create the expectation that we would be eager to come and be 
involved in a conflict.”499 Second, in the context of U.S.-China relations, there is a fundamental 
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asymmetry between China’s interests and those of the United States in the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue. 
Beijing clearly sees its interests as directly related to the regime’s nationalist credential and 
legitimacy, whereas Washington’s primary concerns are regional stability and the security of its 
Japanese ally. This “asymmetry of interests,” as termed by Alexander George, makes it 
intrinsically difficult for the U.S. treaty commitment – be it clarified or not – to function as a 
credible deterrence in a Diaoyu/Senkaku scenario.500 
South Korea had traditionally been another important front in Beijing’s calibration of its Japan 
policy; but rather than representing another source of geopolitical costs, the South Korean front 
was seen as a source of support and partnership for Beijing on both issues of maritime disputes 
and wartime history with Japan. South Korea and Japan are long locked in a bilateral territorial 
dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the Sea of Japan. In addition, South Korea insists 
that its continental shelf in the East China Sea ends at the Okinawa Trough,501 a claim that China 
shares and based on which Beijing even sought to form a united front with Seoul in 2012 to counter 
Japan’s claim.502  
The history issue between South Korea and Japan has been as thorny as that between China 
and Japan, and for this reason it was seen favorably by Chinese analysts as another useful wedge 
between Seoul and Tokyo. In April 2001, Seoul recalled its ambassador to Japan to protest what it 
perceived as a whitewash of Japan’s wartime atrocities in a revised history textbook approved by 
the Japanese Ministry of Education.503 As noted by Jin Xide, a Northeast Asia expert at CASS,  
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The postwar ROK-Japan political and security ties were sustained primarily 
through the U.S. which works as the ‘hub,’ and there is no strong endogenous driver 
to strengthen the bilateral relationship. The root cause of this problem is that the 
two sides have not yet reached a consensus on Japan’s colonial rule in Korea, which 
has resulted in lack of a solid political foundation and mutual trust.504 
Even after Roh Moo-hyun became South Korea’s president in 2003 and came into office with a 
pragmatic agenda to improve ties with Japan, Beijing was confident that ROK-Japan relations 
would remain heavily constrained by the fundamental disagreement on history as well as by the 
strong anti-Japanese emotions in the South Korean public.505 In the wake of Koizumi’s Yasukuni 
visit on the News Year’s Day of 2004, according to Ming Wan, a Japan expert at George Mason 
University, it was even “encouraging” for Beijing to see a stronger Korean reaction to this visit 
than over prior ones.506  
Lastly, potential geopolitical costs on the Southeast Asian front also appeared to be low. The 
Diaoyu/Senkaku lease came at a time when Beijing was indeed scoring a spectacular success in its 
charm offensive toward ASEAN. Following a widely applauded response to the Asian Financial 
Crisis in late 1990s, China further reassured its Southeast Asian neighbors by signing the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 and completed its 
official accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2003. 
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China’s Restrained Nonmilitary Escalation 
Seeing a cost trade-off calculation clearly tilting toward the domestic end, Beijing opted for an 
escalatory response to the Diaoyu/Senkaku lease. Meanwhile, Beijing did not seem to perceive the 
lease as presenting a fait accompli that must be reversed. The Chinese Foreign Ministry routinely 
criticized the lease as “invalid” and vaguely demanded Japan “correct its wrongdoing” without 
specification – a stark contrast with Beijing’s clear, repeated demand in 2012 that Japan revoke 
the island purchase. 507 Without a perceived fait accompli to roll back, China tended to be risk 
averse and thus undertook a restrained nonmilitary escalation by quietly relaxing restrictions on 
mainland-originating Baodiao voyages in mid-2003. The detention of the mainland Baodiao 
activists by Japan in March 2004 presented Beijing with an increased possibility of having a fait 
accompli should Tokyo choose to subject the Chinese nationals to Japanese domestic law, which 
in the Chinese perception would set a legal precedent negatively biased toward China’s 
sovereignty claims to the Diaoyu/Senkakus. Therefore, Beijing stepped up its escalatory measures 
by permitting small-scale street protests and selectively cancelling nonessential diplomatic events 
to dissuade Japan from pursuing the legal path.  
In June 2003, thirteen Baodiao activists sailed from Zhejiang before being blocked by the Japan 
Coast Guard (JCG) in waters close to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.508 It was the first time that 
activists were permitted to sail protest voyages from the Chinese mainland.509 In August, nine 
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members of the Japanese right-wing organization Seinensha landed on the islands.510 In October, 
a group of activists from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan sailed another protest voyage. 
Although the Baodiao boat was again blocked by the JCG, Chinese state media featured photos of 
this voyage, which was the first time that the state media had endorsed such acts.511 In January 
2004, the Baodiao activists made another unsuccessful attempt to land on the islands.  
The prospect of a major change in China’s policy on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, according 
to a former senior U.S. government official, opened a “fertile ground” for Japan to push 
Washington for a reaffirmation of U.S. treaty obligation covering the islands.512  In February 2004, 
Washington weighed in and began to underscore the coverage of Japan-administered territories by 
the treaty. Speaking to the Japanese media in Tokyo, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage stated that treaty “would require any attack on Japan, or the administrative territories 
under Japanese control, to be seen as an attack on the United States,”513 although he did not 
explicitly refer to the Diaoyu/Senkakus and seemed to be merely restating the language of the 
treaty. Beijing did not respond to Armitage’s remarks until a week later when asked by media for 
comments on Armitage’s remark. In what appeared to be an effort to avoid scolding Washington, 
Beijing laid blame entirely on Tokyo as the MFA spokesperson Zhang Qiyue stated, “We firmly 
oppose and absolutely reject any attempts by the Japanese side to manipulate words and deeds by 
a third party to pressure China on the Diaoyu Islands issue.”514  
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Despite Armitage’s statement, the Chinese Baodiao voyages continued. On March 24, 2004, 
seven Baodiao activists landed on the Diaoyu/Senkakus – the first successful landing by mainland 
Chinese activists. The JCG detained all seven activists on the grounds that they violated Japanese 
immigration law and transferred them to Okinawa – the first time that Japanese authorities had 
arrested Chinese nationals for landing on the islands.515 MOFA summoned Chinese Ambassador 
Wu Dawei to lodge an official protest against what Japan perceived as an intrusion by Chinese 
nationals.516 In Beijing, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui summoned the Japanese 
Charge d’Affaires Harada Chikahito, demanding Japan release the activists immediately and 
unconditionally. Otherwise, Zhang warned, the situation would be “complicated and escalated.”517 
Meanwhile, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a statement calling for a “negotiated solution” 
to the detention.518 Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi defended the detention as “the result of strictly 
in conformity with the law,” but he also urged both parties to handle the case as calmly as 
possible.519 
On the same day, small-scale street protests were permitted to take place in Beijing to illustrate 
the Chinese public’s fury with the detention as well as Japan’s occupation of the Diaoyu/Senkakus. 
Some 100 protesters gathered outside the Japanese Embassy, holding banners calling for the return 
of the islands to China to “end national humiliation and rejuvenate the country.”520 Demonstrations 
were allowed to resume the next day. Protesters trampled on and burned Japanese flags in front of 
the embassy,521 a scene that came as a shock to the Japanese diplomats. In the words of Japanese 
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Ambassador Anami, “burning flags has never happened in front of the embassy in the presence of 
Chinese police.”522 Demonstrations were also staged at the Japanese Consulate in Guangzhou.  
Outside the mainland, Baodiao activists and the public in Hong Kong exerted extra pressures 
on Beijing to take a tough stand against Japan. Lo Chau, spokesperson of the Hong Kong-based 
Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands, said, “Although Beijing has adopted a 
stronger stance toward Japan over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands, it is still not tough enough.”523 
The independent Ming Pao published a charged editorial, which urged Beijing to protect the 
Baodiao activists and “dump its policy of mollifying Japan” on issues concerning national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.524 
While giving the greenlight to the anti-Japanese protests, Beijing carefully prevented them 
from snowballing into larger-scale ones that could further fuel anti-Japanese hostilities in the 
public as Chinese diplomats were striving to negotiate with Japan for a quick resolution. Police 
prevented passersby from participating in the protests.525 The Central Propaganda Department 
quickly issued internal orders prohibiting Chinese media coverage on these protests.526  
Amid the escalating Sino-Japanese tensions over the Diaoyu/Senkakus, Washington made its 
first official, unequivocal reaffirmation that the U.S. treaty obligations extends to the contested 
islands. On March 24, when asked to comment on the Baodiao landing, the State Department’s 
spokesperson Adam Ereli stated:  
The Senkaku Islands have been under the administrative control of the Government 
of Japan since having been returned as part of the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. 
Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security states 
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that the treaty applies to the territories under the administration of Japan; thus, 
Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. 527  
This time Beijing did not even openly respond to Washington’s reaffirmation – probably as Beijing 
at the time had high hopes of securing Washington’s continued cooperation in curbing Taiwan’s 
President Chen Shui-bian, who was just reelected on March 20 and started his second term with 
what Beijing regarded as an even more radical Taiwan independence agenda.528 As some Chinese 
analysts expressly noted when evaluating the U.S.-China-Japan triangular relations, “the existence 
of the Taiwan issue means that China must maintain a stable U.S.-China relations.”529 
On March 25, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo summoned Harada again to push 
for an immediate release of the Chinese activists. Dai stated that China “will never accept the 
application of Japanese domestic law to this incident.”530  
In addition, Beijing seemed to also have selectively canceled a few non-essential diplomatic 
events to make a symbolic protest. On the night of March 25, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wu 
Dawei abstained from a cherry blossom viewing party, an annual gathering of diplomats in Tokyo 
hosted by Japan’s farm minister. From the Japanese perspective, Wu’s absence was likely intended 
 
527  U.S. State Department Press Briefing Transcript, Mar. 24, 2004, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/30743.htm, accessed Dec. 29, 2018. Emphasis added. 
528 As of Taiwan’s 2004 March presidential election, the perception and interest gap between Washington and Taipei 
was running wide and deep, and Washington’s dissatisfaction with Chen’s provocative cross-Strait policy was even 
stronger and all the more manifest. A congressional testimony by James Kelly, then Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asia on April 21 was seen as the “most negative statement of U.S. policy on Taiwan ever delivered publicly” and 
for the first time Washington openly implied its support for Taiwan’s democracy was limited. James A. Kelly, 
Assistant Secretary of State or East Asia and Pacific Affairs, “Overview of U.S. Policy toward Taiwan,” testimony at 
House International Relations Committee, Washington D.C., Apr. 21, 2004, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm, accessed Dec. 26, 2019; Dalei Jie, The Rise and Fall of Taiwan 
Independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Pennsylvania, 2012), p. 164. 
529 Zha Daojiong [查道炯], “Changes in Japan’s China policy in the post-Cold War era and China’s response” [冷战
后日本对华政策的变化与中国的对策], Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies [当代亚太], issue 11, 2004, 
p. 19. 
530 “MFA made solemn presentation to the Japanese side” [我外交部向日方提出严正交涉], People’s Daily, Mar. 
26, 2004. 
- 169 - 
 
to be a protest over the detention because Wu had confirmed that he would attend the event.531 A 
pre-scheduled bilateral meeting in Beijing for discussions on definitions under UNCLOS was also 
cancelled.532 
At the same time, Tokyo began to signal its intention to curb the ramifications of this episode 
on the bilateral relations. Koizumi stated on March 25 that he would like to see the incident be 
“handled in such a way that it will not stymie the overall Japan-China relations.” Japan’s Vice 
Foreign Minister Abe Masatoshi expressed his hope that Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko’s 
planned trip to China in early April would not be affected by the incident.533 On the same day, the 
JCG banned a Japanese nationalist group from sailing to one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets, the first 
instance since 1997.534 Tokyo’s signals were not lost on Beijing. While cancelling a few non-
essential diplomatic events, Beijing refrained from postponing or cancelling Kawaguchi’s pre-
scheduled trip to Beijing on April 3-4.535  
On March 26, the Okinawa police handed the Chinese activists over to Japanese immigration 
authorities for deportation – a move that came apparently as a political decision by Koizumi to de-
escalate the diplomatic brawl with Beijing.536 
A Truce of Island Landing 
On March 26, upon their return to China, the seven Baodiao activists were immediately taken into 
custody.537 Public security authorities warned a leading activist against talking to the media or 
 
531 “China envoy fails to attend party hosted by Japanese minister,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 25, 2004. 
532  James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Not Quite All about Sovereignty – But Close,” Comparative 
Connections, vol. 6, issue 2, July 2004.  
533 “Japan downplays fallout from isle dispute on ties with China,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 25, 2004. 
534 “Japan bans political group from sailing for disputed islands,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 25, 2004. 
535 “Japanese official hopes island dispute not to hurt ties with China,” BBC, Mar. 25, 2004. 
536 “7 Chinese activists deported to China,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 26, 2004. 
537 “The seven Baodiao warriors taken away by public security upon arrival in Shanghai” [7 保钓勇士返沪遭公安带
走], Boxun [博讯], Mar. 27, 2004, https://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2004/03/200403272147.shtml, accessed Aug. 14, 
2019. 
- 170 - 
 
organizing any further protests, and reportedly complained, “You guys have caused us a lot of 
trouble with this.”538 Beijing re-imposed the ban on mainland-originating Baodiao voyages and 
blocked subsequent ones slated for late March, April and July.539  
After the 2004 Baodiao episode, Beijing and the LDP government reportedly agreed upon a 
tacit truce on tug of island landing war as well as upon a modus vivendi to manage subsequent 
contingencies in the Diaoyu/Senkaku area. Under this “secret pact,” Japan would prevent landings 
of Chinese nationals on the Diaoyu/Senkakus and promised not to detain them “unless it develops 
into a case of grave concerns.” In kind, China promised to block the activists’ ships from setting 
sail.540 Interviews with former Chinese MLE officials, Chinese analysts and scholars close to the 
maritime security establishment, as well as with Japanese defense analysts, largely confirmed that 
there used to be practices by both sides along the line of “no departure, no detention.”541 This 
modus vivendi fell apart amidst the 2010 fishing trawler collision when the DPJ government 
threatened to subject the Chinese fishing skipper to Japan’s domestic law. Beijing then openly 
denied that such a “secret deal” ever existed.542  
Beijing’s commitment to continue blocking mainland-originating Baodiao voyages (and 
increasingly Hong Kong-originating voyages as well through the SAR authorities) seems to be 
motivated not only by concerns about diplomatic fallout from such activities but also by the limited 
value of such actions from a legal perspective. In a 2004 study of a ruling by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) on an island sovereignty dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, Zhang 
 
538 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, p. 146. 
539 “Chinese activists plan new trips to Senkaku isles Sun.,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 25, 2004; Manicom, 
Bridging Troubled Water, p. 53. 
540 “New Japan leaders broke secret islet pact with China: media,” Agence France Presse, Oct. 18, 2010. 
541 Author’s interviews, Shanghai, June 2017; Beijing, August 2017; Tokyo August 2018. 
542 MFA, “There is no so-called ‘secret deal’ between China and Japan on the Diaoyu Island issue” [中日在钓鱼岛
问 题 上 根 本 不 存 在 所 谓 “ 密 约 ”], Oct. 21, 2010, 
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Haiwen, an international law expert at CIMA, concluded, “To seize the initiative in the final 
resolution [to an island dispute], the claimant country must demonstrate its exercise of sovereign 
power over the disputed island(s) through legislative, administrative and jurisdictional actions, in 
particular through occupation and effective control.” In contrast, Zhang noted, activities that do 
not specifically demonstrate the state’s exercise of sovereign power over the disputed territory 
including traditional fishing activities and grassroots island landing activities “bear no 
international legal effects.”543 
2004-2008: THE CHUNXIAO GAS FIELD DISPUTE 
China became a net oil importer in 1993 and had since confronted an ever-deepening energy angst 
as its energy consumption continued to grow. The fact that most of China’s onshore mature oil 
fields had been heavily exploited and their outputs started to stagnate or even decline at the outset 
of the 21st century only aggravated Beijing’s anxiety about the country’s energy security.544 In 
China’s tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), energy security was for the first time highlighted and 
elevated to a national strategic priority. The plan also contained a list of measures for meeting the 
country’s growing energy demand, including the acceleration of natural gas exploration and 
production (E&P) and the promotion of natural gas consumption as a major supplement to oil (油
气并举).545 In light of this energy security strategy, Beijing also prioritized the construction and 
 
543 Zhang Haiwen [张海文] and Liu Fuqiang [刘富强], “An overview of island sovereignty dispute between Indonesia 
and Malaysia” [印尼与马来西亚有关岛屿主权争议案简介], in Gao Zhiguo [高之国] and Zhang Haiwen, ed., 
Essays on China’s Ocean Policy [海洋国策研究文集] (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe, 2007), p. 294. 
544 PetroChina, “How far can Daqing oil field go? Prospects of Daqing’s development trend on the 55th anniversary of 
its discovery: ” [ 大 庆 油 田 能 走 多 远 ？ 发 现 55 周 年 之 际 看 大 庆 发 展 态 势 ], Sept 24, 2014, 
http://intl.petrochina.com.cn/hdipad/jtxw/201409/f384672980e14da3a72ccdfc1ff24d90.shtml, accessed Nov. 25, 
2018; EIA country report-China, last updated May 14, 2015, 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=CHN, accessed Jan. 4, 2019. 
545 “The Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development” [国民经济和社会发
展第十个五年计划纲要], approved by the fourth session of the ninth National People's Congress, Mar. 15, 2001, 
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expansion of two mega natural gas development projects: the CNPC-operated onshore West-East 
Gas Pipelines (WEP) transmitting natural gas from China’s western inland (and later Central Asia 
as well) to the east coast;546 and the offshore natural gas project in the East China Sea jointly 
operated by CNOOC and Sinopec to supply the coastal areas.  
China’s Natural Gas E&P in East China Sea and the Unsettled Maritime Boundary  
China forayed into offshore energy exploration in the East China Sea in the 1970s, and as of 1999 
had drilled at 28 sites in the energy-rich Xihu Trough.547 All the Chinese drillings took place on 
the west side of Japan’s proposed geographical equidistance line (Map 4.1), an area that Beijing 
viewed as falling safely within uncontested waters – even in Japan’s preferred scenario that the 
equidistance line were accepted as the valid maritime boundary.548 In 1991, Beijing approved to 
develop the Pinghu field in the Xihu Trough for natural gas supplies to Shanghai.549 Given the 
diplomatic and economic importance of Japan to China in the initial post-Tiananmen years, it is 
unlikely that China would have forged ahead had Japan protested at the time. Moreover, in 1996 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) granted a $130-million loan to construct the pipeline 
connecting Pinghu to Shanghai. Again, given Japan’s influence in the ADB, the loan seemed to be 
interpreted by China as Tokyo’s “tacit acceptance of the legitimacy” of the Chinese activities.550 
When production at Pinghu commenced in 1999, Tokyo refrained from protesting on the basis that 
 
546 The WEP network is comprised of three mega pipelines running across the country. The first pipeline passes 
through 10 provinces from Xinjiang to Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang. The second passes through 14 provinces from 
Xinjiang to Guangdong, Guangxi, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong and Hong Kong. The third connects 
Xinjiang to Fujian, and Guangdong. “Overview of the West-East Gas Pipeline Project” [西气东输工程简介] in 
“West-East Gas Pipeline Project (2002-2013) Special Report on Corporate Social Responsibility” [西气东输 (2002-
2013) 企业社会责任专题报告], 2013, p. 6.  
547 Zhang Guoxun [张国勋], “Prioritizing exploration of oil and gas in East China Sea carries significant meaning” 
[优先开发东海油气意义非凡], China Petrochemical Industry [中国石化], issue 5, 2000, p. 7.  
548 China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA), State Oceanic Administration (SOA), Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf: Basic System, Method of Delimitation, and Exploration and Conservation [专属经济区和大陆架：
基本制度、划界方法、开发保护] (Beijing: Haiyang Chubanshe, 2002), internal material, p. 151. 
549 Zhang, “Prioritizing exploration of oil and gas in East China Sea carries significant meaning.” 
550 Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, p. 135. 
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the field was “not considered close enough to the median line.”551 Indeed, up to 2004, the Chinese 
E&P activities in the East China Sea were barely met with protests from Japan. 
Map 4.1 China’s drilling sites in the East China Sea 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Current Status of China’s Unilateral Development of Natural 
Resources in the East China Sea,” last updated Mar. 28, 2019, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_000356.html, accessed Aug. 15, 2019. 
Business interests were clearly at play. CNOOC had been an aggressive advocate for 
expanding offshore energy E&P in both the East and South China Seas. In mid-2000, Zhang 
Weiping, then Deputy Chief Economist and Manager of the Planning Department at CNOOC, laid 
 
551 Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, pp. 134-135; Author’s interviews with Chinese Japan experts, Beijing, 
March 2019.  
- 174 - 
 
out an offshore natural gas development strategy which prioritized exploration in the East and 
South China Seas to meet growing demands in the coastal regions.552 For CNOOC and Sinopec, 
the East China Sea came not only with optimistic estimates of natural gas reserves and bullish 
prospects for production,553 but also with a more competitive unit price than that of the WEP due 
to its geographical proximity to the targeted end users and the resulting lower transmission costs.554 
For these reasons, the two NOCs viewed the East China Sea as a vital commercial asset in their 
competition with CNPC’s WEP for the booming markets, especially the Yangtze River Delta 
where the annual consumption of natural gas was projected to hit ten billion cubic meters (approx. 
353 bcf) by 2005.555 In March 2002, CNOOC and Sinopec launched a joint venture to expand 
exploration in Xihu Trough and start drilling at the Chunxiao gas field.  
Given the simultaneous presence of strong business incentive and absence of diplomatic fallout 
from prior exploration activities in the East China Sea, CNOOC and Sinopec seemed to have 
 
552 Zhang Wiping [张位平], “Strategies to Boost the Development of Offshore Gas in China” [关于加速发展我国近
海天然气的战略思考], International Petroleum Economics [国际石油经济], vol. 8, no. 6, 2000, pp. 16-17. 
553 Sinopec in 2000 projected an annual output of 8-10 billion cubic-meter natural gas at Xihu Trough by 2010. In 
early 2001, Sinopec announced the total confirmed natural gas reserve was over 200 billion cubic meters. Zhang, 
“Prioritizing exploration of oil and gas in East China Sea carries significant meaning”, p. 8. “China will explore East 
China Sea gas fields in large scale” [我将大规模开发东海气田], Journal of Chemical Industry and Engineering 
(China) [化工学报], March 2001.  
554 Pipelines connecting the East China Sea natural gas fields with the Yangtze River Delta range from 350 to 400 
kilometers while WEP from Xinjiang with Shanghai is 4,200 kilometers. The natural gas price transmitted through 
the WEP to Shanghai was 1.35 RMB per cubic meter, while the East China Sea natural gas price was 0.88 RMB per 
cubic meter. Xie Heng [谢衡], “West-East Pipeline: Who Will Pay the Bill” [西气东输，谁来买单], Life Week [三
联生活周刊], Oct. 10, 2002; Li Fuyong [李富永], “Uncertainty surrounding the WEP natural gas price, CNPC and 
CNOOC compete for coastal market” [西气东输价格悬疑，中石油中海油沿海竞争], China Business Times [中华
工商时报], Sept. 22, 2004. 
555  Peng Weixin [彭伟欣], Lu Linsong [卢林松] and Ye Congying [叶丛英], “Superiority of Gas Industrial 
Development in Shanghai” [上海发展天然气产业的优势], Offshore Oil [海洋石油], 2002, issue 3, pp. 9-15. In his 
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account of the competition between CNPC and CNOOC. Zhang Guobao, Starting from Scratch: Recounting the 
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Renmin Chubanshe, 2018), pp. 113-15. For media reports and business analysis on this competition, see, Liu Linglin 
[刘凌林], “WEP encounters competitors” [西气东输遭遇竞争对手], China Enterprise News [中国企业报], Apr. 12, 
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东输], International Finance News [国际金融报], Aug. 25, 2003. 
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invoked little if any input from the Chinese foreign policy establishment as they proceeded with 
the Chunxiao project. In a 2016 interview, Zhang Kang, former Chief Engineer of Sinopec’s 
Petroleum Exploration and Production Research Institute who was long involved in survey and 
development activities in the East China Sea, provided a firsthand account of the decision-making 
process that led to the drilling at Chunxiao: 
We drilled one site after another [in the East China Sea], closer and closer to the 
disputed area with Japan…Chunxiao is very close to the disputed sea area between 
China and Japan. Japan claims that the equidistance line should be used as the 
boundary. We do not recognize Japan’s claim in the first place; and second, we did 
not know the exact location of that line because Japan had never informed us of the 
coordinates. Thus, on the map we picked one point on the Chinese side and another 
on the Japanese side, drew a straight line, and took the middle point [on the straight 
line]; then we pick a drilling site on the Chinese side [of the middle point].556 
In this process, the foreign policy community was unconsulted. According to Zhang, “when drill 
in contested areas, we report to the Foreign Ministry after the drilling is completed.”557 Interviews 
with knowledgeable Chinese sources in the energy sector and foreign policy community confirm 
the likely under-coordination or even lack of coordination – albeit on a different ground. Chinese 
interlocutors attribute the lack of consultation and coordination to the perception that “Chunxiao 
is located within uncontested waters no matter whether you go with the equidistance line claim 
[by Japan] or the continental shelf claim [by China]; and as such there was no need to report to the 
MFA or to evaluate the project’s potential diplomatic ramifications.”558  
 
556 Wu Weinan [武魏楠], “History of the Survey and Development of the Chunxiao Oil and Gas Field” [春晓油气田
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In August 2003, CNOOC, Sinopec, Shell and Unocal signed a contract to jointly develop five 
blocks in the East China Sea, including Chunxiao.559 The economic significance that Beijing 
attached to this project was evident in the attendance of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the signing 
ceremony in the Great Hall of the People. Encouraging all the parties to “accelerate the exploration 
in the East China Sea,” Wen said that the project along with the WEP were expected to ensure 
energy supply in the Yangtze River Delta – China’s most economically vibrant region with the 
largest demands for energy.560  
In June 2004, Chunxiao suddenly became a new flashpoint in Sino-Japanese relations. On the 
sideline of an ASEAN-plus-Three energy ministers meeting in Manila, Nakagawa Shoichi, Japan’s 
Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, raised the issue with then NDRC Deputy Director 
Zhang Guobao. Given that Chunxiao lies less than five kilometers on the Chinese side of the 
equidistance line, as Nagakawa argued, once China started extracting hydrocarbon resources at 
this site, it would also siphon those on the Japanese side.561 During a meeting with his Japanese 
counterpart Kawaguchi Yoriko in Qingdao on June 21, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing 
proposed that China and Japan negotiate for a joint development solution to the issue.562  In 
response to Beijing’s proposal, Tokyo insisted on China’s provision of seismic data on the gas 
field as a precondition to start the negotiations.563 A few days later, Nakagawa took a JCG aircraft 
 
559CNOOC and Sinopec each held a share of 30 percent while Shell and Unocal each 20 percent in the project. 
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561 “Oil rivals see value of cooperation,” Nikkei Weekly (Japan). Jul. 5, 2004. 
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for an inspection flight to Chunxiao, and upon his return, announced that Japan would soon begin 
surveying the sea areas on its side of the equidistance line.564   
In September Shell and Unocal, citing “commercial reasons,” pulled out of the East China Sea 
natural gas development project.565 
The Cost Trade-off: Tilting Further toward the Domestic End 
Following the Diaoyu/Senkaku lease, the Hu-Wen leadership, despite their intentions to patch up 
relations with Japan,566 were under mounting domestic pressures to take a firm stand vis-à-vis 
Japan. At the time when Chunxiao became the new bilateral focal point, China and Japan were not 
only vying for offshore territories and natural resources but also locked in a security dilemma 
especially in the maritime domain, dragging more maritime security actors into the picture. In the 
public sphere, continual bilateral controversies around wartime history, the Yasukuni shrine, 
Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as well as the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute 
further fueled popular animosity towards Japan. As a result, the compromise-averse coalition 
rapidly snowballed during this period. 
On the international end, China’s relations with other regional stakeholders remained stable in 
general. U.S.-China relations continued to improve in Bush’s second term, although Beijing had 
deep suspicions that the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance was targeting China and preparing to 
intervene in a Taiwan scenario. With respect to South Korea, China viewed the two countries’ 
shared historical grievances toward Japan as a source of moral support and political bond. Beijing 
also was optimistic about the Southeast Asian front, as the tripartite Joint Maritime Seismic 
 
564 “China warns Japan in tussle over gas,” Financial Times, Jul. 2, 2004. 
565 “Shell, Unocal exit China’s disputed gas project,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 29, 2004. 
566 In April 2004, Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko visited Beijing as scheduled, and the bilateral meeting 
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Undertaking agreement (JMSU) among China, the Philippines and Vietnam provided the first 
successful instance for pursuing joint development in disputed waters. 
As tensions continued to build over the gas dispute as well as other bilateral controversies, the 
apparently dominating domestic audience costs exerted strong pressures on the Hu-Wen 
administration to adopt an escalatory posture – even though later developments illustrate that they 
were earnest to negotiate and even willing to make key compromises on the gas field dispute.  
A Multi-Dimensional Strategic Rivalry: Compromise-Averse Coalition Snowballed  
When the East China Sea gas dispute began to unfold the second half of 2004, a leadership 
consensus prioritizing the reparation and stabilization of the Sino-Japanese relationship seemed 
still wanting. Although Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as the Chairman of the CMC in 
September, it took time for Hu to consolidate power and change tack on Japan policy. According 
to Tokyo University’s China expert Takahara Akio, at least as of September 2005, Hu still had 
difficulty exerting full control over the foreign policy decision-making process.567 
More importantly perhaps, below the top, the compromise-averse coalition confronting the Hu-
Wen leadership continued to grow as actors in the maritime security system, along with energy 
sector, began to take a more active part in the East China Sea.  
The PLA, driven by its responsibilities for safeguarding China’s primary strategic interests and 
by its institutional interests, was a vocal supporter for offshore resource exploration. The PLA 
Navy in particular, as observed by Fravel and Liebman, had been a longtime advocate for 
developing energy in China’s EEZ and had cast itself as the leading protector of the country’s 
energy security.568 In 2000, the defense of China’s “maritime rights and interests” was articulated 
 
567 Akio Takahara, “The Development of Japan-China Relations in the Period of Stability in Cross-Strait Relations,” 
Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 2015, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 119-144.  
568 M. Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman, “Beyond the Moat: The PLAN’s Evolving Interests and Influence,” in 
Saunders et al., ed., The Chinese Navy, pp.54-62. 
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in the defense white paper for the first time as part of the PLA’s frontier defense and construction 
missions.569 In February 2001, the PLA Daily carried an article underscoring the importance of 
natural gas to China’s energy security while highlighting the great potential of the offshore energy 
in East and South China Seas.570 In July 2002, the PLA Daily published an interview with Tian 
Fengshan, then Minister of Land and Resources, with a focus on China’s energy security. Tian 
highlighted the great potential of the East China Sea as the primary site for China’s offshore natural 
gas development.571 The 2002 piece is remarkable, as noted by James Manicom, because at the 
time China’s offshore resource production was concentrated in the Bohai Gulf and the Tonkin 
Gulf. 572  An article in the PLAN’s professional journal Modern Navy in September 2004, 
anticipating energy competition would grow into another “destabilizing factor” in Sino-Japanese 
relations along with the Diaoyu/Senkaku and history issues, called for strengthening the PLAN to 
protect China’s maritime resources and interests in the East China Sea (as well as in the South 
China Sea).573 
Moreover, the Chunxiao dispute took on a new significance as it unfolded against the backdrop 
of an emerging Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry especially in the maritime domain. China’s 
expanding naval activities within and beyond the first island chain starting from the early 2000s 
generated a profound impact on Japan’s perception of its maritime security environment. In 
November 2004, it was revealed that the Japanese Defense Agency, in light of the flareup over the 
 
569 “China’s National Defense in 2000.”  
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- 180 - 
 
Diaoyu/Senkakus and the gas field, had developed a contingency plan on how to respond to three 
types of hypothetical military conflict scenarios with China, two of which were involved the East 
China Sea disputes. Based on these scenarios, the agency drew up a plan of deploying 55,000 
GSDF personnel, along with air and sea reinforcement from the Kyushu and Chugoku regions.574 
In early December, Japan issued its new National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), which 
highlighted China’s rapid military modernization and expanding area of operation at sea as well 
as the uncertainty in the Taiwan Strait. This marked the first time that Tokyo specified in its NDPG 
that it saw China’s expanding military capabilities and activities at sea as a potential security 
threat. 575  In this document, Tokyo also vowed to “respond instantly to…submerged foreign 
submarine operating in Japan’s territorial waters,” 576  an apparent reference to the accidental 
intrusion of a PLAN nuclear-powered submarine into Japanese territorial waters on November 
10.577 More to China’s dismay, Japan began actively lobbying against lifting EU’s arms embargo 
imposed on China since 1989.578 
 
574 The three hypothetical scenarios are: 1) a Chinese attack on Japanese territory to prevent U.S. forces stationed in 
Japan from intervening in a Taiwan scenario; 2) a Chinese seizure of the Diaoyu/Senkakus by force to shore up the 
CCP’s regime legitimacy in the face of growing domestic pressures; 3) a Chinese move to secure its interests amid a 
dispute over the East China Sea resources. “Japan Defense Agency set 3 scenarios of China attack,” Japan Economic 
Newswire, Nov. 7, 2004. 
575 Defense Agency of Japan, “National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005-,” Dec. 10, 2004, pp.2-3; “Japan’s new 
defense outline raises concerns about China,” Japan’s Economic Newswire, Nov. 16, 2004. 
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Newswire, Dec. 29, 2004. 
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The PLA strategists interpreted these moves as signs that Japan’s evolving security strategy 
was targeting China. Jiang Xinfeng, a Japan expert at the PLA’s AMS, wrote in the People’s Daily 
that in light of the NDPG’s reference to China’s military modernization, the Taiwan Strait and 
foreign submarines as well as Japan’s open opposition to the lifting of EU’s arms embargo on 
China, “it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that Japan is increasingly eyeing China as a 
primary target in its national defense planning.”579 In late December, China released its biannual 
Defense White Paper, which listed Japan as one of the factors that complicated the security 
landscape in Asia-Pacific through “stepping up its constitutional overhaul, adjusting its military 
and security policies and developing the missile defense system.” The white paper also highlighted 
Japan’s “markedly increased military activities abroad.”580 This was the first time that China’s 
defense white paper expressed Beijing’s growing suspicions about Japan’s defense policies and 
their impacts for China’s security environment. In this white paper, the PLA also announced to 
give priority to the development of the PLA Navy, along with the Air Force and the Second 
Artillery Force.581 The Chinese perception of an emerging Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry was 
reinforced when the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee released a joint statement in 
February 2005 which included assuring peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue as a goal of the 
alliance and thus – to Chinese eyes – raised the prospect of a Japanese intervention in a cross-strait 
scenario.582  
 
579 Jiang Xinfeng [江新凤], “Analysis of Japan’s new National Defense Program Guideline” [解析日本新《防卫计
划大纲》], People’s Daily, Dec. 14, 2004. 
580 “China’s National Defense in 2004,” Dec. 2004. 
581 Ibid. 
582 Anthony Faiola, “Japan to Join US Policy on Taiwan: Growth of China Seen Behind Shift,” Washington Post, Feb. 
18, 2005; Michael H Armacost, “Japan: Tilting to Washington,” in Richard J. Ellings, Aaron L. Friedberg and Michael 
Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2003-04 (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), pp. 81-108. The 1997 
Guideline of US-Japan Defense Cooperation included the highly ambiguous clause about US-Japan cooperation in 
“situations in areas surrounding Japan.” China believed that such a loose geographical definition failed to explicitly 
exclude Taiwan from the scope of “the areas surrounding Japan” and thus could justify Japanese involvement in the 
event of a cross-strait conflict. Christopher Hughes and Akiko Fukushima, “US-Japan Security Relations: Toward 
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Aside from the PLA, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), which was the primary agency 
administering China’s near seas and supervising the CMS, was another bureaucratic stakeholder 
in pushing for the development of offshore resources. In a 2002 internal study on issues that China 
was facing in its EEZ and continental shelf, the SOA laid out clearly what it saw as the bottom-
line when negotiating for a joint development deal in the undelimited areas of the East China Sea:  
In the area in the middle of the East China Sea, Japan may want to have a joint 
development zone straddling the equidistance line. This is but a substitute for 
Japan’s position of using the equidistance line for delimitation, and thus is 
unacceptable to China. The joint development zone should be located between the 
equidistance line and the Okinawa Trough.583 
Moreover, with respect to the prospect of pursuing joint development in the Diaoyu/Senkaku area, 
this study was also clear on China’s bottom-line and goal: 
The basin north to the Diaoyu is also rich in oil and gas…China should actively 
seek to establish a joint development zone there…Japan proposes that the areas 
south of N 26° where Diaoyu Island is located should be excluded…from the joint 
development zone, and we must not accept it…The joint development…should 
include the basin north of Diaoyu so as to compel Japan into admitting that areas in 
the Diaoyu Island are disputed.584 
The two components outlined in this internal study – 1) whether a joint development zone (JDZ) 
should straddle the median line or fall in the area between the line and the Okinawa Trough; 2) 
whether the JDZ should include the area near the Diaoyu/Senkakus especially the basin north to 
the islets – became the central issues between China and Japan in the bilateral gas talks from 2004-
2008.  
 
Bilateralism Plus?” in Ellis S Krauss and T. J. Pempel, eds. Beyond Bilateralism: US-Japan Relations in the New 
Asia-Pacific, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 76. 
583 China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA), Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf: Basic System, Method 
of Delimitation, and Exploration and Conservation [专属经济区和大陆架: 基本制度、划界方法、开发保护] 
(Beijing: Haiyang Chubanshe, 2002), internal material, pp. 150-151. Emphasis added. 
584 Ibid, p. 151. 
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Another thrust of the SOA’s push for a firm line on the East China Sea dispute was its 
institutional interests in claiming and consolidating the agency’s leading position in China’s 
maritime administration and law enforcement system. In July 2004, after spotting a Japan-
chartered Norwegian survey ship prospecting the waters near the median line, the CMS began to 
actively seek Beijing’s permission for the agency to dispatch aircraft and patrol ships to monitor 
the survey ship.585 As Zhang Huirong, then Executive Deputy Director of the CMS, wrote in a 
March 2005 article, “Only by proactively performing rights protection duties and seizing the 
initiative can the SOA and CMS consolidate our leading position in maritime rights protection 
work.”586  
CNOOC also took a firm stand. Following Shell and Unocal’s withdrawal, Fu Chengyu, 
chairman of CNOOC, claimed that “the change of partners has little impact on the ongoing 
project.”587 In March 2005, in response to Tokyo’s threat to start prospecting the disputed waters 
for undersea hydrocarbon reserves if China would not halt drilling, CNOOC claimed that its 
drilling operations at Chunxiao would begin in August. The energy company’s assertive response 
contrasted the MFA’s relatively restrained response, which duly expressed “grave concerns” and 
urged Japan not to “complicate this situation.”588  
At the grassroots level, popular animosity towards Japan continued to intensify throughout 
2004 and in early 2005 amidst a slew of contentious bilateral issues including Japan’s bid for a 
 
585 Yu Zhirong [郁志荣], Dong Xiji [董奚戟] and Zhang Ying [张颖], “Soul in the East China Sea: maritime law 
enforcement activities of the China Marine Surveillance East China Sea Corps” [魂系东海，再铸蓝色辉煌——记
中国海监东海总队海洋维权执法], Ocean Development and Management, issue 4, 2005, p. 59; “Japan starts 
surveying gas field in own EEZ. In E. China Sea,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jul. 7, 2004. 
586 Zhang Huirong [张惠荣], “Demonstrate law enforcement power, safeguard maritime rights and interests” [体现执
法威力，维护海上权益], Ocean Development and Management, issue 3, 2005, p. 15. 
587 “Shell, Unocal exit China’s disputed gas project.” 
588 “China asks Japan not to explore for gas in disputed waters,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 31, 2005. 
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permanent seat on the UN Security Council,589 the Chunxiao dispute, Japan’s taking control of a 
lighthouse on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets,590 as well as Japan’s approval of a revisionist 
history textbook.591 These issues were perceived as being inherently interlinked (while some are 
in fact interrelated). A February 2005 People’s Daily commentary linked Japan’s decision to 
control a lighthouse on the Diaoyu/Senkakus to the East China Sea resource and boundary disputes:  
The Japanese government’s so-called “takeover” of the lighthouse indicated its 
intention to retaliate against China for exploring the East China Sea. Japan attempts 
to use the Diaoyu Islands as a basepoint to grab more of the East China Sea 
continental shelf and EEZ…the possession of the Diaoyu Islands would entitle 
Japan to an extra 200,000-square-kilometer sea area, and half of the oil and gas 
resources in continental shelf.   
The comment then claimed that Japan reinforced its control and defense posture around the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus in an attempt to “use the islands as a military base in the preparation for an 
intervention in the Taiwan Strait.” Lastly, the piece linked the disputes to the history issue, 
asserting the Diaoyu/Senkakus as a “symbol of China’s dignity and national sovereignty,” a 
“witness of China’s history of humiliation” and a “litmus test of whether Japan would repent for 
its history of aggression.”592 
The perceived issue linkage, while forming the basis for a broad-based anti-Japanese public 
mobilization, also increased rigidity for issue-specific negotiations. Some Chinese foreign policy 
elites – including some opponents to the “new thinking” – attempted unsuccessfully to delink the 
issues to allow the necessary latitude for Beijing to negotiate on the East China Sea gas and 
 
589 In September 2004, Japan, along with India, Brazil and Germany (G4), launched a joint campaign for permanent 
seats on the United Nations Security Council.   
590 In February 2005, Japan announced to place under state control a lighthouse built by rightist on Uotsuri. 
591 In early April 2005, the Japanese education officials approved new history textbooks which China and South Korea 
perceived as whitewashing Japan’s wartime atrocities. 
592 Sun Lingling [孙伶伶], “A unilateral action in violation of international laws—on Japanese government’s so-called 
‘taking over’ of the Diaoyu Island lighthouse” [有悖国际法的单方行为——评日本政府所谓 “接管” 钓鱼岛灯塔], 
People’s Daily, Feb. 23, 2005. 
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boundary disputes. Jin Xide, for instance, stated plainly in an interview: “Territorial sovereignty 
and resources are inherently two separate things. But now they are mixed together… For each 
government, the probability of compromising on territories is very small…but neither sides can 
afford waiting on resource needs.”593  
An Optimistic Outlook on the International End 
As the Sino-Japanese relationship fell to its historical low, China maintained overall stable 
relations with other key regional stakeholders, which further lowered China’s expected 
international audience costs. On the U.S.-China front, despite its dissatisfaction with the more 
explicit position that the U.S.-Japan alliance took on Taiwan, Beijing was more confident about 
its relations with Washington at the outset of Bush’s second term than four years before. An 
optimistic tone was set for the next four years as Hu Jintao and Bush pledged to maintain a strong 
and constructive relations during their meeting in November 2004 in Chile.594 At the meeting, Hu 
broached the idea of “strengthening the strategic dialogue between the two countries,” 595 
suggesting Beijing’s desire and confidence to restore the relationship to one of “strategic 
partnership” – as opposed to Bush’s depiction of China as a “strategic competitor” when starting 
his first term.  
While the Bush administration was reluctant to adopt the name “strategic dialogue” which 
China preferred, as Dai Bingguo recalled in his memoir, the two countries jumpstarted the work 
toward institutionalizing a mechanism for periodic bilateral senior-level dialogue on security and 
 
593 Li Chunhui [李春辉] and Jin Xide [金熙德], “’East China Sea conflict’ amd Somp-Japanese energy cooperation” 
[“东海冲突” 与中日能源合作], China Oil News [中国石油报], Aug. 16, 2004. 
594 White House, “President Bush’s Remarks with Chinese President Hu Jintao,” Santiago, Chile, Nov. 20, 2004, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041120-1.html, accessed Aug. 19, 2019. 
595  MFA, “President Hu Jintao Meets with US President Bush,” Nov. 21, 2004, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/huvisit_665888/t171299.shtml, accessed Aug. 19, 2019. 
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political affairs.596 According to a recount by Michael Green, then senior director for Asia of the 
National Security Council, in February 2005 he hand-delivered Bush’s letter to Hu, in which Bush 
proposed to “bring U.S.-China relations ‘to the next level.’” After reading the letter, Hu was 
“visibly pleased.”597 An assessment by the MFA-affiliated CIIS on Washington’s China policy in 
Bush’s second term concluded with an upbeat prospect, “As the influence of the neoconservatives 
within the Bush administration declines, adopting a pragmatic China policy has gradually become 
a consensus in the United States.” This came not only from Washington’ lack of capabilities to 
“restart a confrontation with China” as it was bogged down in the war in Iraq, but also from the 
fact that the U.S. needs China’s cooperation on key global issues including nonproliferation, trade, 
counterterrorism and environment.598 
China also maintained a warm relationship with South Korea, with shared historical grievances 
and bitter nationalistic sentiment against Japan. In early 2005, after Japan’s Shimane Prefecture 
declared February 22 as Takeshima Day to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the incorporation of 
the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands into the prefecture, Seoul’s relations with Tokyo worsened 
dramatically.599 The Chinese domestic audience looked on the South Korean public’s radical anti-
Japanese protests with strong admiration and approval. Sun Zhihui, then head of the SOA, praised 
South Korea’s assertive attitude of defending the Dokdo/Takeshima “at any costs and sacrifices.” 
Sun said that China should learn from South Korea, and that given China’s maritime rights 
 
596 Dai Bingguo [戴秉国], Strategic Dialogue: Dai Bingguo Memoir [战略对话：戴秉国回忆录] (Beijing: Renmin 
Shubanshe, 2016), pp. 117-119. The Bush administration kept referring to this mechanism as the “U.S.-China Senior 
Dialogue on Security and Political Affairs” while China used “Strategic Dialogue.” The Obama administration 
adopted the name “Strategic Dialogue.” 
597 Green, More Than Providence, p. 497. 
598 CIIS, International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs (2005/2006), p. 159. 
599 Norimitsu Onishi, “Dispute over Islets Frays Ties between Tokyo and Seoul,” New York Times, Mar. 22, 2005, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/22/world/asia/dispute-over-islets-frays-ties-between-tokyo-and-seoul.html, 
accessed Aug. 19, 2019. 
- 187 - 
 
protection forces, “when necessary, we have the capabilities and determination to confront Japan 
at sea.”600  
China’s popular Internet news portals, including Sina and QQ, ran extensive coverage on the 
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute. QQ positively titled its special coverage “Dokdo: testimony to a nation-
state’s spine and guts.”601 As noted by Ming Wan, a Japan scholar at George Mason University, 
Japan’s worsening diplomatic relations with South Korea (as well as with Russia) had “boosted 
China’s confidence and strengthened its sense of justice.”602 South Korea’s firm stand vis-à-vis 
Japan also added grassroots pressures on Beijing’s handling of Sino-Japanese problems. An op-ed 
published in the popular Southern Metropolis Daily wrote, with implicit criticism of the Chinese 
foreign policy elites, “Uniting the power of a whole nation-state to support its foreign policy elites 
is a country’s fortune as well as the people’s hope…For today’s foreign policy elites, they need to 
better understand the people’s heart, respect the people’s feeling, and trust the people’s 
opinion.”603 
On relations with Southeast Asia, China maintained a strong confidence in its charm offensive 
and reassurance of its small neighbors. In particular, a historical tripartite agreement that China 
concluded with Vietnam and the Philippines in March 2005 to carry out joint seismic surveys in 
the disputed Spratly islands was hailed by Beijing as “a new breakthrough” in implementing Deng 
 
600 “Director of the State Oceanic Administration: China has the determination to confront Japan” [国家海洋局长：
中国 有 决 心抗 日 ], China Review News [ 中國評 論新 聞 網 ], Apr. 29, 2006, http://cn1.crntt.com/crn-
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Xiaoping’s formula of “shelving disputes and developing jointly.”604 In April, during Hu Jintao’s 
state visit to Manila, China and the Philippines declared that their relations were entering a “golden 
age,” suggesting Beijing’s optimistic outlook on the South China Sea front. 605 
China’s Strong Nonmilitary Escalation and Restrained Military Escalation 
The clear dominance of the domestic audience costs during this period decidedly rendered a 
moderate Japan policy indefensible and incentivized Beijing to take an escalatory posture on the 
gas dispute. From the outset of the gas dispute in June 2004, Japan’s threat to explore the side east 
to the median line raised the prospect of creating a fait accompli that Beijing believed would 
undermine China’s claims. In an attempt to signal a firm Chinese position and deter Japan from 
forging ahead, Beijing launched a strong nonmilitary escalation by permitting MLE patrols near 
the gas field and unleashing large-scale anti-Japanese street protests. Tokyo’s announcement in 
July 2005 to award the drilling contract to a Japanese oil company presented Beijing with a fait 
accompli. As Beijing sought to reverse the fait accompli through negotiation, it resorted to a 
restrained military escalation in order to signal its resolve and deter Japan from taking further 
moves while keeping the gas talks undisrupted. 
Phase One (June 2004- July 2005): Strong Nonmilitary Escalation 
The CMS was brought to the forefront as part of the nonmilitary escalation and has since remained 
one of the most active nonmilitary actors in the East China Sea disputes. In July 2004, Beijing 
gave the greenlight to the CMS’s request to dispatch aircraft and patrol vessels to shadow and 
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monitor the Japan-commissioned Norwegian survey ship near the equidistance line,606 although 
some Japanese media accounts claimed that the Chinese surveillance ship was a PLAN vessel 
“disguised as a research ship.”607 During the one-year period from July 2004 to July 2005, the 
CMS established a constant presence in the area reportedly with one or two patrol voyages per 
month and two patrol flights per week, paving the way for the agency’s push for regularizing its 
patrols in China’s near-seas.608 In 2006, the Chinese State Council approved the regularization of 
the CMS patrols, a decision hailed by the SOA as a milestone and a leap forward in China’s 
maritime rights protection work.609  
Meanwhile, Beijing and Tokyo started bilateral negotiations in October 2004 for a mutually 
acceptable resolution to the Chunxiao dispute. The talks soon deadlocked on the sharing of China’s 
seismic data on the gas field.610 On April 1, 2005, Japan announced its intention to start procedures 
to grant permission to Japanese oil companies for exploring the disputed area if China persisted 
with its operations in the gas field and continued to refuse sharing the seismic data.611 
The Japanese announcement came amidst the mass anti-Japanese mobilization in the Chinese 
public, enabling Beijing to conveniently use the large-scale street protests as another escalatory 
measure – to be clear, the popular anger was directed at a wide variety of Sino-Japanese bilateral 
 
606 Yu, et al., “Soul in the East China Sea, p. 59; “Japan starts surveying gas field in own EEZ. In E. China Sea,” Japan 
Economic Newswire, Jul. 7, 2004. 
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- 190 - 
 
controversies at the time, including but not limited to the gas field dispute. On April 2, anti-Japan 
demonstrations erupted in fifteen Chinese cities including Shenzhen and Chengdu. The protests 
escalated over the weekend of April 9-10 as tens of thousands of Chinese people participated in 
demonstrations in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and other Chinese cities. 
Demonstrations quickly degenerated into violence and attacks targeting Japanese businesses and 
diplomatic compounds.612 As the gas talks continued to deadlock on the provision of the seismic 
data,613 Tokyo declared on April 13 that it would grant permission for Japanese oil companies to 
test drill in waters east of the equidistance line.614 Beijing responded fiercely, calling Japan’s 
decision a “serious provocation” and an attempt to impose its “unilateral conceived” demarcation 
line on China.615  
While starting to rein in the street protests after Koizumi offered an apology for Japan’s history 
of aggression at the Asian-African summit in late April,616 Beijing proposed to continue the gas 
talks. Roughly at the same time, Teikoku Oil, a Japanese oil company, submitted a request to METI 
to conduct test drilling in the area east of the median line.617 In May, China for the first time tabled 
a concrete proposal for joint development and suggested a joint development zone be established 
between the equidistance line and the Okinawa Trough, the area where the Chinese and Japanese 
claims overlapped. Tokyo quickly rejected the proposal for being “not quite acceptable as it is.”618 
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Phase Two (July 2005-early 2006): Restrained Military Escalation 
On July 14, Japan upped the ante by awarding Teikoku Oil the permission to test drill in the East 
China Sea, presenting China with a fait accompli. Beijing reacted immediately. Calling Japan’s 
decision “a severe provocation and violation” of China’s sovereignty and interests, Cui Tiankai, 
then head of the Asian Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, warned that if Japan 
attempted to impose its unilateral action on China as a fait accompli (既成事实), Beijing would 
firmly oppose and never accept it.619  
Tensions remained high throughout the summer, as China implied that military options were 
not ruled out. On July 22, a Xinhua article warned that the East China Sea gas dispute had become 
“the flashpoint that is most likely to trigger an accident” (擦枪走火) between China and Japan. 
This article went so far as to assert that “eruption of small-scale conflict is not impossible” should 
Japan choose to press on.620 In an article published in August in SOA’s official newspaper China 
Ocean News, Liu Jingbo, then Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Institute of the PLA’s 
National Defense University, urged for a “maritime defense consciousness” of “competing for 
each inch of the sea and never surrendering an inch of water” (寸海必争,寸水不让). Safeguarding 
China’s maritime rights and interests, Liu wrote, required not only internal administration but also 
“military, political, and diplomatic struggles.”621 
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Amidst the heightened tensions, actions by the oil companies of the two sides only added more 
fuel to the flame. On August 26, Teikoku Oil’s President Sugioka Masatoshi requested assurance 
from the GOJ that the company’s workers on the project would be safe, while at the same time 
confirming the company’s willingness to explore for in the East China Sea despite “the risk of 
Chinese interruption.”622 A few days later, CNOOC’s Chairman Fu Chengyu announced that 
production in Chunxiao might begin in September, prompting MOFA to summon Cheng Yonghua, 
then Minister at the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, to express its “regrets.”623 
The escalation suddenly took on a military aspect on September 9 when a Chinese flotilla – 
comprised of a Sovremenny-class missile destroyer, two Jianghu I-class missile frigates, a 23,000-
ton replenishment vessel and a 6,000-ton missile observation support ship – sailed near Chunxiao, 
a move Beijing characterized this deployment as “a regular military training.”624 This was the first 
time that Japan had spotted Chinese warships near the gas field, though the PLAN vessels did not 
enter the Japanese side of the median line.625 When a JMSDF P-3C aircraft was sent to monitor 
the Chinese warships, one of the ships reportedly pointed its 100-mm gun on the aircraft, an action 
that Japan described as “a clear threat.”626  
This military move seemed to be intended to deter Japan from initiating drilling and to reverse 
Japan’s decision of permitting Teikoku Oil to drill in the disputed area. Zhou Yongsheng, a Japan 
expert at the MFA-affiliated China Foreign Affairs University, claimed that the warship 
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deployment was intended as “a warning to Japan” that it must not explore near Chunxiao: “If Japan 
starts drilling in that area, it would be very unfavorable [for China] to solve the East China problem 
in future.”627 Sun Zhihui, then head of the SOA, implied similar concerns: “If Japan really starts 
drilling here, I think we will lose the initiative not only at sea but also in the international arena.” 
Therefore, Sun argued, even though severe conflict with Japan was the last thing China wanted, 
China adopted an assertive posture in order to demonstrate its resolve to defend national 
sovereignty and thus to deter Japan.628  
China’s strong rhetoric notwithstanding, the military episode was quietly called off and did not 
recur during the gas dispute. Meanwhile, the bilateral gas talks were kept undisrupted despite the 
fact that the first few rounds made little headway. The relatively restrained manner that China 
undertook the military escalation and the continuation of the gas talks reflected China’s calculation 
that Japan’s decision to drill could be reversed through negotiations. This Chinese calculation was 
likely grounded in the fact that the East China Sea natural gas was commercially unprofitable for 
Japan due both to transportation barriers and to the uncertainty in the prospect for commercial 
discoveries in the area east of the equidistance line. To transmit natural gas produced in the 
disputed area to mainland Japan requires an undersea pipeline, which was technically extremely 
difficult and economically very expensive due to the long distance as well as to the more than 
2,000-meter depth of the Okinawa Trough. Moreover, the Japanese assessment was pessimistic 
about the prospect for commercial discoveries in this area.629 As a very knowledgeable Japanese 
maritime strategist plainly acknowledged in interview, “the East China Sea [gas field] is not 
 
627 Feng Yifei [冯亦斐], “East China Sea field: a difficult area for Sino-Japanese cooperative development” [东海油
田：中日合作开发的难题 ], China News Week [ 中国新闻周刊 ], Sept. 22, 2005, reprinted on Sina, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-09-22/11387836539.shtml, accessed Jan. 14, 2019. 
628 “Director of the State Oceanic Administration.” 
629 Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, p. 154. 
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commercially profitable for Japan…transport[ing] and sell[ing] the energy from Shirakaba to 
Shanghai, then sharing the profits between Japanese and Chinese companies, that is the only 
profitable way [for Japanese investors].”630 While it remains unclear how many technical details 
that China knew during the dispute, Chinese media reports surfacing during this period indicated 
that China was aware of these problems confronting Japan.631 Considering these circumstances, it 
is possible that Beijing perceived Japan’s announcement to permit drilling in the East China Sea 
more as a bluffing or a bargaining chip, and concluded that there was still room for China to 
negotiate the fait accompli away. 
The 2008 Joint Development Agreement and the Sabotaged Implementation 
Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni on October 17, 2005 brought Japan’s top-level contacts with 
China to a complete halt.632 Frustrated with Koizumi and anticipating Japan’s upcoming leadership 
change in September 2006, Beijing decided to wait Koizumi out. From early 2006, China started 
actively reaching out to Koizumi’s likely successors, including Abe Shinzon, Aso Taro and Fukuda 
Yasuo, to pave the way for cultivating ties with the next Japanese leader.633  
The gas talks continued albeit moving forward extremely slowly. In October 2005, the 
hardliner METI minister Nakagawa Shoichi was replaced by Nikai Toshihiro, who was seen to 
favor warmer relations with China.634 Four rounds of gas talks were held between October 2005 
 
630 Author’s interview, Tokyo, August 2018. 
631 Yue Shaoyan [乐绍延], “Japan encounters opposition in approving East China Sea drilling; calls for cautious 
handling grow” [日本审批东海油气开发遇阻力，谨慎处理呼声渐起], International Herald Leader [国际先驱导
报], Apr. 25, 2005, reprinted on Sina, http://finance.sina.com.cn/j/20050425/12261547640.shtml, accessed Dec. 31, 
2019.  
632 Tang, Heavy Storm and Gentle Breeze, p. 32; Dai, Strategic Dialogue, p. 309. 
633 Tang, Heavy Storm and Gentle Breeze, pp. 37-44; Dai, Strategic Dialogue, pp. 310-316.  
634 Hidetoshi Ikebe, “Gas talks all smoke, no fire,” The Daily Yomiuri, Mar. 9, 2006. 
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and July 2006 with both sides bargaining hard on the central issues of whether the proposed JDZ 
should straddle the equidistance line and encompass waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.635  
In September 2006, Beijing decided to invite Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister Abe Shizon 
to visit China without an explicit pledge from Abe not to visit Yasukuni. During his trip to Tokyo 
from September 22-27, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo reportedly delivered a 
private message from Hu Jintao to Abe inviting him to visit Beijing provided that Abe would 
commit to not visit Yasukuni.636 Tough negotiations ensued in the following days. The Hu-Wen 
administration eventually decided to take the political risk and host Abe without the latter 
explicitly pledging not to visit Yasukuni.637  Such a bold decision by Beijing was reportedly 
enabled by a major move that Hu Jintao took in consolidating his power. According to an account 
by a group of prominent Japanese China experts, only a few days before extending the invitation 
to Abe, Hu removed Chen Liangyu, Shanghai party chief and a powerful ally of Jiang Zemin. This 
removal, according to the Japanese scholars, considerably weakened Jiang’s influence on policy 
and untied the hands of the Hu-Wen administration in their diplomacy toward Japan.638 Abe visited 
Beijing in October, hailed by China as an “ice-breaking trip.” In the joint statement issued during 
Abe’s trip, both sides pledged to accelerate negotiation and seek a mutually acceptable resolution 
in the “broad direction of joint development.”639  
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Meanwhile, Beijing began to curb its compromise-averse stakeholders, especially the energy 
sector. In January 2006, CNOOC’s Executive Vice President Yang Hua, when speaking on the 
company’s strategy preview for the year, said that although construction at Chunxiao had 
completed and conditions were “ripe for production,” when production would start “is not up to 
the producer.”640 A few days later, production delays at Chunxiao became widely reported, with 
CNOOC citing necessary pipeline fine-tune work as the reason. 641  In August, CNOOC’s 
homepage posted a report about an inspection tour to Chunxiao by NDRC’s Deputy Director 
Zhang Guobao. According to the report, during his tour Zhang praised that the commencement of 
the first stage of production. As Japanese media quickly picked up the story, the report was quietly 
removed from CNOOC’s website after Beijing weighed in. According to one Chinese industrial 
executive, “[c]entral government said CNOOC should not have publicized the news.”642 In 2007, 
CNOOC stopped featuring Chunxiao in its strategy preview.643 In March, when asked to confirm 
media reports that production at Chunxiao had started, CNOOC’s Chairman Fu Chengyu declined 
to comment, claiming that “the issue is too sensitive for me to say.” Instead, he implied that after 
Abe’s visit, the chance for bilateral cooperation became higher.644  
In April, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid a return visit to Tokyo, which Beijing positively 
dubbed “the ice-thawing trip.” When delivering a landmark speech at the Japanese Diet, Wen 
called on both sides to “conduct active consultations so as to make substantive progress towards 
peaceful settlement of the differences and make the East China Sea a sea of peace, friendship and 
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cooperation.”645 Moreover, Wen proposed to establish a maritime crisis management mechanism 
between the two defense forces,646 which, after more than ten years of marathon negotiations, 
culminated in the China-Japan Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism in June 2018. 
The gas talks began to pick up speed after Abe’s successor Fukuda Yasuo visited Beijing in 
December 2007. According to one Chinese source, even with improved ties with Tokyo, Beijing 
was worried by the uncertainty associated with the short-lived Japanese cabinets and calculated 
that the negotiations could not be delayed for too long. Thus, Hu set a deadline for the MFA to 
hammer out a deal while Fukuda was in office. The talk was then accelerated while compromise-
averse stakeholders, including NDRC and SOA, were by and large kept in the dark.647 In May 
2008, Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan cemented what the leaders of both countries viewed as an 
acceptable deal on the East China Sea gas resources.  
The agreement, signed on June 18, designated two areas in the East China Sea for collaborative 
development. One was a 2,700-square-kilometer JDZ straddling the equidistance line while not 
including areas near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This arrangement reflected a major compromise 
made by the Hu-Wen leadership on the two core components of China’s bottom line with respect 
to joint development in the East China Sea as laid out in the 2002 SOA internal study. The other 
area was Chunxiao. In this agreement, China welcomed Japanese enterprises’ participation “in 
accordance with Chinese laws regarding cooperation with foreign enterprises in the exploration 
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and exploitation of offshore petroleum resources.” 648  This arrangement was not a joint 
development venture, as Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko explained, “Given that the 
Japanese side will invest in a development that the Chinese side has already undertaken, one could 
not say that it will truly be a 50-50 joint development.”649 In return for Beijing’s opening Chunxiao 
to Japanese investors, Tokyo was expected to revoke exploration rights granted to Teikoku Oil.650  
However, no sooner had the agreement been signed than it was met with backlashes and 
resistance from China’s compromise-averse stakeholders at home. NDRC leveled a thinly veiled 
criticism of the deal, and Zhang Guobao, reportedly a strong opponent to the agreement, leveraged 
his political clout to block the conclusion of an implementation treaty of the agreement. 651 
According to a source in the Chinese energy sector, the agreement was deeply resented because 
the JDZ extended into the “uncontested area” (i.e. waters west of the equidistance line) while at 
the same time excluding the Diaoyu/Senkaku area.652 The agreement was also resisted, albeit in a 
quieter way, by the SOA. Aa a Chinese scholar well versed in Sino-Japanese relations recalled, 
“At that time, the MFA asked CIMA and other government think tanks to write some articles 
defending the agreement. But few people were willing to do that.”653 During the three months 
following the signing of the agreement, People’s Daily published only one commentary defending 
the agreement and it was authored by the newspaper’s own Tokyo correspondent.654 Yu Zhirong, 
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former Deputy Director of the CMS East China Sea Corps, explicitly criticized on the deal: 
“China’s proposal of jointly developing the East China Sea has generated huge negative 
impacts…it gave the greenlight to Japan’s claim that the equidistance line should be used to delimit 
the East China Sea between China and Japan, thus rejecting or [at least] undermining China’s 
traditional position.”655 
At the same time, reports emerged in Japanese media celebrating this agreement as a 
vindication of Japan’s claims on the East China Sea, rendering the deal all the more domestically 
indefensible in China. A Kyodo News report published on June 18, citing Japanese Foreign 
Minister Komura Masahiko, asserted the deal as a de facto Japanese victory over Chunxiao: “We 
have won the opportunity for Japanese firms to take a stake in a place that the Chinese side has 
already begun developing. For us, it doesn’t really matter whether that is referred to literally as 
joint development.”656 The location of the JDZ as it was eventually agreed upon, asserted a 
Yomiuri Shimbun editorial, “can be interpreted that China accepted Japan’s proposal based on the 
median line claim, even if it was in a limited manner.”657 Another Yomiuri Shimbun report cited a 
Japanese government official who claimed that the median line “surfaced as a de factor boundary 
of the EEZ” and this would have “significant implications” for Japan’s future negotiations with 
China. 658  Such Japanese reports, as a former Japanese diplomat involved in Sino-Japanese 
relations during this period, did not go unnoticed by China’s domestic audience and indeed quickly 
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brought the Chinese Foreign Ministry under fire – “even the NPC began to criticize the 
agreement.”659 
In the Chinese public, the deal was also perceived as having compromised the country’s 
sovereignty and thus unacceptable. Protests against the deal were allowed to take place outside the 
Japanese Embassy in Beijing on June 18. The protest was unusual in that it came as an open 
opposition to what at the time had been articulated as Beijing’s official policy line regarding the 
East China Sea gas dispute. Chinese authorities reportedly made no efforts to disperse the crowd, 
and even allocated a space for media to interview the protesters.660 A group of Baodiao activists 
petitioned to the NPC to nullify the agreement on the basis that this consensus was 
“unconstitutional” and “unprecedentedly humiliating in the 60 years’ history of the PRC.” This 
petition was first reported by Hong Kong media and soon reprinted by the mainland-based news 
portal Sina,661 suggesting that at the very least acquiescence was granted by some strands within 
Chinese authorities to opposing voices. 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued multiple statements to defend the agreement and reassure 
the domestic audience that this deal did not compromise China’s claims.662 On June 19, China’s 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei held a press conference to explain the agreement to the public.663 
Five days later, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi had to hold another press conference to 
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defend the agreement amidst mounting criticism. Yang emphasized that, despite the JDZ 
straddling the equidistance line, China “has never recognized and will never recognize Japan’s 
claim about the so-called ‘median line,’” and the role of Japan in Chunxiao was “no different from 
that of Unocal and Shell.”664 
MFA’s endeavor turned out largely unsuccessful. The agreement was never implemented, not 
even during the two years following its conclusion when China and Japan strived to recover the 
lost ground in their bilateral relationship.665  
CONCLUSION 
Between 2002 and 2008, the domination of domestic audience costs best explains China’s decision 
to opt for escalation in both the Diaoyu/Senkaku lease incident and the offshore gas field dispute 
with Japan. In the Diaoyu/Senkaku lease episode, with no fait accompli that Beijing perceived as 
having to be reversed or a likely fait accompli that needed to be deterred, China undertook a 
restrained nonmilitary escalation. In contrast, China responded to the offshore gas field disputes 
with a combination of a strong nonmilitary escalation and a restrained military escalation after 
Japan granted drilling permission to a Japanese oil company but continued gas talks, which 
presented Beijing with a fait accompli that could possibly be reversed through negotiations. 
The joint development deal concluded in June 2008 presented Beijing and Tokyo with an 
opportunity to lower the temperature on the East China Sea and mend fences, culminating in 
Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo’s visit to Beijing and attendance at the grand opening 
ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games in August. The rapid warmup, however, soon turned out 
 
664 “Sino-Japanese agreement on the East China Sea does not prejudice to China’s sovereign rights” [中日东海协议，
无损中国主权权利], Xinhua Daily Telegraph [新华每日电讯], Jun. 25, 2008. 
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to be short lived when two Chinese government ships entered the highly sensitive 12-nautical-mile 
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5. The China Maritime Surveillance Diaoyu/Senkaku Patrol and the Fishing 
Trawler Collision 
On December 8, 2008, two China Marine Surveillance (CMS) patrol ships entered the territorial 
sea of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, marking the very first time that China’s government ships were 
present in the highly sensitive area. A few days later, Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro raised 
this issue with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during a sideline meeting of a trilateral China-Japan-
South Korea summit in the Japanese city of Fukuoka. Upon Japan’s protest, Beijing quickly de-
escalated and tightened control over its MLE agencies. 
Firsthand information confirmed that this episode was likely planned and carried out by the 
CMS with little knowledge of the foreign policy apparatus or authorization by Beijing. This 
incident demonstrates how behavior of compromise-averse actors in China (and in Japan as well) 
can create unexpected foreign policy ramifications that drag in central governments and may be 
interpreted by the other party as a signal of strategic intention.  
Following Japan’s 2009 election in which the Democratic Party (DPJ) replaced the 
conservative LDP as the ruling party, reconciliation between China and Japan appeared to have 
gained new momentum as Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio attempted to balance Japan’s relations 
with the U.S. by drawing closer to China and South Korea.666 However, the bilateral relationship 
hit another bump in September 2010 when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with JCG vessels in 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea. As Tokyo considered subjecting the captain of the fishing boat 
to Japan’s domestic legal procedure, Beijing launched a strong escalation along multiple 
nonmilitary dimensions over the course of two weeks. 
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This chapter traces China’s handling of two major incidents arising from the East China Sea 
disputes during and immediately after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As will be demonstrated 
below, China’s increased international audience costs especially from the improved Sino-Japanese 
relationship and declined domestic audience costs that accompanied the improved mutual 
perceptions incentivized Beijing to de-escalate the incident in December 2008. By contrast, the 
combination of a perceived decline in international audience costs and a surge in domestic 
audience costs on the heels of the financial crisis created incentives for China to take an escalatory 
response in 2010.  
THE 2008 CMS PATROL IN THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU TERRITORIAL SEA  
In 2006, the CMS received the greenlight from the State Council to regularize its maritime rights 
protection patrols in the Chinese EEZ and continental shelf in the East China Sea. The SOA’s 
official newspaper China Ocean News reported that the CMS routine patrols in the East China Sea 
was conducted on a daily basis, consisting of six law enforcement ships and four patrol flights.667 
Although rights protection patrols had henceforth taken the pride of place in CMS’s missions,668 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea remained consistently off-limits. This restriction appeared to be 
made largely out of foreign policy considerations. As observed by a Japan expert affiliated with 
the MFA: “The CMS had long been very dissatisfied about being pressured by the MFA. When 
Sino-Japanese relations were good, the foreign ministry would forbid the CMS from patrolling the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus so as to prevent the positive political climate from being tarnished. When the 
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relations soured, the MFA would not let CMS conduct such patrols either out of the concern that 
the patrols would only add fuel to the fire.”669   
According to an SOA source, considering the sensitivity of the islets, “As long as the CMS 
wants to patrol in waters near the Diaoyu/Senkakus – usually understood as being in the 12 nautical 
miles’ territorial sea, it must be reported to and approved by the SOA, CMS headquarters, and the 
MFA.” Requests to patrol the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea would be reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis: “For each proposed patrol [in the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea], it requires a separate 
reporting procedure (一事一报). But the fact is: up to August 8, 2008, no such request had been 
approved, because Fukuda was coming [to the Olympic Games opening ceremony].” 670 This 
observation converges with information from Japanese sources. As noted by a Japanese 
interlocutor close to both Japanese and Chinese foreign ministries: “CMS had this plan and vowed 
as early as in 2006 to regularize its patrols to cover all of China’s seas. But its implementation was 
put on hold until the end of 2008, because [patrols in the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea] definitely 
could not be carried out before the Olympics. Therefore, in late 2008, the CMS was under time 
pressure to carry out such a patrol by the end of the year which it considered as long overdue.”671 
Time was tight because the patrol had to be completed between August 8 and December 31.672 
At the same time, the CMS appeared to have doubled down on its lobbying for the greenlight from 
above for this patrol. On October 18, speaking at the institution’s 10th anniversary of foundation 
and perhaps signaling the institution’s intention to forge ahead with the patrol, Sun Shuxian, 
Deputy Director of the CMS, vowed that the agency’s next step would be strengthening its 
administration and control over the disputed sea areas. Sun emphasized specifically that in order 
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to perform the mission of safeguarding the country’s maritime rights and interests, the CMS must 
show its presence and demonstrate effective administration in territorial seas and contiguous 
waters as well as in China’s EEZ and continental shelf; therefore, with respect to some disputed 
sea areas, Sun said the CMS would “appeal to its supervisory agency in seeking to boost patrols 
and demonstrate jurisdiction.”673  
The patrol was slated to take place on December 7-8. According to a firsthand account, the 
dates were picked because December 8 fell on a Monday, the same day that the JCG vessels in the 
area would be taking their shift, enabling the CMS ships to take advantage of the time gap between 
shifts.674 After determining the time, the next step would be reporting and getting approval. “For 
this patrol, it was only reported to the CMS headquarters. The MFA was not notified.”675 Two 
participating CMS patrol vessels, Haijian 46 and Haijian 51, both newly commissioned in 2005, 
departed respectively from Shanghai and Ningbo on December 4. 
On the morning of December 8, 2008, the Japanese coast guard spotted the CMS ships sailing 
six kilometers (approx. 3.3 nautical miles) southeast of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets. After loitering 
at its first stop location for roughly an hour, the CMS ships started circling the islands. The JCG 
claimed that the CMS ships remained within the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea for about nine 
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hours, despite repeated verbal warnings from JCG patrol ships.676 According to a Chinese source, 
Haijian 46 was less than one nautical mile away from the islets at its closest point.677  
Tokyo immediately lodged a strong protest with Beijing. Prime Minister Aso Taro called the 
incident “an obvious intrusion of (Japan’s) territorial waters” and “very regrettable.”678 MOFA 
summoned the Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai to lodge a formal protest while simultaneously 
lodging a protest with the Chinese Foreign Ministry through the Japanese Embassy in Beijing.679 
The MFA initially responded by stating that it “was checking the facts” and later dismissed 
Tokyo’s protest, claiming that it was legitimate for Chinese vessels to conduct normal patrol 
activities in waters under Chinese jurisdiction.680 The MFA’s spokesperson Liu Jianchao claimed 
that  this issue would not have any impacts on the upcoming China-Japan-South Korean leadership 
summit.681 
Four days later, however, Aso and Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly “clashed” over the incident 
during their one-hour meeting in Fukuoka.682 According to information from both Chinese and 
Japanese sources, Wen was apparently not even briefed on this incident and thus was apparently 
caught off guard when Aso raised the issue.683 Wen was reportedly embarrassed by this unexpected 
 
676 “Chinese Survey Ships Enter Japanese Waters,” Jiji Press, Dec. 8, 2008; “Japan urges Chinese ships to leave 
disputed waters,” Associated Press, Dec. 8, 2008; Xie Tao [谢韬], “Details of China’s patrol of the Diaoyu Island: the 
Japanese side attempted to ram CMS ships” [中国巡航钓鱼岛细节：日方企图碰撞中国海监船], International 
Herald Leader [ 国 际 先 驱 导 报 ], Dec. 12, 2008, reprinted on ifeng.com, 
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vessels’ entry into Diaoyu Island’s surrounding sea areas is ‘irreproachable’” [外交部发言人表示：中国海监船只
进入钓鱼岛海域活动是 “无可非议” 的], People’s Daily, Dec. 9, 2008. 
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issue,684 and could merely respond by a reiteration of China’s position.685 Even Chinese diplomats 
accompanying Wen at the meeting were not prepared for this situation, according to a 
knowledgeable source.686 A Chinese interlocutor deeply involved in the East China Sea issues 
recalled: “I was in Japan when this incident happened and Premier Wen was in Fukuoka. One day 
I suddenly got a call from the [Chinese] Embassy and asked whether I knew anything about the 
patrol. It seems neither the Embassy nor Wen had any idea about the patrol beforehand.”687  
The Cost Trade-off: Swing to the International End 
The initial high media coverage of the CMS patrol notwithstanding, it was quickly played down 
in subsequent reports on the Aso-Wen meeting, and Chinese MLE patrols in Diaoyu/Senkaku 
territorial waters were put on hold until August 2011,688 a sign that some Chinese interlocutors 
pointed to as proof that this 2008 CMS patrol was unauthorized.689 
Both domestic and international factors created incentives as well as political room for Beijing 
to curb its maritime law enforcement actors. By the time when the CMS episode took place, Beijing 
and Tokyo were striving to manage touchy issues including the offshore gas field disputes and the 
history issues through a modus vivendi that both countries had tenuously reached in the post-
Koizumi years. Moreover, China’s domestic opposition to a moderate policy line with Japan 
appeared to be on a slow decline, freeing up, albeit to a limited extent, the Chinese leaders’ hands 
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in navigating relations with Japan. At the same time, the recovering Sino-Japanese relationship, in 
which the Hu-Wen leadership had invested much of their political capital to patch up, considerably 
raised China’s perceived international audience costs in the event of another downturn in the 
bilateral relationship.  
Domestic Audience Costs Declined: Improving Mutual Perceptions and Curbing Opposition 
When the CMS episode took place, domestic audience costs on the Hu-Wen leadership had 
substantially decreased should they choose to de-escalate this incident. At the top, Hu Jintao had 
gradually consolidated his power base after Jiang Zemin stepped down as the Chairman of the 
CMC in the fall of 2004, and thus was politically less constrained and less vulnerable as compared 
to the first few years of his stewardship. As noted by Joseph Fewsmith, Hu began to consolidate 
his power from 2006 with the promotion of ten senior PLA officers to the rank of full-general.690 
Observing the outcomes of the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, James Mulvenon similarly 
concluded that Hu was already “firmly in charge” of both the civil and military apparatuses.691  
Meanwhile, the PLA, while continuing to cast a wary eye on Japan, had been expanding 
military-to-military contact with the Japanese defense force since 2007, and therefore might have 
relatively softened its tone on the maritime disputes. High-level military exchanges were on an 
uptick following the visit to Japan by Cao Gangchuan, then CMC’s Vice Chair and China’s 
Defense Minister, in August 2007.692 In 2008, both Xu Qiliang, then commander of the PLA Air 
Force, and Wu Shengli, then commander of the PLA Navy, visited Japan. During his visit, Wu 
 
690 Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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692 MFA, China’s Foreign Affairs 2008 (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe), p. 113. In the previous three years’ 
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told his Japanese counterpart that navies should be the major actors in the bilateral military 
exchanges.693 As a confidence building measure and part of the bilateral naval diplomacy, Chinese 
and Japanese warships made historical reciprocal visits. In November 2007, a PLA missile 
destroyer made a four-day port call at Tokyo Bay, marking the first such visit in the history of 
Sino-Japanese relations. 694  In June 2008, a JMSDF destroyer paid a visit to Zhanjiang in 
Guangdong, the first one by a Japanese warship to China since the end of WWII.695 In a PLA Daily 
commentary, Jiang Xinfeng, an Japan expert at the PLA’s AMS, hailed the warship visits as “a 
new start for Sino-Japanese exchanges in defense affairs with the bilateral political relationship 
having moved out of the shadow.”696 At the same time, bilateral negotiations jumpstarted in 2008 
to institutionalize a crisis prevention and management mechanism. In April, a bilateral expert 
group convened in Beijing to initiate the talks on establishing a maritime communication 
mechanism between the Chinese and Japanese defense agencies,697 which later incorporated the 
air domain and in 2018 culminated in the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism 
between the Chinese and Japanese militaries. 
At the grassroots level, popular resentment towards a moderate Japan policy had substantially 
declined, to a large extent due to Tokyo’s cautious handling of the thorny historical issues. 
Koizumi’s successors – Abe, Fukuda, and Aso – had consistently refrained from visiting the 
Yasukuni shrine in their official capacity as prime ministers. Indeed, the GOJ even demonstrated 
 
693 Sheng Xin [盛欣] and Xiao Wei [肖伟], “The Maturing Sino-Japanese relations” [日趋成熟的中日关系], in 
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式分析] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2009), p. 237. 
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a preemptive approach in containing diplomatic fallout from controversies over the wartime 
history before such controversies could further poison the broad bilateral relationship. Notably, on 
October 31, 2008, the Aso cabinet fired the Air Self-Defense Force Chief Tamogami Toshio, who 
wrote an award-winning revisionist essay defending Japan’s wartime atrocities including comfort 
women and the Nanjing massacre.698 Calling Tamogami’s essay “inappropriate,” the Aso cabinet 
immediately distanced itself from the views expressed in the essay. Foreign Minister Nakasone 
Hirofumi stated that views expressed by Tamogami by no means represented the official position 
of the GOJ and reaffirmed Tokyo’s adherence to the position expressed in the 1995 Murayama 
Statement,699 which Beijing had often quoted as the GOJ’s official apology for its aggression. 
Beijing quickly took notice of – with ostensible approval – Tokyo’s handling of Tamogami and 
aligning its position on history with the Murayama Statement. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s 
spokesperson Jiang Yu stated on November 1, “the Chinese side has taken notice of the GOJ’s 
clarification about its position and the measures taken. Both sides should work collaboratively to 
protect the broad interests of the Sino-Japanese relationship.”700  
In addition, Japan’s prompt disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to China in the 
aftermath of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake had generated substantial positive PR effects in the 
Chinese public.701 The annual opinion survey jointly conducted by Genron NPO and China Daily 
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shows that starting from 2006 the Chinese public’s perception of Japan by and large had been 
bouncing back (Figure 5.1). In fact, 2007 and 2008 witnessed the smallest margins between the 
ratio of respondents holding unfavorable perceptions and that of those harboring favorable views 
(12.1 percent and 13.3 percent, respectively). 
Figure 5.1: The Chinese Public’s Perception on Japan 2005-2011 
 
Source: Adapted from Genron NPO and China Daily, “The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll: Analysis 
Report on the Comparative Data,” Sept. 9, 2014, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/docs/10th_Japan-
China_poll.pdf, accessed Jan. 25, 2019. 
Investing in Sino-Japanese Relationship: International Audience Costs Climbed 
On the international end, the audience costs on an escalatory response by Beijing to Japan’s 
protests had increased, and the increase came primarily from the bilateral dimension. As of late 
2008, Sino-Japanese relations had improved to the extent that Beijing might risk jeopardizing these 
improvements should it to reverse the course and be tough on Japan. 
By the time Fukuda resigned as Japan’s Prime Minister in September 2008, Sino-Japanese 
relations had been stabilized overall and Beijing’s interest to continue pursuing cooperation with 
Fukuda’s successor was strong. Beijing’s initial response to Aso Taro’s election victory seemed 
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to be cautious and there were even concerns about potential backtracking of the relationship, given 
Aso’s reputation as a strong conservative nationalist and China hawk. Specifically, Beijing was 
worried that Aso might resume his pursuit of “value-oriented diplomacy” and push for the shaping 
of an “arc of freedom and prosperity,” two concepts he proposed in November 2006 during his 
term as Japan’s foreign minister. “Value oriented diplomacy,” as conceived by Aso, put emphasis 
on “universal values” such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market 
economy; and the “arc of freedom and prosperity” was envisioned to align Japan with “the 
successfully budding democracies that line the outer rim of the Eurasian continent.”702 Some 
Chinese analysts viewed the two concepts as key components of Japan’s emerging geostrategy 
which aimed to form an encirclement hemming in China and Russia.703 In the runup to the election, 
China Youth Daily, the official publication of the Communist Youth League which constituted Hu 
Jintao’s primary power base, articulated the concern: “[The concept of the ‘arc of freedom and 
prosperity’] is widely interpreted as a policy that seeks to contain China. Fukuda abandoned this 
concept which embodies the Cold War mentality; but once Aso assumes power, whether he will 
again push for this arc strategy will be another test of Sino-Japanese mutual trust.”704  
On the other hand, Beijing did not fail to detect signs of moderation and pragmatism that Aso 
had demonstrated toward China. As noted by Jin Xide, a Northeast Asia expert at CASS, in a 
People’s Daily commentary published on September 23 right after Aso won the election: 
“Recently, Aso has proposed to move WWII war criminals to a shrine separate from the Yasukuni 
 
702  MOFA, “Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of 
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and stopped talking about ‘the arch of freedom and prosperity.’ There are signs that Aso might be 
cautious in words and deeds on sensitive issues in Sino-Japanese relations and pursue a more 
pragmatic foreign policy approach.”705 Two days later, Beijing saw a clearer sign of pragmatism 
in Aso’s speech at the UN General Assembly, in which he called China and South Korea 
“important partners for Japan and countries with which Japan must seek to increase mutual benefits 
and shared interests,”706 Beijing responded positively to Aso’s message. A People’s Daily article 
stated, “Aso’s remarks reflected the intention of the new Japanese government to continue to 
develop friendly cooperation with China.” Calling on Aso to build on the “positive legacy” left by 
his two immediate predecessors, Fukuda and Abe, the article stated, “We hope the new Japanese 
government would follow the opinion expressed in Aso’s UNGA speech…[and] carry forward 
China and Japan’s mutually beneficial strategic relationship.”707  
Building on this positive note, Hu and Wen met with Aso in Beijing in October on the sideline 
of the Asia-Europe meeting. In particular, Wen told Aso that both countries should cherish the 
“hard earned” improvement in Sino-Japanese relations since the ice was broken with four high-
profile mutual visits by the two countries’ leaders.708 Impressed also by Aso’s handling of the 
Tamogami episode, as of late 2008, Beijing seemed to have come to see Aso as a pragmatist with 
whom it could work with on a basis of shared interests between the two countries.709 
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706 Kantei, “Address by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Prime Minister of Japan at the Sixty-Third Session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations,” Sept. 25, 2008, New York, 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/asospeech/2008/09/25speech_e.html, accessed Aug. 27, 2019. 
707 Xia Wenhui [夏文辉], “Aso inherits ‘positive legacy,’ China and Japan mutually benefit each other and move in a 
positive direction” [麻生承接“良性资产”，中日互惠向好], People’s Daily, Sept. 28, 2008. 
708 Chen Yiming [陈一鸣] and Cao Pengcheng [曹鹏程], “Wen Jiabao meets with foreign leaders attending the 
seventh Asia-Europe meeting in China” [温家宝会见来华出席第七届亚欧首脑会议外方领导人], People’s Daily, 
Oct. 25, 2008. 
709 CIIS, International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs (2008/2009) [国际形势和中国外交蓝皮书 (2008/2009)] 
(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2009), pp. 38-39. 
- 215 - 
 
Beijing De-escalated – But Not without Ramifications 
Presented with a decline in domestic audience costs and a simultaneous increase in international 
audience costs especially in the bilateral dimension, Beijing moved to de-escalate the contingency 
and curbed the CMS’s activity. According to a knowledgeable Chinese source: “After the patrol, 
the MFA took the issue directly to Hu Jintao. Hu’s instruction was to prioritize maintaining 
stability. Of course, He understood the [rationale and incentive of] the CMS’s work, otherwise the 
head of the SOA certainly would have been fired. The CMS had stayed low-profile and treaded 
very carefully for quite a long period of time after the patrol.”710 The reporting and approval 
requirement was more strictly enforced, according to this source, “The bureaucracy to which such 
patrols need be reported is the Central Foreign Affairs Office, even the [later established] Maritime 
Rights Protection Office does not have the authority to approve such patrols.” The reporting 
requirement was for both pre-planned and ad-hoc patrol operations. For pre-planned routine patrols, 
the reporting and approval was on an annual basis. For contingencies that requires 
countermeasures, the proposed countermeasures need to be separately reported and approved.711 
Quite noteworthy, this reporting requirement for both pre-planned and ad-hoc patrol operations 
seems not only applicable to CMS patrols but also to the FLE’s fishing protection patrols after the 
latter launched regular patrols in the Diaoyu/Senkaku area following the 2010 fishing trawler 
collision. Speaking at the FLE 2012 annual work conference, Zhao Xingwu, Chief of the Fisheries 
Enforcement Bureau, underscored the importance of complying with the reporting requirement 
and reporting in a timely manner when conducting patrols in the Diaoyu/Senkakus and the Spratlys 
for stabilizing China’s peripheral environment.712 
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Despite Beijing’s decision to play down the episode and keep CMS vessels away from the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters (until March 2012), this incident did not go away without 
implications for the preexisting security dilemma between China and Japan. Japanese sources in 
the foreign policy establishment, defense and academia, as well as some Chinese sources explicitly 
identified this incident as what began to alter Japan’s assessment about Beijing’s strategic intention 
and security pressure from China.713 In the words of a Japanese source, “Japan read the incident 
as a sign of Chinese irredentism, that China is planning on ‘recovering its lost land.’”714  
To boost the defense around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, beginning February 1, 2009, the JCG 
reportedly added a helicopter-bearing large patrol vessel in the Diaoyu/Senkaku area and 
temporarily increased its patrol ships in the area from two to three. 715 Moreover, according to a 
report by the PLA Daily-run newspaper China Defense News, Japan created a three-layer alert 
zone: the area within 12 nautical miles of the islands was an off-limits zone where foreign vessels 
must be expelled “at all costs;” the contiguous water between 12-24 nautical miles of the islands 
was a “strict surveillance zone” where foreign ships would be identified, closely monitored, and 
ordered to leave; and beyond 24 nautical miles, foreign ships, depending on their place of origin, 
would be coped with employing different tactics, ranging from tailing, warning to expelling.716  
Tokyo began to actively seek an explicit reaffirmation from the newly inaugurated Obama 
administration with respect to the coverage of the Diaoyu/Senkaku under Article Five of the U.S.-
Japan Defense Treaty. This issue was reportedly raised during Aso’s summit with President Barack 
Obama in Washington. On February 26, upon returning from his trip to Washington, Aso told a 
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Lower House committee that “since the Senkaku Islands are Japan’s inherent territory, the Japan-
US. Security treaty covers them.”717  
This incident also to a large extent laid the ground for how the 2010 fishing trawler collision 
was started and managed. As noted by a Chinese interlocutor in private communication:  
Japan seemed to have been shocked by the CMS patrol, seeing it as a prelude to 
China’s deliberate change of the status quo [in the Diaoyu/Senkakus]. When the 
fishing trawler collision happened in 2010, Japan insisted that it was China who 
made the first move to have changed the status quo (referring to the 2008 CMS 
incident). The Japanese side thought the Chinese government was behind the scene, 
using the fishing trawler to further change the status quo. To compound the 
situation, Japan had a hardliner minister of land, industry, and tour [when the 
fishing trawler incident occurred]. These in combination led to Tokyo’s sudden 
departure from the traditional practice of simply expelling the fishing boat [from 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku area] or deporting the crew [after detention].718  
In this sense, the CMS episode is a telling case of the interrelatedness between crises, in particular 
consecutive ones in protracted territorial disputes. 
THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER COLLISION 
The imperative to set up bilateral mechanisms to regulate encounters and prevent incidents at sea 
was heightened after China and Japan experienced a series of dangerous air-sea encounters in early 
2010.719 During his trip to Tokyo in late May 2010, Wen Jiabao reached an agreement with 
Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio to set up a hotline for communications between the two 
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countries’ political leaders in the event of a contingency or political emergency.720 On June 13, the 
hotline was activated through a phone call between Wen and Hatoyama’s successor Kan Naoto.721 
During the phone call, Wen and Kan reaffirmed the pledge to establish mechanisms for maritime 
communications in addition to the hotline so as to more effectively “avert misunderstanding and 
incidents.” 722  Both the hotline and the political will to move toward a fully-fledged crisis 
prevention and management mechanism were soon put to the test when a Chinese fisher trawler 
collided with JCG patrol ships in the Diaoyu/Snkaku territorial sea. 
On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two JCG patrol ships in waters 
some nine kilometers (approx. 4.85 nautical miles) north of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The 
fishing boat first collided with a JCG patrol ship Yonakuni, and then with another JCG vessel 
Mizuki. After chasing and forcing the fishing ship to stop, Japanese inspectors boarded the Chinese 
ship and detained the 15 crew members, including the captain who was believed to be drunken at 
the time, on suspicion of violating Japan’s fisheries law.723 On the same day, MOFA informed 
Chinese Ambassador Cheng Yonghua of the GOJ’s intention to handle the incident based on 
Japan’s domestic law and to pursue a criminal case against the captain of the fishing boat.724  
On September 8, the JCG announced the arrest of the skipper on the charge of obstructing the 
coast guard from performing public duties.725 Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito 
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stated that the collision would be handled “strictly in accordance with Japan’s domestic law” on 
the ground that there was no sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.726 
Shortly after the collision, the two countries became engaged in a PR battle with each side, 
blaming the other for causing the clash. China’s state media CCTV dismissed Japan’s claim that 
the Chinese fishing boat rammed the JCG ship as being “unthinkable,” asserting that the Chinese 
fish trawler “was rammed by” the modern, armed JCG patrol ship.727 Japanese Foreign Minister 
Okada Katsuya dismissed the Chinese account as being “not true,” adding that the trawler had 
been caught on video as it rammed into the JCG ships.728 
Some subsequent Chinese analyses insist that Japan’s detention of the Chinese fisherman 
violated the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement; in other words, this incident could have been 
avoided had Japan abided by the agreement. This line of argument goes that since the two countries 
pledged in the agreement “not to apply domestic fisheries law and ordinance” to citizens of the 
other party operating in waters south of 27°N, where the Diaoyu/Senkakus Islands are located, 
Japan has no jurisdiction over Chinese fishing boats operating in the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial 
sea – regardless of whether Japan recognizes China’s sovereignty claims or not.729  
However, as already discussed in Chapter 3, the scope of the agreement covers only the two 
countries’ EEZs and thus is not applicable to territorial sea or contiguous waters. Beijing was not 
unaware of this subtle exclusion of the Diaoyu/Senkaku waters from the agreement. As noted in a 
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2002 SOA internal publication, “For the time being, fishery disputes between China and Japan 
primarily concentrate in the sea area surrounding the Diaoyu Islands. This sea area is not covered 
by the adjustment as stipulated in the Sino-Japanese fishery agreement.” 730 A former Chinese 
diplomat acknowledged plainly in private communication:  
The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute was circumvented [in the fishery agreement], as Japan 
insists there are no disputes over the islands and the surrounding territorial waters. 
Therefore, this point was addressed in an ambiguous way subject to [China and 
Japan’s] respective interpretations. When the agreement was signed, [Beijing] 
already knew the Diaoyu/Senkaku problem would resurface in future. But at that 
time the priority was to solve the fishery problem in the much vaster sea areas.731 
This explanation is consistent with information from other Chinese interlocuters and corroborated 
with Japanese sources. A Chinese Japan expert acknowledged, “[That ‘no enforcement’ does not 
apply to the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea] cannot be put in writing, otherwise the agreement 
would not have been acceptable at home.”732 A Japanese maritime security analyst similarly noted 
in a separate interview, “[That the “no enforcement” does not cover the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial 
sea] was understood and accepted by China – until 2010.”733 
The Cost Trade-off: Overshadowed by the Growing Domestic Costs 
When the collision took place, Beijing seemed to have every reason to worry about strong domestic 
backlashes if it was seen as being weak on Japan. First and perhaps most importantly, the incident 
was particularly ill-timed – it occurred ten days prior to September 18, the 79th anniversary of the 
Mukden Incident that marked Japan’s invasion of Manchuria. Nationalist emotions were often 
running high in the Chinese public on the eve of September 18, which was unofficially but widely 
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recognized as China’s “Day of National Humiliation.” Moreover, China at the time had just 
emerged from the global financial crisis as the world’s major economic powerhouse and in the 
second quarter of 2010 replaced Japan as the second largest economy. The boosted public 
confidence, combined with the still strong mentality of victimization, means that the backlash at 
home had the potential to be even stronger than in the past should Beijing appear weak in 
responding to a perceived Japanese insult.  
On the international end, the prospective costs seemed not adequate to prevail over the 
potential costs on the domestic end. On the U.S. front, the Obama administration maintained an 
ambivalent position before and during the collision incident with respect to the coverage of the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus under the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty, which Beijing seemed to have perceived 
as working to its advantage. Meanwhile, that Washington prioritized global issues led Beijing to 
conclude that the United States was eagerly seeking Chinese cooperation such that it would be 
careful to maintain a positive relationship with China. In addition, other regional stakeholders 
especially those having maritime disputes with China were either preoccupied with other priorities 
or not responding to Chinese behavior during the incident in a way which would clearly signal to 
China that its handling of the collision would generate a strong spillover effect.  
The cost trade-off created an incentive for China to launch an escalatory response to avoid a 
strong backlash at home.  
Preempting the Domestic Audience: Getting Tough on Japan to Avoid Backlash 
At the outset of the collision, Beijing expected to quickly resolve the incident as it did in past 
fishery disputes between China and Japan. The Chinese confidence was not unfounded. 
Comparing with the South China Sea and Yellow Sea, incidents involving Chinese fishing ships 
and Japanese government vessels in the East China Sea had traditionally come in a smaller number 
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and at a lower level of intensity.734 Beijing seemed to be satisfied overall with the implementation 
of the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement as a bilateral provisional arrangement in the undelimited 
waters in the East China Sea. In June 2010, just two months prior to the collision, China Fishery 
News, the official newspaper under direction of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and Fisheries 
Enforcement Bureau, published an article penned by the FLE headquarters celebrating the 10th 
anniversary of the agreement and making an ostensibly upbeat evaluation on the implementation 
of the agreement. Specifically, the article mentioned that detention of Chinese fishermen by 
Japanese authorities occurred at times: “When Chinese fishermen are detained and fishing ships 
seized, the diplomatic and fishery agencies can coordinate in a timely manner and actively 
intervene and negotiate to ensure the safety of Chinese fishermen’s personal life and property.”735 
While the lack of data in open sources leaves unknown whether there had been incidents in which 
Chinese fishermen were detained by Japanese authorities when operating in the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
territorial sea and/or contiguous waters prior to the 2010 collision, this China Fishery News article 
indicated that a quick release and deportation of detained Chinese nationals had become a 
routinized if not standardized procedure accepted and long practiced by both parties.  
Apart from the confidence in securing a rapid resolution to the collision, there was also a sense 
of urgency in Beijing to quickly resolve the incident on China’s term in order to forestall grassroots 
mobilization, as nationalist emotions tend to surge as the highly sensitive Mukden Incident 
anniversary approaches. Progress in the Sino-Japanese relationship since 2008 notwithstanding, 
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China’s self-image of a victim of Japanese militarism was still deeply rooted and colored the lens 
through which the general public understood China’s relations with Japan. Meanwhile, China at 
the time had just emerged from the global financial crisis as the world’s major economic 
powerhouse and in the second quarter of 2010 replaced Japan as the world’s second largest 
economy. With growing confidence in the country, as noted by Shi Yinhong, a scholar at Renmin 
University, the Chinese public became increasingly critical of Beijing’s traditional, relatively 
moderate foreign policy as being “not compatible with people’s impression that China is rising.”736 
The combination of the victimization mentality with the shift of power distribution favorable to 
China seemed to have engendered a particularly strong nationalist impulse in the Chinese domestic 
audience. An online survey conducted by the populist Phoenix TV between September 7-9 
reported that 79.8 percent of the Chinese respondents supported using force as an option to 
permanently solve the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes.737  
Strong reactions from Baodiao activist groups added extra weight to Beijing’s prospective 
domestic costs in the event of a backing down. On September 8, some 30 Baodiao activists from 
the Diaoyu Action Committee staged a protest at the Japanese Consulate in Hong Kong, vowing 
to undertake a protest voyage to the disputed islets. Notably, the activists blamed Beijing for failing 
to adopt a sufficiently tough attitude in dealing with the Japanese.738 On the same day, Li Yiqiang, 
a mainland Baodiao activist who sought to rent a boat to sail to the Dioayu/Senakus criticized 
Beijing’s diplomatic negotiation with Japan over the detained Chinese fishermen as “the old 
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playbook.”739 The Chinese security apparatus reportedly took pains to block Baodiao protest 
voyages sailing from the mainland,740 which in turn only created more pressures on Beijing to 
deliver an quick diplomatic victory. 
In light of these circumstances, it seemed that Beijing had accepted the logic of pressuring 
Tokyo in order to preempt strong reactions from domestic audience and forestall grassroots 
mobilization. Early in the crisis, Liu Jiangyong, a Japan expert at Tsinghua University and a 
frequent contributor to the People’s Daily, clearly set out this logic in an interview, “China wants 
a rapid resolution to the sensitive territorial issue without arousing nationalist backlash against the 
government.”741 A very knowledgeable source close to both Chinese foreign policy and security 
establishments noted in private, “The public gets upset with the [Chinese] government usually 
when the latter is seen as not being tough enough on Japan.”742  
Tokyo’s insistence on prosecuting the Chinese skipper under Japan’s domestic law even after 
releasing the other fourteen crew members took Beijing by surprise. As the crisis dragged on and 
September 18 drew closer, the mounting grassroots pressure became even more pronounced. 
Chinese interlocutors acknowledged that Beijing miscalculated Tokyo’s willingness to follow past 
practice and cooperate in managing the incident. As a Chinese interlocutor familiar with the 
incident noted, by elevating the levels of diplomatic protests to Tokyo, Beijing expected that “at 
some point the DPJ government would feel satisfied and release the detained [Chinese 
fishermen] … But apparently China misjudged the situation.” 743  Japanese sources attributed 
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Tokyo’s recalcitrance to the DPJ government’s inexperience in handling Sino-Japanese tensions. 
A China expert in the Japanese defense community portrayed this incident as being “poorly 
managed by the Kan administration” which “did not know how the past LDP cabinets managed 
such incidents.”744 In addition, both Japanese and Chinese sources familiar with the crisis also 
ascribed Tokyo’s recalcitrance to the influence of China hawks within the DPJ on the crisis 
management process, naming in particular Maehara Seiji, who was the head of the Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport which oversees the JCG when the collision occurred and was 
appointed as the Foreign Minister on September 17 in a cabinet reshuffling.745 Maehara urged that 
Japan take “a rigid and resolute response to any threat to Japan’s sovereignty” when inspecting the 
rammed JCG patrol ships in Ishigaki.746 
On September 18, the MFA itself became a target of nationalistic backlash from the Chinese 
public who believed that the ministry was liable for a weak approach to Japan. A group of 
protesters held a rally marching outside the ministry, shouting “down with the traitors to the 
motherland” and “retake the Diaoyu Islands.”747 The Chinese Foreign Ministry building, one mile 
to the north of the Japanese Embassy, was as heavily guarded as the embassy on that day.748 
Backlash from Chinese netizens intensified further following Japan’s decision to extend the 
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captain’s detention. Online bulletin board and blogs on China’s major news portals were quickly 
filled up with charged posts pressing for a hardline approach toward Japan so as not to “let the 
public lose confidence.”749 
Apart from the impetus to preempt grassroots pressures, parochial interests – especially the 
competition between MLE agencies for greater maritime administrative clout – were also at play 
in shaping the way that Beijing reacted to the collision. That a Chinese fishing boat was involved 
in this incident offered the FLE an opportunity to expand its presence in the East China Sea, a 
traditional turf of the CMS. Prior to the collision, although the FLE was designated as the principal 
implementer of the three bilateral fishery agreements that China concluded with its neighbors, this 
agency traditionally had more actively conducted “fishing and maritime rights protection patrols” 
(护渔维权巡航) in the South China Sea than in the East China Sea.750 Huang Zuoping, Deputy 
Director of the General Office of the FLE South China Sea Bureau, stated that the FLE had 
traditionally conducted joint exercises and patrols in the South China Sea, joined by vessels from 
the East China Sea Bureau, but rarely were such activities conducted in the East China Sea.751 This 
traditional division of labor – and their corresponding “spheres of influence” – between the CMS 
and FLE first became blurred after the CMS proposed its ambitious plan to regularize rights 
protection patrols in the East China Sea in 2006 and soon expanded its patrols to areas claimed by 
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China in the Yellow Sea and South China Sea. Being a capable MLE agency on par with the CMS 
and vying for greater influence in China’s maritime administrative system, FLE reportedly had 
been aspiring to expand its fishing protection patrols in the East China Sea conversely.752  
The collision provided the raison d’être for strengthening state protection for Chinese 
fishermen operating in the East China Sea. Sun Chen, an aquaculture economist at Shanghai Ocean 
University and an advisor to the MOA on fisheries and aquaculture trade, stated in a September 8 
Global Times article, “When operating at sea, [Chinese] fishermen are a highly vulnerable group 
working in a dangerous environment. As more and more Chinese fishermen risk their lives at sea, 
their safety should be protected and respected.”753  
While it is true that when the collision occurred, the Hu-Wen leadership was not facing a lack 
of consensus on the importance of maintaining good relations with Japan, this leadership 
consensus appeared to have easily succumbed to pressures from compromise-averse pressures, in 
particular pressures from the general public. This might be best explained by the mounting 
challenge that the Hu-Wen administration was facing in maintaining domestic stability at the time, 
considering the fact that it was in 2010 that China’s internal security expenditure for the first time 
surpassed its defense budget. 
Discounting International Audience Costs: Regional Stakeholders’ Ambivalence 
The inaugural year of Barack Obama engendered a strong confidence in Beijing that the new 
administration was eagerly seeking a stable and cooperative relationship with China. Obama’s 
Asian policy team took pains to ensure the president would start on a right track on U.S.-China 
relations once in office. According to Jeffrey Bader, Obama’s principal Asian policy advisors 
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during the campaign and senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council from 
2009 to 2011, the team “had taken pains in campaign to avoid the mistakes of the presidential 
campaign of 1980s, 1992, and 2000, which had damaged U.S.-China relations early on and taken 
anywhere from one to three years to get past. We wanted to put a floor under the relationship.”754 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s annual bluebook noted with satisfaction that China-U.S. relations 
had “achieved a stable transition” following the 2008 presidential election.755  
In November 2009, Obama made a state visit to China in his first year in office and shunned 
he Dalai Lama in the lead-up to his visit. At the top of the agenda of his trip were Iran’s nuclear 
program, North Korea, and economic issues especially China’s currency exchange rate, among 
others.756 During Obama’s visit, the two countries issued a joint statement that included a line that 
read “[t]he two sides agreed that respecting each other’s core interests is extremely important to 
ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.”757 The inclusion of the expression “respecting 
each other’s core interests” in a formal bilateral statement, according to Michael Swaine, had been 
something Beijing increasingly pressed Washington on, and the 2009 joint statement marked the 
first time that this term had been accepted and used in a top-level official U.S.-China document.758 
The Obama administration’s endeavors to reassure China, as noted by Thomas Christensen, led 
many in China to view the administration as “more accommodating and sensitive to Chinese 
concerns than its predecessors” either because it “realized that the United States was weaker than 
before the financial crisis” or because the new president and his team “had a different philosophical 
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approach to the bilateral relations.”759 Assessments by Chinese analysts corroborate Christensen’s 
observation. The PLA’s National Defense University stated in its annual report on China’s 
strategic environment published in early 2010 that the Obama administration’s reaching out to 
China was “both an inevitable choice as America’s power declines, as well as a pragmatic response 
to the deepening globalization.” 760 The continued U.S. “retrenchment” in years to come, as the 
assessment went, would benefit China’s “continued expanding and consolidating international 
space” because “China is not one of the problems, it is part of the solution to the problems.”761 
From the outset of 2010, however, U.S.-China relations became plagued by controversies 
revolving around Taiwan arms sale in January, Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in February, 
the sinking of South Korean naval vessel Cheonan by North Korea in March, the consequent series 
of U.S.-ROK military exercises as well as the looming deployment of a U.S. aircraft carrier in the 
Yellow Sea, and in July a diplomatic clash between State Councilor Yang Jiechi and the U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Hanoi over the South China Sea.762 Bader admitted that by 
mid-2010, there had emerged a “somewhat different China from the one the United States had 
been dealing with for several decades.”763 While acknowledging that it had locked horns with 
Washington “at a high frequency and on a wide arrange of issues that are rarely seen in recent 
years,” 764  Beijing’s confidence did not seem to have substantially waned. In its 2010/2011 
bluebook on China’s foreign relations, the MFA-affiliated CIIS claimed that the U.S.-China 
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relationship retained “a high level of resilience and self-reparation capability.” One of the major 
factors that contributed to this high level of resilience, according to this assessment, was that the 
two countries need each other on many global and regional undertakings, such as Iran, counter-
terrorism initiatives, anti-piracy operations, and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.765 In other 
words, Beijing seemed to believe that Washington had an agenda that made China politically 
indispensable and still could offset the adverse aspects in the bilateral relationship. 
When it comes to Japan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, the Obama administration’s position 
might have confirmed Beijing’s calculation. Despite Prime Minister Aso’s open statement upon 
his return from a summit with Obama in February that the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty covers the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus, Washington did not appear to be on the same page with Tokyo regarding this 
issue. Michael Auslin, an East Asia expert with American Enterprise Institute (AEI), stated in his 
testimony at a US-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing in March:  
The broader concern for the Japanese is a political one, will the United States 
maintain its commitment to its presence in the Western Pacific to supporting 
Japan’s claims? And there is right now, of course, a bit of contention over our 
interpretation of the Senkaku Islands, whether or not it falls under the auspices of 
the security treaty. The previous administration indicated that it did; the current 
administration has made some comments that it may not.766  
On August 16, 2010 – less than a month before the collision, a report came out in Kyodo News, 
which, citing sources “familiar with the matter,” stated that the Obama administration had shifted 
from the position articulated by the Bush administration and had decided not to state explicitly that 
the Diaoyu/Senkakus was covered by the security treaty. According to the report, the Obama 
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administration had already notified Tokyo that it had decided not to state explicitly that the Japan-
US security pact covers the islands “so as not to irritate Beijing as it wanted to secure cooperation 
in the US economy’s recovery from the financial crisis.”767 Later that day, U.S. Assistant Secretary 
of State Philip J. Crowley dismissed the report as being “incorrect,” claiming that Washington’s 
position on the Diaoyu/Senkakus remained unchanged. When asked by media to reaffirm that the 
treaty covers the contested islets, Crowley said: “Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security states that the treaty applies to the territories under the administration of 
Japan,” stopping short of making a statement as unequivocal as the one given by the Bush 
administration in March 2004 (i.e., the statement by the State Department’s spokesperson Adam 
Ereli during the Baodiao landing). Pressed time and again by the media to make an explicit 
statement that the treaty applies to the Diaoyu/Senkakus, Crowley eventually modified his 
statement by saying: “The Senkaku Islands are under the administrative control of the Government 
of Japan. Article 5 states that the treaty applies to the territories under the administration of Japan. 
So that if you ask today would the treaty apply to the Senkaku Islands, the answer is yes.”768  
This episode between Japan and the United States did not go unnoticed in China. On August 
17, the website of the People’s Daily published both the Kyodo report and Crowley’s response.769 
While delighted to see what Beijing might consider as a sign of Washington’s reassurance to China 
and reluctance to interpose itself in the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute, Chinese observers 
suggested that there was essentially nothing new in Washington’s position with respect to the 
treaty’s coverage of the Diaoyu/Senkakus. Zhou Yongsheng, a Japan expert at the MFA-affiliated 
 
767 “US not to state security pact with Japan covers Senkaku Islands,” Japan Economic News, Aug. 16, 2010. 
768  Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, Aug. 16, 2010, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/08/146001.htm, accessed Jan. 30, 2019. 
769 “U.S. decided the U.S.-Japan security treaty would not explicitly covers Diaoyu islands, which Japan calls a setback 
[ 美 决 定 美 日 安 保 条 约 不 直 接 提 及 钓 鱼 岛 ， 日 称 倒 退 ], People.com.cn, Aug. 17, 2010, 
http://japan.people.com.cn/35469/7106509.html, accessed Sept. 7, 2019. 
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China Foreign Affairs University, noted that avoiding making an explicit statement did not change 
the logic that the treaty applies to the islets. As U.S.-China relations became tense in the first half 
of 2010, said Zhou, the United States might “want to reduce the tensions by sweetening China up 
a bit.”770  
During the collision crisis, the Obama administration dodged an open, explicit statement 
reaffirming the extension of America’s treaty obligations to the Diaoyu/Senkakus,771 which was 
intended to avoid further provoking Beijing while signaling Washington’s dissatisfaction with 
Tokyo’s “maladroit” handling of the collision.772 As a former U.S. government official recalled, 
there was a “definite aversion” in Washington of making an open reiteration of its treaty obligation 
out of the concern that a public clarification would only provoke China and led to further tit-for-
tat escalation. Also, by withholding such a statement during the crisis, the Obama administration 
conveyed its message to Japan, “accidents as such happened a lot in that area, you have to act more 
prudently on incidents like this;” otherwise, “they would drag in the United States.”773 Or, as more 
bluntly put by another former senior official in the Obama administration, “They [the Japanese] 
can’t assure that the United States would intervene if they act imprudently.”774  
 
770 “Hong Kong media: U.S.-Japan security treaty does not make direct reference to the Diaoyu Islands, avoiding 
unnerving China” [港媒：美日安保条约不直接提钓鱼岛，避免刺激中国 ], Chinanews, Aug. 17, 2010, 
http://www.chinanews.com/hb/2010/08-17/2472747.shtml, accessed Sept 17, 2019.  
771  On September 14, Crowley urged both parties to peacefully resolve the incident through dialogue while 
emphasizing that “the U.S.-Japanese alliance is a cornerstone of security and stability across Asia.” A week later, U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg called on both parties to have “engagement and discussion” to defuse the 
tensions during his trip to Tokyo. Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, Sept. 14, 2010, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/09/147112.htm, accessed Feb. 2, 2019; “US Official Urges Japan, China to Ease 
Tensions thru Dialogue,” Jiji Press, Sept. 21, 2010. 
772 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, p. 106; author’s interview, Los Angeles, August 2019. 
773 Author’s phone interview, August 2019. 
774 Author’s interview, Los Angeles, August 2019. 
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Chinese analysts acknowledged that the U.S. ambivalence during the crisis was perceived as 
working to China’s advantage, allowing the tensions to cool down in a face-saving way for Beijing. 
As a Japan expert put it plainly: 
The United States refrained from making an explicit statement [regarding 
application of Article 5 to the Diaoyu/Senkakus] to avoid intensifying the situation 
during the crisis by making China lose face. But it was almost certain that the 
United States would make an explicit statement after the crisis was over, otherwise 
there would be a risk that Japan might drift apart. [The U.S.] waited till the situation 
had cooled down such that it would not have an explosive effect…In China’s 
evaluation, it would be to China’s advantage as long as the U.S. would not openly 
side with Japan [during the crisis].775 
This argument was consistent with information from interviews with other Chinese sources. A 
Chinese strategist familiar with the incident noted that the U.S. “would for sure side with 
Japan…but at the same time the U.S. does not want to be dragged into a conflict between China 
and Japan.”776 Another Japan hand suggested that a U.S. reaffirmation was unsurprising from a 
structural perspective: “As the distribution of power between China and Japan shifted, Japan has 
constantly been pressing the U.S. for a clarification on the applicability of Article 5 to a 
Diaoyu/Senkaku contingency.”777 
During the crisis, the South China Sea factor appeared to have received little consideration in 
Beijing’s calculation, although in post hoc evaluations Chinese analysts expressed the concern 
about how disputants to the South China Sea would perceive China’s assertive response to 
Japan.778 Both time pressure and the perceived weak linkage between the East and South China 
 
775 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
776 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
777 Author’s interview, Shanghai, April 2019. 
778 See, for example, Zhang Jie [张洁] and Zhong Feiteng [钟飞腾], “2010: Peripheral Security Situation and China’s 
Response” [2010: 周边安全形势与中国对策] in Zhang Jie, ed., China’s Peripheral Security Situation Evaluation 
(2011) [中国周边安全形势评估 (2011)] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences Ltd., 2011), pp. 8-9. 
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Seas at the time explained Beijing’s underestimation of this part of geopolitical cost. As 
researchers affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry noted in interviews: “[China] had not 
expected that Japan would quickly reach out to ASEAN after the collision. At the time, the South 
China Sea had only witnessed the outer continental shelf claim [disputes] and the Impeccable 
[incident], and thus was not considered as a hot-button issue [as what it grew into in subsequent 
years]. For these reasons, priority was given to getting the people back. [We thought] after the 
crisis was resolved, it would be put behind us.”779 
On the South Korea front, little evidence shows that Seoul was even factored into Beijing’s 
audience costs calculations when responding to the collision, although at the time the China-ROK 
relationship had witnessed a sharp downturn following the torpedoing of Cheonan. Assessments 
by the Chinese foreign policy community similarly stressed that it was Beijing’s reluctance to 
support tougher U.N. sanctions against North Korea following the Cheonan incident and its 
diplomatic clash with Washington and Seoul over the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises in the 
Yellow Sea that had taken a heavy toll on the China-ROK relationship.780 
China’s Strong Nonmilitary Escalation 
In the collision incident, China’s goal was similar to that of the 2004 Baodiao landing incident: 
preventing Japan from subjecting Chinese nationals to Japanese domestic law and getting them 
back, thereby blocking what Beijing perceived as Japan’s attempt to use this collision to set a legal 
 
779 Author’s interviews, Beijing, June 2019. 
780 Yuan Peng [袁鹏] and Wang Honggang [王鸿刚], “The Eastward Tilting of U.S. Strategy and Obama’s Asia 
Pacific Policy” [战略重心东移与美国的亚太战略调整], in Li Xiangyang [李向阳] ed., Annual Report on 
Development of Asia-Pacific (2011) [亚太地区发展报告 (2011)] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011), 
p. 149; CIIS, International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs (2010-2011), pp. 88-97; Dong Xiangrong [董向荣], 
“South Korea in the shadow of the ‘Cheonan incident’” [“天安舰事件”阴影下的韩国], in Li, ed., Annual Report on 
Development of Asia-Pacific (2011), p. 229; Yang Danzhi [杨丹志], “Evolution of situation on the Korean Peninsula 
and its impacts on China’s national security” [朝鲜半岛局势的演变及对中国国家安全的影响], in Zhang, ed., 
China’s Peripheral Security Situation Evaluation (2011), pp. 58-60. 
- 235 - 
 
precedent which would be negatively biased toward China’s sovereignty claims. Until September 
19, Beijing seemed to believe that there was still room for securing a quick release of the Chinese 
fishermen through negotiations and dissuasion, and thus China’s escalation in this period was 
nonmilitary and moderately strong.  
Japan’s decision on September 19 to extend the captain’s detention, a step closer to what China 
perceived as “legitimizing” Japanese control over the islands, considerably reduced Beijing’s 
perceived room for negotiation while at the same time raising the possibility of presenting China 
with a fait accompli through legal means. As noted on September 20 by Liang Yunxiang, a Japan 
expert at Peking University, Beijing felt compelled to “vigorously oppose” Japan’s decision to 
subject the captain to Japanese domestic law, otherwise it would be tantamount to accepting 
Japan’s sovereignty claims over the islands.781  In this sense, Japan’s decision created strong 
incentives for Beijing to undertake a forceful escalation along multiple nonmilitary dimensions in 
order to deter Japan from indicting the skipper.  
Phase One (September 7-18, 2010): Moderately Strong Nonmilitary Escalation 
In this period, China launched a moderately strong nonmilitary escalation comprised of small-
scale anti-Japan protests, selective cancellation of bilateral exchanges, vaguely framed fishing 
protection patrols, and a rapid escalation of diplomatic protests. 
With the CMS maintaining an active presence on the forefront of the East China Sea dispute,782 
on September 9 Beijing announced the deployment of FLE vessels to “relevant waters” 
purportedly to “maintain order for fishing and production activities” and “protect the safety of 
 
781 Christopher Bodeen, “Japan urges calm after Chia severs contacts,” Associated Press, Sept. 20, 2010. 
782 “Chinese ship asks Japan ships to stop survey amid tense row,” Agence France Presse, Sept. 11, 2010. 
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Chinese fishermen’s lives and property.”783 In the small hours on September 10, the FLE vessel 
Yuzheng 202 encountered a JCG patrol ship in the Diaoyu/Senkaku area. The JCG warned the 
Chinese vessel against entering the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters. As both sides refused to 
budge and called in reinforcement, a standoff ensued until September 13 when the released 
Chinese fishing boat joined the FLE ships and was escorted back to China.784 Following the first 
deployment, Yuzheng 201 and Yuzheng 204 conducted another three-day fishing protection patrol 
near the Diaoyu/Senkakus from September 14.785 Notably, until August 2011, FLE ships had kept 
clear of the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters.786  
The diplomatic front saw an unusual rapid escalation, which was intended as a clear illustration 
of Beijing’s revolve to dissuade and deter Tokyo from pressing charges against the Chinese 
fishermen under Japan’s domestic law. On September 7, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao 
summoned the Japanese Ambassador Niwa Uichiro to lodge a protest. The next day, China’s 
Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue summoned Niwa, the second summoning within 24 hours, 
demanding the immediate release of the Chinese boat and its crew.787  On September 10, in 
 
783 “MFA Spokeswoman Jiang Yu held Regular Press Conference on September 9, 2010” [2010 年 9 月 9 日外交部
发言人姜瑜举行例行记者会], http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/chn//fyrth/t738955.htm, accessed Sept. 9, 
2019. 
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[环球时报], Sept. 21, 2010, reprinted on Chinanews, http://www.chinanews.com/gj/2010/09-21/2548168.shtml, 
accessed Sept. 12, 2019; Yu Xiangdong [余向东] and Kang Cundong [康存栋], “Sovereignty must not be violated, 
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船渔民], China Fisheries News, Sept. 20, 2010. 
785 “Special Report: Moving to become an ocean-oriented nation-Safeguarding Japan’s seas-Situations surrounding 
the Senkakus” [特集 新たな海洋立国に向かって > II 日本の「海」を守る >尖閣諸島をめぐる情勢], Japan 
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Islands,” Jiji Press, Aug. 24, 2011. 
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response to Japan’s decision to keep the Chinese captain in detention till September 19,788 Beijing 
announced the postpone of bilateral talks on the implementation of the 2008 joint development 
agreement, which was scheduled for mid-September. 789  On the same day, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Yang Jiechi summoned Niwa, the third time since the collision took place, to reiterate 
China’s “unswerving and firm determination to defend the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands.”790 
In the small hours of September 12, China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo summoned Niwa, 
warning Tokyo to avoid “making a misjudgment.”791 This meeting, as noted by the Japanese media, 
was an “extremely rare” situation in that a senior Chinese official of Dai’s ranking summoned a 
foreign ambassador in the early hours on a Sunday.792 
At the grassroots level, Chinese authorities took pains at the outset of the incident to constrain 
public mobilization. Only sporadic, small-scale protests were allowed to take place to convey a 
message of Chinese dissatisfaction. On September 8, a group of some thirty Chinese activists, 
obviously with the greenlight from the public security authorities, staged a brief protest at the 
Japanese Embassy in Beijing.793 Baodiao voyages originating from the mainland were blocked by 
Chinese authorities as of September 11.794  
 
788 “10-day detention granted for Chinese skipper over Senkaku incident,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 10, 2010. 
789 “The Chinese side postponed the second East China Sea talk” [中方推迟第二次东海问题政府间谈判], Xinhua, 
Sept. 11, 2010, reprinted on People, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/9491/181874/12696875.html, accessed Jan. 
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http://world.people.com.cn/GB/12691750.html, accessed Jan. 31, 2019.   
791 “State Council Dai Bingguo urgently summon Japan’s ambassador to China Niwa Uichiro” [国务委员戴秉国紧
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09/12/content_1700979.htm, accessed Jan. 31, 2019; “Top China Official Demands Japan’s ‘Political Resolution’ to 
Ship Row,” Jiji Press, Sept. 12, 2012. 
792 “China steps up pressure on Japan over ship collision,” Kyodo News, Sept. 12, 2010. 
793 Yoko Nishikawa and Ben Blanchard, “Beijing protests as Japan arrests China bot captain,” Reuters, Sept. 8, 2010, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china/beijing-protests-as-japan-arrests-china-boat-captain-
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After Japan released on September 13 the fourteen Chinese crew members and the fishing boat, 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry summoned Ambassador Niwa on September 14, the fifth time since 
the collision occurred, to press for the release of the Chinese skipper who was still held in detention. 
Meanwhile, Beijing announced to postpone a visit to Japan planned for an NPC delegation led by 
Li Jianguo, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC.795  
While the release of the fourteen fishermen was hailed in China as a diplomatic victory,796 
popular pressure remained high as the captain was kept in detention. A Chinese health-food 
company announced on September 17 to cancel its sight-seeing trip to Japan, which was offered 
as a benefit for the company’s 10,000 employees and agents.797 On the sensitive date of September 
18, Beijing decided to let off some steam by allowing three waves of demonstrations outside the 
Japanese Embassy. Some 100 protesters chanted slogans demanding Japan release the skipper and 
“get out” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Protests also erupted in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenyang, 
and Shenzhen.798 All these protests were kept in small scales and nonviolent.  
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Phase Two (September 19-25): Forceful Nonmilitary Escalation 
Following Japan’s decision on September 19 to extend the Chinese captain’s detention until 
September 29 to decide whether to pursue formal charges,799 China resorted to a forceful escalation 
along multiple nonmilitary dimensions.  
On the diplomatic front, China upped the ante by the indiscriminate cancellation of high-level 
bilateral exchanges and the elevation of diplomatic protest to the very top level. Shortly after Japan 
announced the decision to extend the Chinese skipper’s detention, the MFA released a sternly 
worded statement, threatening with “robust countermeasures of which Japan will have to bear all 
the consequences.”800 China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya summoned Ambassador 
Niwa, the sixth time since the occurrence of the collision, and warned again that China would take 
“strong countermeasures” should Japan refuse to unconditionally and immediately release the 
Chinese captain. On the same day, Beijing announced to suspend all bilateral exchanges at and 
above the provincial/ministerial levels, putting on hold talks on increasing civilian flights, and 
postponing a conference on coal. 801  On September 21, Beijing ruled out a meeting between 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto, both of whom would be 
attending the annual UN General Assembly in New York that week.802 In a move that sent an 
unusually strong signal that Beijing would continue pressuring if Tokyo remained unyielding, Wen, 
when speaking to Chinese American leaders in New York, vowed that “China will take further 
 
799 In the Japanese judicial system, detainees can be held for up to 20 days before a decision is made on whether to 
press for formal charges. Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, p. 80.  
800 “If the Japanese side does not immediately, unconditionally release the Chinese captain, the Chinese side will take 
strong countermeasures” [日方如不立即无条件放回中方船长，中方将采取强烈反制措施], People, Sept. 20, 
2010, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/9491/181874/12772617.html, accessed Feb. 1, 2019. 
801 Ibid. 
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retrieved at SCIO, http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxwfbh/xwfbh/wjb/Document/769015/769015.htm, accessed 
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actions if Japan continues to act willfully.”803 On September 22, Beijing called off the visit of a 
delegation consisting of some 1,000 Japanese youths to the Shanghai World Expo. 804  When 
speaking at the UN General Assembly on September 23, Wen sent another strong message to Japan 
by asserting that China would “never concede or compromise on issues concerning sovereignty, 
reunification and territorial integrity.”805 
On the frontline of the dispute, China made clear that it would step up its regular presence in 
the contested waters by bringing in the FLE. On September 20, the FLE announced that it would 
conduct regular patrols in areas near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.806 Another two FLE ships were 
deployed to the Diaoyu/Senkaku area for a 13-day patrol from September 23 to October 6.807 This 
move by FLE stood in stark contrast to the MFA’s meticulous response on September 9 which 
only stated that Beijing had dispatched FLE ships (without specifying whether it would be 
regularized or not) to “relevant waters” (without highlighting the sensitive Diaoyu/Senkaku area). 
Yet even more forceful countermeasures were called forth. Peng Guangqian, a PLA Major General 
and military strategist at the AMS, urged Beijing to indefinitely put off East China Sea gas talks 
and conduct military exercises in the Diaoyu/Senkaku area.808  
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On the economic front, reports began to surface from September 22 that China’s rare earth 
exports to Japan came to a halt.809 Rare earth is a widely used element in high-tech products such 
as electronic devices and hybrid cars. At the time, China accounted for 90 percent of Japan’s rare 
earth imports, and for 97 percent of the global rare earth supply.810 There were growing suspicions 
that this sudden halt was an unofficial economic sanction by Beijing to exert extra pressures on 
Tokyo while evading an open violation of WTO rules.811 
But there have been conflicting information and assessments of whether there was a 
systematically implemented embargo. On September 24, Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and 
Industry Akihiro Ohata stated that MOFCOM had informed Tokyo that it had not issued a ban on 
rare earths exports.812 It was also noted in open reports that rare earth had already been in in short 
supply since China announced in July that it would cut export quotas by 72 percent for the year 
and a Japanese business delegation was in Beijing on September 7 lobbying against the 
reduction.813 Some post hoc studies also pointed to the possibility that the rare earth export decline 
might be caused by an acceleration of the export reduction already in place before the collision or 
a fluctuation in shipments rather than by a systematically imposed embargo.814  
Information coming out of Chinese language sources both during and after the incident, 
however, implies that a rare earth embargo was pushed for by both elites and the general public 
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and – as a result – adopted. A Global Times article on September 20 discussing possible follow-
up countermeasures against Japan is revealing in that rare earth restriction was proposed at the 
time and being considered as an option by Chinese policy elites. Tang Chunfeng, a Japan expert 
at the MOFCOM’s in-house research institute the Chinese Academy of International Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), stated that “Japan had large demands for natural resources 
exported from China, making the reduction or restriction of natural resource exports to Japan a 
feasible measure.” Tang did not specify which natural resource should be subject to export 
restriction. Bit in an online survey published alongside Tang’s s remarks asking readers to vote for 
“the most effective countermeasure suggested by the experts,” six options were listed: 1) buying 
Japanese Yen to drive up its exchange rate (13.7 percent); 2) restricting rare earth export to Japan 
(11.6 percent); 3) restricting Japanese enterprises and boycott Japanese goods (37.2 percent); 4) 
indefinitely postponing East China Sea gas field talks (5.6 percent); 5) routinizing fisheries law 
enforcement vessels’ patrol in the Diaoyu/Senkaku sea areas (28.7 percent); 6) other measures (3.2 
percent). 815  Retrospective accounts by credible Chinese sources seemed to confirm the 
employment of the rare earth sanction in 2010. In 2012, amid tensions between China and Japan 
over the nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkakus, Feng Zhaokui, a senior Japan expert at CASS, 
noted to the People’s Daily that China did temporarily suspend rare earth export to Japan in 2010 
during the collision incident even though Beijing did not openly admit it.816 Other assessments 
emerging during the nationalization by Chinese analysts, especially those affiliated with the 
MOFCOM, on the effectiveness of imposing a rare earth sanction (as will be detailed later in this 
chapter) also pointed to the employment of such an embargo in 2010.  
 
815 “Chinese experts proposed countermeasures against Japan.” Emphasis added. 
816 Yang Mu [杨牧], “In fighting economic warfare, China necessarily has greater resilience than Japan?” [打经济
战，中国承受力定比日本强？], People’s Daily, Sept. 17, 2012, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2012/0917/c1002-
19027698.html, accessed Mar. 2, 2019.  
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Figure 5.2 Japan’s Rare Earth Imports from China (month-to-month by net-weight, unit: kilogram) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Database. * This category includes both Cetrium compounds (HS 284610) and rare earth 
metals (excluding cetrium) of scandium and yttrium (HS 284690) 
Data wise, a month-to-month comparison of Japan’s rare earth imports from China during this 
period (Figure 5.2) shows that in both August and September, Japan’s total monthly imports of 
rare earth – metals and compounds combined – indeed increased as compared to the monthly total 
in July. Moreover, a disaggregated analysis shows that rare earth metals imports did start declining 
in August and continued to November before starting to bounce back in December; by contrast, 
rare earth compounds imports – which accounted for the bulk of Japan’s rare earth imports – in 
August, September and October were all larger than in July, in effect offsetting the decrease in 
rare earth metals imports and leading to a net increase in the monthly total imports in August and 
September. If China had tightened its rare earth exports under the quota system, then one should 
expect declines in both categories after July. Indeed, the rare earth compounds imports, after a 
conspicuous decline in November, saw a dramatic increase in December, which again cast doubt 
on the quota explanation. Even the across-the-board decline in Japan’s rare earth imports from 
China in 2011 cannot be explained by the quota factor either, because only half of China’s 2011 
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rare earth export quota was indeed used in that year due to decreased global demand and the price 
of rare earth.817 On top of the price factor, the decline in 2011 is more likely a result of Japan’s 
diversification of its supply chain in the wake of the sanction. 
While both evidence from the Chinese language sources and the trade data seems to confirm 
China’s quiet use of unofficial rare earth embargo on Japan, the data raised questions about the 
exact extent of the embargo. At the peak of the bilateral tensions, the shipment restriction appears 
to be more concentrated in the category of rare earth metals. The data suggest that at the very least 
the embargo was selective rather than across-the-board.  
In addition, Beijing used its domestic legal apparatus to hold Japanese nationals residing in 
China de facto political hostage – a tactic of “hostage diplomacy” that Beijing has since 
increasingly employed to gain bargaining leverage over foreign governments including Canada, 
Australia, and the United States.818 Xinhua reported on September 23 that four Japanese nationals 
were detained in Hebei Province by Chinese state security authorities reportedly for trespassing 
into a local military zone and videotaping military facilities. Japan’s Fujita Corp, the employer of 
the detained Japanese citizens, stated that these employees were working on a project to process 
the chemical weapons abandoned in China by the Imperial Japanese Army during WWII and that 
they were in Hebei to inspect a potential construction site for a processing facility.819  
 
817 Wayne M. Morrison and Rachel Tang, China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Trade 
Implications for the United States, CRS Report for Congress (R42510), Apr. 30, 2012, p. 17. 
818 Bradley J. Murg, “Of Hostage Diplomacy and History: China and American Political Polarization,” The Diplomat, 
Oct. 19, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/of-hostage-diplomacy-and-history-china-and-american-political-
polarization/, accessed Feb. 5, 2021. 
819 “Japanese arrested in China as Clinton urges talks on dispute,” Agence France Presse, Sept. 23, 2010; Linda Sieg, 
Chisa Fujioka and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan confirms 4 nationals detained in China,” Reuters, Sept. 23, 
2010,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan/japan-confirms-4-nationals-detained-in-china-
idUSTRE68M2VW20100924, accessed Feb. 3, 2019.  
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As neither China nor Japan showed any willingness to compromise, Washington weighed in 
pressing for a rapid de-escalation “before both sides were drawn into further provocations.”820 U.S. 
President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, both in New York for the UN General 
Assembly meetings, met with the Chinese and Japanese leaders separately on September 23. In 
advance of the leaders’ meetings, Jeffrey Bader, the senior director for Asian affairs on the 
National Security Council and, Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State, met with their 
senior Chinese and Japanese counterparts to “explore modalities to resolve the situation.”821 
According to a firsthand account, Washington’s basic proposal was for Japan to release the captain 
on humanitarian grounds, as the Chinese side informed the U.S. team that one of the captain’s 
family had a health issue upon his arrest: “Japan could use the health issue for a humanitarian 
gesture to release the captain…in a face-saving way where they can maintain their position and 
say it’s humanitarian.” Thus, during her meeting with Maehara, Clinton pressed for a resolution 
along this line and was told by Maehara that Japan would find a way to de-escalate.822 Application 
of Article 5 to the Diaoyu/Senkakus was reaffirmed – as a quid pro quo – during the Clinton-
Maehara meeting. From Washington’s perspective, to privately reaffirm its treaty obligations with 
respect to the islands, as put by a former U.S. senior diplomat, “is just a restatement [of a longtime 
U.S. policy] and is not a problem.” 823  After the meeting, Maehara announced that Clinton 
confirmed to him that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were covered by the U.S.-Japan security 
 
820 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, p. 107. 
821 Ibid., p. 107. 
822 Author’s interview, Los Angeles, August 2019. Zhan’s grandmother passed away on September 8. “Detained 
Chinese captain’s grandmother passed away, the family hoped ‘[Zhan] would return to see her off’” [中国被扣船长
祖母去世，家属望“回来送老人一程 ”], Chinanews, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/09-
09/2523619.shtml, accessed Sept. 13, 2019. 
823 Author’s phone interview, August 2019. 
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treaty.824 Prime Minister Kan informed Obama during their meeting of Japan’s decision to release 
the Chinese skipper.825  
This outcome, in the words of a former U.S. government official with firsthand knowledge of 
the mediation, was intended as a “two-way message and solution” in that “the Chinese got the 
captain and the Japanese got Article 5.”826 Washington had refrained from making an open, formal 
reaffirmation with respect to Article 5 until October.827 
Patriotic Hero Released, FLE Presence Regularized, and Security Dilemma Deepened 
On September 24, Japan’s Naha District Public Prosecutors Office announced the release of 
the Chinese skipper, citing considerations over the incident’s “adverse impact on Japanese people 
and the country’s relations with China.” The announcement also noted that the incident was not 
deliberately planned. 828  Meanwhile, Japan rejected China’s demand for an apology and 
compensation over the detention of the fishing boat captain.829 Six days later, China released three 
of the four detained Japanese nationals.830  
Back home in Fujian, the Chinese captain was warmly welcomed and hailed as a national hero. 
Phoenix TV provided full coverage of his journey home. Officials from the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry and the Fujian provincial government went to the Fuzhou airport to greet him and 
escorted him to a medical checkup. On the Internet, the skipper was applauded by many Chinese 
 
824 “Clinton tells Maehara Senkaku subject to Japan-U.S. security pact,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 23, 2010. 
825 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, p. 107. 
826 Author’s interview, Los Angeles, August 2019. 
827 After the New York leaders’ meetings, Jeffrey Bader reiterated the treaty obligation at a press conference: “[T]he 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers all areas administered by Japan, and since the reversion of Okinawa to – from the 
U.S. to Japan in 1972, the Senkaku Islands have been administered by Japan, so that is what that is a reference to.” 
White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director 
for Asian Affairs Jeff Bader, and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes,” Sept. 
23, 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/23/press-briefing-press-secretary-robert-
gibbs-special-assistant-president-, accessed Jan. 30, 2019.  
828 “Japan to Release Chinese Boat Skipper,” Jiji Press, Sept. 24, 2010. 
829 “Japan spurns China’s demand for apology, compensation over skipper,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 25, 
2010. 
830 “China: Three Japanese nationals released,” CNN, Sept. 29, 2010. 
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netizens as a “hero resisting Japan,”831 a term generally referring to the Chinese soldiers and 
civilians resisting Japanese aggression during WWII. Chinese nationalists expressed their 
satisfaction with the assertive way Beijing dealt with Japan during this incident. Tong Zeng, a 
veteran Baodiao activist in mainland China, said he was “astonished and pleased by the Chinese 
government’s strong and quick response.” Tong added: “I don’t believe China acted like a bully, 
we have reason and evidence for our actions.”832 
Diplomatic tensions began to ease following Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s brief, informal 
talk with Japanese Prime Minister Kan on the sideline of the Asia-Europe meeting forum in 
Brussels in October. Both leaders agreed to resume high-level bilateral talks, as well as 
nongovernmental exchanges and communications. 833  A few days after the meeting, Beijing 
released the last of the four detained Japanese nationals and reversed the cancellation of the 
Japanese-youth delegation to the World Expo.834 In November 2010, Hu Jintao attended the APEC 
summit in Japan’s Yokohama, on the sideline of which he met briefly with Kan, signaling a modest 
recovery of the relationship.835 
Rare earth exports slowly bounced back. Japanese media reported on September 29 that 
China’s rare earth shipments to Japan had restarted, as Chinese commerce ministry’s officials 
stated that China intended to speed up customs procedures for rare earth exports to Japan.836 The 
 
831 “Jinjiang residents made festival decoration to welcome Zhan Qixion back home like a hero” [晋江相亲张灯结彩
英 雄 式 欢 迎 詹 其 雄 返 乡 ], iFeng, Sept. 27, 2010, both video and transcript retrieved at 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/zrczdydxz/content-2/detail_2010_09/27/2638900_0.shtml, accessed Feb. 3, 
2019.  
832 Calum Macleod, “China’s aggressive posture stuns Japan; Nation dishes out ‘shock and awe’ in territorial disputes,” 
USA Today, Sept. 28, 2010. 
833 Arthur Max and Scott McDonald, “Japan says maritime spat with China over,” Associated Press, Oct. 5, 2010; 
“Japanese, Chinese leaders Agree to Improve Ties,” Jiji Press, Oct. 5, 2010. 
834 “China frees last of 4 detained Japanese,” Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 9, 2010; “China allows Japanese youth 
group visit to Shanghai Expo,” Japan Economic News, Oct. 10, 2010. 
835 “Kan, Hu hold 1st bilateral talks since collision row to patch up ties,” Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 13, 2010. 
836 “China Resuming Rare Earth Exports to Japan,” Jiji Press, Sept. 29, 2010. 
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mineral export was not fully resumed to the pre-crisis level until November after Zhang Ping, head 
of China’s NDRC, reassured his Japanese counterpart Ohata Akihiro in Yokohama that the 
Chinese customs agency had been instructed to expedite inspections and that slow shipment would 
be “resolved soon.” 837  On November 19, METI stated that it had “confirmed signs of 
improvements” in rare earth shipments from China.838 
This incident further highlighted the need for an effective crisis prevention mechanism 
between the two countries. On October 11, during a sideline meeting between Chinese Defense 
Minister Liang Guanglie and his Japanese counterpart Kitazawa Toshimi in Hanoi, both ministers 
agreed to establish a liaison system between the two countries to prevent incidents at sea.839 In 
practice, both countries appeared to have adopted a more cautious attitude when handling 
subsequent incidents. On November 6, 2011, JCG arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing boat 
for intruding into Japan’s EEZ off Nagasaki after a four-and-a-half-hour chase at sea. The Japanese 
patrol ship reportedly rammed the fishing boat to stop the latter from getting away. In response, 
Beijing refrained from protesting against the arrest or making a charged statement.840 While calling 
on Japan to “properly handle the issue as soon as possible,” Beijing played down the arrest by 
calling it a “regular fisheries case.”841 Japan released the detained captain on November 9 after he 
paid a fine of 300,000 yen for violating Japan’s fisheries law.842  
The FLE capitalized on the collision to expand its presence in the East China Sea and influence 
in the Chinese maritime security system. The routinized FLE and CMS patrols in the 
 
837 “China likely to resume rare earth exports to Japan: sources,” Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 17, 2010. 
838 “Signs of improvement seen in stalled China rare earth shipments: Ohata,” Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 19, 
2010. 
839 “Kitazawa asks Liang to build liaison system for maritime contingency,” Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 11, 2010. 
840 “Japan arrests captain of Chinese fishing boat: report,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 6, 2011; “No China protest 
over fisherman’s arrest: Japan,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 7, 2011. 
841 “China dismisses diplomatic problems from arrest of Chinese fisherman,” Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 8, 
2011. 
842 “Japan releases Chinese fisherman,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 9, 2011. 
- 249 - 
 
Diaoyu/Senkaku area continued, although at a declined frequency after October until September 
2012 (Figure 5.3). In November, the FLE commissioned and deployed to the East China Sea its 
first chopper-equipped patrol ship Yuzheng 310, which was intended for fishery law enforcement 
missions in the South China Sea when it was completed in March 2010. Li Jianhua, director of the 
Fisheries Enforcement Bureau, applauded the commissioning of the patrol ship as “a great leap 
forward in the bureau’s capabilities from single-domain enforcement at sea to air-surface 
enforcement.” As the FLE shouldered more responsibilities in defending China’s maritime rights 
and in protecting Chinese fishermen’s rights, Li added, the agency would aspire to build more 
cutting-edge fishery enforcement vessels during the upcoming 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015).843  
Boasting that fishing protection patrols had made a positive contribution to the defense of 
China’s maritime rights while raising FLE’s domestic reputation in the Chinese public, the Fishery 
Enforcement Bureau vowed at the MOA’s National Fisheries Work Conference to continue its 
regular fishing protection patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkakus in 2011.844 Ju Li, Deputy Director of 
the FLE, pledged that the agency would become Chinese fishermen’s “real protective god in 
disputed waters.”845 Ruling out a quick solution to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute through political 
or military means, Huang Zuoping, director of the South China Sea Fisheries Enforcement Bureau, 
called for strengthening FLE patrols in the area. Fishery law enforcement and administration 
activity, according to Huang’s argument, were “inherently part of the domestic fishery economic  
 
843 Liang Ganghua [梁钢华], “China’s first helicopter-capable Yuzheng ship commissioned and deployed to the East 
China Sea for law enforcement activities” [我国第一艘载直升机渔政船入列开赴东海执法], Xinhua, reprinted on 
Global Times, Nov. 16, 2010, http://china.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-11/1258745.html, accessed Feb. 3, 2019; “China’s 
new chopper-equipped patrol ship heads toward Senkaku: report,” Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 16, 2010. 
844 Suo Youwei [索有为], “China will strengthen fishery law enforcement administration, safeguarding the country’s 
maritime rights and interests” [中国将强化渔政执法管理，维护国家海洋权益], China News [中国新闻网], Dec. 
23, 2010, reprinted on People, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/13566443.html, accessed Feb. 8, 2010. 
845 Hu Jing [胡婧], “FLE takes the heavy lift in safeguarding maritime rights and interests” [维护海洋权益，渔政担
纲重任], China Fisheries News, Dec. 20, 2010. 
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administration” and as such constituting a “more concrete and pragmatic” way of asserting China’s 
sovereign claims than issuing diplomatic statements. To effectively use fishery affairs to defend 
China’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkakus, Huang proposed that China should organize and 
support fishermen to operate in the Diaoyu/Senkaku waters. Moreover, according to Huang, the 
regularized FLE patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands should be elevated to an “important 
national operation on a par with the anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden.” 846 
Beyond China’s diplomatic victory, boosted maritime presence in the East China Sea, and the 
signs of recovery in the bilateral relations on the surface, issues fundamental to the crisis remained 
unaddressed, and in a sense paved the way for the Senkaku nationalization crisis in 2012. The 
immediate and arguably most pressing issue was that bilateral crisis management mechanisms 
were proved in this incident to be only as strong as the two countries’ political will to utilize them. 
Multiple sources in both China and Japan confirmed that the premiers’ hotline, activated only a 
few months prior to the collision, was completely unused during the course of the incident.847 
Discussions on installing and institutionalizing more effective bilateral crisis prevention and 
management mechanisms proved futile, if not utterly lip service, in the more serious 2012 crisis. 
Moreover, it did not take long before Beijing realized that the primary consequences of the 
incident would play against China’s long-term security interests in multiple aspects. First, this 
incident served as a key thrust for Tokyo and Washington to reconsolidate the strained alliance 
under the Hatoyama cabinet. The Obama administration made clear and official the coverage of 
the Diaoyu/Senkakus under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty when Secretary of State 
 
846 Huang Zuoping [黄作平], “Expert: solving Diaoyu Islands disputes through military means is only wishful 
thinking” [ 专家：军事手段解决钓鱼岛一厢情愿 ], Global Times, Dec. 1, 2010, reprinted on Sina, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-12-05/112221584717.shtml, accessed Feb. 9, 2019. 
847 Author’s interviews, Tokyo, August 2018; Beijing, March 2019; Shanghai, April 2019; Beijing, May and June 
2019. 
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Hillary Clinton reiterated U.S. treaty obligations at a press conference after a meeting with 
Maehara in Honolulu on October 28. She said, “Let me say clearly again that the Senkakus fall 
within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security.”848 While knowledgeable sources in both China and the United States noted that the 
statement represented nothing new, 849  the statement still came as a major diplomatic and 
geopolitical setback that Beijing reacted strongly to.850  
Second, this incident galvanized regional concerns that China had become more willing to 
leverage its growing power to pressure its neighbors in maritime disputes, bringing claimant states 
in the South China Sea closer to Japan as security partners. Speaking at the ASEAN-China summit 
in Hanoi on October 29, Philippine President Aquino stated that his country viewed “with grave 
concern the tensions in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.”851 Speaking at the East Asia Summit the next 
day, Prime Minister Kan echoed Aquino’s concerns about China’s unyielding stance in the East 
and South China Seas.852 The 2011 China Security Report released by NIDS made clear that Japan 
began to link the East China Sea disputes with China’s behavior in the South China Sea:  
Being in dispute with China over the EEZ and the boundary of the continental 
shelf in the East China Sea, Japan inevitably has to pay attention to China’s action 
in the South China Sea...For China, just like the South China Sea, the East China 
Sea is an important route for its advance into the oceans, and if China’s military 
 
848  Remarks by Secretary Clinton: Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, Honolulu, 
Oct. 27, 2010, transcript retrieved at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/150110.htm, 
accessed Feb. 8, 2010. 
849 Author’s interviews, Beijing, March 2019; Beijing, June 2019; Los Angeles, August 2019; telephone interview, 
August 2019; Minnie Chan, “Japan’s top diplomat blamed for arousing Beijing’s ire,” South China Morning Post, 
Oct. 31, 2010.  
850 “MFA spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu answers media questions, Oct. 28” [10 月 28 日外交部发言人马朝旭答记者问], 
transcript retrieved at SCIO, http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxwfbh/xwfbh/wjb/document/793923/793923.htm, 
accessed Feb. 8, 2019. 
851  “Statement of President Aquino during the 13th ASEAN-China Summit,” Hanoi, Vietnam, Oct. 29, 2010, 
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2010/10/29/statement-of-president-aquino-during-the-13th-asean-china-summit/, 
accessed Sept. 16, 2019. 
852 “Kan airs concerns over China’s stance on Senkakus at regional summit,” Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 30, 
2010. 
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power improves in relative terms in the East China Sea as well, it is likely that 
China will adopt a similar assertive attitude towards this water area as shown in 
the South China Sea.853 
Third, the hardening perception of China as a growing threat to Japanese maritime security 
translated into a strong imperative for a security strategy that would prioritize the defense of 
Japan’s southwestern region and effectively integrate different services of the Self-Defense Force 
(SDF) to form a multi-domain response to China’s expanding naval presence in the country’s 
surrounding waters. Building on its 2005 National Defense Program Guideline and 2005-2009 
Mid-Term Defense Program,854 Tokyo released its updated National Defense Program Guidelines 
and Mid-Term Defense Program in December 2010, both of which gave a greater priority to the 
defense of the country’s southwestern islands. Specifically, Tokyo gave a high priority to enhance 
the SDF’s mobility to respond to attacks on Japan’s southwestern offshore islands. To achieve this 
goal, Tokyo announced its intention to permanently station “the minimum necessary” SDF units 
as a first response force on the offshore islands.855 Tokyo also aimed to enhance Japan’s ISR 
capabilities in the southwestern region, announcing that the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 
would establish a new coastal surveillance unit and assign mobile ground-based radar to the 
southwestern islands.856 The new defense programs, as noted by Liu Jiangyong, a Japan expert at 
 
853 National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2011, Feb. 2012, p. 26.  
854 The 2005 National Defense Program Guideline states that Japan would “maintain necessary defense force structure 
to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and 
deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner.” The Mid-Term Defense Program FY 2005-2009 laid 
out goals of capability-building along two lines germane to coping with contingencies in the East China Sea: first, 
strengthening capabilities to effectively respond to “invasion of Japan’s offshore islands;” second, making defense 
equipment procurement, modernizing early warning system, and modernizing patrol aircrafts and fighters to “patrol 
and survey in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously and to deal with properly with 
armed special purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea.” Ministry of 
Defense of Japan, “The National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-,” Dec. 10, 2004; “Mid-Term Defense 
Program FY 2005-2009,” Dec. 10, 2004. Both documents were retrieved at 
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html, accessed Jul. 30, 2018. 
855 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond,” Dec. 17, 2010, 
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html, accessed Jul. 30, 2018. 
856  Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Mid-Term Defense Program FY 2011-2015,” Dec. 17, 2010, 
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html, accessed Jul. 30, 2018. 
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Tsinghua University, in a People’s Daily article, “have conceived China as the number one rival 
against whom Japan needs defend itself.”857 
These profound security ramifications did not go unnoticed among Chinese analysts. Noting 
all these fallout in a 2011 report on China’s peripheral security environment, a researcher at CASS 
cautioned that “after the collision, adverse changes have emerged in China’s peripheral security 
environment.”858 Likewise, Lin Limin, a senior researcher at the MSS-affiliated CICIR, wrote in 
the PLA-run China National Defense News:  
For its peripheral security, China faces three major dangerous trends. First, two or 
more neighboring countries’ conflicts with China simultaneously inflame, 
overwhelming the imperative for cooperation and forming a united front against 
China; second, China’s conflict with the U.S. increases to an extent that it prevails 
over the need for cooperation; third, China’s conflicts with the U.S. and one of our 
neighbors grow simultaneously and give rise to a strategic coalition [against 
China].859 
As China has become the world’s second largest economy and in light of the heightened tensions 
in the East China Sea as well as in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea in 2010, Lin cautioned, 
the prospect of China’s peripheral security falling prey to the three trends in the upcoming years 
might be greater than any time in the past since the end of the Cold War.860  
At the grassroots level, mutual perceptions between the Chinese and Japanese publics 
deteriorated rapidly. In China, several waves of anti-Japan protests were staged nationwide in 
October 2010. Thousands of Chinese citizens held three-day anti-Japanese demonstrations from 
 
857 Liu Jiangyong [刘江永], “The dangerous inclination in Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines” [日本
新防卫大纲的危险倾向], People’s Daily (overseas edition), Dec. 24, 2010. 
858 Li Zhifei [李志斐], “International fallout of the collision at Diaoyu Islands and China’s foreign policy” [钓鱼岛撞
船事件的国际效应与中国外交], in in Zhang, ed., China’s Peripheral Security Situation Evaluation (2011), pp.70-
75. 
859 Lin Limin [林利民], “Evaluating China’s peripheral strategic environment” [中国周边战略环境浅析], China 
National Defense News [中国国防报], Nov. 16, 2010. 
860 Ibid. 
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October 16 in Chengdu, Xi’an, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou, asserting Chinese sovereignty over the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus and calling for the boycotting of Japanese goods. Protests resulted in vandalism 
of local Japanese businesses including Ito-Yokado, Panasonic and Isetan. 861  Violent protest 
erupted in Mianyang, a city 100 kilometers northeast of Chengdu, prompting the local authorities 
to dispatch armed police to patrol the city.862  Another wave of protests was staged over the 
weekend of October 23 in three inland cities.863 Three days later, a third wave of protest took place 
in Chongqing. The annual Japan-China joint opinion survey reported in 2011 that the Chinese 
public harboring favorable views on Japan declined from 38.3 percent in August 2010 – right 
before the collision – to 28.6 percent while the ratio of those with unfavorable perceptions jumped 
from 55.9 percent to 65.9 percent.864  
Mirroring the deteriorating Chinese perception of Japan, the Japanese domestic perception of 
China worsened off to an even greater extent in the wake of the incident – the “Senkaku shock” so 
to speak. The Cabinet Office annual survey conducted in October 2010 shows that Japanese 
respondents with favorable views on China plunged from 38.5 percent in 2009 to 20 percent, while 
those reporting unfavorable views jumped from 58.5 percent to 77.8 percent.865  
More important but probably somewhat underappreciated by Beijing was the surge of the so-
called “Senkaku nationalism” mantra in Japanese domestic politics. On September 29, a bus 
 
861 “Chinese hold Anti-Japan Protests over Disputed Islands,” Jiji Press, Oct. 16, 2010; “Anti-Japan Protests in China 
Regrettable: Kan,” Jiji Press, Oct. 18, 2010; “Anti-Japan Protest Held in China for 3rd Straight Day,” Jiji Press, Oct. 
18, 2010. 
862 “Anti-Japan protests go into 3rd day, violence reported in Wuhan,” Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 18, 2010. 
863 “Chinese protests against Japan in Sichuan Province, 1st since Mon.,” Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 23, 2010; 
“Chinese protest against Japan in 2 inland cities,” Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 24, 2010. 
864 Genron NPO, Horizon Consulting Group and Peking University, “The comparison of results from the seventh 
Japan-China joint public opinion survey” [第７回日中共同世論調査比較結果], August 2011, http://www.genron-
npo.net/pdf/forum2011.pdf, accessed Jan. 25, 2019. 
865 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Foreign Policy Public Opinion Survey (survey conducted in 2010 October)” 
[外交に関する世論調査（平成 22 年 10 月調査）], Dec. 20, 2010, https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h22/h22-
gaiko/2-1.html, accessed Jan. 25, 2019. 
- 256 - 
 
carrying Chinese tourists was attacked by a group of Japanese right-wing protesters in Fukuoka.866 
On October 2, some 1,500 Japanese nationalists held a rally in Tokyo to protest what they saw as 
the Kan cabinet’s weak position toward China 867 Another massive rally was held in central Tokyo 
on October 16 protesting against China’s “invasion” of Japanese territories. 868  The Chinese 
embassy in Tokyo received two threatening letters containing rifle bullets with anonymous notes 
warning against Chinese activities near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. 869  Japanese nationalism 
centered on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute intensified still further after a 44-minute long JCG video 
capturing the collision in its entirety was leaked on the Internet in November. Some 4,000 Japanese 
citizens held anti-China demonstrations calling the collision “an act of terrorism.”870 During Hu 
Jintao’s trip to Yokohama in November for the APEC summit, another anti-China protest was 
staged near the site of the summit.871  
Alongside nationalist activists and civil organizations, Japan’s local authorities and individual 
politicians became two other increasingly active components in the “Senkaku nationalism.” 
Ishigaki, the city that administers the Diaoyu/Senkaku area, adopted a resolution on October 20, 
2010, expressing the intention of its mayor and assembly members to inspect the islets in 
preparation for the construction of a shelter for fishermen.872 Denied by the GOJ the permission 
for the proposed inspection, two members of the Ishigaki municipal assembly sailed a voyage to 
and landed on Minami Kojima on December 10. Beijing lodged a strong complaint protesting the 
 
866 Kwan Weng Kin, “China issues Japan travel warning; Advisory comes after Chinese tour group was harassed in 
Fukuoka,” Strait Times, Oct. 2, 2010; “Freed Japanese fly home, but protest fuels China row,” Agence France Presse, 
Oct. 1, 2010.  
867 “Japan nationalists rally against center-left PM, China,” Agence France Presse, Oct. 2, 2010. 
868 “Over 1,000 Japan nationalists protests China ‘invasion,’” Agence France Presse, Oct. 16, 2010. 
869 Liang Shan [梁杉], “Chinese embassy received a second threat letter containing bullet, Japanese police launches 
investigation” [中国驻日大使馆再次收到恐吓子弹信，日警方展开调查], China Daily, Oct. 26, 2010. 
870 “Anti-China rally held in Japan after video leak of collision,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 6, 2010. 
871 Eric Talmadge, “Thousands stage anti-China protest in Japan,” Associated Press, Nov. 14, 2010. 
872 “Ishigaki Mayor, Assembly Members Eager to Visit Disputed Isles,” Jiji Press, Oct. 20, 2010. 
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landing despite Japan’s reiteration of its policy that no one was allowed to land on any of the 
islands.873 In response to Beijing’s protest, Ishigaki adopted a city ordinance, designating January 
14, the day in 1895 on which Japan incorporated the Diaoyu/Senkakus into its territories, as “the 
Day of Senkaku.” The ordinance claimed that the designation was meant to “send the message to 
the international community that the Senkaku Islands have historically been an integral part of 
Japan and to enlighten public opinion in Japan.”874 Unsurprisingly, Beijing responded with another 
statement denouncing the ordinance. In June 2011, Ishigaki’s mayor Nakayama Yoshitaka, during 
a meeting with the JCG’s commandant Suzuki Hisayasu, requested the JCG enhance its patrols in 
the disputed waters in the East China Sea, introduce patrol ships with advanced capabilities and 
increase coast guard manpower. Nakayama claimed that if Chinese fishing boats entered the 
disputed waters in large numbers, “operations by Okinawa fishermen could be disrupted and their 
lives could be put in danger.”875 A week later, 550 local residents and fishermen of Ishigaki held 
a rally urging Tokyo to reinforce safety measures in the surrounding sea areas.876 On January 3, 
2012, another four Ishigaki city assembly members landed on the Diaoyu/Senkakus, provoking a 
furious complaint from Beijing.877  
The “Senkaku nationalism” was perhaps the most profound legacy of the incident on the 
Japanese side. It eventually culminated in the nationalization crisis, which was initiated when 
Ishihara Shintaro, Governor of Tokyo and one of Japan’s most prominent conservative right-wing 
politicians, announced his plan to purchase the disputed islets in April 2012.878 
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6. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Nationalization and the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone 
The 2010 collision left Sino-Japanese relations, as correctly characterized by a Nikkei commentary 
afterwards, “potentially very fragile.” 879   Despite bilateral attempts to mend fences after the 
incident, mutual perceptions between the two countries deteriorated considerably. 880  Most 
importantly, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute remained the major flashpoint for the bilateral relations. 
As China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi acknowledged at a press conference in March 2011: “The 
[Diaoyu/Senkaku] issue is highly sensitive, and it must be handled very cautiously.”881  
The tinderbox was ignited in 2012 after Ishihara Shinaro announced his intention to purchase 
the islands, which compelled the Noda cabinet to opt for a preemptive state purchase and led to 
the most serious Sino-Japanese bilateral crisis since normalization. China viewed the Noda 
administration as a complicit with Ishihara in attempting to alter the status quo of the islands at the 
expense of China’s sovereignty claims. Rather than playing down the issue out of concerns for the 
40th anniversary of normalization, China’s growing troubles on the South China Sea front, or the 
upcoming leadership transition at the 18th Party Congress, Beijing instead issued repeated and 
ever-tougher warnings against the purchase. When it became clear that Japan would unlikely be 
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deterred from proceeding with the island nationalization, Beijing did not hesitate to undertake a 
string of measures that constituted a strong nonmilitary escalation. Moreover, in contrast to the 
2010 collision incident, the Chinese response to the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization involved 
elements of a strong military escalation, namely, with the PLA being brought from the “second 
line” to the “first line” to declare the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 
in the East China Sea. 
That domestic audience costs outweighed international audience costs best explains why China 
chose to escalate in response to the nationalization. Interactions between the Chinese and Japanese 
central governments following Ishihara’s initial announcement of his island purchase considerably 
increased the salience of the island nationalization in both countries’ domestic political 
environments. Furthermore, it lent more legitimacy to the compromise-averse coalition’ advocacy 
for an assertive policy line on maritime disputes. Thus, the domestic audience costs continued to 
build up during the process of interactions, squeezing Beijing’s (and also the GOJ’s) room for even 
mere inaction, let alone compromise.  
After Tokyo announced the nationalization as a done deal in September 2012, Beijing was then 
presented with what it regarded as China’s loss that needed to be reversed or compensated for. 
This loss-aversion rationale created incentives for Beijing to employ military escalatory measures 
in combination with a forceful nonmilitary escalation. 
Moreover, the ill timing of the nationalization appeared to have magnified its ramifications in 
at least three ways. First, the Noda cabinet announced the final decision of nationalization on the 
eve of September 18, the sensitive anniversary of the Mukden Incident that tends to arouse much 
stronger nationalist emotion in China than usual. Second, Japan made the announcement the day 
after Hu Jintao met with Noda in Vladivostok in an attempt to prevent the purchase, which was 
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regarded as a slap in the face to the Chinese top leader and thus an intentional insult to China. 
Third, the management of the incident on the Chinese side came in the middle of a precarious 
transition of power. While there is a lack of definitive evidence at the time of writing, available 
information indicates that the new leadership under Xi Jinping, with an aim to consolidate power 
by garnering support among the general public and the military top brass, might have caved into 
popular demands for a hardline approach toward Japan and later to the PLA’s longtime push for 
an ADIZ in China’s near seas. 
SHORT-LIVED RECONCILIATION: THE DISPUTE NEVER WENT AWAY  
The bilateral relationship saw a brief reconciliation in late 2011 after Noda Yoshihiko succeeded 
Kan as Prime Minister and reached out to Beijing. Early in his term, Noda made a phone call with 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, during which both leaders agreed to fully capitalize on the upcoming 
40th anniversary of normalization to improve relations. Wen extended an invitation to Noda for a 
visit to China.882 In November, Japan’s Foreign Minister Gemba Koichiro, who at the time visited 
Beijing and met with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi in preparation for Noda’s upcoming trip, 
called for the creation of a “crisis management mechanism” to avoid potential maritime incidents 
in the East China Sea. This mechanism was envisaged as a regular dialogue scheme involving the 
two countries’ foreign and defense ministries, fishery and energy agencies, as well as the coast 
guards.883 Noda made a two-day state visit to Beijing in December, but his meetings with Hu Jintao 
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and Wen Jiabao heavily focused on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-
il’s death on December 17.884 
The reconciliation soon turned out to be nothing more than a fleeting episode, with the GOJ 
announcing its plan to name a set of unnamed remote islands near the Diaoyu/Senkakus in January 
2012. The “Zhongsheng” column in the People’s Daily published a strongly worded article in 
response, calling Japan’s plan “a brazenfaced move to harm China’s core interests.”885 This article 
marked the first time that China’s state media had described the Diaoyu/Senkakus as a “core 
interest.” In contrast to the People’s Daily article, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, while making it 
clear that “any unilateral move by Japan regarding the Diaoyu and its affiliated islands is illegal 
and invalid,” refrained from using the term “core interests.”886  
In a retaliation to Japan’s official announcement on March 2 of names for 39 unnamed islets 
near the Diaoyu/Senkakus, Beijing announced its own list of names for 70 islands in the area.887 
In a follow-up move, the CMS staged a rights protection patrol on March 16 by deploying two of 
the agency’s newest vessels to the Diaoyu/Senkaku waters.888 One of the CMS ships entered the 
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Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters, prompting Tokyo to lodge a protest with Chinese Ambassador 
Cheng Yonghua.889  
Ishihara Shintaro, then Governor of Tokyo and Japan’s most prominent right-wing politician, 
dropped the bomb on April 16, 2012 when he made the announcement in Washington that the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government would purchase the three privately-owned Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islets, Uotsuri, Kita Kojima and Minami Kojima, which Japan’s central government had been 
leasing on a year-to-year contract. Criticizing the GOJ’s reluctance to confront China’s campaign 
to undermine Japan’s effective control over the islands, Ishihara vowed that the Tokyo city 
government would defend the Diaoyu/Senkakus and block the Chinese access to the area should 
the deal be finalized by the end of the year.890  
The GOJ found itself in a predicament as a result of Ishihara’s announcement. Japan’s Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu claimed that the Noda cabinet was unaware of the plan 
although the central government had its own separate contact channel with the islands’ private 
owner. Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba likewise denied foreknowledge of Ishihara’s plan.891 
However, regardless of whether the GOJ was aware of Ishihara’s initiative beforehand, the Noda 
cabinet was pushed to make a choice between action and inaction.  
The idea of nationalization was first raised on April 17 when Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Fujimura suggested that the GOJ might consider purchasing the islands.892 The next day, when 
questioned at a Diet session about the prospect of a national purchase, Noda suggested that 
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892 “Tokyo Governor Raps China over Senkaku Islands,” Jiji Press, Apr. 18, 2012. 
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nationalizing the islands could be an option.893 While Ishihara began to discuss plans to develop 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku areas for fishing, energy exploration and natural preservation,894 Japanese 
analysts suspected that the real intention of his initiative was to prod the GOJ into actions to defend 
Japan’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkakus in the face of China’s expanding presence. Miyake 
Kunihiko, a former diplomat and research director at the Canon Institute for Global Studies, 
characterized Ishihara’s purchase announcement as “shock therapy” intended to prompt the GOJ 
to take firm actions by highlighting its inability to act on “something the country should be working 
on instead of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.”895 Interviews with Japanese defense analysts, 
former government officials and scholars indicated that this interpretation was widely held within 
the Japanese foreign policy community.896 
Pressures on the Noda cabinet to make a national purchase built up quickly while at the same 
time a growing number of politicians gave their endorsement to Ishihara’s plan. On April 19, the 
Ishigaki municipal assembly adopted an opinion paper which called for a national purchase while 
criticizing the GOJ’s failure to enhance Japan’s effective control over the Diaoyu/Senkakus in the 
face of China’s expanding presence.897 Ishigaki mayor Nakayama Yoshitaka welcomed Ishihara’s 
plan and expressed the city’s desire to establish joint ownership over the islands with Tokyo city 
government.898 Nakaima Hirokazu, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, claimed that ownership by 
Tokyo would help “stabilize” the Senkaku tensions.899 Maehara Seiji, the hardline DPJ policy chief 
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and former Japanese foreign minister who handled the 2010 fishing trawler collision, also called 
on the GOJ to buy the islands in order to consolidate Japan’s control over them.900 Meanwhile, 
nationwide donations poured into the special account set up by the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government to finance the purchase.901  
The question of how to forestall Ishihara’s initiative while minimizing the potential diplomatic 
fallout from a national purchase for the Sino-Japanese relationship presented a conundrum not 
only to the GOJ but also to the United States. While allowing Ishihara to move forward with the 
purchase would surely “be a disaster in the making,” nationalization represented a no less 
worrisome option, as recalled by a former senior U.S. diplomat who was directly involved in 
communication with the GOJ regarding the purchase: 
We knew certainly this would be a huge political problem for China and was going 
to create a lot of turmoil and anger. Our message to the Japanese was that they need 
to have a quiet dialogue with the Chinese and make the Chinese understand what 
this is. Namely, it was not a provocation; instead, it was a preventive measure. It 
was a solution to a problem, not the creation of a problem.902 
MUTUAL MISJUDGMENT AND MIS-SIGNALING WHILE DOMESTIC COSTS BUILDING UP 
During the five-month period between Ishihara’s initial announcement of his island purchase plan 
and the Noda cabinet’s conclusion of the national purchase, the interactions between China and 
the GOJ might be best characterized as a process of mutual misjudgment and consequent mis-
signaling. Beijing appeared to have overestimated the GOJ’s ability to block Ishihara’s initiative 
without having to nationalize the islands; and as a result, Beijing’s repeated warnings against the 
nationalization turned out to be ineffective as a deterrent. On the other hand, the Noda 
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administration seemed to have underestimated the difficulty of convincing Beijing about the 
necessity of nationalization as well as China’s resolve to back up its verbal warnings with 
escalatory actions; and consequently, Tokyo’s repeated clarification that nationalization would be 
a lesser destabilizing option than a purchase by Ishihara failed to reassure Beijing.  
China’s initial response to the proposed island purchase was relatively measured and laid the 
blame primarily on Ishihara while seeking a “soft landing” with the GOJ. After Ishihara announced 
his purchase plan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Liu Weimin warned on April 18 
“irresponsible words and deeds by some Japanese politicians” would not only violate China’s 
sovereignty but also poison the broad Sino-Japanese relations.903 A People’s Daily commentary 
published on April 20 criticized Ishihara for seeking to sabotage Sino-Japanese relations and the 
40th anniversary of normalization with the highly provocative proposal of island purchase.904 Four 
days later, Xi Jinping, then China’s Vice President and Hu Jintao’s heir apparent, told the visiting 
Japanese Lower House Speaker Kono Yohei that “sensitive issues” should be handled properly.905 
While some reports on the meeting said that Xi used the term “core interests” during the 
meeting,906 both the Chinese and English versions of the statement released by MFA used the term 
“sensitive issues” without any mention of the words “core interests.” There was an equal chance 
that the phrase was not mentioned at all or it was used by Xi but was later deleted from the versions 
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released by MFA. In either case, it was indicative of Beijing’s tentative moderation toward the 
island purchase. On May 2, the “Zhongsheng” column of the People’s Daily warned again that 
Ishihara’s “irresponsible words and deeds” would only create problems for Japan in its conduct of 
diplomacy.907 
Nevertheless, after the Tokyo Metropolitan Government disclosed on May 2 that it had 
received a total donation of 76 million yen within five days of launching its nationwide fundraising 
drive, China’s tone sharpened.908 The term “core interests” began to appear frequently in the 
standard lexicon of Chinese leaders in their reference to the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue. On May 3, Xi 
Jinping told the visiting former Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko that Japan must 
“prudently handle sensitive issues especially those of great concerns and relating to the core 
interests of the other party.”909 Ten days later, when meeting with Noda on the sideline of a China-
Japan-ROK trilateral summit in Beijing, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao raised the issue of the island 
purchase and urged the GOJ to “respect China’s core interests and major concerns, and handle 
relevant issues in a cautious and appropriate manner.”910 On May 22, Wang Jiarui, the head of the 
CCP International Liaison Department in charge of the party’s relations with foreign political 
parties, reportedly declared that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was part of China’s core interests 
when meeting with former Japanese House of Councilors President Eda Satsuki in Beijing.911 
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China’s repeated invocation of the phrase “core interests,” as noted by Michael Swaine, was often 
intended to “lay down a marker, or type of warning” about the need for foreign states to “accept 
with little if any negotiation” China’s position on certain issues. 912  In this sense, by clearly 
declaring the Diaoyu/Senkakus as a core interest, Beijing was attempting to draw a red line and 
deter what it perceived as Japan’s further infringement on China’s sovereignty. 
At the same time, Beijing appeared to harbor a strong belief that the GOJ, if it chose to, had 
the ability to block Ishiraha’s initiative without necessarily having to make a national purchase. 
During the first meeting of the Sino-Japanese High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs held 
in May, a high-ranking MFA official overseeing the Japan affairs reportedly stated that Beijing 
was “confident that Japan would stop Ishihara’s plan.”913 Feng Wei, a Japan expert at Fudan 
University, claimed that even though Ishihara had raised more than 5,000 million yen as of mid-
May, his purchase plan was bound to be a “farce” given “the lack of support from the Japanese 
government and public.”914 This Chinese perspective, as noted by a former senior U.S. government 
official with firsthand knowledge of this crisis, speaks to the difficulty for Chinese authorities “not 
to mirror image their own system when dealing with other governments.” Namely, Beijing 
appeared unable to believe that “the central government of a country does not have the ability to 
sway the decisions of private entities or local authorities.”915 As such, to Chinese eyes, the GOJ’s 
inaction was a signal of acquiescence to Ishihara’s island purchase scheme and its proposal to 
make a national purchase of the islands tantamount to evidence of a “good cop bad cop” collusion 
with Ishihara. While the conspiracy theory rapidly gained currency within the Chinese foreign 
 
912 Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part One.” 
913 Green, et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, pp. 134-135. 
914 “Ishihara’s ‘island purchase’ bound to be a farce” [石原 “购岛” 注定是闹剧], Southern Daily [南方日报], May 
16, 2012. 
915 Author’s phone interview, August 2019. 
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policy community,916 to be fair, Beijing’s worry was not entirely unfounded. As a 2017 CSIS 
report noted, although Noda and his subordinates openly emphasized the need to forestall 
Ishihara’s plan, it was “well known within his inner circle that the underlying motivation was 
countering a perceived Chinese revanchist threat.”917 
In particular, Beijing’s belief that the Noda cabinet had been abetting Ishihara was reinforced 
when Japan’s ambassador to China Niwa Uichiro was warned by MOFA and forced to apologize 
for expressing his opposition to the island purchase in an interview with Financial Times in 
June.918 The People’s Daily claimed in a “Zhongsheng” commentary: “At the outset of the ‘island 
purchase’ farce, the Japanese government could still distance itself [from Ishihara], but before long 
its tone began to change: first by stating the possibility of ‘purchasing the islands’ by the GOJ, and 
then by issuing a stern warning to the Japanese ambassador to China who expressed his opposition 
to the ‘island purchase.’”919 A Xinhua commentary similarly stated that MOFA’s warning to Niwa 
made it clear that “Japan’s central government has departed from its initial acquiescence and 
shifted to its current thinly veiled support [for Ishihara’s purchase].” The Xinhua piece urged the 
GOJ to stop Ishihara’s island purchase plan, otherwise, it warned, “people have to question 
whether the GOJ is deliberately collaborating with Ishihara or even has made up its mind to 
forcefully establish a fait accompli.”920  On July 3, when meeting in Beijing with a business 
 
916 Sun Yi [孙奕] and Liu Hua [刘华], “Japan must weigh carefully the outcome of its attempted ‘island purchase’” 
[“购岛” 图谋后果, 须掂量掂量], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Jul. 13, 2012. 
917 Green, et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, p. 135. 
918  Mure Dikie, “Tokyo warned over plans to buy islands,” Financial Times, Jun. 6, 2012, 
https://www.ft.com/content/af98fc54-aef7-11e1-a4e0-00144feabdc0, accessed Feb. 13, 2019; “Gov’t warns envoy to 
China over remarks on Tokyo plan to buy Senkakus,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jun. 7, 2012; “Japan envoy does 
not wish Senkaku rows to affect ties with China,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jun. 11, 2012. 
919 Zhongsheng, “Japan’s ‘island purchase’ farce should come to an end” [日本 “购岛” 闹剧当休矣], People’s Daily, 
Jun. 12, 2012. 
920 Wu Liming [吴黎明], “Japanese government should weigh in to stop the ‘island purchase’ farce” [日政府应出面
制止 “买岛” 闹剧], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Jun. 15, 2012. 
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delegation from Japan’s Kansei area, Xi Jinping urged Japan to “firmly block any actions that 
would damage the national sentiments” of the two countries.921 
The Noda government, however, interpreted Beijing’s message (blocking Ishihara’s purchase 
without making a national purchase) in a different – and incorrect – way: China’s anxiety was 
more about Ishihara’s radicalism and Beijing would be less nervous if the purchase was made by 
the GOJ. After an intensive consultation with his close policy advisers on May 18, Noda reportedly 
made the decision to nationalize the islands. 922  After Ishihara announced that the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government had received a total donation of 1.3 billion yen for the purchase,923 the 
Noda cabinet made it official on July 7 that the GOJ would purchase the three privately-owned 
islets in order to “maintain and manage the Senkakus in a calm and stable manner.”924 Beijing 
made a strong response, asserting that “China’s sacred territory cannot be sold or purchased by 
any party” and that Beijing would take “necessary measures to firmly defend the sovereignty of 
the Diaoyu Islands.”925 Tokyo rejected Beijing’s protest on the basis that the purchase “concerns 
transferring ownership of domestic land” and thus was “not a diplomatic matter.”926 
HARDLINERS DOMINATED BEIJING’S DOMESTIC COSTS CALCULATION 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization came at a time when China’s traditional foreign policy line 
and its longtime approach to deal with maritime disputes were undergoing an internal rethinking 
and debate. As the first decade of the 21st century drew to its close, the traditional Chinese position 
of peaceful development was confronting growing challenges from compromise-averse 
 
921 “China’s Xi opposes Tokyo’s plan to buy land on disputed islets,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jul. 3, 2012. 
922 Green, et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, p. 135. 
923 “Japan considers buying disputed islands: PM,” Agence France Presse, Jul. 7, 2012. 
924 “Japan Govt Moves to Acquire Senkaku Islands,” Jiji Press, Jul. 7, 2012; “Japan considers buying disputed islands: 
PM,” Agence France Presse, Jul. 7, 2012. 
925 “China’s sacred territory cannot be sold or purchased by anyone” [中国神圣领土绝不允许任何人买卖], People’s 
Daily, Jul. 8, 2012, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2012/0708/c157278-18466942.html, accessed Feb. 13, 2019. 
926 “Govt: Senkaku plan not diplomatic matter,” Daily Yomiuri, Jul. 10, 2012. 
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stakeholders.927 For most of 2010, the advocates of a more assertive Chinese policy had “gone 
unchallenged publicly,” while those favoring the traditional cautious policy line had been 
“effectively silenced.”928 Later that year, in the face of mounting international concerns about an 
increasingly assertive China, the Chinese foreign policy community undertook a review,929 which 
culminated in a long article penned by State Councilor Dai Bingguo in December, which 
reaffirmed China’s commitment to peaceful development.  
Defending Deng Xiaoping’s policy line of tao guang yang hui that promotes moderation, 
caution and international engagement, Dai argued that China had benefited tremendously from its 
adherence to peaceful development both in terms of domestic economic growth and international 
emergence as a great power. As China grew stronger, Dai contended, it must refrain from 
arrogance and triumphalism while always bearing in mind that the country was still facing 
enormous socioeconomic difficulty at home. According to Dai, China could continue its 
development and achieve rejuvenation by expanding international engagement and cooperation, 
whereas challenging existing international orders or other countries as a way of seeking national 
development was neither necessary nor feasible. 930  Veteran China observers such as Henry 
Kissinger and Jeffrey Bader viewed Dai’s article, which apparently had Hu Jintao’s support, as an 
authoritative, strong rebuttal to those who had been arguing for a more assertive Chinese foreign 
policy and as a sincere call for a more cautious regional diplomacy.931  
 
927 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), pp. 503-507. 
928 Bader, Obama and China's Rise, p. 122. 
929 “Focus: Japan-China Relations Reach Major Turning Point,” Jiji Press, Sept. 20, 2011. 
930 Dai Bingguo [戴秉国], “China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo: Stick to the path of peaceful development” [中国
国务委员戴秉国：坚持走和平发展道路], Dec. 6, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2010-12/06/content_1760381.htm, 
accessed Jul. 30, 2019. An English version of this article could be found http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-
12/13/content_21529346_4.htm, accessed Sept. 23, 2019.  
931 Bader, Obama and China's Rise, p. 123; Kissinger, On China, p. 512. 
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Although Dai’s article was applauded then by foreign observers as a sign that Beijing was 
about to return to a moderate foreign policy path, in hindsight it is clear that the article was 
essentially an unsuccessful attempt by moderates to arrest the assertive trend in Chinese foreign 
policy. Dai’s position seemingly encountered immediate pushbacks from the hardliners. On the 
maritime disputes specifically, the hawks, also invoking Deng’s teachings but interpreting them in 
a way to support an assertive posture when handling those disputes, contended that “sovereignty 
belonging to China” must be a precondition for – and therefore take priority over – the principle 
of “shelving the disputes and pursuing joint development.”  
A few days after Dai’s article came out, Zhang Wenjie and Chen Minhang, two military 
strategists at the PLA’s National Defense University (NDU), penned an article calling for a 
“scientific understanding” of Deng Xiaoping’s guidance for resolving maritime disputes. This 
article, first published in the CASS-run China Social Sciences and reprinted in January 2011in the 
Central Party School-run Study Times, strongly criticized that understanding Deng’s strategic 
thinking on resolving maritime disputes merely as “shelving disputes and pursuing joint 
development” while ignoring the basic premise of “sovereignty belonging to China” had led to a 
“serious deviation from the very essence of Deng’s thinking.” 932  A related longtime 
misunderstanding of Deng’s thinking, according to this article, is that “peaceful resolution is the 
only way” to resolve the disputes; however, as the authors argued, Deng “had never given up and 
would never give up” the “legitimate rights” of “using force for self-defense.” Moreover, the 
 
932 Zhang Wenjie [张文杰] and Chen Minhang [谌民航], “Scientifically understand Deng Xiaoping’s strategic 
thinking on resolving maritime rights disputes” [科学理解邓小平解决海洋权益争端的战略思想], China Social 
Sciences [中国社会科学报], Dec. 10, 2010, https://www.sinoss.net/2010/1210/29165.html, accessed Sept. 23, 2019. 
This article was reprinted in Study Times using the pseudonym Wen Hang [ 闻 航 ] comprised of one 
character/homophone from each of the authors’ name, Wen and Hang, “Comprehensively understand Deng 
Xiaoping’s strategic thinking on resolving maritime disputes” [完整理解邓小平解决海洋争端的战略思想], Jan. 3, 
2011. 
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authors claimed, “Under the new historical circumstances, once peaceful resolution cannot be 
achieved, or countries impinging on China’s maritime rights attempts to escalate the situation by 
force, defending our country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by force will be an inevitable 
choice.” It means that China must be prepared to use force to resolve the disputes while continuing 
to search for peaceful means.933 To prepare for a military struggle, Zhang and Chen contended, 
China must redouble its propaganda campaign on possible “maritime self-defense counterattack 
military operations,” bolster the confidence that China could fight and win in such conflict even 
in the face of the persistent risk of a U.S. intervention, and must enhance the PLA’s readiness and 
deterrence capabilities in both the East and South China Seas.934 To avoid the adverse situation in 
which China was “unilaterally shelving the disputes” while other claimant states were “taking a 
yard after being given an inch”, as argued by the authors, China should seek a two-pronged strategy: 
first, leveraging economic ties with the U.S. to secure its neutrality on these disputes and to prevent 
direct intervention by the U.S. in the event of a conflict; second, responding to other states’ 
provocation with forceful countermeasure and “appropriate defensive offensive operations.”935 
Zhang and Chen’s article provoked a wave of discussions around the issue of whether 
“sovereignty belonging to China” must be a premise for “shelving disputes and pursuing joint 
development.” Amid the discussions, Deng’s supposedly three-leg prescription increasingly 
gained salience (Figure 6.1) as more prominent Chinese strategists and opinion leaders joined the 
discourse. Retired PLA Major General Luo Yuan openly criticized on numerous occasions that the 
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claimants in the East and South China Seas in a way that the principle of “sovereignty belonging 
to China” had in effect been “abandoned.” Joint development, as argued by Luo, must be clearly 
based on the premise of “sovereignty belonging to China.”936 Likewise, Qiao Liang, a Major 
General of the PLA Air Force and a military strategist famous for spearheading the concept of 
“unrestricted warfare,”937 wrote in June 2011: “China’s slogan has traditionally been ‘shelving 
disputes and pursuing joint development.’ In fact, there is another leg coming before the two – 
‘sovereignty belonging to China.’ Only by completely spelling out the twelve characters can we 
correctly understand Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping’s true intention and deeper meaning. It has been 
nearly 30 years since Comrade Xiaoping said this. Disputes have not been shelved, joint 
developments not commenced, but ‘sovereignty belonging to China’ has been threatened…To 
resolve the disputes…there is only one big premise that cannot be changed – sovereignty belonging 
to China. With this precondition, we will retain the right to resort to special means as a last resort 
lest we are compelled to do so someday.”938 Lin Dong, another military scholar at the PLA’s NDU, 
made a similar argument for making “sovereignty belonging to China” the precondition, although 
his discussion focused mostly on the South China Sea tensions.939 
Apart from the strategic community, China’s energy sector, which has a major stake in offshore 
resources development, soon joined the discourse. In January 2011, Wang Peiyun, former Editor-
 
936 Liu Yaling, “China’s rise cannot ‘having only bones but no muscle” [中国崛起不能 “只长骨头不长肉”], Zhuhai 
Daily [珠海特区报], Dec. 19, 2010; “PLA Major General interprets the situation in the South China Sea: Be 
accountable to our decedents” [解放军少将解读南海局势：要对子孙后代负责], Tuanjie Bao [团结报], Apr. 24, 
2012. 
937 The concept of unrestricted warfare refers to the use of ways other than traditional military actions such as legal, 
political, and financial warfare to inflict costs on and defeat an adversary without ensuing a direct military 
confrontation. Qiao Liang [乔良] and Wang Xiangsui [王湘穗], Unrestricted War [超限战] (Beijing: Jiefangjun 
wenyi chubanshe, 1999). 
938 Qiao Liang [乔良], “The political wisdom in the South China Sea situation” [南海局势中的政治智慧], Economic 
Observer [经济观察报], Jun. 27, 2011. 
939 Lin Dong [林东], “Only by pursuing joint development can disputes be shelved” [只有共同开发才能搁置争议], 
Study Times, Jul. 4, 2011. 
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in-Chief of CNOOC’s inhouse newspaper, made a strong statement in an interview that tao guang 
yang hui must not be applied to or be used as a justification for inaction on the issue of sovereignty. 
Some “dated ideas” on how to handle China’s maritime dispute “must be subject to a review and 
rethinking” and be given a “new meaning in the context of the era,” according to Wang, because 
should China continue to shelve the disputes without “preemptively pursuing development,” it 
could never bring the other claimants to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the most important leg 
of “sovereignty belonging to China” must be prioritized over maintaining stability, Wang argued, 
as the traditional priority given to the maintenance of stability had come at the expense of China’s 
maritime sovereignty.940  In November, the inhouse journal of Sinopec reported that “due to 
Japan’s obstruction,” production at Chunxiao had been shelved for six years. Even without 
harvesting a single bucket of oil or gas, China still made huge investments every year to maintain 
the aging facilities there. While the big picture of the Sino-Japanese relationship and national 
strategy must be given full consideration, as contended in the article, “what cannot be lost and 
must be kept in balance is the equally important defense of [maritime] rights.”941 
The SOA joined the discourse as the agency’s official newspaper China Ocean News in a 
March 2012 article explicitly called for a rethinking on Deng’s teaching of shelving disputes on 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue and for a finite timetable to resolve the dispute. The island dispute, as 
argued by the article, “could be shelved for the sake of the bigger picture of normalizing [Sino-
Japanese] relations; [but] shelving by its definition is provisional and conditional, and [thus] must 
 
940 Ye Yijian [叶一剑] and Lu Jing [卢靖], “Wang Peiyun, former Editor-in-Chief of CNOOC News, Author of 
Exciting Chinese Seas: now it is the last ocean and belated awareness for China” [《中国海洋石油报》原总编辑、
《激荡中国海》作者王佩云：对中国来说，现在已经是最后的海洋和迟到的觉醒], 21st Century Business 
Herald [21 世纪经济报道], Jan. 24, 2011. 
941 Li Yongzeng [李永增], “Having invested several billion yuans, Chunxiao field has not produced a single drop of 
oil” [投资数十亿元 春晓油田六年未产一滴油], China Oil, Gas & Petrochemicals [中国石油石化杂志], issue 18, 
Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.ccin.com.cn/ccin/news/2011/09/22/200356.shtml, accessed on Nov. 5, 2017 
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be resolved within a certain period of time, say, 10, 20 or 30 years.” Now came the moment for 
China to rethink this policy and take actions, this article asserted, given Japan’s longtime lack of 
credibility, constantly landing and erecting structures on the islands, detaining Chinese fishermen, 
harassing Chinese marine scientific survey activities, and naming the islets near the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus in its latest move.942 
The influence of the hardliners found its way into the top where leadership consensus on crisis 
containment was lacking at the time. At a CCP leadership meeting in Beidaihe in August 2012, 
Hu Juntao reportedly came under attacks from hawks within the leadership for being too weak in 
handling the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization. 943  The impacts of leadership disunity were 
magnified as the party-state was expecting its once-in-a-decade power transition. Although Hu 
was to officially depart in November, his successor Xi Jinping was already in charge of China’s 
maritime affairs as of mid-2012.944 For Xi, the flareups on China’s maritime periphery presented 
an “important test” of his competence in defending national sovereignty as well as an opportunity 
to “project strength in contrast to Hu.”945  
That the hardliners eventually carried the day was clear when Xi Jinping gave his endorsement 
to the three-leg formula of “sovereignty belonging to China, shelving disputes, and pursuing joint 
developments” at a Politburo study session in July 2013. 946  Taylor Fravel argues that Xi’s 
repetition of Deng’s guideline came as a sign that “Beijing may be reconsidering the merits of its 
 
942 Dong Mu [冬木], “Revisiting Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s statements on Diaoyu Islands,” China Ocean News, Mar. 
7,2012. 
943 Kokubun, et al., Japan-China Relations in the Modern Era, p. 186. 
944 Author’s interviews, Beijing, August 2017; Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Maritime Rights Protection Leader Small 
Group – Shrouded in Secrecy,” CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Sept. 11, 2015, 
https://amti.csis.org/chinas-maritime-rights-protection-leading-small-group-shrouded-in-secrecy/.  
945 Todd Hall, “More Significance Than Values: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 4, Issue 4 (August 2019), p. 31. 
946 “Xi Jinping underscored in the 8th Politburo study session: further care about, understand and manage oceans, 
pushing great maritime power construction toward new progress” [ 习近平在中共中央政治局第八次集体学习时强
调：进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略海洋 推动海洋强国建设不断取得新成就], People’s Daily, Aug. 1, 2013. 
- 277 - 
 
most assertive actions in the East and South China Seas.” Fravel seems to interpret the internal 
debate as one on whether Deng’s formula should be maintained or discarded as a whole, thus 
arriving at the conclusion that Xi’s repetition of Deng’s guideline represented a reaffirmation and 
continuity of Deng’s position as well as a likely temporary Chinese moderation on maritime 
disputes.947 Nevertheless, as elaborated in the preceding paragraphs, the real focus of the internal 
rethinking and debate appears to be whether the allegedly long-forgotten first leg, “sovereignty 
belonging to China,” should be reemphasized, prioritized over, and even made a precondition to, 
the other two. Viewed in light of this more nuanced analysis of what was truly being debated on, 
then Xi’s articulation of the three-leg guideline (as opposed to the traditional two-leg narrative), 
as well as the way the three legs were ordered, lead to a conclusion very different from Fravel’s: 
it is a sign that the hardline school finally won the debate. The hardliners’ argument that 
“sovereignty belonging to China” should be the precondition to the other two legs of Deng’s 
formula is also consistent with the so-called “bottom-line approach” (底线思维) in Xi Jinping’s 
foreign policy, which “stresses the need for China to stand resolute in managing territorial and 
sovereignty issues.”948  
The continued flare-up in the East China Sea (as well as in the South China Sea) roughly in 
tandem with the debate thus legitimized the hardline position and rationalized a more assertive 
pushback to perceived foreign infringement on China’s maritime rights and interests as advocated 
by the compromise-averse stakeholders.  
 
947 M. Taylor Fravel, “Xi Jinping’s Overlooked Revelation on China’s Maritime Disputes,” The Diplomat, Aug. 15, 
2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/xi-jinpings-overlooked-revelation-on-chinas-maritime-disputes/?all=true, 
accessed Aug. 28, 2019. 
948 Michael Swaine, “Beyond U.S. Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance 
of Power” (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Apr. 20, 2015, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-
china-balance-of-power-pub-59837, accessed Oct. 7, 2019. 
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Since 2010 the FLE had maintained a constant presence at the forefront of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute and had in effect benefited as a bureaucratic actor vying for greater institutional influence. 
Speaking at a regional fisheries enforcement work conference in February 2011, Niu Dun, a vice 
minister of the MOA, stressed:  
From the sensitive waters bordering the two Koreas in the Yellow Sea, to the 
surrounding areas of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, and to the Nansha, 
Xisha and Beibu Gulf, in all the sea areas we are facing serious challenges in 
defending our rights and maintaining stability. This is a matter related to national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of fishermen’s lives and property. 
The leadership attach great importance to it, society has high expectations, and the 
international community pays much attention. This is a golden opportunity as well 
as a challenge…The enforcement work by the FLE should serve the construction 
of modern fisheries, seize the opportunity of the reform of the maritime law 
enforcement system…further expand (做大) and beef up (做强) rights protection 
and fishing protection, proactively play a unique role, and enhance the FLE’s 
domestic and international influence and reputation.949  
Niu stressed that in addition to redoubling the FLE’s own fishing protection patrols in disputed sea 
areas, the agency also needed to closely collaborate with the PLA Navy in strengthening fishing 
protection patrols and joint enforcement patrols.950  
On August 24, 2011, two Chinese FLE patrol ships were spotted by JCG inside the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea – the first time that FLE vessels had been found in the sensitive 
waters and the first Chinese entry to this zone since December 2008. Tokyo lodged a protest with 
Beijing and urged for prevention of recurrence.951 The Chinese foreign ministry defended the FLE 
 
949 “Speech by MOA’s vice minister Niu Dun at the 2011 Regional Fisheries Enforcement Work Conference” [农业
部副部长牛盾在 2011 年海区渔政局工作会议上的讲话], Feb. 28, 2011, China Fishery Yearbook 2012, p. 287.  
950 Ibid., p. 288. 
951 Chinese patrol boats enter Japanese waters off Senkaku Islands,” Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 24, 2011; 
“China Ships Enter Japanese Waters near Disputed Islands,” Jiji Press, Aug. 24, 2011; “Minister lodges protest over 
Chinese boats’ approach near Senkakus,” Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 25, 2011. 
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patrol as a routine operation. 952  This patrol, likely reported to and approved by Beijing in 
compliance with the tightened reporting requirement, might have been conducted in response to a 
Japanese Lower House meeting on August 23 which considered requesting the GOJ to approve 
onsite inspection of the Diaoyu/Senkakus. The patrol might also be related to a push in June by an 
Okinawa citizen independent judicial panel to indict the Chinese skipper involved in the 2010 
collision who Japanese prosecutors decided not to indict.953 
Following Tokyo’s announcement to name the uninhabited islands near the Diaoyu/Senkakus, 
Vice Minister Niu Dun, speaking at a national fishery work conference in February 2012, urged 
the FLE to “dare to protect rights” (敢维权) and step up the agency’s enforcement activity when 
foreign ships were involved.954 Amid continued tensions over the island purchase, three FLE patrol 
ships were spotted by JCG within the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters on July 11.955  
The CMS remained another key player in the East China Sea after the collision. In May 2011, 
Sun Shuxian, Deputy Director of the CMS, claimed that the agency was planning to “carry out 
regular sea patrols more frequently.”956 On March 16, 2012, in response to Japan’s announcement 
to name the unnamed islets, the CMS conducted its second patrol inside the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
territorial sea. Beijing seemed to have given the greenlight for this patrol, probably driven also by 
a sense of urgency to assert Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction. As Colonel Li Jie, a researcher 
at the PLA’s Naval Research Institute, warned that by 2022, Japan will have effectively controlled 
 
952 “MFA spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu answers media questions regarding Chinese fishery enforcement ships patrol in 
sea areas around Diaoyu Islands” [外交部发言人马朝旭就我渔政船赴钓鱼岛海域巡航答记者问], Aug. 24, 2011, 
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn//fyrbt_602243/dhdw_602249/t851643.shtml, accessed Feb. 9, 2019. 
953 James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Muddling Through,” Comparative Connections, vol. 13, issue 2, Sept. 
2011. 
954 “Speech by MOA’s vice minister Niu Dun at the National Fishery Law Enforcement Work Conference” [农业部
副部长牛盾在全国渔政工作会议上的讲话], Feb. 25, 2012, China Fishery Yearbook 2013, p. 279. 
955 “Chinese Patrol Boats Enter Japanese Waters,” Jiji Press, Jul. 11, 2012; “Japan summons China ambassador over 
island dispute,” Agence France Presse, Jul. 11, 2012. 
956 “China beefs up maritime patrol force; 1,000 officers to be hired this year 36 ships to be added over next five years,” 
Strait Times, May 3, 2011. 
- 280 - 
 
the Diaoyu/Senkakus for 50 years, a duration long enough to allow Japan to justify its seizure of 
the islands on the basis of acquisitive prescription. This circumstance, as argued by Li, presented 
China with a closing window of opportunity to assert its sovereignty claims. According to Li, this 
patrol had not just successfully demonstrated China’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over the islands 
but also had effectively paved the way for the CMS to routinize its rights protection patrols in this 
area.957  A report on this patrol published in the SOA’s official newspaper China Ocean News on 
March 30 called for persistent CMS patrols “at a higher frequency and at a closer distance [to the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus].” In addition, the report urged the CMS to take the lead in organizing various 
MLE forces to form joint patrol fleets, improve coordination with diplomatic and military agencies 
as well as to “support legal activities by civilian Baodiao organizations.”958 
The Chinese military, silent most of the time after Ishihara’s announcement, made its position 
clear in May following the disclosure of Japan’s SDF plan for recovering the Diaoyu/Senkakus in 
the event of a Chinese occupation. It was revealed by Japanese media that during the joint 
operation drills near Okinawa in November 2011, Japan’s SDF exercised on three hypothetical 
scenarios of the Diaoyu/Senkakus being attacked by Chinese forces: the landing of Chinese 
maritime militia on the islands in peace time, followed by the deployment of PLAN warships, 
amphibious and airborne forces, and PLAAF fighters; a situation in which an armed attack was 
expected; and an actual armed attack.959 The PLA-run China National Defense News suspected 
the timing of the disclosure of Japan’s island recovery plan was well calculated as a test of China’s 
resolve and thus China must react strongly to deter further moves by Japan: 
 
957 Li Jie [李杰], “Li Jie: Patrols around the Diaoyu Islands should be routinized” [李杰：巡航钓鱼岛应常态化], 
Global Times, Mar. 20, 2012, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-03/2537992.html, accessed Feb. 14, 2019. 
958 Dong Mu [冬木], “Lessons from the CMS patrols in Diaoyu sea areas” [中国海监巡航钓鱼岛海域的启示], China 
Ocean News, Mar. 30, 2012.  
959 Przystup, “Happy 40th Anniversary…? Part 2;” Yu Qing [于青], “Japanese media discloses SDF’s ‘island recovery’ 
plan” [日本媒体披露自卫队 “夺岛” 方案], People’s Daily, May 10, 2012. 
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Given that the Diaoyu Islands is a sensitive issue between China and Japan, combat 
plans related to the Diaoyu Islands should be the Japanese MOD’s ‘top 
secret’…[which] usually cannot be publicized. Therefore, this move by the GOJ is 
to test China’s reaction. If the Chinese government does not react strongly, this plan 
may evolve into a plan for stationing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces on the Diaoyu 
Island and nearby islets.960 
After the GOJ finalized the island purchase in September, the SOA convened a symposium on 
September 20 on defending China’s maritime rights and interests in the East China Sea with 
participants from the CMS, SOA, PLAN, CNOOC and FLE. Addressing the symposium, Liu Cigui, 
then head of the SOA, vowed that his institution “would never back down on core issues 
concerning national territories and maritime rights and interests.”961 The executive deputy director 
of the CMS Sun Shuxian called for an acceleration of the agency’s capacity building. Sun also 
claimed that unlike the boundary delimitation and resource development issues in the East China 
Sea, the Diaoyu/Senkakus was a symbol of historical legacy, sovereignty, and national dignity, 
and therefore China had no room to back down.962 Ju Li, Deputy Director of the FLE, similarly 
pledged to redouble the agency’s fishing protection patrols in the area.963 Wang Xiaoxuan, head 
of the PLA Naval Research Institute, called for a shift of the policy of shelving dispute to one of 
“retaliating firmly” while waiting for opportunities to “thoroughly resolve the dispute.”964  
At the grassroots level, pressures from the Baodiao activists and the general public to respond 
firmly to Japan were mounting simultaneously. Repeated blocking of Baodiao voyages by the 
 
960 Ye Lian [叶莲], “Analyze Japan’s combat plan to grasp China’s Diaoyu Islands” [剖析日本欲夺我钓鱼岛作战
计划], China National Defense News, May 15, 2012.  
961 Zhao Jiandong [赵建东] and Sun Anran [孙安然], “Firmly and unswervingly defend China’s sovereignty over the 
Diaoyu Islands and maritime rights and interests” [坚定不移维护我钓鱼岛主权和海洋权益], China Ocean News, 
Sept. 21, 2012. 
962 “Excerpt and summaries of some experts’ presentation at the symposium on defending sovereignty over the Diaoyu 
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News, Sept. 24, 2012. 
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Hong Kong SAR government in the years preceding the nationalization had already stirred widely-
spread suspicions and dissatisfaction in the Hong Kong public that Beijing had been behind the 
scene and that local residents’ rights to freely criticize the government’s handling of the dispute 
were violated.965 The dissatisfaction was aggravated further still after a local court found two 
activists guilty for not having sufficient fire extinction equipment on the ship to be used for a 
protest voyage and for carrying passengers while holding only a fishing license. The two activists, 
fined HK $ 1,350 (USD $173), called the ruling “political” in nature and told the media, “We 
couldn’t have guessed we would be persecuted by the governments in Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
mainland China when we want to say ‘No’ to invaders. It is shameful.”966  
In June 2012, Chinese authorities interdicted another Baodiao protest voyage departing from 
Hong Kong in waters near Hainan.967 This move came under fierce criticism from the Chinese 
public in the wake of the landing of two Japanese citizens on the Diaoyu/Senkakus and a Baodiao 
voyage which successfully set sail from Taiwan, both in July. What seemed to the Chinese public 
an extremely sharp and even ironic contrast with Beijing’s approach was that the Taiwan Baodiao 
ship was escorted by five Taiwan Coast Guard ships and returned safely after sailing all the way 
to a distance of less than one nautical mile from the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.968 As the news of 
the Taiwan Baodiao expedition went viral in the Internet, Beijing incurred strong backlash from 
the Chinese public. On Tiexue (“iron blood”), one of China’s popular nationalistic internet bulletin 
board site, a netizen wrote: “The Baodiao people departing from Hong Kong were ‘dissuaded’ 
 
965 Chris Yeung, “Why block on Diaoyus trip is worrying,” South China Morning Post, May 10, 2009. 
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全返回 ], Voice of America, Jul. 4, 2012, https://www.voachinese.com/a/boat-to-disputed-island-back-home-to-
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while those departing from Taiwan were protected by Taiwan’s government ships. This is the 
gap.”969 Another netizen wrote: “Taiwan has done a great job. The mainland is spineless.”970 Even 
a researcher at the PLA’s AMS joined the backlash, urging the state to protect the Baodiao 
movement.971 
BEARABLE INTERNATIONAL COSTS 
To Chinese eyes, in the context of the broader Sino-Japanese relationship at the time, the island 
purchase was not merely an isolated territorial dispute but part of a multi-faceted strategic rivalry 
with Japan, in which various Japanese actions were perceived as attempts to exploit China’s 
vulnerability. As the bilateral relationship soured across-the-board, it effectively weakened 
China’s incentive to avoid escalation over the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue and created extra domestic 
pressures on Beijing to take a firm position on one issue area to signal resolve on others. 
First, after the 2010 collision and against the backdrop of Washington’s growing interest in 
maritime security in the Asia-Pacific,972  Japan had been stepping up its outreach to ASEAN 
countries as well as to India, a move perceived by Beijing as forging a “strategic encirclement (战
略包围)” of China on both the southern and eastern maritime frontiers.973 In particular, Beijing 
watched warily as Japan boosted its strategic partnerships with both the Philippines and Vietnam 
in 2011 – in the first instance through Aquino’s visit to Tokyo in September and in the second 
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instance by signing a memorandum in October which sought to promote Japan-Vietnam 
cooperation in security and defense.974  
Moreover, in April 2012, during the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) 
meeting, Japan agreed to make “strategic use” of its Official Development Assistance (ODA), such 
as for financing the provision of patrol boats to littoral states in the South China Sea, as part of the 
alliance’s “new initiatives to promote regional peace and stability.”975 In May, in the middle of a 
tense standoff between China and the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal, information surfaced 
that Japan had since March been planning to provide ten coast guard vessels to the Philippines to 
support the latter in its territorial dispute against China.976 Beijing perceived an increasingly clear 
link between Japan’s policy in the East China Sea and its growing interest in the South China Sea, 
“Now Japan goes out of its way to intervene in the South China Sea, but its direct incentive is to 
check China on the Diaoyu Islands dispute.”977  
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National Defense University, International Strategic Situation and China’s National Security 2011/2012 [国际战略
形势与中国国家安全 2011/2012] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2012), pp. 177-179; Zhu Fenglan [朱凤岚], “Inherit 
or go beyond?—Trend in Japanese foreign policy after the double earthquake” [继承还是超越？——双重地震后日
本对外关系走向], in Zhang Jie [张洁] and Zhong Feiteng [钟飞腾], ed., China’s Regional Security Environment 
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In addition to China’s concerns about Japan’s growing influence in the South China Sea, the 
relationship had also been constrained by what Beijing perceived as Japan’s challenge to China’s 
core interest in Xinjiang.978  On May 14, 2012, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), a pro-
Xinjiang-independence organization that Beijing claimed had engaged in separatism and terrorism 
activities, was allowed to convene a general assembly in Tokyo, despite strong oppositions from 
Beijing.979 Indeed, on May 13, during the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit held in 
Beijing, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made a request to Noda, asking the GOJ to block the WUC 
meeting.980 In a move that China might have perceived as even suggesting a connection between 
Xinjiang and the Diaoyu/Senkakus, Rebiya Kadeer, Chair of the WUC who Beijing accused of 
leading the Uyghur separatist movement, made a 100,000-yen donation on May 18 to support 
Ishihara’s island purchase, in addition to paying a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine where she hailed 
the Japanese war dead as “heroes.”981 China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei stated that 
the WUC was “colluding with Japanese right-wing forces” to split China.982 A few days later, 
Beijing announced the cancellation of CMC Vice Chair Guo Boxiong’s planned trip to Japan for 
“work-related reasons,” signaling Beijing’s strong dissatisfaction.983  
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On the U.S. front, while China watched with deepening suspicions as Washington fleshed out 
its “pivot to Asia” strategy in 2011 and 2012,984 Beijing appeared to be confident that due to the 
United States’ declined power, this strategy would unlikely translate into an American military 
intervention in China’s maritime disputes. The 2012 CIIS Bluebook evaluating China’s foreign 
relations in the previous year assessed that the United States, constrained by its financial abyss and 
military overstretch around the world, no longer had the capability to implement a “Cold War-
style direct containment of China” and instead must rely on its allies and partners in the region to 
jointly balance against China.985 Similar assessments were also reflected in analyses by China’s 
security and military agencies. In the 2012 NDU evaluation of China’s international security 
environment, Yuan Peng, head of the MSS-affiliated CICIR and an expert on U.S.-China relations, 
wrote: “Now in China too much attention has been paid to America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia while ignoring 
the Middle East will continue to be its strategic priority...given China’s accumulated power and its 
deep economic integration with the neighboring countries, it is entirely possible to avoid a Sino-
U.S. confrontation.”986 Likewise, the PLA’s AMS noted in its 2012 Strategic Review:  
Given its declined power, tightened budget, and the resultant overall military 
retrenchment, even though the U.S. prioritizes the western Pacific, there will not be 
a conspicuous increase in U.S. forces deployed to this region soon; meanwhile, the 
U.S. cannot ignore challenges from other regions…the gap between America’s 
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strategic ambition and its means remains a pronounced problem. In this context, 
avoiding a general military confrontation with China becomes an increasingly clear 
red line in America’s China policy.987  
With respect to the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue and Sino-Japanese tensions specifically, the 
perceived decline in U.S. power undergirded the Chinese optimism that Washington would not 
confront China for Japan over some uninhabited islands, despite the unpleasant fact that the Obama 
administration explicitly reaffirmed after the 2010 collision the application of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty to the islands. In early 2011, Yuan Peng, head of CICIR, identified the South China 
Sea, Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula as the three “most dangerous” flashpoints where the 
potential risk of Sino-U.S. military frictions was high,988 leaving out the Diaoyu/Senkakus. In May 
2011, writing specifically on a potential Diaoyu/Senkaku scenario, Liu Jiangyong, a Japan expert 
at Tsinghua University, argued:  
The United States knows clearly the limitation and risks of manipulating the Diaoyu 
disputes [as a tool to bolster U.S.-Japan alliance]…Once China and Japan become 
involved in another crisis over the Diaoyu Islands, the United States will face a 
dilemma: if it supports Japan, the U.S.-China relations would deteriorate, and Japan 
would be emboldened to take more radical actions…The mainstream public 
opinion in the United States will not support its government to fight a war against 
China over some uninhabited islands seized by Japan.989 
Moreover, that Washington pressured Japan into releasing the Chinese skipper during the 2010 
collision incident illustrated that “the U.S. is neither willing nor able to defend the Diaoyu Islands,” 
according to Liu. 990  Still other analyses argued that the U.S. would refrain from a direct 
 
987 Academy of Military Science [军事科学院], Strategic Review 2012 [战略评估 2012] (Beijing: Military Science 
Press, 2013), pp.22-24. 
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intervention in a Diaoyu/Senkaku scenario not only to avoid a head-on clash with China but also 
out of the concern for possible implications that such an intervention might have for America’s 
relations with Russia and South Korea, both of which also have territorial disputes with Japan.991 
Washington’s somewhat ambivalent response to the GOJ’s purchase plan seemed to have 
confirmed the Chinese assessment. On July 9, two days after the Noda cabinet made it official that 
the GOJ would make a national purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkakus, U.S. State Department’s 
spokesperson Patrick Ventrell, when asked about Washington’s position on Japan’s decision, said, 
“We expect the claimants to resolve the issue through peaceful means among themselves.” When 
pressed with follow-up questions of whether Washington perceived Japan’s purchase plan as “a 
productive way to resolve the dispute” and whether the purchase would resolve the dispute “in a 
peaceful manner” – as the U.S. called for – Ventrell dodged a direct answer and reiterated that he 
was stating Washington’s “comprehensive position on the Senkaku Islands, and that’s where we 
are.”992  
Washington’s ambivalence toward the island purchase plan appeared to stem from its concerns, 
or even discomfort, that Japan was “rushing” a policy decision that could well trigger a serious 
crisis with China and destabilize U.S.-China relations as well. According to a CSIS report, on July 
8, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell held two meetings in Tokyo with his Japanese 
counterpart Sugiyama Shinsuke, head of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau. Campbell 
took with a grain of salt Sugiyama’s claim that Japan had convinced China of the rationale for 
nationalizing the Diaoyu/Senkakus – i.e., a national purchase would be less destabilizing to Sino-
Japanese relations than a purchase by Ishihara – and that China had given its support to the 
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nationalization.993 In an interview in April 2013, Campbell revealed that he gave his Japanese 
counterpart “very strong advice not to go in this direction.” In a likely suggestion of frustration, 
Campbell said, “Japan decided to go in a different direction, and they thought they had gained the 
support of China, or some did, which we were certain that they had not.”994 A later declassified e-
mail dated September 3, 2012 that Campbell sent to senior State Department officials and copied 
to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton only sheds more light on Washington’s reservations about the 
nationalization plan. This email was written shortly after Japan’s vice foreign minister Sasae 
Kenichiro made a phone call to inform Washington that the GOJ and the islands’ private owner 
had agreed upon a price. According to the email, Campbell again urged Japan to have prior 
consultation with China when he met with Sasae on August 7, 2012 in Tokyo. By the time of 
Campbell’s phone call the Sasae, “[t]he GOJ has just concluded a round of deliberations and 
apparently their PRC counterparts were irate. Sasae, however, believes that China actually 
understands the necessity of these actions and will accept them (I am not so sure).”995  
Whereas former senior U.S. officials stated in private communication that America’s 
reservations with the nationalization plan, as well as the U.S.-Japan communication in this regard, 
were not made known to China through diplomatic channels between Washington and Beijing, 
some noted that the probability that Beijing got the information through other channels could not 
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be ruled out.996 One U.S. interlocutor noted that Beijing repeatedly requested Washington to help 
block Japan’s nationalization plan.997 Interviews with Chinese analysts and scholars, short of 
yielding definitive evidence for China’s knowledge about the U.S.-Japan communication, confirm 
Beijing’s conviction that the U.S. was unwilling to be dragged into a conflict over the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus.998 
On the South Korea front, while some Chinese analysts cautioned that China’s heavy-handed 
approach on East and South China Seas might push Seoul, with whom China also has unsettled 
maritime boundaries, to reinforce its alliance with Washington,999 a rapid deterioration in Japan-
ROK relations in mid-2012 over the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute provided Beijing with a window 
of opportunity to mitigate the potential costs that an escalatory response to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
nationalization might incur. In late June, South Korea’s popular resentment against Japan over the 
Dokdo/Takeshima and over the comfort women issue were reignited after a Japanese nationalist 
activist put up a post next to a Korean comfort woman statue in front of the Japanese embassy in 
Seoul claiming that the Dokdo/Takeshima is Japanese territory.1000 Amid strong pressures from 
domestic civic groups and opposition parties, the Lee Myung-bak administration announced to 
postpone the signing of the General Security of Military Information Act (GSOMIA) with Tokyo, 
a bilateral pact that would allow intelligence sharing between the two countries.1001  
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On August 10, to boost his declining domestic support, President Lee Myung-bak made a 
surprise visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima, the first by a South Korean leader. In response, Tokyo 
recalled its ambassador to Seoul and summoned the South Korean ambassador to lodge a formal 
protest, while proposing to submit the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute to the ICJ for a binding ruling on 
sovereignty. Seoul dismissed the ICJ proposal on the basis that the Dokdo/Takeshima was Korean 
territory and thus there was no territorial dispute.1002 On August 24, Japan’s Lower House passed 
a resolution condemning Lee’s visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima and demanding South Korea 
immediately end its “illegal occupation.”1003  
The flare-up over the Dokdo/Takeshima presented China an opportunity to co-opt South Korea 
on the East China Sea boundary disputes, as each of the two countries claimed an extended 
continental shelf stretching to the Okinawa Trough. In early July, Korean media reported that 
Seoul and Beijing were in a quiet discussion to file a joint claim for an extended continental shelf 
to the UNCLCS with the aim of countering Japan’s maritime claims.1004 In seeking alignment with 
Seoul, Beijing’s rationale was to gain recognition in the first place that the Okinawa Trough was 
the continental shelf rim, and then settle the overlapping claims between China and South Korea 
through bilateral negotiation.1005 
 
1002 “S. Korean leader visits islets also claimed by Japan; Trip may further strain ties; Tokyo recalls ambassador,” 
Straits Times, Aug. 11, 2012; “Analysis: Japan’s Isle Row with S. Korea Seen Continuing,” Jiji Press, Aug. 17, 2012; 
Kwan Weng Kin, “Tokyo to take isles row with Seoul to world court; South Korea reject outright proposal to jointly 
ask ICJ to settle dispute,” Strait Times, Aug. 22, 2012; “South Korea rejects Japan’s ICJ proposal,” Japan Times, Aug. 
31, 2012, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/08/31/national/south-korea-rejects-japans-icj-
proposal/#.XZDAQ2ZS82w, accessed Sept. 29, 2019. 
1003 ; “Seoul holding islets illegally, Noda charges,” Japan Times, Aug. 25, 2012; “Japan Lower House Passes 
Resolution against S. Korea’s Lee,” Jiji Press Aug. 24, 2012. 
1004 The two countries filed their respective preliminary reports in May 2009. “Korea, China agree on joint maritime 
claim against Japan,” Korea Herald, Jul. 8, 2012. 
1005 “China seeks to ally with South Korea against Japan on continental shelf delimitation” [大陆架划界案，中国欲
联合韩国应对日本], Lianhe Zaobao, Sept. 19, 2012, https://www.zaobao.com.sg/wencui/politic/story20120919-
176373, accessed Feb. 13, 2019. 
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Information from Chinese language sources appears consistent with the South Korean reports. 
China’s Global Times argued in October that although China, South Korea, and Japan have 
mutually overlapping continental shelf claims in the East China Sea, Beijing and Seoul’s shared 
position of extending their continental shelves to the Okinawa Trough contradicts Japan’s claim 
and in effect puts the former two on the same side. Even after China and South Korea ended up 
submitting separate (and overlapping) claims in December,1006 Chinese analysts still seemed to 
regard South Korea as a potential partner with whom a united front could and should be formed 
against Japan on the East China Sea disputes. Lv Chao, a researcher at the Liaoning Academy of 
Social Sciences, stated that the overlapping claims between China and South Korea “is not a major 
discrepancy between the two countries” and that “the two countries’ common interest in delimiting 
the boundary at the Okinawa Trough vis-à-vis Japan’s [equidistance line] claim far outweighs this 
[discrepancy].”1007 Japan was uneasy with the prospect of a China-ROK alignment on the East 
China Sea disputes. The possibility that China, South Korea and Russia, each having maritime 
disputes with Japan, might “gang up on Japan,” according to a Nikkei Weekly commentary, was 
“most worrisome.”1008 
On the Southeast Asian front, whereas Beijing was aware of the repercussions that its 
escalatory response to the 2010 fishing trawler collision had generated among claimants in the 
 
1006 According to a former MFA official, two factors contributed to China’s dismissal of the idea of submitting a 
China-ROK joint claim. First, given the unsettled maritime boundary between China and South Korea, Beijing was 
concerned that the alignment would be used by South Korea as a bargaining chip with China in their bilateral maritime 
boundary negotiations. Second, even though South Korea insists the continental shelf principle in its disputes with 
Japan but applies the equidistance line principle in its dispute with China, Beijing was “unwilling to confirm South 
Korea’s claims in any form.” Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
1007 Wang Gang [王刚], “South Korea mulls submitting continental shelf claim in the East China Sea, probably 
aligning China and ROK against Japan” [韩国拟提东海大陆架划界案，或成中韩对日本局面], Global Times, Oct. 
23, 2012, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2012-10/3207082.html, accessed Feb. 11, 2019; Liu Yang [刘洋], 
“South Korea submitted continental shelf claim, doubling the claimed area stipulated in the version made three years 
ago” [ 韩 提 交 大 陆 架 划 界 案 ， 较 三 年 前 方 案 面 积 翻 倍 ], Global Times, Dec. 27, 2012, 
http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2012-12/3422516.html, accessed Feb. 13, 2019. 
1008 “Japan must maintain its territorial integrity,” Nikkei Weekly, Aug. 28, 2012. 
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South China Sea, the open discourse in the Chinese foreign policy community on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization seems to have given little consideration on the potential 
geopolitical costs generated on this front should China make an escalatory response to the GOJ’s 
decision. In the months leading up to the nationalization, in the context of the South China Sea, 
Beijing was apparently preoccupied by the standoff with the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal 
and the diplomatic row with Vietnam over the Vietnamese Maritime Law that claimed sovereignty 
on both the Spratlys and Paracels. Therefore, as will be elaborated in chapter 8, the Chinese 
assessment focused more on the potential spillover effects of these incidents especially the 
Scarborough Shoal standoff – rather than the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization – to China’s 
relations with other claimants in the South China Sea and with ASEAN. 
CHINA’S STRONG MILITARY AND NONMILITARY ESCALATION 
The potential political costs that the Chinese decision makers might incur at home outweighed 
their concerns for potential diplomatic and geopolitical costs, compelling Beijing to take an 
escalatory response to the GOJ’s decision of nationalizing the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. 
Between the Noda cabinet’s formal proposal on July 31 to purchase the three privately owned 
Dioayu/Senkaku islets for two billion yen and the GOJ announcement on September 10 that the 
island purchase had been finalized,1009 Beijing’s primary goal was to deter Japan from moving 
forward with the deal. During this period, there was no fait accompli that China was seeking to 
reverse and in the Chinese perception there was still room for dissuasion. Facing a growing 
likelihood that the GOJ would press on, China’s escalation in this period was a relatively strong 
 
1009 “Gov’t proposes buying parts of disputed Senkakus for 2 billion yen,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jul. 31, 2012; 
“China says Japan’s buying disputed islands ‘illegal,’” BBC, Sept. 10, 2012; “Japan Inks Senkaku Purchase Contract,” 
Jiji Press, Sept. 11, 2012. 
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nonmilitary escalation comprised of Baodiao expeditions and nationwide anti-Japan protests to 
signal China’s resolve without closing the door to negotiation and pressuring. 
Japan’s finalization of the purchase on September 10 altered China’s goal of deterring the 
nationalization. At this stage, presented with a fait accompli, Beijing’s primary goal was to reverse 
it through what the Chinese analysts branded as “the combination punches” (组合拳), namely, a 
variety of countermeasures that constituted a strong nonmilitary escalation and a restrained 
military escalation. The strong nonmilitary escalation was comprised of massive and at times 
violent anti-Japan protests, routinized MLE patrols within the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters, 
a complete suspension of bilateral exchanges, and the initiation of international legal warfare at 
the UN. Meanwhile, the restrained military escalation allowed the PLA to play a more active role 
in asserting China’s maritime claims, though still short of coming to the “first line.”  
Following the leadership transitions in both China and Japan in late 2012, mutual perceptions 
continued to harden as neither side saw a prospect that what had been done by the other could be 
rolled back through negotiation or compellence. At this stage, China was more risk acceptant in 
seeking to prevent Japan from taking further steps that might come at the expense of China and to 
compensate for what was perceived as China’s loss. In this context, the PLA and the Japanese SDF 
were brought into direct contact with each other on the forefront of the disputes, and as such, 
elements of a strong military escalation emerged.  
Phase One (Jul. 31-Sept 10, 2012): Strong Nonmilitary Escalation 
The Baodiao activists were allowed back to the forefront of the dispute as part of Beijing’s 
nonmilitary escalation. On August 12, a group of activists from mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Macau set sail from Hong Kong.1010 Contrasting its previous efforts to block the ship, the Hong 
 
1010 “H.K. protesters head to disputed East China Sea isles,” Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 12, 2012. 
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Kong authorities expressed support for this trip. Leung Chun-ying, Chief Executive of the Hong 
Kong SAR government, even told the activists to watch out for weather changes and their personal 
safety when claiming sovereignty of the islands,1011 suggesting official endorsement by Chinese 
authorities. A reporter and a cameraman from the Phoenix Television, a Hong Kong-based TV 
station primarily serving mainland Chinese audience and characterized by Susan Shirk as “the 
television equivalent of [the nationalistic tabloid] Global Times,”1012 also sailed with the activists. 
The participation of Phoenix TV in the Baodiao expedition marked the first real-time television 
reporting on such a voyage.1013  
The group landed on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands on August 15. JCG soon detained fourteen 
of the participants, including the two Phoenix TV staff. The Japanese Foreign Ministry summoned 
the Chinese ambassador Cheng Yonghua to lodge an official protest.1014 Prime Minister Noda 
vowed that his government “will respond to the incident strictly in accordance with the law” – a 
remark which sounded to resonate the Kan cabinet’s approach during the 2010 fishing trawler 
incident.1015 In Beijing, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying summoned Japanese Ambassador 
Niwa, demanding the immediate and unconditional release of the Chinese activists.1016  
Aside from the diplomatic channel between Beijing and Tokyo, the Hong Kong SAR 
government stepped in as Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying announced on August 15 to send 
 
1011 “Hong Kong Leaders Supports Boat Headed for Disputed Isles,” Jiji Press, Aug. 14, 2012. 
1012 Susan Shirk, Fragile Superpower, p. 89. 
1013 “Exclusive on-the-scene report: Baodiao Activists erected Chines flags after landing on the island” [独家现场目
击 保 钓 人 士 登 岛 后 插 五 星 红 旗 ], Phoenix TV, Aug.15, 2012, video and transcript retrieved at 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/diaoyudaozhengduan/content-3/detail_2012_08/15/16828783_0.shtml, 
accessed Feb. 20, 2019.  
1014 “Japan Eyes Early Deportation of Hong Kong Activists,” Jiji Press, Aug. 15, 2012. 
1015 “Japan Arrests 14 Foreigners over Senkaku Landing,” Jiji Press, Aug. 15, 2012. 
1016 “Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying made a solemn presentation regarding Japan’s illegal detention of Chinese citizens 
in Diaoyu Islands” [就日方在钓鱼岛非法抓扣中国公民，外交部副部长傅莹提出严正交涉], People’s Daily 
(overseas edition), Aug. 16, 2012. 
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immigration department officials to Japan to “provide assistance” to the arrested activists.1017 The 
next day, Leung summoned the Japanese Consul General to Hong Kong. Noting that for decades 
the Hong Kong public had harbored “strong feelings” toward the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, Leung 
urged an immediate release of the activists.1018 This move was very uncommon for a Hong Kong 
Executive Chief in the sense that under the “one country, two systems” formula, Beijing retains 
the authority to manage foreign policy on the behalf of the Hong Kong SAR government.  
The landing and the resulting detention of the activists prompted a string of anti-Japan protests, 
although all on a small scale. On August 15, the 67th anniversary of the end of WWII, a group of 
some twenty Chinese activists staged a brief protest in front of the Japanese embassy in Beijing 
over the island disputes. The protesters held up banners stating radical slogans such as “a war 
against Japan to take back control of Diaoyu.”1019 More demonstrations erupted the next day in a 
multitude of Chinese cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Qingdao.1020 
Phoenix TV staged a high-profile propaganda campaign. On August 16, two of the company’s vice 
presidents went to the Japanese consulate in Hong Kong to deliver a letter of protest. Calling for 
an immediate release of its staff and the activists, the television company also urged Japan to return 
the news records intact and to “fully respect the freedom of press.”1021  
Tough rhetoric notwithstanding, the GOJ avoided a repetition of the 2010 situation. The Noda 
cabinet suggested on August 15 that this incident would be handled following Koizumi’s 
 
1017 “H.K. to send officials to Japan to help activists arrested in Senkakus,” Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 15, 2012. 
1018 “Hong Kong Chief summons Japan consul over arrest of Chinese activists,” BBC, Aug. 16, 2012. 
1019 “Chinese Activists Protest Before Japan Embassy over Isles,” Jiji Press, Aug. 15, 2012. 
1020 “Protests across China urging release of nationals detained by Japan,” BBC, Aug. 16, 2012; “Protests in China, 
Hong Kong over Japan arrest of activists,” BBC, Aug. 16, 2012; “Anti-Japan protests erupt in Beijing, other major 
Chinese cities,” Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 16, 2012. 
1021 “Phoenix TV delivered a petition to the Japanese consulate with respect to the detention of the company’s reporters, 
making three demands” [凤凰卫视就记者被扣向日本领馆递交交涉函，提三点要求], Phoenix TV, Aug. 16, 2012, 
video and transcript retrieved at http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/diaoyudaozhengduan/content-
3/detail_2012_08/16/16857606_0.shtml, accessed Feb. 20, 2019. 
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management of the 2004 Baodiao landing.1022 Declining to confirm the activists’ accusation that 
JCG used water cannon in an attempt to block the landing, a local JCG official stated that the 
coastguard was “exercising caution to avoid a possible collision.”1023 This claim about JCG’s extra 
caution in handling Chinese civic ships is consistent with information from interviews with 
Japanese analysts in defense and foreign affairs institutions as well as with Japanese scholars. 
Indeed, a few Japanese interlocutors even pointed to the ramming and sinking of a Taiwan fishing 
boat by JCG in 2008 in the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea as a case sharply contrasting the more 
cautious way that JCG has handled Chinese civilian boats.1024 As noted by a Japanese source, while 
ramming and water cannons could be employed against Chinese civilian boats identified by JCG 
as illegally operating in Japan’s territorial waters, Japan – as well as China – had in general 
“politically controlled” such encounters, knowing that “if we fail to control it, it will be difficult 
to contain [the political fallout].”1025  
On August 17, Tokyo deported all fourteen of the Chinese nationals. Phoenix TV ran intensive 
coverage of its staff’s departure from Naha airport alongside five activists and the hero’s welcome 
home ceremony at the Hong Kong airport.1026 The other seven activists returned to Hong Kong on 
the Baodiao ship on August 22. They were also greeted with a warm ceremony and hailed by a 
crowd of over 100 activists and local residents at the port.1027 
 
1022 “Japan Eyes Early Deportation of Hong Kong Activists,” Jiji Press, Aug. 15, 2012. 
1023 “Japan fires water cannon at protest ship: H. K. activists,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 15, 2012. 
1024 Author’s interviews, Tokyo, August 2018.  
1025 One of the interlocutors also noted that when dealing with Chinese government vessels that show flag, the Japanese 
and Chinese ships usually issue verbal warning toward each other that this is Japanese/Chinese territorial sea. This 
type of encounters has become a quite routinized, business-as-usual practice nowadays. The JCG vessels usually 
maneuver with the Chinese ones at a two-on-one ratio. Author’s interview, Tokyo, August 2018. 
1026 “Two reporters of Phoenix TV covering the Baodiao campaign returned to Hong Kong safe” [凤凰卫视两位采
访 保 钓 记 者 平 安 抵 达 香 港 ], Phoenix TV, Aug. 17, 2012, video and transcript retrieved at 
http://phtv.ifeng.com/lcl/detail_2012_08/18/16909560_0.shtml, accessed Feb. 20, 2019. 
1027 “Hong Kong Baodiao Ship ‘Kai Fung 2’ arrives in Tsim Sha Tsui port” [香港保钓船“启丰二号”抵达尖沙咀码
头 ], Phoenix TV, Aug. 22, 2012, video and transcript retrieved at 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/diaoyudaozhengduan/content-3/detail_2012_08/22/17004918_0.shtml, 
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This Baodiao voyage, intended to let off some steam while signaling popular dissatisfaction in 
China with Japan’s proposed nationalization, backfired in two ways. First, it created more 
domestic steam than had been let off. Following the detention of the activists, the Action 
Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands that organized the voyage issued a statement, 
criticizing the PLA for failing to provide protection to the Baodiao ship despite the organization’s 
strong petitions before the activists’ departure.1028 Despite his open support for the Baodiao voyage 
and dispatch of SAR government representatives to Japan to handle the arrest, Hong Kong’s Chief 
Executive Leung Chun-ying was criticized for failing to send government representatives to 
welcome the activists home.1029 Emotions in the mainland were running similarly high. On Sina 
Weibo, a Chinese equivalent of Twitter, a number of netizens questioned why the PLA did not 
provide protection to the activists landing on what was supposed to be China’s territory.1030 Tong 
Zeng, a veteran mainland Baodiao activist, urged China to take further strong measures to 
demonstrate its sovereignty and strengthen control of the islands, such as declaring baselines 
around the islands, authorizing SOEs and private enterprises to develop the islands for tourism, 
establishing a military restricted zone in the area, etc.1031  
Second, a Japanese pushback quickly followed the landing. On August 18, 150 Japanese 
activists, including eight parliamentary members, sailed to the Diaoyu/Senkakus. Ten of the 
 
accessed Feb. 20, 2019; “Kai Fung 2 arrives in Hong Kong, Phoenix TV’s video records remain intact” [启丰二号抵
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Japanese participants landed on the island the next day.1032 Beijing fiercely protested the Japanese 
landing,1033 and unleashed the largest anti-Japan protests since 2005 in more than 20 Chinese cities, 
including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Hangzhou, Chengdu, Xi’an, 
Wuhan, and Qingdao. Starting from August 18 for three consecutive days, thousands of Chinese 
citizens staged large-scale demonstrations and marches. In Shenzhen and Hangzhou, protests soon 
devolved into violence and vandalism targeting Japan-linked businesses and Japanese-brand 
cars.1034  
Japanese Ambassador Niwa also became a direct target of the heightened Chinese nationalism, 
which highlighted the potential of anti-Japan protests in generating serious diplomatic 
ramifications. On August 27, Niwa’s car was forced to stop on the road by two cars and a Chinese 
man emerged from one of the cars and ripped off the Japanese flag on the ambassador’s car. The 
ambassador, who was in his car at the time, was not harmed. The Japanese Embassy lodged a 
strong protest with the Chinese foreign ministry. 1035 Tang Jiaxuan, Chair of the China-Japan 
Friendship Association and former Chinese State Councilor, openly condemned the attack as an 
act of “harming the country” (害国), claiming that “the attackers are by no means patriots and their 
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in Japan-China island row,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 19, 2012. 
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behavior by no means patriotic.” 1036  On Weibo, however, the attackers were applauded by 
numerous posts as a national hero.1037  
On August 29, Japan’s senior vice minister of foreign affairs Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi visited 
Beijing as Noda’s envoy to deliver the prime minister’s personal letter to Chinese President Hu 
Jintao. The letter underscored the importance of dealing with the territorial dispute in a way that 
would not harm the broad bilateral relationship. However, it did not mention the GOJ’s impending 
plan to nationalize the islands, as Noda perceived the transfer of the islands’ ownership as an 
inherently “internal affair of Japan.”1038 Some Chinese government officials, in their retrospective 
accounts, indicated that the omission led Hu to believe, incorrectly, that there was “still room for 
Japan to re-examine the purchase plan.”1039  
The Chinese perception that there were still hopes for dissuasion was reflected in the relatively 
moderate language of a long speech that former State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan delivered on August 
29 at a CASS symposium commemorating the 40th anniversary of Sino-Japanese normalization. 
Reiterating that “China and Japan are partners not threats to each other” and describing Sino-
Japanese relationship as “one of China’s most important bilateral relationships,” Tang noted that 
 
1036 Tang Jiaxuan [唐家璇], “Uphold broader interest, control and manage crisis, move Sino-Japan relations toward 
sound and steady development – speech at the China Academy of Social Sciences international symposium 
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日关系健康稳定发展——在中国社会科学院纪念中日邦交正常化 40 周年国际学术研讨会上的演讲], Aug. 29, 
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the relationship had been highly combustible such that “even a single oblivious move could trigger 
a confrontation between the publics and deal a heavy blow to the bilateral relationship.” Therefore, 
the relationship required careful protection and negotiation to resolve problems however 
complicated they might be.1040 The island purchase, Tang cautioned, if allowed to move ahead, 
“could spin out of control and create endless trouble to Sino-Japanese relations;” therefore, the 
two governments “are now confronting a grave challenge to contain and manage the crisis in a 
timely and effective manner, to appropriately handle relevant problems, and to keep these issues 
from causing serious damage to the overall relationship.”1041 To appropriately control and manage 
the current crisis over the island purchase, Tang urged both parties to adopt an approach of three 
DOs and three DON’Ts: “Recognizing rather than denying the disputes, shelving rather than 
intensifying the controversies, stabilizing the situation rather than taking unilateral actions to 
further complicate and escalate it.”1042 
Beijing’s hopes to dissuade Japan from forging ahead with the purchase were shattered in early 
September when information surfaced, and soon was confirmed, that the Noda cabinet was in the 
final stage of sealing the deal. 1043  Xinhua denounced Noda’s letter and GOJ’s simultaneous 
purchase negotiation as an illustration of Japan’s duplicity. 1044  On September 5, the MFA’s 
spokesperson Hong Lei claimed that China “is resolute and determined in defending its territorial 
sovereignty” and “will take necessary measures” to do so.1045  
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In this context, Hu Jintao and Noda held a brief informal meeting on the margin of the APEC 
summit in Vladivostok on September 9. There is little available information to confirm which side 
proposed the meeting. According to a diplomatic source quoted by Japanese media, Hu dodged a 
formal meeting with Noda for fears of domestic backlash for being weak on Japan. By making an 
informal, brief “chat” with Noda, according to this source, Hu was able to “show to Japan his 
willingness to prevent the bilateral ties from deteriorating further while conveying China’s tough 
stance in the territorial row.” 1046  During the 15-minute conversation, Hu reiterated China’s 
position of “firmly opposing” to the nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.1047  
That said, Beijing seemed to perceive this meeting as a last-ditch effort to block the GOJ’s 
island purchase, according to multiple sources. As a former U.S. government senior official who 
was at the Vladivostok APEC recalled, Hu Jintao “was very nervous, very uneasy” about the 
impending nationalization, as the Chinese leadership at that point needed some time to “figure out 
how they could live with this.”1048 This is consistent with information from Chinese interlocutors. 
According to a Chinese scholar well versed in Japan policy, Beijing perceived this meeting as “a 
last-ditch effort” based on the judgment that Japan might be receptive to the warning coming 
directly from China’s top leader.1049 Another Chinese scholar close to Beijing’s foreign policy 
establishment put it plainly that at the time of the meeting, the Chinese leadership had already 
realized that the purchase might not be blocked; thus, Beijing’s  “psychological bottom line” was 
that Japan would give China a “buffer period” before making the final announcement.1050  
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1049 Author’s interview, Shanghai, April 2019. 
1050 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019 
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The bilateral relationship took a nosedive following the Noda government’s announcement on 
September 10 that it had finalized the island purchase.1051 The announcement, coming right on the 
heels of the Hu-Noda meeting, was perceived by Beijing as a grave snub. Hu Jintao, according to 
multiple Chinese sources, was “very upset.”1052 On September 27, Tang Jiaxuan told a visiting 
Japanese delegation headed by former Lower House Speaker Kono Yohei that the island purchase 
decision, coming right after the Hu-Noda meeting, made the Chinese public feel having lost face 
and thus triggered fierce popular reactions.1053 The ill-timing of Japan’s announcement arguably 
put the final nail in the coffin of Hu’s longtime position of a moderate Japan policy. To be fair, a 
ferocious Chinese backlash would have been unsurprising and in fact entirely predictable even if 
Japan had made the announcement at a later date. Furthermore, in light of the Japanese domestic 
politics confronting the Noda cabinet at the time and the Japanese legal procedure for property 
transfer, it is conceivable that even the Noda government itself might not fully control the 
procedure and timing of nationalization. However, the second half of a year, given the 
concentration of sensitive anniversaries and dates in this period,1054 is the “fire season” in Sino-
Japanese relations and requires extra caution when making potential controversial decisions.  
Phase Two (Sept. 10-late 2012): The “Combination Punches” 
The finalized island purchase presented a fait accompli in the Diaoyu/Senkakus that Beijing 
attempted to reverse through a strategy popularly dubbed “combination punches” in China.1055 In 
 
1051 “Japan Inks Senkaku Purchase Contract,” Jiji Press, Sept. 11, 2012; “China says Japan’s buying disputed islands 
‘illegal,’” BBC, Sept. 10, 2012. 
1052 Author’s interviews, Shanghai, April 2019. 
1053 Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: 40th Anniversary: ‘Fuggetaboutit;’” Weiss, Powerful Patriots, p. 204. 
1054 July 7 is the anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident; August 15 the anniversary of the end of WWII; 
September 2 the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in WWII; September 18 the anniversary of the Mukden incident; 
October 1 the birthday of PRC; December 13 the anniversary of the fall of Nanjing and the start of the Nanjing 
massacre. 
1055 See, for example, “Scholars discuss China’s response to Japan’s ‘island purchase:’ at the moment China needs 
countermeasure rather than military strike” [学者谈中国应对日“购岛”目前需要反制而非打击], China Newsweek 
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this phase, the “punches” were comprised of an even more forceful nonmilitary escalation and a 
restrained military escalation. The nonmilitary escalation entailed international legal warfare, 
large-scale anti-Japan protests, routinized and intensified MLE patrols, cancellations of 
anniversary events as well as suspensions of high-level exchanges. The restrained military 
escalation consisted of military drills and joint exercises of the PLA and the MLE agencies which 
were geared toward swiftly responding to maritime rights protection scenarios.  
Reversing the fait accompli was the primary goal that Beijing strived to achieve at this stage. 
China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi articulated this goal on September 10 when summoned 
Japanese Ambassador Niwa Uichiro to lodge a “fierce protest” against Japan’s decision and urge 
the GOJ to “immediately revoke its wrong decision” of the purchase. 1056  On the same day, 
delivering a speech at the China Foreign Affairs University, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pledged 
that China “will never make any concessions on issues of national sovereignty and territory.”1057 
The next day, Beijing reiterated its demand that Japan “immediately revoke” the decision of the 
purchase.1058 Japan rejected the Chinese demand. Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba Koichiro 
asserted that there was “no way” that the GOJ would reconsider the decision.1059  
Against the backdrop of the 40th anniversary of Sino-Japanese relations normalization, bilateral 
diplomacy became the field that incurred perhaps the largest casualties as Beijing decided to call 
off a slew of celebration events and, with only rare exceptions, to freeze all high-level 
 
[中国新闻周刊], Sept. 24, 2012, reprinted on http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2012_09/24/17852851_0.shtml, 
accessed Feb. 28, 2019. 
1056 “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi summoned Japanese Ambassador to China and Lodged Strong Protest,” MFA, Sept. 
10, 2012, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t968382.shtml, accessed Feb. 28, 
2019. Emphasis added. 
1057 “Premier Wen Jiabao Attends Inauguration of a Bronze Statue of Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi and Delivers a Speech 
at China Foreign Affairs University,” MFA, Sept. 10, 2012, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t969868.shtml, accessed Feb. 28, 2019. 
1058 “China demands again Japan revoke the decision of ‘island purchase’” [中方再次要求日方撤销 “购岛” 决定], 
People’s Daily, Sept. 12, 2012. 
1059 “Gemba rejects China’s demand that Japan rescind island acquisition,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 12, 2012. 
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communication and inter-government exchanges.1060  The Sino-Japanese talks on setting up a 
maritime crisis management were also suspended.1061 Most notably, on September 23, Beijing 
notified the GOJ through the Japanese Embassy that formal ceremonies slated to take place at the 
Great Hall of the People would be cancelled; instead, only the Japanese delegation headed by Kono 
Yohei was granted a one-hour meeting on September 27 with Jia Qinglin, the fourth ranking 
member on the Politburo Standing Committee.1062 Most local-level events and cultural exchange 
activities were also called off.1063 While Beijing refrained from further escalation in the diplomatic 
dimension with moves such as recalling its ambassador, a measure that South Korea had repeatedly 
employed in disputes with Japan,1064  the damages done to Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties were 
substantial and arguably more far-reaching. “Even sister-city events were ordered to stop,” 
according to a knowledgeable Chinese source who acknowledged in private that the complete halt 
of bilateral exchanges was “over the top” (过了); in some cases, the Japanese side was given a 
short notice about event cancellations after the delegation had already arrived in China.1065  
On the front line of the island disputes, China stepped up its presence by giving a greenlight to 
the CMS on September 11 to regularize patrols in the contested area.1066 Remotely overseeing a 
 
1060 Zhu Fenglan [朱凤岚], “The Diaoyu Islands sovereignty crisis and the U.S.-Japan alliance” [钓鱼岛主权危机与
日美同盟关系], in Zhang Jie [张洁], ed. China’s Regional Security Environment Review: 2013 [中国周边安全形势
评估 (2013): 海上争端的焦点与根源] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013), p.041; author’s interviews, 
Tokyo, August 2018; Beijing, March 2019. 
1061 Przystup, “40th Anniversary: ‘Fuggetaboutit!’” 
1062 Ibid. 
1063 “Events cancelled, postponed amid Japan-China tensions over islets,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 13, 2012; 
“Badminton: China pulls players from Japan Open in spat,” Agence France Presse, Sept. 18, 2012. 
1064  Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea recalls ambassador to Japan,” New York Times, Jul. 14, 2008, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/world/asia/14iht-15korea.14476081.html, accessed Oct. 3, 2019; Mark 
Magnier, “S. Korea Sees a Textbook Case of Whitewash,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 10, 2001, 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-apr-10-mn-49214-story.html,  accessed Oct. 3, 2019. 
1065 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
1066  “CMS ships arrive in Diaoyu Islands sea areas” [中国海监船抵达钓鱼岛海域 ], People, Sept. 11, 2012, 
http://japan.people.com.cn/35469/7944626.html, accessed Feb. 28, 2019; Luo Sha [罗沙] and Zhang Jiansong [张建
松],  “China Marine Surveillance routinized patrols in sea areas around the Diaoyu Islands” [中国海监在钓鱼岛海
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patrol of six CMS ships in the Diaoyu/Senkakus, Liu Cigui, then head of the SOA, vowed that the 
SOA (along with the CMS), as China’s “primary maritime administrative agent,” would 
“persistently and unswervingly defend national maritime rights and interests.”1067 All six of the 
CMS ships entered the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters on September 14, a move that the JCG 
described as “unprecedented.”1068 Xiao Huiwu, deputy director of the CMS, characterized this 
patrol as a “firm” strike back on Japan over the nationalization and claimed that CMS would 
“firmly retaliate all encroachments on China’s sovereignty.”1069 Information from Chinese media 
reports and interviews with Chinese analysts and scholars indicated that the action plan for 
regularized CMS patrols was collaboratively drawn up by multiple line agencies including MFA, 
the military and SOA. The six CMS ships’ entry into the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial water was 
approved by Xi Jinping, who had started presiding over the newly installed Maritime Rights 
Protection LSG and was already the de facto decision-maker on China’s maritime policies.1070 The 
CMS patrols were reportedly required to enter the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea at a certain 
frequency not only to establish a constant Chinese presence but also “for the consumption of the 
domestic audience.” 1071  At the same time, the reporting and approval requirement strictly 
 
域巡航实现常态化 ], Xinhua, Jan. 7, 2013, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-01/07/c_114284648.htm, 
accessed Feb. 28, 2019. 
1067 Wang Qiurong [王秋蓉], “Seriously performing the honorable duty of defending national maritime rights and 
interests” [认真履行维护国家海洋权益光荣职责], China Ocean News [中国海洋报], Sept. 17, 2012.  
1068 “6 China ships enter Senkakus; JCG: Large-scale intrusion into waters near islets ‘unprecedented,’” Daily Yomiuri, 
Sept. 15, 2012. 
1069 Su Tao [苏涛], “Retaliate all actions encroaching on China’s rights” [对一切侵权予以回击], China Ocean News, 
Sept. 17, 2012. 
1070 Zhang Zhe [张喆], “Two CMS ships arrive in the Diaoyu Islands area, Japanese patrol ships fully on guard” [中
国两艘海监船抵钓鱼岛海域，日本巡视船全面戒备], Oriental Morning Post [东方早报], Sept. 12, 2012; author’s 
interviews, Beijing, March 2019. 
1071 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. The annual defense whitepaper released by the Japanese Defense 
Ministry describes the Chinese patrols as demonstrating a stable “3-3-2” pattern from late 2013: undertaking two to 
three patrols per month, entering the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters around 10 am and staying there for roughly 
two hours, and the patrol fleet often comprised of two to three ships. Defense of Japan [平成 29 年版防衛白書], 
Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2017, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2017/pdf/index.html, p.120, accessed 
Sept. 8, 2017. 
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implemented following the 2008 December CMS patrol, according to a former SOA official, 
remained intact because “the Diaoyu Islands is still an area of high political sensitivity.”1072  
Meanwhile, the FLE redoubled its fishing protection patrols in the Diaoyu/Senkakus. On 
September 14, the Fisheries Enforcement Bureau vowed to beef up fishing protection patrols for 
Chinese fishermen operating in the Diaoyu/Senkaku waters in anticipation of a large number of 
Chinese fishing boats flooding into the area after a three-month fishing moratorium ended on 
September 16.1073 On September 24, MOA claimed that it had dispatched a total of ten ships to 
patrol the Diaoyu/Senkaku area.1074  
As a result, in operational terms, the Diaoyu/Senkaku area saw a surge of activities of Chinese 
MLE vessels and later aircraft (Figure 6.2). From September through December, Chinese 
government vessels made 20 patrols inside the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea.1075 A Xinhua report 
published on September 11, 2013 stated that during the year following Japan’s island purchase, 
Chinese government vessels conducted 59 patrols inside the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial waters.1076 
To provide the regularized Diaoyu/Senkaku patrols with a legal foundation, Beijing declared 




1072 Author’s interview, Shanghai, April 2019. 
1073 Feng Hua [冯华], “China has indisputable fishing rights in the Diaoyu Islands sea areas” [我在钓鱼岛海域拥有
无可争辩的渔业权益], People’s Daily, Sept. 14, 2012. 
1074 “Ten Chinese fishery law enforcement ships deployed to Diaoyu sea areas to protest fishing and enforce laws” [10
艘 中 国 渔 政 船 在 钓 鱼 岛 海 域 执 行 护 渔 和 执 法 ], People, Sept. 24, 2012, reprinted on 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/diaoyudaozhengduan/content-3/detail_2012_09/24/17862257_0.shtml, 
accessed Mar. 1, 2019. 
1075 “Special Report: Japan Coast Guard defending territorial sea and EEZ-Responses to sea areas surrounding the 
Senakkus-Reponses to Chinese government vessels” [特集 領海・EEZ を守る海上保安庁- II 尖閣諸島周辺海域
における対応- 4.中国公船への対応], Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2013 [海上保安レポート 2013], 
https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2013/html/tokushu/toku13_02-4.html, accessed Jul. 29, 2018. 
1076 “China made 59 patrols to the Diaoyu Islands in a year, less than 10 meters to Japanese ships at the closest point” 
[ 我 国 一 年 59 次 巡 航 钓 鱼 岛 ， 日 船 最 近 时 不 足 10 米 ], Xinhua, Sept. 11, 2013, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2013-09/11/c_125363769.htm, accessed Mar. 1, 2019. 
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islets, 1077 and two days later deposited China’s Diaoyu/Senkaku maritime chart and a list of the 
geographical coordinates of the baselines with the UN. 1078  The new legal dimension was 
welcomed by the CMS. As noted by Yu Zhirong, former deputy commander of the CMS East 
China Sea Corps, “Now having a clear target and a legal foundation…China’s law enforcement 
vessels undoubtedly should expel foreign ships especially armed ones that intrude into China’s 12 
nautical miles’ territorial sea.” 1079  In addition, this move was intended to showcase China’s 
adherence to international law at a time when China’s behavior in maritime disputes had been 
increasingly subject to international criticism for undermining the rules-based international order. 
Calling this legal move a perfect practice of the principle of “youli, youli, youjie” (on just grounds, 
to our advantage, and with restraint), Zhang Haiwen, an international law expert at the China 
Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA) – SOA’s research arm, stated that the baselines not merely 
provided a legal basis for the patrols but also asserted China’s sovereignty claims in a way 
consistent with international law and especially UNCLOS because “only the country that has the 
sovereignty over a territory has the right to declare its baselines.”1080 
Adding another wrinkle to the legal warfare, Beijing declared on September 16 that it would 
submit China’s claim to an extended continental shelf in the East China Sea to the UNCLCS.1081 
This Chinese move appeared not so much an endeavor to roll back the island purchase as a measure 
 
1077 “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of Diaoyu 
Dao and Its Affiliated Islands,” Sept. 10, 2012, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t968769.shtml, accessed Feb. 28, 2019. 
1078 “Japan opposes China’s Diaoyu map bid at UN,” Xinhua General News Service, Sept. 24, 2012. 
1079 Zhang, “Two CMS ships arrive in the Diaoyu Islands area.” 
1080 “China’s declaration of the baselines of the Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated islands is an act on just grounds, to 
our advantage, and with restraint” [中国公布钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿领海基线是有理、有利、有节的行为], China 
Ocean News, Sept. 12, 2012. 
1081  “China to submit outer limits of continental shelf in East China Sea to UN,” Sept. 16, 2012, GOC.cn, 
http://www.gov.cn/english/2012-09/16/content_2225823.htm, accessed Mar. 1, 2019. The official submission was 
delivered to the UN on December 14. “China submitted its submission concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles in the East China Sea” [中国提交东海二百海里外大陆架划界案 ], MFA, Dec. 14, 2012, 
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/wjb/zzjg/bjhysws/xgxw/t998191.htm, accessed Mar. 1, 2019. 
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to compensate for what was perceived as China’s loss on its East China Sea front at large. Qu Xing, 
head of the MFA-affiliated CIIS, claimed that the submission would indeed be the most important 
achievement in the sense that this move “has exceeded the scope of the Diaoyu Islands issue and 
has linked with the East China Sea continental shelf issue…[therefore] [i]t is a move that 
strengthens our position on the East China Sea continental shelf by utilizing Japan’s provocation 
over the Diaoyu Islands.”1082  
At the grassroots level, Chinese authorities again held back the Baodiao activists while on the other 
hand unleashing nationwide mass protests.1083 Protests quickly spread across the country during 
the following week as popular antipathy towards Japan heightened (Figure 6.3). On September 11, 
protests were held in front of the Japanese Embassy in Beijing as well as at the Japanese consulates 
in Guangzhou and Shanghai.1084 On September 16, over 80,000 people demonstrated against Japan 
in some 50 Chinese cities. More than 20,000 protesters rallied in Beijing at the heavily guarded 
Japanese Embassy. Despite Chinese authorities’ calls for “rational patriotism,”1085 protests soon 
turned violent. Vandalism of Japanese-related businesses, including Toyota, Honda, Nissan and 
Panasonic, was rampant. In Beijing, protesters threw bottles, eggs, and waste at the embassy 
compound. The protests further escalated on the eve of September 18 and spread to over 100 
Chinese cities including Hong Kong, marking the largest ever anti-Japan protests since 
 
1082 Qu Xing [曲星], “Whenever provoked, strengthen our countermeasures to weaken Japan’s effective control” [每
挑衅一次，反制就加强一次，让日本的 “实际控制” 力度更弱], World Affairs [世界知识], 2012, issue. 19, pp. 
21-22.  
1083 Keith Bradsher, “Hong Kong Impedes Trip to Islands, Activists Say,” New York Times, Sept. 13, 2012. 
1084 “Japan stokes territorial tensions with purchase of islands,” Washington Post, Sept. 12, 2012; “Japan’s Senkaku 
Nationalization Sparks Protests in China,” Jiji Press, Sept. 12, 2012. 
1085 MFA spokesperson Hong Lei urged the public on September 11 to “express their patriotic passion in a law-abiding, 
rational way;” “People’s Daily web comment: How should we defend the Diaoyu Islands?” [人民网评：我们怎样
保卫钓鱼岛？], People, Sept. 17, 2012, http://japan.people.com.cn/35469/7950078.html, accessed Mar. 9, 2019. 
“Demonstrations turned violent in a few cities, official media called for rational behavior” [多地反日游行现暴力，
官方媒体纷纷呼吁理性], Caixin [财新], Sept. 16, 2012, http://china.caixin.com/2012-09-16/100438252.html, 
accessed Mar. 9, 2019.  
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normalization in 1972.1086 Japanese Prime Minister Noda, urging Beijing to ensure the safety of 
Japanese nationals and businesses, admitted that Japan had “miscalculated” China’s reaction and 
that “the scale is broader than expected.”1087  
Figure 6.3 The Chinese Public’s Perception on Japan 2012-2018 
 
Source: Adapted from Genron NPO, “The 14th Joint Public Opinion Poll between Japan and China.”  
Despite China’s strong countermeasures to the nationalization, the public’s dissatisfaction with 
Beijing’s response was pronounced in the protests. During the September 18 demonstrations in 
Beijing, protesters carried Mao’s portraits, which the protestors said were intended to shame the 
current Chinese leaders and to pressure them to take a tough line with foreign powers.1088 That 
 
1086 “Over 20,000 Chinese Rally against Japan in Beijing,” Jiji Press, Sept. 15, 2012; “Update: Over 80,000 Chinese 
in over 50 cities join biggest anti-Japan protests,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 15, 2012; Leo Lewis, “Chinese 
protesters demand war with Japan over disputed islands,” TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012; “Anti-Japan Protests Spread to Hong 
Kong,” Voice of America News, Sept. 16. 2012; “Anti-Japan Protests Spread Across Over 100 Cities in China,” Jiji 
Press, Sept. 17, 2012; Ivan Broadhead, William Wan, “Beijing gives protests a nod and a wink” Washington Post, 
Sept. 18, 2012; “Anti-Japan Protests Erupt Again in China on Anniversary,” Jiji Press, Sept. 18, 2012; “17,000 people 
stage police-shepherded anti-Japan protests in Shanghai,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 18, 2012; Przystup, “40th 
Anniversary: ‘Fuggetaboutit!’” 
1087 “Japan to Urge China to Ensure Safety amid Protests: Noda,” Jiji Press, Sept. 16, 2012; Teddy Ng and Keith Zhai, 
“Japanese Prime Minister Noda admits ‘miscalculation’ over Diaoyus,” South China Morning Post, Sept. 21, 2012, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1041878/japanese-prime-minister-noda-admits-miscalculation-over-
diaoyus, accessed Oct. 5, 2019. 
1088 William Wan, “China reins in anti-Japan protests,” Washington Post, Sept. 19, 2012; Didi Tang, “In protests, Mao 
holds subtle messages for Beijing,” Associated Press, Sept. 20, 2012. 
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popular indignation at perceived foreign insults might quickly devolve into frustration targeting 
Chinese authorities was an all-too-familiar story for the CCP. Moreover, this wave of protests 
came as China was preparing for a leadership transition in a few weeks, giving strong political 
incentives to the incoming Chinese leaders to take a hardline approach while moving to gradually 
rein in the popular protests. During a meeting with visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
on September 19, Xi Jinping condemned the nationalization as a “farce.” Portraying Japan’s island 
purchase as an attempted challenge to the post-WWII international order, Xi told Panetta that 
Japan’s behavior had intensified its territorial disputes with neighboring countries and requested 
the United States to stay out of the controversies.1089 A very knowledgeable source in Beijing 
explained that as the incoming top leader, Xi was tempted to garner grassroots support by 
appealing to the nationalistic young generation while building his power base within the PLA.1090  
In the economic dimension, in contrast to China’s reaction to the 2010 fishing trawler incident 
and the Scarborough Shoal a few months prior to the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization, Beijing this 
time refrained from using its economic big stick,1091 although harsh economic retaliation including 
rare earth embargo appeared to be under consideration and advocated by some Chinese policy 
analysts – most notably those affiliated with MOFCOM – and pundits. Mei Xinyu, a researcher at 
the CAITEC under MOFCOM, proposed the restriction of Japanese product imports alongside 
 
1089 “Xi Jinping met with U.S. Defense Secretary Panetta at the Great Hall of the People on September 19” [习近平
19 日在人民大会堂会见美国国国防部长帕内塔 ], Xinhua, Sept. 19, 2012, reprinted on GOV.cn, 
http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2012-09/19/content_2228184.htm, accessed Mar. 9, 2019. 
1090 Author’s interview with Chinese scholar, Beijing, March 2019. 
1091  Japanese businesses registered huge economic losses from the Chinese market primarily due to temporary 
shutdown during the protests, a plummet in sales of goods, and tour cancellations. “Major Chinese Travel Agency 
Cancels Japan Tours,” Jiji Press, Sept. 12, 2012; “Japanese Close Facilities in China as Tensions Rise,” New York 
Times, Sept. 18, 2012; “Growing anti-Japan sentiment casts shadow over tourism,” Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 
18, 2012; “Chinese Visitors to Japan Jump 88 Pct in Aug.,” Jiji Press, Sept. 21, 2012; “Toyota’s New Auto Sales in 
China Down 48.9 Pct. In Sept.,” Jiji Press, Oct. 9, 2012; “Territorial Row with China Hurting Japan Tourism 
Businesses,” Jiji Press, Oct. 10, 2012. 
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Japan-bound tourism and China’s product exports to Japan especially rare earth.1092  Another 
CAITEC senior analyst, Jin Baisong, proposed a retaliatory measure to hit Japan’s bond market 
and trigger a debt crisis.1093 However, the use of economic sanctions, or “fighting a trade war with 
Japan” as some policy analysts recommended at the time, was “immediately ruled out as infeasible 
after assessment” given the “high level of integration and interdependence between the Chinese 
and Japanese economies,” according to a firsthand account.1094  
Three major factors might have contributed to the infeasibility of economic sanctions as a 
weapon against Japan over the nationalization. First, a systemic use of economic sanctions would 
hurt China at a time when China’s economic growth had begun to slow down. As Feng Zhaokui, 
a senior Japan scholar at the State Council-affiliated CASS, explicated,  
China imports from Japan high add-value, high-tech particles. Import falls will 
cause a disruption to the chain of production and have adverse [economic] impacts 
on China…With 10 to 20 million newly added to the labor force, if the economy 
cannot keep up at a necessary growth rate, the job market would take the blow. So, 
playing economic cards must be done cautiously with a realistic assessment of the 
two countries’ resilience.1095 
Feng specifically ruled out rare earth embargo as an effective leverage, pointing to the fact that 
Japan had quickly diversified its rare earth import portfolio with increased supplies from Australia 
and Malaysia since the 2010 incident.1096  
 
1092 Mei Xinyu [梅新育], “Four major options to impose economic sanctions on Japan” [对日经济制裁的四大选择], 
China Economic Weekly [中国经济周刊], Sept. 17, 2012, pp.19-22. 
1093 Dong Guanyang [董冠洋], “MOFCOMM expert: Diaoyu Island issue would probably trigger China’s economic 
sanctions against Japan” [商务部专家：钓鱼岛问题或引发中国对日经济制裁], Chinanews, Sept. 12, 2012, 
http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2012/09-12/4177733.shtml, accessed Mar. 9, 2019.  
1094 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
1095 Yang Mu [杨牧], “Fighting economic warfare, China necessarily has greater resilience than Japan?” [打经济战，
中国承受力定必日本强？], People, Sept. 17, 2012, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2012/0917/c1002-19027698.html, 
Mar. 2, 2019. China’s economic growth rate in 2012 turned out to be 7.8 percent. 
1096 Ibid. 
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Second and relatedly, economic sanctions as a weapon against Japan would be simply 
ineffective, namely, they would not inflict as much pain on Japan as China would hope. Drawing 
on Japan’s trade data, Zhang Yun, a Chinese scholar at Japan’s Niigata University, suggested that 
China’s economic leverage with Japan was in fact less substantial than it appeared to be. Most 
importantly, being Japan’s top trading partner did not render China Japan’s largest final destination 
of exported goods. In other words, the bulk of Japan’s exported goods to China as of 2011 were 
semi-finished products to be assembled in China before being exported to the U.S. and Europe, 
and industrial machinery and equipment. Final goods exported from Japan to China – the most 
visible portion to the Chinese public and therefore most often subject to boycott – counted for a 
small portion.1097 Consistent with Feng’s argument, Zhang also ruled out the feasibility of natural 
resource export embargo and cautioned that sanctions against Japan would accelerate the 
relocation of Japanese production branches to other regions, particularly India and ASEAN which 
are rich in low-cost labors, thereby effectively reducing job opportunities in China.1098 
Third, economic sanctions might also have encountered growing internal oppositions. In a 
2007 internally circulated collection of Zhongnanhai lectures, a briefing on China’s security policy 
toward Northeast Asia by Lin Limin, a senior researcher at the CICIR, cautioned,  
Given the high level of economic interdependence between Northeast Asian 
economies, political disagreement between relevant countries should be resolved 
through political means. Disagreement at political level should not be allowed to 
spill into the economic and trade level under any circumstances.1099  
 
1097 Zhang Yun [张云], “Why economic sanctions on Japan may not work” [为什么经济制裁日本不一定有效], 
China International Strategy Review 2013 [中国国际战略评论 2013], Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 
Peking University [北京大学国际战略研究院] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2013), p. 135. 
1098 Ibid., p. 136. 
1099 Lin Limin [林利民], “China’s security policy toward Northeast Asia” [中国对东北亚地区的安全政策], in 
Zhongnanhai Lectures: The Historical Experience of Great Powers’ Rise and China’s Path of Development [中南海
讲座：大国崛起的历史经验与中国发展道路] (Beijing: Guofa yan lian ziliaozu, 2007), vol. 2, internal circulation, 
p. 466. 
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Even when it comes to the territorial disputes, Lin suggested that China should not let economic 
ties be affected by issues that “cannot be resolved for the time being” and instead adopt a “long-
term approach” with a focus on “broad interest and mutual benefits.”1100 
Apart from a multi-pronged nonmilitary escalation, Beijing at this stage also allowed a 
restrained military escalation, namely, allowing for a greater role played by the military without 
letting it come to the “first line” of the disputes. The PLA stepped in with a string of strong 
statements and large-scale military exercises immediately after the GOJ announced the island 
purchase. On September 11, the Chinese Defense Ministry stressed the PLA’s “unwavering 
determination and resolve to defend the country’s territorial sovereignty.”1101 Two days later, PLA 
Daily wrote in its inaugural  piece of its “Junbao Yan” column (the PLA Daily equivalent of the 
“Zhongsheng” column in the People’s Daily): “Today’s China is not the China during the days of 
the Mukden Incident, nor is today’s Chinese military the [Qing Dynasty] Beiyang Fleet…We have 
firm determination and sufficient capabilities…the Japanese should be careful not to misjudge the 
situation.”1102 During a joint press conference on September 18 with visiting U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Leon E. Panetta, China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie stated that Japan should bear 
the full responsibility for the escalation of the dispute and warned that China reserved the rights 
for “further actions.”1103  
 
1100 Ibid., p. 467. 
1101  “MND spokesperson: Chinse military firmly opposes and strongly protests the so-called Diaoyu Island 
‘nationalization’ by the Japanese government” [国防部发言人：中国军队对日本政府实施所谓钓鱼岛 “国有化” 
表示坚决反对和强烈抗议], PLA Daily, Sept. 12, 2012. 
1102 “Jun Baoyan” is a homonym for “the military newspaper’s words” and PLA Daily began to use following the 
island nationalization to express the newspaper’s views on important national security issues. Gao Jiquan [高吉全], 
“From being good commentators to producing ‘Jiexin Ping’ ‘Junbao Yan’ brands, we defend justice and our 
determination always firm” [从当好“评论员”到打造“解辛平”“钧保言”品牌，我们捍卫正义，决心始终坚定], 
PLA Daily, Dec. 14, 2015, reprinted on http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1225/c172467-27974166.html, 
accessed Mar. 1, 2019. 
1103 U.S. Department of Defense, “Secretary Panetta and Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie hold a 
Joint News Conference, China,” Sept. 18, 2012, transcript retrieved at 
http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5116, accessed Mar. 3, 2019. 
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Starting from mid-September, the Military Regions in Nanjing, Jinan and Guangzhou 
conducted a chain of live-fire military exercises in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.1104 The 
Chinese defense ministry claimed that these exercises were pre-planned but emphasized that the 
Chinese military would “take corresponding measures depending on the development of the 
situation.”1105 Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong, a PLA strategist and popular commentator on 
military affairs, stated that these exercises, although planned a year in advance, were intended to 
warn and deter “countries with vicious intentions toward China’s territory” through their timing, 
large scale, and focus on amphibious landings and air strike capabilities on surface vessels.1106  
The exercises clearly sought to achieve a higher level of coordination and interoperability 
between naval and maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft when operating at sea. The PLA’s 
East Sea Fleet launched a one-day “military-civilian maritime right protection joint exercise” on 
October 19 with the CMS’s East China Sea Corps and the FLE’s East China Sea Bureau off the 
coast of Zhejiang Province. According to the PLA Daily, the exercise started with a hypothetical 
scenario in which Chinese maritime law enforcement ships were harassed by “foreign ships” and 
called for naval reinforcement. The PLA East Sea fleet quickly dispatched surface vessels 
including one guided-missile frigate, fighter aircraft, tugboats, and search and rescue helicopters 
and a hospital ship. This exercise involved 11 vessels, eight aircraft, and over 1,000 personnel 
 
1104 “Flying dragons and leaping tigers in multi-service military exercises” [三军演兵场龙腾虎跃], PLA Daily, Sept. 
14, 2012; “Storm driven by multi-service live fire exercises” [三军实战化演兵风起云涌], PLA Daily, Sept. 15, 2012; 
“Multi-service air-sea joint precision strike exercise” [多兵种海空联合精确打击], PLA Daily, Sept. 21, 2012. 
1105  “Chinese military will take corresponding measures under unified national arrangements depending on the 
situation” [中国军队将在国家统一部署下视情采取相应措施], PLA Daily, Sept. 28, 2012. 
1106 “Zhang Zhaozhong: China would not initiate war, but must be ready for a war” [张召忠：中国不主动挑起战
争，但要做好战争准备 ], China Radio International [ 国际在线 ], Sept. 12, 2012, transcript retrieved at 
http://news.cri.cn/gb/27824/2012/09/12/5190s3847804.htm, accessed Mar. 3, 2019.  
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from the three agencies.1107 Such collaboration between the PLA Navy, CMS and FLE to conduct 
maritime rights protection missions were not common in the past, according to senior Colonel Li 
Jie, a researcher at the PLA’s Naval Research Institute.1108  
Phase Three (early 2013 – early 2014): Bringing the Militaries to the “First Line” 
At this stage, as Japan made clear its nonnegotiable position on the Diaoyu/Senkakus and took 
moves to boost its defense posture in the face of growing Chinese activities in the region, the door 
to reverse the fait accompli through negotiation and diplomatic pressuring had been – in the 
Chinese perception – completely shut. Given that the done deal was unlikely to be rolled back as 
Beijing would hope, China’s policies this phase tended to be more risk acceptant and coercive in 
seeking to recoup its perceived loss. As a result, while continuing to push for a reversal of the fait 
accompli, the military was brought to the “first line” of the disputes. 
In late 2012, both China and Japan underwent leadership transitions. Xi Jinping assumed 
Chinese leadership at the 18th Party Congress in mid-November. On the other hand, Noda 
dissolved the Lower House and set elections for December 16. On December 13, the 75th 
anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, a CMS aircraft entered the airspace over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands, 1109  marking the first entry by Chinese government aircraft into the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
territorial airspace. Japan scrambled eight F-15 fighter jets in response. 1110  This move, as a 
knowledgeable Chinese observer noted, contributed to the landslide victory by Abe Shinzo in the 
 
1107 Zhang Zhe [张哲], Wang Lingshuo [王凌硕] and Fang Lihua [方立华], “Maritime Rights Protection ongoing — 
an on-the-scene record of the ‘East China Sea joint operation-2012’ military-civilian maritime rights protection joint 
exercise” [海上维权进行时——“东海协作 – 2012“军地海上联合维权演习见闻], PLA Daily, Oct. 20, 2012. 
1108 “Expert analyzes three highlights in the East China Sea rights protection exercise, military-civilian coordinate to 
enhance rights protection strength” [专家解析东海维权研习三大亮点，军地协作加强维权力度], China Daily, 
Oct. 20, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/shizheng/2012-10/20/content_15834140.htm, accessed Mar. 3, 
2019. 
1109 Wang Zhongjian [王中建], “Air-Sea patrols demonstrated ‘two whole and one high’” [立体巡航体现 “两全一
高”], China Ocean News, Dec. 21, 2012. 
1110 “China Defends Flights Over Disputed Islands,” Voice of America News, Dec. 14, 2012. 
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election,1111 who staked out a hardline approach to China in the election.1112 Ascending to power 
amid the continued tensions over the islands, both of the conservative leaders, Xi and Abe, were 
strongly incentivized to adopt assertive policy lines on the Diaoyu/Senkakus in the initial period 
of their terms. 
Against the backdrop of China’s increased activities in Japan’s vicinity waters, Prime Minister 
Abe started his second term with a higher priority given to programs boosting Japan’s situational 
awareness and defense capabilities in the country’s southwest waters. On January 11, 2013, Abe 
explicitly stated that “there’s no room for negotiation” with China over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute, leaving no doubt about the unnegotiability of the fait accompli.1113 Abe also instructed the 
Japanese defense ministry to strengthen surveillance around the islands, and to launch a review of 
the 2010 Defense Guideline as well as to replace the five-year mid-term defense program, the latter 
of which capped Japan’s annual defense budget at approximately 23,390 billion yen from 2011 
through 2015.1114 In response to Abe’s instruction, the Japanese defense ministry requested an 
additional 180.5-billion-yen budget for the rest of FY 2012 including a 60.5 billion-yen plan to 
overhaul equipment necessary to boost air and sea surveillance around the Diaoyu/Senkakus. The 
defense ministry also announced that it would request an increase of over 100 billion yen in its FY 
2013 budget, the first increase in Japan’s defense budget in 11 years if approved.1115 Moreover, 
after China scrambled two J-10 fighters on January 10 in response to Japanese F-15s tailing a 
 
1111 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
1112 In the LDP presidential election, Abe said that Japan “must further promote its control” over the Diaoyu/Senkakus. 
In the general election campaign, the LDP called for the “permanent stationing of civil servants and plans for 
improving the fishery environment in the nearby sea areas.” Przystup, “40th Anniversary: ‘Fuggetaboutit.” 
1113 “Japan Prime Min. Abe Resolved to Defense Senkaku Isles,” Jiji Press, Jan. 11, 2013. 
1114 “Japan PM orders boosting patrols around islands disputed with China,” BBC Monitor Asia Pacific, Jan.8, 2013; 
Martin Fackler, “Japan Is Weighing Raising Military Spending,” New York Times, Jan. 8, 2013; Ministry of Defense 
of Japan, “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2011-FY 2015),” Dec. 17, 2010. 
1115 “Defense Ministry to seek 180 bil. Yen ‘economic measure’ in extra budget,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jan. 9, 
2013; “Ministry to ask for 100 bil. Yen more in defense spending for FY 2013,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jan. 11, 
2013. 
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Chinese transport plane in the East China Sea,1116 Tokyo claimed that Japan might fire warning 
shots to prevent foreign aircraft from entering what Japan considered as its airspace.1117 On the 
other hand, JCG also drew up plans to reinforce security in the southwest area by creating a 
Diaoyu/Senkaku special patrol unit comprised of twelve ships by April 2015.1118 Departing from 
its longtime practice of sending patrols ships to the Diaoyu/Senkaku area from all over Japan in 
rotation, JCG announced a plan of transferring two patrol ships from Fukuoka and Hiroshima to 
Okinawa to strengthen patrols in the southwestern waters.1119 
Japan’s hardening posture and boosted defense capabilities coincided with what Beijing 
considered as important changes in the U.S. position on the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue that would 
embolden Japan and further work to China’s disadvantage. In its National Defense Authorization 
Act for FY 2013, the U.S. Congress contained a segment specifically on the Diaoyu/Senkakus, 
which, among others, stated that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United 
States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.”1120 Following 
the congressional statement, the Obama administration began adopting similar language. Notably, 
on January 18, 2013 when speaking at a joint press conference with visiting Japanese Foreign 
Minister Kishida Fumio, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, after reiterating the traditional 
U.S. policy of not taking a position on the sovereignty issue and of acknowledging Japan’s 
administration of the islands, added, “[W]e oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to 
 
1116 Zhang Yuan [张媛], “J-10 fighters scramble to verify and monitor Japanese aircraft” [歼 10 战机对日机进行查
证监视], PLA Daily, Jan. 12, 2013. 
1117 Eric Talmadge, “Japan talk of warning shots heats up China dispute,” Associated Press, Jan. 20, 2013. 
1118 “Japan Preparing Long-Term Response to Chinese Provocations,” Jiji Press, Jan. 10, 2013. 
1119 “Japan to deploy two ships to strengthen security near disputed islands,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Jan. 14, 
2013. 
1120 U.S. Congress, Sec. 1286. Sense of Congress on the Situation in the Senkaku Islands, in National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (H.R. 4310/Pl. L. 112-239), Jan. 2. 2013, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ239/html/PLAW-112publ239.htm, accessed Oct. 6, 2019. 
- 320 - 
 
undermine Japanese administration.”1121 From the Chinese perspective, this additional sentence 
represented a clear sign of the United States taking the side of Japan. The “Zhongsheng” column 
of the People’s Daily wrote on January 21: “During the past few months, amid the tensions 
surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, the U.S. persistently said two sentences: it does not take a position 
on the ultimate sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands; it acknowledges Japan’s administration of the 
islands. Now the U.S. adds another line: it opposes any unilateral actions seeking to undermine 
Japan’s administration.” The additional sentence, as this article claimed, represented “a step further 
by the U.S. in an erroneous direction.”1122 Xinhua also put it plainly that “the most immediate 
effects of Hillary Clinton’s statement would be emboldening the Japanese right wing…[and] 
increasing the difficulty and complexity in resolving the Diaoyu Island issue.”1123  
In the context of increased involvement of both Chinese and Japanese militaries at the forefront 
of the disputes, the first signs bespeaking the heightened risk of Sino-Japanese military missteps 
surfaced in February, when Tokyo and Beijing traded a string of he-said-she-said accounts over 
two mysterious fire-control radar lock-on incidents. On February 5, Japanese Defense Minister 
Onodera Itsunori stated that in two separate incidents taking place on January 19 and 30, Chinese 
frigates locked their fire-control radar on a MSDF helicopter and a destroyer, respectively. 
Onodera described the actions as being “very abnormal” with the potential of developing into a 
“very dangerous situation.” When speaking at an Upper House session, Abe denounced the 
incidents as “a unilateral, provocative and dangerous act.” 1124  Beijing rejected the Japanese 
 
1121 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida after Their Meeting,” Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, Washington DC, Jan. 18, 2013, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/203050.htm, accessed Mar. 16, 2019. 
1122 Zhong Sheng [钟声], “The U.S. should not take on new burden” [美国不要再背新包袱], People’s Daily, Jan. 21, 
2013. 
1123 Jiang Yaping [江亚平], “The U.S. sends a wrong signal on the Diaoyu Islands issue” [美在钓鱼岛问题上发出
错误信号], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Jan. 21, 2013. 
1124 Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, “Chinese target-locked MSDF ship, chopper,” Japan Times, Feb. 6, 2013, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/06/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-says-chinese-warships-locked-
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account outright, calling it “a fabrication” to “tarnish China’s image, create tensions, and mislead 
international public opinion.” 1125  In March, responding to a Kyodo News report stating that 
Chinese military officials had admitted to the lock-on incidents,1126 Beijing again dismissed the 
account as motivated by “ulterior incentives.”1127 Zhang Junshe, a researcher at the PLA’s Naval 
Research Institute, claimed that Japan attempted to use the “the fabricated accusation” to gain 
support for constitution revisions and a reinterpretation of the collective self-defense right. In 
addition, argued Zhang, the GOJ also attempted to use the allegation to justify the “firing the first 
shot on China should such a clash at sea really occur.”1128 
In its annual report on China’s strategic environment released in April 2013, the PLA’s AMS 
cautioned the increased risk of air-sea accidents in the East China Sea as the militaries had been 
brought into direct contact:  
During the [Noda] period, the Chinese and Japanese maritime law enforcement 
agencies confronted each other at sea without the military forces getting involved. 
The struggle between the two sides primarily involved legal warfare, diplomatic 
warfare, and public opinion warfare… Since his inauguration in December 2012, 
Abe had taken a tougher position on the Diaoyu Islands issue, claimed that ‘there 
is no room for negotiation on the sovereignty of Senkakus’…and adopted a series 
 
weapons-radar-on-msdf/#.XZpUnGZS82w, accessed Jun. 21, 2019. In a statement seemingly contracting Onodera 
and Abe’s claims, Nishi Masanori, Japan’s Ministry of Defense Director General for Defense Policy, noted to a 
meeting of LDP Defense Policy Committees that the PLA ships had aimed neither missiles nor guns at the Japanese 
ships. James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Treading Troubled Waters,” Comparative Connections, vol. 15, 
issue 1, May 2013. 
1125 MFA, “MFA spokesperson Hua Chunying holds press conference on Feb. 8, 2013” [2013 年 2 月 8 日外交部发
言人华春莹主持例行记者会], Feb. 8, 2013, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgjed/chn/fyrth/t1012778.htm, accessed 
Oct. 8, 2019. 
1126  “Chinese officials admit to MSDF radar lock allegations,” Japan Times, Mar. 18, 2013, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/18/national/politics-diplomacy/chinese-officials-admit-to-msdf-radar-
lock-allegations/#.XZpUnWZS82x, Oct. 4, 2019. 
1127 “Ministry of National Defense: the Japanese side repeatedly play up the ‘fire-control radar lock-on’ motivated y 
ulterior incentives” [国防部：日方再三炒作 “火控雷达照射 ”别有用心 ], China Daily, Mar. 18, 2013, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2013-03/18/content_16316941.htm, accessed Oct. 8, 2019. 
1128 Zhang Junshe [张军社], “The Underlying Story of Japan’s fabricated ‘fire control radar locking’” [日炮制 “火控
雷达照射” 的背后], PLA Daily, Mar. 21, 2013. 
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of measures with an emphasis on increasing military preparation and 
readiness…Since Abe came into office, Japanese fighter jets have repeatedly tailed 
and conducted close-in monitor of CMS patrol airplanes performing regular patrol 
tasks. As a result, the two countries’ confrontation might expand from the sea 
surface to the air, increasing the risk of an accident.1129  
Despite China’s awareness of the heightened risks of accidents, Beijing, like Tokyo, saw no 
room for softening over the sovereignty issue and took steps to reinforce its posture. In March, 
Beijing consolidated four of China’s five MLE agencies into a unified coast guard.1130 In April, 
MFA began to officially refer to the Diaoyu/Senkakus as a “core interest” of China,1131 more than 
one year after the term first appeared in Chinese leaders’ speeches and statements in reference to 
the islands. The one-year lapse might indicate a lack of internal consensus with respect to whether 
the Diaoyu/Senkakus should be officially recognized as a core interest. But from the point that 
MFA began to use the term, as observed by Orville Schell and Susan Shirk, it in effect denied 
Chinese diplomats the “necessary latitude in seeking a peaceful solution” while sending “a clear 
warning to Japan and to the United States that China’s claim to the islands is non-negotiable and 
that it is prepared to use military force to defend it.”1132  
Tensions suddenly heightened after Beijing announced on November 23, 2013 to establish an 
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, which overlapped the existing 
ADIZs of Japan, ROK, and Taiwan (Map 6.1). China began considering the creation of an ADIZ 
after the 2001 EP-3 incident. In 2002, a senior PLA official, referring to the accident, reportedly  
 
1129 AMS, Strategic Review 2012 [战略评估 2012] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanse, 2013), pp. 48-50. 
1130 The five dragons and 2013 merge are detailed in Chapter 3. 
1131 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated at the MFA’s regular press conference on April 26 
that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are part of the country's core interests concerning its territorial sovereignty. It is the 
first time that a Chinese Foreign Ministry official has openly recognized that the islands is a core interest of China. 
“China official Clearly Calls Senkaku Core Interest,” Jiji Press, Apr. 27, 2013. 
1132  “What’s Really at the Core of China’s ‘Core Interests’?” A China File Conversation, Apr. 30, 2013, 
http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/whats-really-core-chinas-core-interests, accessed Oct. 10, 2019. 
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Map 6.1 Existing Air Defense Identificaion Zones in the East China Sea 
 
Source: USNI, “Tag Archive: Senkaku Islands, https://news.usni.org/tag/senkaku-island, accessed May 5, 2020. 
stated at an international meeting that China was considering an ADIZ.1133 Early writings by the 
PLA Air Force advocated for an ADIZ primarily on the basis of strengthening air surveillance and 
defense capabilities along China’s coast. For instance, in a May 2008 article published in the SOA-
run China Ocean News, a military scholar at the PLA’s Air Force Command Academy called for 
the establishment of an ADIZ to improve coastal surveillance capabilities and defense readiness 
as part of a “comprehensive maritime security defense system” proposed in the article.1134 During 
 
1133 Nozomu Hayashi and Nanae Kurashige, “China overturned draft air defense zone, expanded it toward Japan,” 
Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 12, 2014, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140216065721/http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201401120021, accessed 
Oct. 7, 2019. 
1134 Li Anmin [李安民], “Thoughts on measures defending China’s maritime rights and interests” [维护我国海洋权
益之对策思考], China Ocean News, May 6, 2008. For more discussion on this regard, see, Michael Swaine, “Chinese 
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his tenure, Hu Jintao reportedly remained cautious about the move to designate an ADIZ. The 
internal discussion had been ongoing, but the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization critically altered the 
internal political dynamics on this issue. In early 2013, the ADIZ proposal was put on the agenda 
but blocked because “some people at the top still disagreed” out of the concern that “in the context 
of the already heightened Sino-Japanese tensions, such a move could further blow up the 
relationship,” according to a knowledgeable Chinese source. But after the NPC session, the power 
transition was fully completed and the ADIZ proposal was raised again.1135 The proposal was said 
to be submitted by the Air Force Command Academy in May,1136 and was pushed through this 
time, as Xi Jinping was still consolidating his power and need to garner support from the PLA.1137 
The final decision was reportedly “made by Xi with Hu giving the nod.”1138 As a result, the military 
as the implementer of the ADIZ was consigned a greater and more direct role in the island disputes, 
culminating in a strong military escalation. 
On the other hand, MFA appeared to have been sidelined in the ADIZ decision-making process. 
Security and foreign policy experts in and outside China widely characterized Beijing’s ADIZ 
declaration as a “rush,” “sudden,” and “poorly coordinated” move that lacked consideration about 
the potential geopolitical costs – not only in the East China Sea but also in the South China Sea (I 
examine in detail the implications of the East China Sea ADIZ for the South China Sea disputes 
in Chapter 8). According to sources in China and Japan close to their respective foreign policy and 
defense communities, MFA had in a large part been kept in the dark during the policy making 
process of the ADIZ.1139 On the day of the announcement, the 21st Century Committee for China-
 
Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),” China Leadership 
Monitor, spring 2014, issue 43. 
1135 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
1136 Hayashi and Kurashige, “China overturned draft air defense zone.” 
1137 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
1138 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
1139 Author’s interviews, Beijing, March 2019; Tokyo, August 2018. 
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Japan Friendship, an advisory body for the two governments, was holding an informal session in 
Hangzhou which was attended by China’s former State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and diplomats 
from the two countries. Upon learning the news of the ADIZ, a Japanese diplomat attending the 
meeting asked his Chinese counterpart whether the latter had known beforehand about the 
announcement and got a reluctant “yes” after “a momentary pause,” which indicated that MFA 
was probably not being kept informed of the final decision on the ADIZ. “A likely situation is that 
MFA only knew the ADIZ was to be announced at some point but had no idea about when exactly 
the announcement would be made,” as a knowledgeable Japanese source noted.1140  
Unsurprisingly, the escalation along the military dimension provoked fierce reactions from 
other regional stakeholders. The overlapping of the ADIZ with other existing ones in the East 
China Sea as well as the vagueness in Beijing’s initial announcement regarding the circumstances 
which would justify a “defensive emergency measures” by the Chinese military heightened the 
risk of dangerous encounters and even accidental collisions.1141 Tokyo demanded Beijing revoke 
its decision while requesting Japanese civilian airlines not to yield to the Chinese requirement of 
submitting flight plans for flights through areas encompassed in China’s ADIZ.1142 Washington 
expressed deep concerns about the ADIZ, as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of 
 
1140 Author’s interview, Tokyo, August 2018. For information on this informational session, see, MFA, “The 21st 
Century Committee for China-Japan Friendship Conducts Informal Discussion,” Nov. 24, 2013, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2721_663446/2724_66345
2/t1103427.shtml, accessed Oct. 7, 2019. 
1141 Ministry of National Defense of PRC, “Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea 
Air Defense Identification Zone of the People's Republic of China,” Nov. 23, 2013, China Daily, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/23/content_17126618.htm, accessed Oct. 9, 2019. 
1142 “Kishida dismisses China’s air defense zone over Senkakus,” Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 24, 2013; “Japan 
to Stand Tough on Airspace Violations: Defense Chief,” Jiji Press, Nov. 25, 2013; “URGENT: Abe ‘strongly 
concerned’ by China's setting up of air defense zone,” Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 25, 2013; “No Need to Submit 
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of Japan, “Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the announcement on the ‘East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone’ by the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China,” Nov. 24, 2013, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000098.html, accessed Oct. 9, 2019. 
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Defense Chuck Hagel issued separate statements, which denounced the ADIZ as a “unilateral” and 
“destabilizing” move to “alter the status quo” in the region.1143 South Korea lodged a formal 
protest with the Chinese Embassy in Seoul, as China’s ADIZ overlapped that South Korea off Jeju 
and covered the contested submerged rock Suyan/Ieodo Reef.1144  Australia also joined the chorus, 
calling the ADIZ “unhelpful in light of current regional tensions.”1145 
Despite Beijing’s strong rhetoric pushing back on the international criticism,1146 the PLA Air 
Force did not conduct active enforcement following the initiation of the ADIZ. While asserting 
that the PLA had closely monitored foreign military aircraft entering the ADIZ,1147 Beijing did not 
respond to the two U.S. B-52 bombers that flew through the ADIZ on November 25 without 
 
1143 U.S. Department of Defense, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone,” Nov. 23, 2013, https://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392; U.S. 
Department of State, “Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” John Kerry, Secretary of 
State, Washington DC, Nov 23, 2013, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm. Both 
accessed Oct. 9, 2019. 
1144 Chung Min-uck, “Seoul protests China’s air defense zone,” Korea Times, Nov. 25, 2013. 
1145 Minister for Foreign Affairs The Hon. Julie Bishop MP, “China's announcement of an air-defence identification 
zone over the East China Sea,” Nov. 26, 2013, 
https://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2013/jb_mr_131126a.aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FlS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3
D%3D, accessed Oct. 9, 2019. 
1146 “MFA spokesperson refutes U.S. and Japan’s statements on China’s designation of ECS ADIZ: Urging U.S. and 
Japan to stop irresponsible remarks” [外交部发言人驳斥美日对我国划设东海防空识别区有关表态: 敦促美日停
止说三道四], People’s Daily, Nov. 25, 2013; “Ministry of National Defense: Japan and U.S. relevant statements are 
unreasonable” [国防部: 日美有关表态毫无道理], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Nov. 26, 2013; “MFA: Protesting Japan 
and America’s unreasonable criticisms” [外交部: 抗议日美方的无理指责], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Nov. 26, 2013; 
“Defense Ministry’s Spokesperson answers media question, Japan and U.S. has no rights to make irresponsible 
comments on China’s designation of ECS ADIZ” [国防部新闻发言人答记者问，日美无权对中国划设东海防空
识别区说三道四], PLA Daily, Nov. 26, 2013. 
1147 Lv Desheng [吕德胜], “MND spokesperson answers media questions regarding U.S. military aircraft entry into 
the ECS ADIZ: Chinese military monitored the tire process and made timely identification” [国防部新闻发言人就
美军机进入东海防空识别区答记者问: 中国军队进行了全程监视及时识别], PLA Daily, Nov. 28, 2013; Xu Lin 
[徐琳] and Lv Desheng, “China fully control the situation of aircraft entering ECS ADIZ” [中方全面掌握进入东海
防空识别区航空器的情况], PLA Daily, Nov. 29, 2013. 
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informing China.1148 Nor did China respond to fly-overs by South Korean and Japanese aircraft on 
November 28 and 29, respectively.1149  
Multiple factors might have contributed to China’s muted response to the bombers and the 
subsequent Japanese and Korean fly-overs. First and perhaps most important, the way that 
Washington framed its response to the ADIZ might have reduced Beijing’s incentive to make a 
forceful reaction. Washington distinguished its position from Japan’s by refraining from 
demanding China to roll back the zone and by urging American commercial airlines to comply 
with the Chinese ADIZ requirements. Specifically, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stressed 
that what Washington would not support were “efforts by any State to apply its ADIZ procedures 
to foreign aircraft not intending to enter its national airspace,” and that Washington expected China 
“to exercise caution and restraint” and “not to implement its threat to take action against aircraft 
that do not identify themselves or obey orders from Beijing.” The U.S. message that Washington 
was not explicitly calling on China for reversing the ADIZ but instead for avoiding enforcement 
was made even clearer during then U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Japan, China, and South 
Korea in early December.1150  
Moreover, the way that the B-52 fly-over was conducted probably confirmed Beijing’s 
assessment of America’s intention to contain the tensions. Shen Dingli, an international security 
expert at China’s Fudan University, called the fly-over a “restrained show of resolve” by 
 
1148 Thom Shanker, “U.S. Sends Two B-52 Bombers into Air Zone Claimed by China,” New York Times, Nov.26, 
2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/world/asia/us-flies-b-52s-into-chinas-expanded-air-defense-zone.html, 
accessed Oct. 9, 2019. 
1149 Christopher Bodeen, “S. Korea, Japan defy Chinese air defense zone,” Associated Press, Nov. 28, 2013; Zhang 
Yuqing [张玉清], “PLA Air Force verify foreign military aircraft entering ECS ADIZ” [空军查证进入东海识别区
的外国军机], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Nov. 30, 2013. 
1150 U.S. Department of State, “Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” Mark Landler and 
Martin Fackler, “Biden walks a fine line in Japan; He voices concern about China’s air zone, but no call for a reversal,” 
New York Times, Dec. 4, 2013; David Nakamura, “In China, Biden aims to ease tension,” Washington Post, Dec. 5, 
2013 “U.S. looks to manage, not end, China air rift,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 7, 2013. 
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Washington because the military aircraft performing the fly-over were unarmed, unescorted 
bombers. 1151  Another Chinese expert on U.S.-China relations, making a similar observation, 
interpreted this fly-over as intended to convey a dual-purpose message: on the one hand, the U.S. 
demonstrated forcefully its defiance of China’s ADIZ rules; on the other hand, this message of 
defiance was sent in an unthreatening way to China to minimize the risk of miscalculation and 
overreaction.1152 Assessment by the Chinese military reflects a similar perception. An annual 
report on China’s security environment by the PLA’s National Defense University, noting the way 
that Washington conducted (not armed, not escorted by fighter jets) and characterized (as part of 
a routine exercise flight planned before the ADIZ announcement) the B-52 fly-over, described the 
flight as a “moderate, restrained” U.S. response to the ADIZ. The report also referred with approval 
to a remark made by USAF chief of staff Gen. Mark Welsh that China’s creation of the ADIZ 
should serve as an opportunity for an international discussion regarding how countries could better 
communicate with each other and manage air defense zones in the region.1153   
Second, the strong reactions from South Korea and the potential pushback from Southeast 
Asian countries alerted Beijing of the steeply rising geopolitical costs it was facing. A Korea expert 
affiliated with a Chinese government think tank explicitly stated that the ADIZ had “unnecessarily 
 
1151 Lu Yifeng [陆益峰], “U.S. ‘restrained show of resolve’ reflects the evolving power structure in Asia-Pacific” [美 
“有克制示强” 反映亚太格局嬗变], Wenhui Bao [文汇报], Nov. 28, 2013. Shen’s account converges with the content 
of a Wall Street Journal report published on Nov. 26. But it remains unclear whether China got the details about the 
bombers from the Wall Street Journal reports or from other non-open sources. Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Directly 
Challenges China’s Air Defense Zone; Pair of American B-52 Bombers Fly Over Disputed Island Chain,” Wall Street 
Journal, Nov. 26, 2013. 
1152 Author’s interview, Shanghai, April 2019. 
1153 Tang Yongsheng [唐永胜] and Pang Hongliang [庞宏亮], “A review of China-U.S. relations” [中美关系评析], 
in Institute of Strategic Studies of National Defense University, International Strategic Situation and China’s National 
Security 2013-2014 [国际战略形势与中国国家安全 2013-2014] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2014), pp. 21-
22. “China’s air defense identification zone ‘a platform for communication,’” defensenews.com, Dec. 11, 2013, 
reprinted on South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1379845/chinas-air-defence-
identification-zone-platform-communication, accessed Oct. 9, 2019.  
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provoked South Korea.”1154 Another very knowledge Chinese source noted that former ROK 
government senior officials, upon witnessing China’s forceful countermeasures toward Japan, 
began to express their worries in private, “China could treat Korea in a similar way when China-
ROK relations counter problems.”1155 In attempts to reassure South Korea, Beijing ostensibly 
softened its tone and expressed its hope of resolving the issue through “friendly consultations and 
negotiations” with Seoul, and this accommodating approach remained unchanged even after South 
Korea announced on December 8 to expand its own ADIZ to cover the Suyan/Ieodo.1156  
Meanwhile, Beijing’s indication of other ADIZs being under consideration fueled wide worries 
and speculations of whether another one would soon be established in the South China Sea.1157 As 
noted by a group of Asia experts at CSIS, “Support for Japanese views may grow in Southeast 
Asia as states bordering the South China Sea worry about a similar Chinese move to place a South 
China Sea ADIZ over their disputed islands.”1158  Furthermore, with a Japan-ASEAN special 
summit upcoming in December, a balancing coalition on China’s eastern and southern maritime 
frontiers appeared to be an imminent possibility.  
 
1154 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
1155 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
1156 “China informed Seoul of air defense zone,” Korea Herald, Nov. 25, 2013; Jun Ji-hye, “No big row likely over 
new air zone,” Korea Times, Dec. 8, 2013; “South Korea expands its air defense zone after informing US, China, 
Japan,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Dec. 9, 2013. 
1157  See, for example, Banyan, “The East China Sea: Regional turbulence,” The Economist, Nov. 27, 2013, 
https://www.economist.com/banyan/2013/11/27/regional-turbulence, accessed Oct. 10, 2019; James Fallows, “More 
on This Strange Chinese ADIZ: ‘Sovereign is as Sovereign Does,’” The Atlantic, Nov. 23, 2013, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/11/more-on-this-strange-chinese-adiz-sovereign-is-as-sovereign-
does/281890/, accessed Oct. 9, 2019. On the same day of the ADIZ announcement, the Chinese MND spokesperson 
Yang Yujun stated that “after relevant preparatory work is completed, China will designate other ADIZs when time 
is appropriate.” MND, “MND’s spokesperson Yang Yujun answers media questions about establishing the ECS ADIZ” 
[国防部新闻发言人杨宇军就划设东海防空识别区答记者问], Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2013-
11/23/content_4476908.htm, accessed Oct. 9, 2019. 
1158 “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Impact on Regional Security,” CSIS Asia Team, Nov. 26, 2013, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-impact-regional-security, accessed Oct. 10, 
2019. 
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Facing the surging geopolitical costs, China began to tone down its rhetoric on the ADIZ. The 
Chinese defense ministry issued a statement on December 3, underscoring that the ADIZ would 
not be treated and operated in the same way as territorial airspace or no-fly zone, but would be 
operated “for the purpose of identification and early warning;” and as such, “supervision and 
control are exercised through reported flight plans and radar response and identification… Fighter 
planes are unnecessary when an entering aircraft is found to pose no threat to us…civil flights pose 
no threat in most circumstances.”1159 
Third, the Chinese military seemed to lack the necessary capabilities to fully enforce the ADIZ. 
According to a 2014 USAF report to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
China was unable to maintain a “constant aerial presence with either fighters or support aircraft;” 
instead, the PLA need to rely on its “dense ground-based radar coverage to maintain awareness” 
throughout the ADIZ. To actively monitor and manage the ADIZ requires “shared efforts among 
coastal units, regional command posts particularly in the Nanjing Military Region, and command 
elements in Beijing.” 1160  In addition to the PLA’s lack of the necessary surveillance and 
enforcement capabilities, knowledgeable Chinese sources also noted that there was a lack of civil-
military aviation coordination mechanisms to enable effective surveillance and enforcement, and 
that for this reason the ADIZ was a move of more political, symbolic significance than military 
value and intended for domestic consumption.1161 Following this line of explanation, Beijing might 
not even intend to fully enforce the ADIZ at  the time of its establishment, at least not until China 
gains the necessary capabilities. 
 
1159 Ministry of National Defense of PRC, “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone,” 
Dec. 4, 2013, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/dhfksbq2/, accessed Oct. 10, 2019. 
1160 U.S. Department of the Air Force, “Presentation to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” 
Statement of Lee Fuell, Technical Director for Force Modernization & Employment, National Air & Space 
Intelligence Center, Jan. 30, 2014. 
1161 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
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In the years following its establishment, the Chinese ADIZ has not been actively enforced for 
most of the time. A 2015 CRS report characterizes China’s ADIZ enforcement since its initiation 
as “restrained.”1162 Likewise, a 2016 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
report states that China “has never sought to fully enforce ADIZ as it pertains to military aircraft” 
except for interception of “only a handful of” Japanese military aircraft in mid-2014. Neither has 
the ADIZ disrupted civilian air traffic in the region, although the GOJ requested Japanese airlines 
not to comply with China’s ADIZ requirements.1163 A 2017 RAND report arrives at a similar 
conclusion.1164  
POST CRISIS INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MARITIME AIR COMMUNICATION MECHANISM 
Official ties between Beijing and Tokyo did not begin to thaw until bilateral back-channel 
diplomacy bore fruit and culminated in a four-point statement in November 2014,1165 which paved 
the way for a brief meeting between Xi and Abe on the sideline of the Beijing APEC summit three 
days after the issuance of the statement. This document was crafted in a subtle and somewhat 
vague fashion in addressing the maritime disputes in order to afford each government adequate 
leeway to present the deal to its domestic audience with an interpretation that the country’s 
traditional position had not been compromised.1166 In this way, the statement and the meeting 
 
1162 Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, China’s Aid Defense Identification Zone, Congressional Research Service, Jan. 30, 
2015, pp. 11. 
1163 Michael Pilger, ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the South China Sea, and 
Implications for the United States, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, 
Mar. 2, 2016, p. 4. 
1164 Edmund J. Burke and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, In Line or Out of Order? China’s Approach to ADIZ in Theory and 
Practice (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporate, 2017). 
1165 In January 2013, Abe sent Yamaguchi Natuo as his envoy to Beijing delivering a personal letter to Xi. Yamguchi’s 
trip was followed up with a series of high-level back-channel diplomatic activities including, among others, a visit by 
Japan’s former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, LDF Deputy Secretary General Nakatani Gen, chairman of the 
Japan-China Friendship Association Kato Koichi, and former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio. Przystup, “Japan-
China Relations: Treading Troubled Waters.” 
1166 For a close sentence-by-sentence trilingual analysis of the content of the official Chinese- and Japanese-language 
statements and their respective English translations, see, Adam P. Liff, “Principles Without Consensus, Setting the 
Record Straight on the 2014 Sino-Japanese ‘Agreement to Improve Bilateral Relations,’” working paper, Nov. 8, 2014. 
For more analyses scrutinizing the agreement, see, for example, J. Berkshire Miller, “A Meeting of the Minds: Did 
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enabled both sides to take the necessary step out of the diplomatic impasse and began to tackle the 
most pressing issue confronting them: hammering out a mutually acceptable, effective crisis 
prevention and management mechanism regulating the interactions of the two countries’ maritime 
security actors. 
The negotiation on a maritime communication mechanism resumed in January 2015 after a 
three-year hiatus. Given the increased encounters between Chinese and Japanese aircraft in the 
airspace over the East China Sea, the negotiation incorporated the airspace domain into the scope 
of the mechanism.1167 Before interrupted by the nationalization, both sides had conducted three 
rounds of expert negotiation between April 2008 and June 2012, and drawn up three pillars of the 
mechanism: 1) installing a hotline between the two countries’ defense agencies; 2) holding regular 
meetings between defense officials; 3) establishing rules for direct communication between local 
military actors during an encounter.1168 However, the negotiation soon deadlocked on the issue of 
whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea and airspace should be excluded from the scope of the 
mechanism.1169 Japan insisted on such an exclusion, because, as a prominent Japanese China 
expert expounded, “if territorial sea and airspace are covered under the mechanism, it would be no 
 
Japan and China Just Press Reset?” Foreign Affairs, Nov. 19 2014, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-11-10/meeting-minds, accessed Oct. 9, 2019; Zhao Tong, “China-
Japan Four Point Consensus Determines Next Important Task: Crisis Management,” Nov. 10, 2014, 
https://carnegietsinghua.org/2014/11/10/china-japan-four-point-consensus-determines-next-important-task-crisis-
management-pub-57338, accessed Oct. 11, 2019; Tatsumi Yuki, “Understanding China and Japan’s Four Point 
Consensus: A Step Forward For Stabilizing Relations,” Stimson Spotlight, Nov. 12, 2014, 
https://www.stimson.org/content/understanding-china-and-japans-four-point-consensus-a-step-forward-for-
stabilizing-relations, accessed Oct. 13, 2019. 
1167 MND, “Ministry of Defense: China and Japan make progress on negotiation regarding maritime security” [国防
部 ： 中 日 就 海 上 安 全 问 题 磋 商 取 得 进 展 ], Jan. 29, 2015, http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2015-
01/29/content_4621265.htm, accessed Oct. 11, 2019. “China and Japan agree to resume negotiation on maritime 
communication mechanisms as soon as possible” [中日同意尽早重启海上联络机制], Beijing Times, Jan. 14, 2015, 
reprinted on People.com, http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2015/0114/c159301-26379205.html, accessed Oct. 11, 2019. 
1168 Liu Xiaobo [刘晓博], “Sino-Japanese ‘Aerial and Maritime Communication Mechanism’ and the two countries’ 
aerial and maritime military security” [中日 “海空联络机制” 与两国海空军事安全], Aug. 29, 2018, Naval & 
Merchant Ships, issue 10. 
1169 Private communication with a Chinese participant in the negotiation; Zhou Bo, “Maritime Risk Management and 
Control.” 
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different from an ‘invitation’ for Chinese ships and aircraft [to frequently intrude into the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial sea and airspace].”1170 Namely, Japan worried that Beijing would use 
such an inclusion to justify its regular presence in the Diaoyu/Senkaku area. Beijing rejected 
Japan’s position on the ground that the great risk of conflict around the Diaoyu/Senkakus precisely 
underscores the great need to extend the coverage of this mechanism to this area.1171 
A final agreement was reached and signed into effect in May 2018 during Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang’s visit to Tokyo. Still pending the release of the full text of the document at the time of 
this writing, information from open sources and the author’s private communication with 
knowledgeable source suggests that the mechanism is comprised of the three pillars agreed upon 
in the pre-2012 rounds. The final document makes no specification about its geographical scope 
but reportedly notes that it has no implication for sovereignty.1172 Rules for direct communication 
between military actors are based on CUES and the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(a.k.a. Chicago Convention), according to a report by China’s National Institute for South China 
Sea Studies (NISCSS).1173  
This mechanism, as it is, is ostensibly inadequate in several key aspects. Most importantly, the 
mechanism regulates the encounters only between military actors; interactions between the various 
nonmilitary actors active at the forefront of the East China Sea disputes go unaddressed in the 
agreement. Second, regulating encounters between military aircraft through rules for civilian 
flights as stipulated in the Convention on International Civil Aviation might render only 
 
1170 Author’s interview, Tokyo, August 2018. 
1171 “After 12 years China and Japan reached an agreement on Aerial and Maritime Communication Mechanism” [中
日历经 12 年达成海空联络机制协议], Nikkei, May 11, 2018, https://cn.nikkei.com/china/cpolicssociety/30443-
2018-05-11-09-13-57.html?start=0, accessed Oct. 11, 2019. 
1172 Michael Kovrig, “How A Long-awaited Hotline Could Pave the Way For Calmer China-Japan Relations, Crisis 
Group, May 13, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/chinajapan/how-long-awaited-hotline-could-
pave-way-calmer-china-japan-relations, accessed Oct. 11, 2019.  
1173 Liu, “Sino-Japanese ‘Aerial and Maritime Communication Mechanism.’” 
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suboptimal effects. As noted in the NISCSS report, to regulate encounters between military 
airplanes conducting missions such as reconnaissance, tailing, surveillance, interception and 
compellence, 1174 rules of the road need to be more specifically tailored to achieve this end. Third, 
viewed in light of hotline mechanisms’ past ineffectiveness and susceptibility to fluctuations in 
diplomatic relations, the pending defense hotline,1175 without a firm commitment by both parties 
to keep it fully functional and promptly connected to key decisionmakers in times of crisis, is likely 


















1175 “MND spokesperson answers media questions regarding the consultation dialogue between defense ministries of 
China and Japan” [ 国 防 部 新 闻 发 言 人 就 中 日 防 务 部 门 机 制 性 磋 商 ], Xinhua, Mar. 31, 2021, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2021-03/31/c_1127276498.htm, accessed Apr. 12, 2021. 
- 335 - 
 
 
South China Sea: “Safeguarding Rights” versus “Maintaining Stability” 
 
Among the hot button issues confronting China, the South China Sea problem is 
one of the very few diplomatic conundrums that pertain to all the keywords 
embodied in China’s foreign policy guideline – ‘periphery,’ ‘great powers,’ 
‘developing countries,’ and ‘multilateralism.’1176 
– National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS) 
2005 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea 
 
China’s neighboring countries on the maritime frontier can be divided into two 
groups: one includes the coastal countries on the East Asia continent, including 
Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea; the other entails archipelagic 
states such as Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia…to launch a large-scale, all-
dimensional attack on China would still need to go through countries onshore. The 
modern history shows that South Korea, the Malay Peninsula and Vietnam are to 
China what the Lower Countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium are to France. 
But the intention of these important neighboring countries to balance against China 
has become quite apparent…Therefore, how to strategically manage relations with 
these countries is of critical importance to China’s maritime security. Politically, 
China must maintain stable and friendly relations with these countries to prevent 
them from being used as bases for containing China; meanwhile, China needs to 
cope with provocations and frictions caused by these countries over maritime 
territories, rights, and interests.1177 
 – Academy of Military Science (AMS) 
2010 Strategic Review 
 
The South China Sea has strong spillover effects, which China had seriously 
underestimated as of 2010. The neighborhood has begun to pay close attention to 
China’s behavior since we submitted the note verbale in 2009, and the South China 
Sea has since become the litmus test for China’s commitment to peaceful 
development…ASEAN has long been an illustration of China’s good neighborly 
diplomacy and intention to rise peacefully…Once ASEAN begins to openly 
criticize China, China will really lose its moral high ground.1178 
– A South China Sea expert at CASS 
Author’s interview, Beijing, May 2019 
 
1176 NISCSS, 2005 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea [2005 年南海形势评估报告], 2006, 
internal material, p.33. The four keywords refer to the phrase “great powers are the key, peripheral areas the first 
priority, developing countries the foundation, multilateralism the important stage” (大国是关键、周边是首要、发
展中国家是基础、多边是重要舞台) which was laid out after Hu Jintao took office in 2002 as a guideline for China’s 
conduct of foreign policy. 
1177 AMS, Crisis, Challenges and Transformation: A Review of the First Decade in the 21st Century and Outlook [危
机、挑战、转型：21 世纪 10 年回顾与展望] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2012), pp. 227-228. 
1178 In discussions with Chinese interlocutors, “spillover effects” [外溢效应] is the more often used term to refer to 
IAC, that is, the negative side effects, backlashes, and alienation of third-party stakeholders. 
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7. Vietnam’s Spratly Cruise, the Tokin Gulf Fatal Shooting, and Sansha City 
Contrasting its strong propensity to escalate local incidents in the East China Sea over the past two 
decades, China has been more selective in escalating contingencies in the South China Sea disputes 
during the same period. Moreover, incidents were not followed by an immediate escalation or de-
escalation; instead, standoffs often ensued before Beijing opted for a subsequent escalation or de-
escalation. As such, China’s crisis behavior pattern in the South China Sea is remarkable as much 
for a greater variation between escalation and de-escalation as it is for the frequent occurrence of 
standoffs. 
The South China Sea falls in the “propensity to gridlock” area that straddles the 45-degree 
borderline in the audience cost trade-off model (Figure 7.1). In this area, the tradeoff between the 
two types of audience costs more often is not immediately clear when a local incident takes place. 
On the domestic end, Beijing in general faces smaller audience costs over the South China Sea 
than the East China Sea. At the top, the leadership consensus on maintaining cordial ties with 
Southeast Asian countries has remained clear across most of the period. Also, unlike the East China 
Sea case in which moderate voices among elites are often overwhelmed by nationalist outcries, 
bureaucratic, business, and intellectual elites diverge more widely regarding how forcefully China 
should assert its claims in the South China Sea. At the grassroots level, whereas nationalist 
emotions at times run high during local incidents, popular pressure for a tough posture on the South 
China Sea is in general far smaller and more manageable than the East China Sea. This absence of 
a strong compromise-averse coalition, while granting Chinese decision makers more latitude in 
making choices, has led Beijing to be relatively more sensitive to changes in the audience costs on 
the international end.  
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Figure 7.1 The South China Sea in the “Propensity to Gridlock” Area 
 
This chapter traces China’s handling of three incidents in the South China Sea during the first 
decade of the 21st century: Vietnam’s decision in 2004 to launch a tourism cruise to the contested 
Spratlys, the fatal shooting of multiple Vietnamese fishermen by the Chinese Maritime Police in 
the Tonkin Gulf in 2005, and Beijing’s decision in late 2007 to table the plan of establishing the 
Sansha City. The prevalence of international audience costs generated in both bilateral and 
multilateral settings created incentives for Beijing to de-escalate. 
THE 2004 VIETNAMESE SPRATLY CRUISE 
Since the end of the Cold War particularly following the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, China 
redoubled its charm offensive toward Southeast Asia in an effort not only to dispel lingering 
suspicions among its small neighbors but also to placate growing concerns in the international 
community about China’s long-term intentions and to foster a positive image of China as a 
responsible, non-threatening rising power.1179  
 
1179 Wang Hui [王辉], “China, Japan and their relations with ASEAN: Competition and Cooperation in Interactions” 
[中、日与东盟关系：互动中的竞争与合作], in Li Yiping [李一平] and Zhuang Guotu [庄国土], ed., Post-Cold 
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The first decade of the 21st century is notable for significant improvements in China-ASEAN 
relations as well as the overall stability in the South China Sea.1180 In November 2002, China and 
ASEAN countries signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), 
an nonbinding document in which the signatories pledged to resolve their maritime disputes by 
peaceful means and to “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or 
escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.”1181 Concluding the declaration at the ASENA-
China summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji praised the conclusion of 
the DOC as a representation of a “higher level of political trust between the two sides.”1182 In 
October 2003, Beijing took another step to boost political trust with Southeast Asian countries 
through China’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Relations with 
ASEAN countries have since become a crown jewel of Beijing’s good neighborly diplomacy as 
well as an opportunity to showcase China’s commitment to multilateralism and its peaceful rise. 
With that said, the South China Sea during this period is not without controversies and 
incidents. Tensions mounted between China and other claimants especially Vietnam on issues 
ranging from tourism in the disputed areas to fatal fishing clashes, hydrocarbon resources and 
administrative disputes. However, contrasting its strong propensity to respond forcefully to 
incidents in the East China Sea during the same period, China avoided taking an escalatory posture 
when responding to most of the incidents in the South China Sea. As demonstrated below, whereas 
 
War International Relations of Southeast Asia [冷战以来的东南亚国际关系] (Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 
2005), p. 63; Zhang Yunlin [张蕴岭] and Sun Shihai [孙士海], A Report on the Development of Asia-Pacific No. 6 
(2005) [亚太地区发展报告 No. 6 (2005)] (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2006), p. 053 
1180 Andrew Chubb argues in a recent article that China became more assertive on the South China Sea disputes starting 
from 2007, a few years earlier than most English-language analyses have assumed. Andrew Chubb, “PRC 
Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Winter 2020/2021), pp. 79-121. 
1181 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” a full text of the document was retrieved from 
ASEAN website, https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2, 
accessed Mar. 26, 2019. 
1182 Tham Choy Lin, “ASEAN, China sign free trade pact and South China Sea Declaration,” Malaysia General News, 
Nov. 4, 2002. 
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the more cordial China-ASEAN ties contributed significantly to this contrast, the absence of a 
strong compromise-averse coalition during this period created a permissive domestic environment 
for Beijing to quickly contain the fallout from the incidents. 
In October 2003, information that Vietnam was considering opening tourism trips to the 
Spratlys began to surface. Le Dung, spokesperson of Vietnam’s foreign ministry, stated on October 
9 that Vietnam was “studying the feasibility of organizing such trips.”1183 Beijing might have 
communicated with Hanoi regarding this announcement through backchannels, but no information 
shows China made any open response during this period. 
In March 2004, Hanoi made it official that the first tour to the Spratlys was scheduled for mid-
April with a stated objective of reaffirming Vietnam’s sovereignty over the area. On March 24, 
the Philippines cautioned against Vietnam’s planned tour.1184 The next day, Beijing noted that it 
was aware of reports about Vietnam’s plan to organize tourist groups to the Spratlys and had 
already made a presentation to the Vietnamese side concerning what Beijing believed to be an 
infringement on China’s sovereignty. Invoking “the principles enshrined in the DOC,” Beijing 
urged Vietnam to “immediately correct its erroneous act” in the South China Sea.1185 Responding 
to Beijing and Manila’s opposition, Hanoi bluntly defended its plan, claiming that it had the right 
to open tourism because “[t]he Spratlys are part of Vietnamese territory.”1186  
As it became clear that Vietnam would not suspend the tourist group slated for April 19, then 
China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi summoned Vietnamese Ambassador on April 16 to lodge 
 
1183 “Vietnam eyes disputed Spratly Islands for tourism,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Oct. 9, 2003. 
1184 “Philippines cautions Vietnam over tour plan to Spratlys,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Mar. 24, 2004. 
1185 “The Chinese side had made a solemn presentation to the Vietnamese side regarding Vietnam’s plan to organize 
tourism trips to the Nansha islands” [就越南准备组织赴南沙群岛旅游，中方已向越方提出严正交涉], People’s 
Daily, Mar. 26, 2004. 
1186 Tini Tran, “Tour, bird-watching stand trigger latest row over Spratly Islands,” Associated Press, Apr. 3, 2004. 
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a protest.1187 Despite Beijing’s complaint, Vietnam pressed ahead with the plan. On April 20, some 
100 Vietnamese tourists including senior officials from Vietnam’s National Administration of 
Tourism took the eight-day cruise voyage to the Spratlys on a naval ship.1188  This tour was 
organized by a travel company under Vietnam’s Ministry of Defense, giving the activity a civilian 
cover. Dismissing criticisms by China and the Philippines, the Vietnamese foreign ministry’s 
spokesperson Le Dung characterized the tour as a “normal civil activity to meet the demands of 
people travelling and visiting.”1189 Vietnam’s vice premier Vu Koan similarly underscored that the 
tour was “just some tourist companies’ idea” during an interview with Hong Kong’s Phoenix 
TV.1190 
Calling Vietnam’s action a violation of China’s territorial sovereignty and the principles 
enshrined in the DOC, Beijing expressed “strong dissatisfaction” over the trip and demanded 
Vietnam “immediately stop actions that could complicate the situation” and “honor its pledge.”1191 
The Philippine foreign ministry likewise summoned Vietnam’s ambassador to “express concern” 
over the trip, although Manila cautiously toned down its complaint in what appeared to be an effort 
to protect ASEAN’s solidarity.1192 
Adding fuel to the fire, in mid-May media reports surfaced that Vietnam had since April begun 
rebuilding an airport with a 600-meter runway on the contested Big Spratly Island to enable future 
 
1187 Yi Ming [一鸣], “China demands Vietnam abide by the DOC” [我国要求越南恪守南海各方行为宣言], China 
Ocean News, Apr. 23, 2004. 
1188 “Vietnam launches first tour to disputed Spratly Islands despite protests from China” Associated Press, Ap. 18, 
2004. 
1189 “Vietnam dismisses regional criticism of tour of disputed Spratlys,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Apr. 20, 2004. 
1190 Lan Jianxue [蓝建学], “Vietnam’s actions on the Nansha issue over the recent years” [近年来越南在南沙问题
上的动向], Zhang Yunlin [张蕴岭] and Sun Shihai [孙士海], ed., Asia-Pacific Region Development Report 2004 [亚
太地区发展报告 2004] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2005), p. 251. Transcript of the whole interview 
was published in Ruan Cishan [阮次山], Talking with World Leaders [风云对话] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2006) pp. 
212-221. 
1191 “MFA spokesperson made a statement expressing strong dissatisfaction with Vietnam’s organizing tour to Nansha 
Islands” [外交部发言人发表谈话：对越南组织赴南沙群岛旅游表示强烈不满], People’s Daily, Apr. 20, 2004. 
1192 “Philippines summons Vietnamese envoy over Spratlys tour,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, Apr. 21, 2004. 
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tourism flights. Duong Xuan Hoi, director of the tourism department at Vietnam’s National 
Administration of Tourism, confirmed on May 14 that the Vietnamese Air Force was 
reconstructing the airport to land small aircraft “for tourism purposes” and acknowledged that 
future trips could take place.1193 Four days later, MFA spokesperson Liu Jianchao – responding to 
a media question about Vietnam’s airport renovation – characterized Vietnam’s construction as “a 
violation of the DOC principles that would lead to further complication of the South China Sea 
issue.”1194 
The Cost Trade-off: The International End Carried the Day 
The international end of the audience costs unambiguously prevailed in China’s calculation at the 
time. Meanwhile, the presence of domestic stakeholders supporting a conciliatory posture toward 
Vietnam, in combination with a weak compromise-averse coalition at home, enabled Beijing to 
take a de-escalatory response.  
Low Domestic Audience Costs: China Reaching Out to ASEAN and Hardline Pushes Curtailed 
The consensus on the importance of maintaining robust relations with ASEAN as well as with 
Vietnam at the time was clear in the Chinese leadership. On November 8, 2002, four days after 
China signed the DOC, the CCP’s 16th Party Congress report reaffirmed China’s commitment to 
good neighborly diplomacy.1195 Signaling a continuity and enhancement of this policy, the Hu-
Wen leadership broached the idea of “peaceful rise” to articulate China’s nonbelligerent 
commitment and reassure the international community, as elaborated in Chapter 4.  
 
1193 “Vietnam renovates airport in disputed Spratly Islands,” Agence France Presse, May 14, 2004; “Vietnam: Spratly 
Islands Airport,” Stratfor Situation Report, May 14, 2004, https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/vietnam-
spratly-islands-airport, accessed Oct. 17, 2019. 
1194 “MFA spokesperson answers media questions” [外交部发言人答记者问], People’s Daily, May 19, 2004. 
1195 “Jiang Zemin’s Report at the 16th Party Congress of the CPC.” 
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Turning now to the post-Cold War Sino-Vietnamese relations, the Chinese leadership put an 
emphasis on safeguarding stability and the shared ideology between the two countries. In 1999, 
Beijing officially codified the bilateral commitment to stabilizing the relationship with a sixteen-
character principle: “long-term stability, future-orientation, good neighborliness, and all-round 
cooperation” (长期稳定、面向未来、睦邻友好、全面合作).1196 During his visit to Hanoi in 
February 2002, Jiang Zemin proposed that the two countries should be “good neighbors, good 
friends, good comrades, and good partners” (好邻居、好朋友、好同志、好伙伴).1197 Unlike the 
“new thinking on Japan” debate that emerged immediately following the Jiang-Hu power 
transition and suggested a likely divergence between Jiang’s and Hu’s approaches toward Japan, 
Jiang’s policy line undergirding the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was adopted in full by the 
succeeding Hu-Wen administration with little if any debate. In 2003, when meeting for the first 
time as China’s top leader with the visiting CPV party chief Nong Duc Manh, Hu Jintao invoked 
Jiang’s formula in full, reaffirming policy continuity in defining the bilateral relationship.1198  
The Chinese leadership also held a clear consensus regarding the significance of prioritizing 
economic cooperation with ASEAN. Apart from a framework agreement signed in 2002 aiming 
for a China-ASEAN free trade area (FTA) by 2010,1199 China began actively engaging ASEAN 
countries in sub-regional cooperation initiatives, most notably, the Greater Mekong Subregion 
 
1196 For a detailed analysis of the sixteen-character principle, see, Christina Lai, “A Coercive Brotherhood: Sino-
Vietnamese Relations from the 1990s to 2018,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2020, Vol. 29, No. 123, pp. 469-
486. 
1197 Guo Ming [郭明], Zhang Xue [张雪] and Wei Shuxian [韦树先], ed., New Era of China Vietnam Relationship 
[中越关系新时期] (Bejing: Shishi chubanshe, 2007), p. 244. For a detailed trace of the sixteen-character principle, 
see, Christina Lai, “A Coercive Brotherhood: Sino-Vietnamese Relations from the 1990s to 2018,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, 2020, Vol. 29, No. 123, pp. 469-486. 
1198 Xinhua, “Hu Jintao and Nong Duc Manh hold meeting, speaking highly of Sino-Vietnamese relations” [胡锦涛
与农德孟举行会谈，高度评价中越关系], Apr. 8, 2003, reprinted on Sina, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-04-
08/0032985215.shtml, accessed Oct. 18, 2019. 
1199 Tham, “ASEAN, China sign free trade pact and South China Sea Declaration.” 
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Economic Cooperation (GMS) program, China-ASEAN Expo, and later the Pan-Beibu Gulf 
Economic Cooperation Forum. While intended as an effort to ameliorate ASEAN’s unease about 
competition from China for foreign investment and labor-intensive product exports,1200 Beijing 
conceived these subregional arrangements also as important policy tools to accelerate the opening 
and development of China’s southwestern region as part of the West Development Strategy 
launched in late 1990s. As the 2002 CASS bluebook on Asia-Pacific development noted, “The 
next period is an important one for China’s implementation of ‘West Development’ and ‘going 
out’ strategies; [therefore] the construction of the [China-ASEAN] FTA would carry more 
importance and influence.”1201 Wang Yi, then China’s Vice Foreign Minister, wrote in a 2003 
Qiushi article, “The surrounding area is becoming an important region for China’s implementation 
of ‘going out’ strategy, and is also an external extension of the West Development Strategy.”1202  
Below the top, the pulling and hauling among parochial interests kicked in. The divergent 
interests and policy agendas at this level effectively forestalled the emergence of a broad-based 
compromise-averse coalition on the South China Sea disputes. Guangxi and Yunnan, China’s 
gateway to the Indochinese Peninsula that had longed for greater economic integration and 
infrastructure connectivity with Southeast Asia, emerged as major domestic stakeholders 
benefiting from the regional and sub-regional cooperation initiatives (Table 7.1). 
In particular, since the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations in early 1990s, Guangxi, 
sharing with Vietnam a 1,020-kilometer borderline increasingly liberalized for border trade, had a 
 
1200 For examples of Chinese analysis on addressing the “China economic threat theory,” see, Zhai Kun [翟崑], 
“Psychological adjustment in peripheral diplomacy” [周边外交的心理调节], World Affairs [世界知识], issue 22, 
2004; and Zhai Kun, “Analysis of the “China threat theory” in Southeast Asian region” [试析东南亚地区的 “中国
威胁论”], Asia & Africa Review [亚非纵横], issue 5, 2006, pp. 52-55. 
1201 Zhang Yunling [张蕴岭] and Sun Shihai [孙士海], ed., Asia-Pacific Region Development Report 2002 [亚太地
区发展报告 2002] (Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2003), p. 63. 
1202 Wang Yi [王毅], “Forging friendship and partnership with neighbors” [与邻为善，与邻为伴], Qiushi, issue 4, 
2003, p. 19. 
- 344 - 
 
major stake in expanding economic ties with Vietnam and with ASEAN in general.1203 Boosting 
border trade was a top priority for the province’s external relations, as articulated in its 10th Five-
Year Plan starting from 2001.1204 In early 2003, Gao Hucheng, then Vice Governor of Guangxi, 
acclaimed that with its geographical location, Guangxi was well positioned to play a critical role 
in the China-ASEAN FTA.1205 Gu Xiaosong, then head of the Southeast Asia Research Institute 
at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences (GASS), envisioned Guangxi – with its critical 
location and infrastructure – would be transformed into a linchpin connecting China’s 
southwestern region with Southeast Asia. 1206  In March 2004, the Guangxi provincial party 
committee applauded its hosting of the China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning and the China-ASEAN 
FTA a “rare opportunity” for the opening of Guangxi to the outside world.1207 Whereas Guangxi 
aspired to expand its economic ties with the broader Southeast Asian region, Vietnam remained 
the province’s top trading partner. In 2003, Vietnam accounted for 80 percent of the total value of 
Guangxi’s trade with ASEAN countries. Small-scale border trade, at a growth rate of more than 
50 percent in both directions, represented the most dynamic and fastest growing dimension in the 
province’s overall foreign trade.1208 Nong Lifu, then Deputy Director of the Southeast Asia Studies  
 
1203 For an excellent study of the role of Guangxi and Yunnan in China’s border diplomacy toward Southeast Asia in 
the 1990s, see, Peter T. Y. Cheung and James T. H. Tang, “The External Relations of China’s Provinces,” in Lampton, 
ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform 1978-2000, pp. 104-107 
1204  “Report on the outlines of the10th Five-Year Plan for socioeconomic development in Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region” [关于广西壮族自治区国民经济和社会发展第十个五年计划纲要的报告], Guangxi Daily, 
Jan. 18, 2001. 
1205 Wu Jianqing [伍建青] and Jiang Mulan [姜木兰], “Guangxi will play an important role in building China-ASEAN 
FTA” [构建 “中国——东盟自由贸易区” 广西将发挥重要作用], Guangxi Daily, Feb. 19, 2003. 
1206  Gu Xiaosong [古小松 ], “Guangxi would be transformed from a hinterland frontier into an international 
intersection and hun” [广西将由国内边陲变为国际通道和枢纽], Guangxi Daily, Feb. 19, 2003. 
1207 Research Small Group under the Propaganda Department of Guangxi Autonomous Region Party Committee [自
治区党委宣传部课题研究小组], “Correctly recognize the opportunities and challenges brought by China-ASEAN 
FTA” [正确认识中国—东盟自由贸易区给广西带来的机遇和挑战], Guangxi Daily, Mar. 30, 2004. 
1208 Dai Zhiqiang [戴志强] and Xu Linyi [徐林翊], “Guangxi foreign trade keeps rapid growth” [我区对外贸易持续
高速增长], Guangxi Daily [广西日报], Jan. 26, 2004; Nong Lifu [农立夫], “Accelerate establishment of Guangxi-
Vietnam border cooperation mechanism” [加快建立桂越边境合作机制], Guangxi Daily, Mar. 24, 2004. 
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Institute at GASS, called on the provincial government to institutionalize a multi-layer cooperation 
mechanism with Vietnam from the provincial all the way down to the county level to regulate and 
facilitate border trade.1209  
Notably, the provincial leadership in Guangxi seemed to be uniquely positioned to lobby the 
central government for the province’s sub-regional economic cooperation agenda. During the first 
decade of the 21st century, Guangxi was able to make full use of officials from the central 
government’s ministries in Beijing who were taking temporary posts (挂职) in Guangxi to promote 
its economic cooperation initiatives with Southeast Asia. Some officials, especially those from the 
Ministry of Commerce who were sent to Guangxi to take temporary posts, “helped Guangxi 
enormously in lobbying the central government.”1210  A case in point is Vice Governor Gao 
Hucheng, who was promoted to China’s Commerce Minister in 2013. Before being posted to 
Guangxi, Gao had worked at MOFCOM as an assistant to Wu Yi – then Minister of Commerce 
who later became be China’s vice premier. Moreover, Liu Qibao, then Guangxi’s party chief and 
a close ally of Hu Jintao, reportedly had “played an important role in winning support from the 
central government for various policy proposals put forth by the local government.”1211 
As one of the Chinese coastal provinces (along with Hainan and Guangdong) of the South 
China Sea, Guangxi’s economic interests seem to have translated into its ostensible silence on the 
South China Sea disputes. A comparison of the three provinces’ official newspapers shows that 
Guangxi has given extremely limited coverage on the South China Sea disputes since early 2000s 
(Figure 7.2). Meanwhile, Guangxi has been a staunch provincial supporter for a cordial and 
 
1209 Nong, “Accelerate establishment of Guangxi-Vietnam border cooperation mechanism.” 
1210 Mingjiang Li, “Local Liberalism: China’s provincial approach to relations with Southeast Asia,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol. 23, no. 86, 2014, p. 288. 
1211 Ibid. 
- 347 - 
 
cooperative relationship not only with Vietnam (Figure 7.3) but also with other claimant states 
such as the Philippines (Figure 7.4). A South China Sea expert in Hainan stated it plainly,  
Guangxi has considerable cooperation with Vietnam, and for most of the time has 
avoided openly stating its own position on the South China Sea issue. Hainan, in 
contrast, is charged with the task of administering the South China Sea and thus 
definitely has a different tone [than Guangxi] on the disputes. This [discrepancy] is 
not necessarily an intentional ‘good cop, bad cop’ arrangement [by the central 
government] but is driven by the fact that the two provinces do have quite divergent 
interests.1212  
A former Chinese military attaché to Vietnam characterized Guangxi – contrasting Hainan – as 
“the positive energy in Sino-Vietnamese relations.”1213 Advocating for a good Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship without appearing to compromise on sovereignty issues, Guangxi has strategically 
framed its economy-centered agenda in conformity with Beijing’s good neighborly diplomacy, 
west development strategy, as well as the unrolling China-ASEAN FTA.  
Likewise, Yunnan had also actively lobbied for expanding economic integration and 
infrastructure connectivity with Southeast Asia under the banners of west development and China-
ASEAN FTA.1214 As an inland province, Yunnan has remained almost completely silent on the 
South China Sea controversies.1215 
On the other hand, compromise-averse voices calling for consolidating China’s control over 
and development of the disputed territories in the South China Sea appeared to often fall on deaf 
ears in Beijing during this period. In Hainan, a local push for incorporating the Paracels, Spratlys 
and Macclesfield into a single administrative entity emerged in the 1990s. In 1992, Xu Tianren,  
 
1212 Author’s interview, Haikou, April 2019. 
1213 Author’s interview, Haikou, April 2019. 
1214 For a detailed account on Yunnan, see, for example, Li, “Local Liberalism,” pp. 276-287. 
1215 I did two separate searches, one by theme and the other by full-text, within Yunnan’s provincial official newspaper, 
Yunnan Daily, in CNKI core newspaper data. I read each search result to determine whether a news article is pertaining 
to the South China Sea disputes. 
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the Party Secretary of the “Xisha, Nansha, and Zhongsha Islands Administrative Office” on 
Woody Island, submitted a proposal to the State Council and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, calling 
for the establishment of local administrative and law enforcement authorities over the archipelagos 
as a way to consolidate China’s sovereignty claims. But at the time Xu was told by “a leader at the 
foreign ministry” to “put it on hold for a while” (缓一缓).1216 Hainan did not cease its push 
thereafter. A 2000 report on Hainan’s development strategy upon China’s accession to WTO by 
the China Institute for Reform and Development (CIRD), a think tank affiliated with the Hainan 
provincial authorities, argued for the establishment of a prefectural-level Sansha city with the local 
government located on Woody Island.1217 In 2004 when speaking at a seminar on the South China 
Sea, Zhu Huayou, then Deputy Director of Hainan’s South China Sea Research Center who later 
was promoted to head the policy research bureau under the provincial government,1218 said,  
Hainan Province since its foundation has done a great amount of work to establish 
on the Yongxing Island a prefectural - or county-level administrative unit 
encompassing Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha. Now conditions to establish such a 
‘Qiongsha’ City are ripe. A local administrative unit in the South China Sea can 
fully demonstrate China’s sovereignty and strengthen China’s position in the 
struggle for rights and interests there.1219  
 
1216 Liu Jun [刘俊] and Yao Xuepeng [姚学鹏], “Birth of Sansha City” [三沙市诞生记], Southern Weekly, Jun. 29, 
2012. 
1217 “Use industrial opening to drive industrial upgrade, materialize a sustainable fast growth of Hainan’s economy –
Hainan’s economic development strategy against backdrop of China’s WTO accession” [以产业开放拉动产业升级，
实现海南经济持续快速增长——中国加入 WTO 背景下的海南经济发展战略], July 2000, in Research and 
Recommendations on Hainan’s Reform and Development – Aspirations and Explorations [策划天涯——立足海南
的追求和探索] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2008), China (Hainan) Institute for Reform and Development [中国
（海南）改革发展研究院], p. 240. 
1218 Hainan’s South China Sea Research Center was renamed the National Institute for South China Sea Studies 
(NISCSS) in July 2004, which is headed by Dr. Wu Shicun. 
1219 Zhu Youhua [朱华友], “Marching toward the blue: Hainan’s hope and options for a way out” [走向蔚蓝色：海
南希望与出路的选择], in Hainan South China Sea Research Center [海南南海研究中心], Papers of the South China 
Sea Resources and Cross-Strait Cooperation Seminar [南海资源与两岸合作研讨会论文集], 2004, internal material, 
p. 210. 
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As will be detailed later in this chapter, whereas the Sansha City was an outgrowth of the 
Hainan-backed Qiongsha/Sansha proposal, until 2012, Beijing had taken pains to rein in Hainan’s 
push. An extremely knowledgeable Chinese academic source close to the decision-making process 
during the Hu Jintao era put it plainly in private communication, “Relations with ASEAN has long 
been held dear to the heart of the Chinese leadership, and for this reason, [after the 1995 Mischief 
Reef incident] heavy- handed policies on the South China Sea were often jettisoned by Beijing. 
Hardliners such as some local officials in Hainan were quite dissatisfied with that.”1220  
Advocates within the PLA calling for stepping up development activity in the South China Sea 
were also given a cold shoulder by Beijing at the time. In March 2004, during the annual National 
People’s Congress (NPC) session, Wu Shengli, then commander of the PLA Navy’s South Sea 
fleet and later the Commander of the PLA Navy from 2006 to 2017, called for accelerating 
infrastructure construction on the Spratlys to facilitate tourism and marine resources exploration. 
Speaking at a panel jointly presided by Guo Boxiong, then Vice Chair of the CMC, and Xu Caihou, 
then head of the PLA’s General Political Department and later CMC Vice Chair, Wu argued that 
rapid development of the disputed islands would help protect China’s national interests.1221 The 
policy agenda Wu advocated did not receive a greenlight from Beijing at the time. The PLA Daily’s 
coverage on this discussion censored all the references to the Spratlys and the South China Sea in 
Wu’s remarks,1222 suggesting Beijing’s concerns about the potential ramifications such remarks 
might generate for China’s diplomacy toward its Southeast Asian neighbors. 
 
1220 Author’s interview, Beijing, March 2019. 
1221 Wang Xiangwei, “Admiral wants Spratly islands developed faster; National interests need protecting, southern 
fleet chief says,” South China Morning Post, Mar. 9, 2004. 
1222 Ibid. 
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Apart from Hainan and the PLA, the Fisheries Enforcement Bureau is another longtime 
staunch supporter for consolidating China’s control and administration of the South China Sea.1223 
Contrasting its low-key presence in the East China Sea and being a newcomer to the Sino-Japanese 
disputes, the FLE has long been actively involved on the forefront of the South China Sea disputes. 
In April 1994, a FLE vessel was dispatched to conduct China’s first fishery enforcement patrol in 
the Spratlys.1224 In December, the bureau landed on Mischief Reef to start constructing outposts 
and has since stationed fishery enforcement personnel on the land feature.1225 In the early 2000s, 
the FLE in general was not as explicit or specific as Hainan or the PLA in pushing for policy 
agendas with respect to the South China Sea. Narrow institutional functions and interests might be 
one contributing factor. Another probable and perhaps more important reason was that the whole 
FLE at the time was swamped with new tasks, including implementing China’s bilateral fishery 
agreements in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, preparing for the implementation of the Sino-
Vietnamese fishery agreement in the Tokin Gulf, settling Chinese fishermen forced out of 
production as a result of these agreements, institutionalizing fisheries enforcement patrols in 
China’s EEZ after the EEZ and Continental Shelf Law came into effect in 1998, and training 
personnel and upgrading the fleet correspondingly.1226 While continuing regular patrols to the 
Paracels and Spratlys, the FLE South China Sea bureau began to stage a PR campaign to showcase 
the significance of maintaining a robust Chinese presence in the contested areas through fishing 
activity. Officials from other line agencies and the media were sometimes invited to ride with the 
 
1223 Yi Shi [伊始], Yao Zhongcai [姚中才] and Chen Zhen’guo [陈贞国], South China Sea! South China Sea! [南海! 
南海!] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2009), pp. 38-39. Chen Zhen’guo participated in 1994 December 
Chinese fishery enforcement voyage to Mischief Reef and was the secretary of the Communist Youth League at the 
FLE South China Sea Bureau when the book was published. 
1224 Yi, et al., “South China Sea!” p. 40; Zhang Liangfu [张良福], Cruise in the South China Sea – Days of Patrolling 
the Spratly [南海万里行——在南沙群岛巡航的日子] (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe, 2006), pp. 21-22. 
1225 Yi, et al., “South China Sea!”, pp. 33-66. 
1226 China Fisheries Yearbook 2000, p. 21; China Fisheries Yearbook 2001, p. 21; China Fisheries Yearbook 2002, p. 
9; China Fisheries Yearbook 2003, p. 133; China Fisheries Yearbook 2004, p. 132. 
- 354 - 
 
patrol ships and visit the Paracels and Spratlys.1227 Documentaries were produced to highlight the 
FLE’s role in safeguarding China-controlled land features and protecting fishing activities in the 
region.1228  
High International Costs: Reconciling with Vietnam and Relations with ASEAN Looming Large 
Whereas China faced low audience costs at home due to the relatively weak compromise-averse 
coalition on the South China Sea disputes, on the international end, Beijing seemed to calculate 
that it would face potentially high costs in the event of a forceful response to Vietnam’s act in the 
Spratlys. The cost came from both the bilateral dimension of Sino-Vietnamese relations and from 
the multilateral dimension, especially from the ASEAN front. 
In the bilateral dimension, China’s priority at the time was to finalize the Sino-Vietnamese 
maritime boundary settlement and fishery agreement in the Tonkin Gulf as well as to continue the 
post-Cold War bilateral reconciliation. Discussions of past conflict had been suppressed following 
a 1993 agreement between Beijing and Hanoi.1229 When Vietnam launched the cruise tour to the 
Spratlys and began rebuilding infrastructure on its occupied land feature in 2004, the two countries 
were about to ratifying the delimitation agreement and the fishery agreement, both of which were 
concluded after rounds of tough negotiation. At the time the ratification of the agreements was 
only awaiting the completion of a supplementary protocol to the fishery agreement.1230 Beijing 
attached great significance to the success of the agreements that would culminate in China’s first 
settlement to its contested maritime boundaries. The Chinese leadership perceived such a 
settlement not only as a key step in stabilizing the situation in the Tonkin Gulf and improving the 
 
1227 China Fisheries Yearbook 2003, p. 141; China Fisheries Yearbook 2005, p. 143. 
1228 China Fisheries Yearbook 2003, p. 141. 
1229 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, p. 217. 
1230 Ian Storey, “Trouble and Strife in the South China Sea: Vietnam and China,” China Brief, vol. 8, issue 8, Apr. 16, 
2008. 
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Sino-Vietnamese relationship, but also an illustration of China’s sincerity in peacefully settling 
maritime boundaries through negotiation, a major achievement of trust building with ASEAN, and 
a positive precedent for future negotiation.1231  
In the multilateral context, Beijing was highly sensitive during this period to the potential 
spillover effects of Sino-Vietnamese frictions over the South China Sea on China’s relations with 
other claimants and non-claimant ASEAN countries. Various Chinese government think tanks 
cautioned about the potential costs on China in the event of a Sino-Vietnamese conflict over the 
Spratlys. A 2002 internal report published by SOA’s China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA) 
noted,  
Vietnam has a major impact on the maritime situation in Southeast Asia. China’s 
struggle with Vietnam on the Nansha Islands will spill over to our maritime disputes 
with other Southeast Asian countries. Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Brunei, among others, have been strengthening and improving 
their military powers…Although these [military] powers are minor, the combat 
capabilities they generate in local sea areas cannot be neglected. Particular 
attention should be paid to the [potential] problem of regional political and 
military alliances…This would have ostensibly adverse impacts on China’s future 
struggle over the South China Sea. It is entirely possible that a broad trend of 
‘economic competition, political antagonism, and military confrontation’ will 
emerge.1232 
A 2002 CICIR task force report on China’s policy toward ASEAN similarly suggested, “To 
properly manage some sensitive problems and relations, China needs to first step up consultation 
 
1231 “Make Chinese-Vietnamese maritime boundary a tie of peace, friendship and cooperation: Wang Yi discusses 
China-Vietnam Beibuwan Delimitation agreement and fishery agreement taking effect” [让中越海上边界成为和平
友好与合作的纽带——王毅就中越北部湾划界协定和渔业合作协定生效答记者问], People’s Daily, Jul. 1, 2004; 
Nong Lifu [农立夫] and Gu Xiaosong [古小松], 2005 Annual Report of Vietnam’s Conditions [2005 年越南国情报
告] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2005), pp. 60-61; NISCSS, 2004 Assessment Report on the Situation 
in the South China Sea [2004 年南海形势评估报告], 2005, internal material, p. 10. 
1232 CIMA, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, p. 391. Emphasis added. 
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and negotiation with ASEAN on maritime disputes…While clearly objecting to infringement on 
China’s maritime rights and interests, China should also be careful to maintain stability in the 
South China Sea.”1233 Likewise, the 2004 CASS bluebook on Asia Pacific region highlighted the 
strong potential for spillover effects in the South China Sea disputes, “The Spratly dispute is not 
just a problem between China and Vietnam. More broader considerations need to be given to 
China’s conflict with other claimants, littoral countries of the South China Sea, and countries 
outside the region.”1234  
Notably, when Vietnam’s Spratly tourism voyage and airport revamping took place, the timing 
was critical in Beijing’s efforts to reassure and engage Manila. The Philippines had long harbored 
deep suspicions of China’s intension since the Mischief Reef incident. From early 2000s, Beijing 
began to actively reach out to Manila in seeking a bilateral reconciliation.1235 Following Philippine 
Presidents Joseph Estrada and Gloria Arroyo-Macapagal’s state visits to China in 2000 and 2001, 
respectively, the two countries quickly moved closer. Since early 2002, Beijing and Manila had 
been in quiet discussions on the prospect of jointly developing the South China Sea. In November 
2003, while still working on specifics of an official agreement, Philippine’s national oil company 
PNOC announced the decision to pursue joint development in the South China Sea with CNOOC 
after the latter’s Chairman Fu Chengyu flew to Manila to nail down the deal.1236 Therefore, with 
the hope of producing a joint development agreement with the Philippines running high, and 
perhaps aware of the cautious tone in Manila’s response to Vietnam’s Spratly tour, Beijing might 
 
1233 CICIR ASEAN Task Force [中国现代国际关系研究所东盟课题组], “Research report on China’s policy toward 
ASEAN” [中国对东盟政策研究报告], Contemporary International Relations [现代国际关系], issue 10, 2002, p. 
10. 
1234 Lan, “Vietnam’s actions on the Nansha issue over the recent years.” 
1235 Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, and Eric Heginbotham, et al., Pacific Currents: The Reponses of U.S. Allies and 
Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 100. 
1236 Chen Ting [陈挺], “China and the Philippine to sign a pact on jointly develop South China Sea” [中菲开发南中
国海协议签署], 21st Century Business Herald [21 世纪经济报道], Nov. 13, 2003. 
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be reluctant to escalate the frictions with Vietnam out of the concern that a heavy-handed approach 
might reignite suspicions in the Philippines and adversely impact the deal under negotiation. Like 
the Sino-Vietnamese settlement in the Tonkin Gulf, Beijing attached great importance to the 
successful conclusion of the joint development agreement, which would represent not only a 
breakthrough in China-Philippine relations but also a significant development that set a precedent 
of cooperation for other claimants in the region. As noted by Zhang Xizhen, an expert on China-
ASEAN relations at Peking University, after the official agreement was signed in September 2004 
during Arroyo’s visit to Beijing, “China has always talked about joint development…this is a 
start.”1237 
Another third-party state in the South China Sea that Beijing had persistently strived to reassure 
was Malaysia. In general, Beijing had maintained a quite genial relationship with Kuala Lumpur. 
Unlike in the Sino-Vietnamese and China-Philippines relations, the disputes were hardly a 
flashpoint in the China-Malaysia relationship. Malaysia from 2002 replaced Singapore and became 
China’s largest trading partner in ASEAN and the seventh largest globally.1238 Moreover, what 
seemed of greater importance to China was the fact that despite being a claimant to the South 
China Sea, Malaysia had been arguably the most vocal party in countering the “China threat” 
perceptions in the region. In September 2003, Malaysia’s outgoing Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad stated, “We do not think that China would indulge in military adventures. There is 
therefore no reason for Southeast Asia to fear China’s military might.” Even though Mahathir 
 
1237 “Oil pact marks new approach to disputes by China,” Financial Times, Sept. 3, 2004. 
1238 Malaysia remained China’s trop trading partner in ASEAN until 2016 when replaced by Vietnam. Nie Dening [聂
德宁], “Progress and Prospects of Sino-Malaysia Bilateral Trade since the Full Implementation of the China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area” [中国-东盟自贸区全面实施以来中马贸易的进展与展望], Southeast Asian Affairs [南洋问题研
究] no. 4, 2011, general serial no. 148, pp.35-36; “China remains Malaysia’s largest trading partner for eight years in 
row” [中国连续 8 年成为马来西亚最大贸易伙伴], Xinhua, Feb. 15, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2017-
02/15/c_129480847.htm, accessed Apr. 5, 2019. 
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acknowledged that Southeast Asia “has the most to fear from China’s expansionism,” such fear, 
he emphasized, “is unnecessary” unless “China is provoked.”1239 On the other hand, China was 
aware of the negative impacts that its clash with other disputants could have on Malaysia’s threat 
perception and its South China Sea strategy. As observed by Zhang Mingliang, a historian at the 
Southeast Asia Research Institute of Ji’nan University in Guangzhou, the 1988 China-Vietnam 
naval skirmish “inevitably had impacts on Malaysia’s judgment about the situation in the South 
China Sea and its own relations with China.” As a result of the skirmish, Kuala Lumpur elevated 
the position of the Spratlys in its national defense planning from a secondary concern to a top 
priority.1240  
On the U.S. front, Washington’s outreach to Southeast Asia, while alarming to China, did not 
seem to present a major source of geopolitical costs at the time. Two factors contributed to this 
assessment. First, as detailed in Chapter 4, the overall U.S.-China relations were quite cordial as 
Beijing cooperated with Washington in fighting international terrorism and rolling back North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program and as Washington reciprocated by curbing the pro-
independence impulse in Taiwan. Second, after 9/11, Washington reached out to ASEAN with a 
nearly single-minded focus on security, treating Southeast Asia as the “second front” of America’s 
war on terrorism.1241 In the words of Michael Green, Washington’s Southeast Asia policy was 
indeed a “derivative” of the global war on terrorism.1242 Moreover, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
which gave rise to “a narrative dominated by counterterrorism and wars against Muslims,” only 
 
1239 “Malaysian leader: China not military threat, but Southeast Asia needs way to defuse conflicts,” Associated Press, 
Sept. 18, 2003. 
1240 Zhang Mingliang [张明亮], Breaking the Deadlock in the South China Sea – What Should China Do [超越僵局
——中国在南海的选择] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences Ltd., 2011), p. 272. 
1241 John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, issue 4, Jul/Aug 2002, pp. 60-74. 
1242 Green, By More Than Providence, p. 501. 
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further tarnished America’s standing in Southeast Asia which was home to a large Muslim 
population.1243 
Beijing De-escalated 
Presented with an audience cost trade-off calculation that apparently tilted toward the international 
end, Beijing responded to Vietnam’s cruise tour with a soft touch, refraining from taking 
countermeasures barring diplomatic rhetoric. Indeed, on May 20 Beijing rolled out the red carpet 
for Vietnam’s Prime Minister Phan Van Khai. Moreover, during his meeting with Khai, Premier 
Wen Jiabao proposed to elevate Sino-Vietnamese relations to a “higher level” by increasing senior-
level exchanges, deepening economic ties, enhancing local and people-to-people communication, 
and by “appropriately solving outstanding problems in the bilateral relations.”1244 Hu Jintao took 
a similar conciliatory tone. Underscoring the ideological comraderies, Hu told Khai that both 
countries’ reform and economic development would benefit from strengthened “Sino-Vietnamese 
all-rounded friendly cooperation.”1245 Khai proposed that the two countries launch an economic 
cooperation initiative which he titled “two corridors, one circle.” One corridor would connect 
China’s Yunnan from Kunming to Vietnam’s Quang Ninh; the other would link China’s Guangxi 
from Nanning to Vietnam’s Hai Phong. The circle referred to the Tonkin Gulf economic rim (Table 
7.1).1246  China agreed to the proposal and put Guangxi in the leading role of the initiative, 
especially the Tonkin Gulf rim economic cooperation. In June, both Chinese and Vietnamese 
legislative branches ratified the delimitation and fishery agreements.  
 
1243 Ibid., p. 501. 
1244 “Wen Jiabao holds talks with Vietnamese Prime Minister, both sides exchange opinions regarding China-Vietnam 
relations and issues of common concerns” [温家宝同越南总理举行会谈，双方就中越关系和共同关心的问题深
入交换意见], People’s Daily, May 21, 2004. 
1245 “Hu Jintao meets Vietnam’s Prime Minister Phan Van Khai” [胡锦涛会见越南总理潘文凯], People’s Daily, 
May 22, 2004. 
1246  “What is ‘two corridors, one circle’” [ 何 谓 “ 两 廊 一 圈 “], Takungpao, Aug.23, 2017, 
http://www.takungpao.com.hk/finance/text/2017/0823/107248.html, accessed Oct. 27, 2019. 
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Reciprocating Beijing’s de-escalation, Hanoi denied in August that its state-run airline was 
planning to open a new tourism air route to the Spratlys by early 2005.1247 An annual assessment 
on China’s international security environment published by CICIR suggested that Vietnam also 
halted tourism voyages to the Spratlys, a likely result of China’s dissuasion and pressuring.1248  
In early October, Chinese Premiere Wen Jiabao made his first official visit to Hanoi to further 
boost high-level exchanges.1249 The swift de-escalation and undisrupted high-level exchanges 
notwithstanding, the bilateral relationship soon stumbled again as competition for hydrocarbon 
and marine resources in the region intensified. On the heels of Wen’ visit, Vietnam announced the 
opening of nine blocks in the South China Sea for international bidding for oil and gas exploration. 
China protested and returned in kind by deploying an oil drilling platform to an area 67 nautical 
miles off the coast of Hainan and 63 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam.1250 Before long, 
another local incident took place in January 2005, this time in the newly demarcated Tonkin Gulf.  
THE 2005 FATAL SHOOTING IN THE TONKIN GULF 
The Sino-Vietnamese fishery agreement in the Tonkin Gulf, effective from June 30, 2004, was no 
panacea to eliminate fishing disputes in this area, especially in waters adjacent to the newly 
delimited boundary. According to a Wikileaks-disclosed confidential cable sent from the U.S. 
Embassy in Hanoi to Washington on January 28, 2005, low-intensity frictions at sea between 
Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen in the Tonkin Gulf had been on the rise since the summer 
 
1247 “Vietnam denies plans to fly to disputed Spratly Islands,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 26, 2004; “Vietnam Airlines 
plans flights to disputed Spratly Islands,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 20, 2004. 
1248 Dao Shulin [刀书林] and Zhai Kun [翟崑], “Security situation in East Asia” [东亚安全形势], in Lu Zhongwei 
[陆忠伟] ed., Strategic and Security Review 2004/2005 [国际战略与安全形势评估], (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 
2005), p. 234. 
1249 Ray Cheung, “Wen aims to build up trust with Hanoi visit; Sovereignty disputes take second place to trade and 
diplomacy, say analysts,” South China Morning Post, Oct. 4, 2004. 
1250 “Vietnam to go forward with oil and gas exploration near disputed Spratly Islands,” Associated Press, Oct. 21, 
2004; “Vietnam asks China not to drill for oil in disputed area,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Nov. 20, 2004. 
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2004.1251 Data from China’s official publication appears consistent with the account in the U.S. 
cable. According to the fishery yearbook published by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, from 
January through June in 2004, the FLE South China Sea Bureau had deployed 22 law enforcement 
vessels for fishing protection operations; the figure climbed to 33 from July through December.1252 
A likely cause of the surge in frictions is that a bilateral response and coordination mechanism was 
still in development at the time – Chinese and Vietnamese authorities did not launch joint patrols 
until in April 2006.  
On January 8, 2005, a fatal encounter between the Chinese Maritime Police (under the MPS) 
and Vietnamese fishermen took place in the Tokin Gulf roughly halfway between Hainan and 
Vietnam’s port city Hai Phong, leaving nine Vietnamese dead and eight arrested by Chinese 
authorities. This incident is unusual both in its level of violence and fatalities. As a Vietnamese 
scholar noted, “Not since 1988…had such bloodshed occurred.”1253 It is also one of the rare fatal 
cases confirmed by both governments. Various Chinese interlocutors pointed to this incident in 
private communication as having significant chilling effects on Chinese MLE officials especially 
with respect to the use of lethal weapons in operations. However, very limited information on this 
incident is available in Chinese-language open sources. 
The CMP became systematically involved in fishery enforcement activities in the Tokin Gulf 
after the Sino-Vietnamese fishery agreement took effect. China created a cross-agency 
collaborative mechanism, which was comprised of a coordination small group and a joint 
command, in order to coordinate fishing protection operations of its MLE and military forces in 
 
1251 Confidential Hanoi 000247 (Wikileaks Canonical ID: 05HANOI247_a), “Chinese missteps in Vietnam are a U.S. 
opportunity,” Jan. 28, 2005, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05HANOI247_a.html, accessed Apr. 5, 2019. 
1252 China Fisheries Yearbook 2005, p. 143. 
1253 Tuong Vu, “The Party v. the People: Anti-China Nationalism in Contemporary Vietnam,” Journal of Vietnamese 
Studies, vol. 9, no. 4, Fall 2014, p. 41. 
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the region. This mechanism put the FLE in charge, with the CMP and PLAN acting as supporting 
agencies.1254 
After the fatal shooting, Beijing claimed that the Vietnamese were pirates attempting to rob 
Chinese fishermen at gunpoint. According to the Chinese account, several Chinese fishing boats 
from Hainan were operating in waters on the Chinese side of the delimitation line when they were 
attacked and robbed by three “unknown armed” ships. The armed ships fired at the CMP vessels 
which responded to the fishing boats’ call for help. CMP then returned fire. The arrested attackers 
admitted that they were Vietnamese nationals. Beijing vowed to prosecute the detained 
Vietnamese nationals based on Chinese laws. 1255  Knowledgeable Chinese sources including 
former MLE and MFA officials, government-affiliated think tank analysts and scholars similarly 
noted in separate interviews that the involved Vietnamese nationals were civilian fishermen who 
bore arms.1256 
Hanoi denied Beijing’s allegation and insisted the Vietnamese were fishermen. On January 16, 
the Vietnamese foreign ministry lodged a protest with the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi. Meanwhile, 
Vietnamese authorities issued a statement, employing what the U.S. diplomatic cable described as 
“unusually harsh language” in criticizing China’s act in the encounter. 1257  The Vietnamese 
statement claimed the location of the incident was on the western side of the delimitation line in 
 
1254 Wu Zhuang [吴壮], “Strengthen law enforcement, surveillance and regulation, ensure smooth implementation of 
the fisheries agreement” [加大执法监管力度，确保协定顺利实施], China Fishery News [中国渔业报], Oct. 31, 
2005. 
1255 “MFA Spokesperson Kong Quan answers media’s questions regarding the armed robbery at sea in Beibu Gulf” 
[ 外 交 部 发 言 人 孔 泉 就 北 部 湾 海 上 武 装 抢 劫 案 件 答 记 者 问 ], MFA, Jan. 14, 2005, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceza/chn/fyrth/t179739.htm, accessed 10/28/2017 
1256 Author’s interviews, Shanghai, April 2019; Guangzhou, May, 2019; Beijing, May and June 2019. 
1257 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, “Statement on the Chinese ship attacking Vietnamese fishermen” [Về 
việc tàu Trung Quốc tấn công ngư dân Việt Nam: Yêu cầu Trung Quốc giải quyết mọi hậu quả], Jan. 16, 2005, 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns050117170913, accessed May 18, 2018; 
Confidential Hanoi 000247 (Wikileaks Canonical ID: 05HANOI247_a), “Chinese missteps in Vietnam are a U.S. 
opportunity.” 
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the common fishing area. Calling CMP’s act a violation of the delimitation agreement and the 
fishery agreement, Hanoi demanded Beijing conduct an investigation into the fatal shooting, 
severely punish the killers, release the detained Vietnamese nationals, and compensate for the 
losses of Vietnamese lives and property.1258  
It appears that Beijing took moves to de-escalate the situation. On January 23, representatives 
from Vietnam’s Consulate General in Guangzhou were allowed to visit the detained Vietnamese 
fishermen, who had been “treated well by the Chinese side.” Officials from both sides also 
discussed the incident, which at the time began to be portrayed as the result of the Vietnamese ship 
“straying into Chinese waters.”1259 Little precise information is available on China’s handling of 
the detained Vietnamese, but a former MFA official noted in private correspondence that a likely 
solution was a quiet deportation through land route.1260 Meanwhile, some Chinese interlocutors 
also noted that CMP officers who opened fire were subject to stern disciplinary actions (处分). 
The decision to punish the officers who were domestically perceived as properly performing their 
duty, according to these Chinese sources, had a profound chilling effect on the morale of China’s 
MLE forces. Law enforcement personnel have since tended to “passively enforce the law” and 
undiscerningly avoid the use of lethal weapons in operations.1261 
After the incident, Hanoi also proposed to use the Joint Committee on Fishery, established 
according to the fishery agreement, to stabilize the situation in the common fishing area. 1262 It 
 
1258 “China requested to deal with the consequences of the attack on Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese vessels,” 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Jan. 16, 2005, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns050120170205, 
accessed Apr. 2, 2019. 
1259 “Vietnamese diplomats visit fishermen detained in China,” Agence France Presse, Jan. 23, 2005. 
1260 WeChat correspondence, October 2019. 
1261 Author’s interviews, Shanghai, April 2019; Beijing, May, and June 2019. 
1262 “China requested to deal with the consequences of the attack on Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese vessels.”  
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took another year for both sides to fully institutionalize regular joint patrols and joint fishery law 
enforcement operations in the Tokin Gulf.1263 
THE 2007 SANSHA CITY PLAN 
Vietnam joined the China-Philippines Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in March 2005 
after vainly protesting over the accord.1264 The tripartite deal, however, did little to ameliorate the 
longtime Sino-Vietnamese rivalry for hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea,1265 where 
the reserves – although believed to be promising – were still unconfirmed in large part due to 
under-exploration and outstanding maritime disputes.1266  
Beijing and Hanoi locked horns in April 2007 upon the revelation of a joint project by 
Vietnam’s NOC PetroVietnam, British Petroleum (BP), and Conoco Phillips (CP) to explore two 
blocks west to the Vanguard Bank and build a gas pipeline in the area.1267 Calling Vietnam’s move 
“illegal and invalid,”1268 Beijing exerted pressures on BP and CP to cease operation on the project, 
warning the IOCs that they would incur unspecified “economic consequences” if  they failed to 
 
1263 Jiang Huai [江淮], “Beibu Gulf: a gulf for Sino-Vietnamese cooperation” [北部湾: 中越合作之湾], World Affairs 
[世界知识], issue 24, 2006. 
1264 “Philippines defends joint study of Spratlys with China,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Sept. 10, 2004; “Chinese 
missteps in Vietnam are a U.S. opportunity.”  
1265 In 1994, naval warships and survey vessels from China and Vietnam confronted in the energy-rich Vanguard Bank 
near the Spratlys, which eventually led China to call off an exploration project with the U.S. oil company Crestone 
Energy in northern part of this area. Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters, Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°275, Jan. 26, 2016, p. 6; Zhang, Cruise in the South China Sea, pp. 257-268.;Philip Shenon, “China Sends 
Warships to Vietnam Oil Site,” New York Times, Jul. 21, 1994, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/21/world/china-
sends-warships-to-vietnam-oil-site.html, accessed Oct. 24, 2019. 
1266 The estimate by U.S. EIA puts the figures at 11 billion barrels of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas reserves in the South China Sea. These numbers represent both proved and probable reserves. “South China Sea,” 
last updated Feb. 7, 2013, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=SCS, accessed 
Oct. 24, 2019. 
1267 The blocks where the joint project was expected to take place included 05-2 and 05-3, both of which China 
considers part of the Vanguard Bank. “Conoco Phillips and BP concerns about projects in the South China Sea,” 
Wikileaks, Jun. 15, 2007 (Canonical ID: 07HANOI1119_a), 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HANOI1119_a.html, accessed May 5, 2019; Feng Xuetao [冯学涛], “Oil and 
Gas development makes Vietnam and Japan hold tighter to each other” [南海油气开发让越南与日本抱得更紧了], 
NISCSS, Aug. 18, 2018, http://www.nanhai.org.cn/review_c/297.html, accessed Oct. 23, 2019. 
1268 Cui Yin [崔寅], “MFA holds regular press conference” [外交部举行例行记者会], People’s Daily, Apr. 11, 2007. 
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comply – according to confidential cables from the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi later disclosed on 
Wikileaks.1269 Notably, the cables also noted that China had not employed pressures on IOCs 
partnering up with or bidding blocks from other disputant countries such as the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Malaysia for offshore E&P in disputed waters.1270  
The special importance that Beijing attached to the Vanguard Bank and China’s differentiated 
strategies towards other disputant countries’ E&P activities in the South China Sea is unmistakbly 
ellucidated in a 2002 internal study by CIMA,  
China should tailor its strategies according to the various levels of development in 
different areas of the Spratlys as well as according to relevant countries’ attitudes. 
In James Shoal-Sabah Basin, some countries have conducted E&P, but China has 
never protested…Vanguard Bank has sheer volumes of oil and gas 
resources…China must compete for this region by nudging and squeezing Vietnam 
to create a structure of interlocking blocks…China should also pay attention to 
exploration in the Reed Bank and pursue joint development there if extractable 
resources are discovered.1271  
The study also suggested blocking attempted joint development projects between Vietnam and 
multinational energy firms,  
For the time being, Vietnam is surveying the Vanguard Bank area and has already 
discovered commercial oil and gas resources…Since this is a disputed area, 
Vietnam cannot conduct joint development with other countries without the consent 
of the Chinese government.1272  
 
1269 “Conoco Phillips and BP concerns about projects in the South China Sea;” “Sino-Vietnam territorial dispute 
entangles multiple multinational energy firms,” Wikileaks, Sept. 7, 2007 (Canonical ID: 07HANOI1599_a), 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HANOI1599_a.html; “Foreign Ministry summons Ambassador to discuss Sino-
Vietnam South China Sea dispute,” Wikileaks (Canonical ID: 07HANOI1623_a), Sept. 11, 2007, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HANOI1623_a.html. All accessed on May 5, 2019. 
1270 “Sino-Vietnam territorial dispute entangles multiple multinational energy firms.” 
1271 CIMA, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, p. 152. 
1272 Ibid., pp. 260-261. 
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The policy line prescribed in this internal study, as will be elaborated in the following chapters, 
seems to explain in part the unusually high frequency of frictions at sea between China and 
Vietnam since 2010 over energy development in the South China Sea. 
In a move further flaring up the bilateral tensions, Vietnam incorporated the Spratlys (“Truong 
Sa islands” in Vietnamese) into an electoral district under the jurisdiction of Khanh Hoa Province 
during Vietnam’s National Assembly elections in May. According to reports in Vietnam’s state 
media, this election was “the first time voters of Truong Sa District cast their ballots in the local 
constituencies.”1273  
A major diplomatic row between Beijing and Hanoi was touched off in late November when 
Hong Kong media revealed that China was ready to elevate the “Xisha, Nansha, and Zhongsha 
Islands Administrative Office” to a county-level Sansha City which would incorporate and 
administer the Paracels, Spratlys and the Macclesfield. The Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao, 
citing the records of a party committee meeting posted on the website of Wenchang County in 
Hainan, reported that the Hainan-backed proposal had been approved by the Chinese State Council. 
The records also showed that Wenchang County would serve as Sansha’s onshore logistical 
support base. Ming Pao also reported that it had confirmed with Wenchang’s propaganda officials 
the authenticity of this record.1274 According to retrospective Chinese media accounts that emerged 
following the official launch of Sansha in 2012, the State Council did give a greenlight to Hainan’s 
proposal in 2007 primarily as a retaliation to Vietnam’s joint development scheme in the Spratlys 
 
1273  “Truong Sa heads to the poll early,” Viet Nam News, May 14, 2007, https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-
laws/164578/truong-sa-heads-to-the-polls-early.html#reru7PPeYjoDGlxY.97, accessed Oct. 24, 2019. 
1274 “Hainan plans to establish Sansha City in the South China Sea, covering an area roughly equal to a quarter of the 
country’s land territory” [海南籌建南海三沙市，面積接近全國陸地四分一], China Review News [中评社], Nov. 
20, 2007, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1004/9/5/6/100495698.html?coluid=45&kindid=0&docid=100495698, accessed 
Nov.22, 2017; Long Wu [龙武], “The establishment of Sansha City: now and future” [三沙设市的今生与来世], 
Takungpao [大公报], Aug. 7, 2012, http://www.takungpao.com/mainland/content/2012-08/07/content_894386.htm, 
accessed Nov. 22, 2017. 
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with BP and the inclusion of the Spratlys in the Vietnamese National Assembly elections.1275 
Aware of the political sensitivity of the city plan, the Wenchang County’s meeting records used a 
codename – “City X” – whenever referring to Sansha.1276 While Beijing did not explicitly confirm 
the news on Sansha,1277 the information was quickly picked up and reported also by the Hong 
Kong-based, Beijing-backed China Review News – a sign indicative of official acquiescence.  
Vietnam reacted ferociously to the Sansha news. On December 3, the Vietnamese Foreign 
Ministry’s spokesperson Le Dung stated that Hanoi’s objection to China’s establishment of Sansha 
to “administer three islands including Viet Nam’s Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos.” The 
Sansha plan was, said Le, “not in line with the common perception of high-ranking leaders of the 
two countries” and detrimental to “the bilateral negotiation process of seeking fundamental and 
long-term solutions to sea-related issues.”1278  
The news also sparked unprecedented anti-China protests in Vietnam. The first wave of 
protests erupted on December 9 as several hundred Vietnamese held hour-long rallies outside the 
Chinese embassy in Hanoi and the Chinese consulate in Ho Chi Minh City.1279 Amid suspicions 
that the protests were tolerated by Vietnamese authorities, Hanoi denied that the demonstrations 
were sanctioned and instead characterized them as “spontaneous actions taken without permission 
 
1275 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century: Economics in Command?” 
Asian Survey, vol. 51, no. 2 (March/April 2011), p. 390; Liu and Yao, “Birth of Sansha City;” “After Chinese State 
Council approved Sansha City in November 2007…” [中国国务院于 2007 年 11 月批准设立三沙市之后……] Asia 
Weekly [ 亚 洲 周 刊 ], Dec. 17, 2007, issue 50, reprinted on nansha.org [ 南 沙 群 岛 在 线 ], 
https://www.nansha.org/index.php/forum/9/1831, accessed on Mar. 15, 2019. 
1276 “Hainan plans to establish Sansha City in the South China Sea.” 
1277 Storey, “Trouble and Strife in the South China Sea: Vietnam and China.” 
1278 “Vietnam objects to China’s establishment of San Sha city on the Hainan Island,” Vietnam Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Dec. 3, 2007, https://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns071204135539, accessed Oct. 22, 2019. 
1279  “Vietnamese rally outside China embassy over disputed islands,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 9, 2007; 
“Vietnamese hold rare demonstration to protest China’s attempt to control disputed islands,” Associated Press, Dec. 
9, 2007; “Rallies over archipelagos not sanctioned: Foreign Ministry,” Viet Nam News, Dec. 10, 2007, 
https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/171775/rallies-over-archipelagos-not-sanctioned-foreign-
ministry.html#7hHmFVVSQ8ozipCh.97, accessed Mar. 18, 2019. 
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by Vietnamese relevant agencies.”1280 On December 16, hundreds of Vietnamese staged a second 
wave of protests in in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.1281 
The Cost Trade-off: The International Costs Continued to Prevail 
As in 2004 and 2005, China in 2007 faced an audience cost trade-off dominated by the 
international end. Domestically, Beijing was unlikely to incur a strong backlash should it choose 
to de-escalate. The leadership consensus prioritizing the maintenance of peripheral stability 
remained clear and strong, the pro-cooperation interests prevailed over the compromise-averse 
coalition, and the general public was barely aware of the Sansha issue at the time.  
Internationally, considering the upcoming Olympic Games, pending renewal of the tripartite 
JMSU, and the prospering China-ASEAN economic cooperation initiatives, Beijing would likely 
incur substantial geopolitical costs should it choose to escalate the situation by ignoring Hanoi’s 
opposition and officially launching the Sansha city. 
Domestic Audience Costs Capped: Expanding Ties with ASEAN, Restricting Public Attention 
As of the occurrence of the Sansha episode, the Chinese leadership retained a clear consensus 
prioritizing stability in China’s external environment, as was reiterated and elaborated at the key 
domestic events – especially the Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs and the 17th Party 
Congress. The 2006 Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs called for adhering to the path 
of peaceful development to create “a peaceful and stable international environment, a good 
neighborly and friendly peripheral environment, an equal and mutually beneficial cooperative 
environment, mutually trusting and collaborative security environment, objective and friendly 
 
1280 “Vietnam’s policy of resolving all disputes in the Eastern Sea through peaceful negotiations,” Vietnam Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 10, 2007, https://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns071210134638, accessed Oct. 25, 
2019. 
1281 Roger Mitton, “Vietnam sees second weekend of anti-China protests,” Strait Times, Dec. 17, 2007; “Vietnamese 
stage second anti-China rally over disputed islands,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 16, 2007. 
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public opinion environment.”1282 Likewise, in his report at the Party Congress in October 2007, 
Hu Jintao reaffirmed China’s commitment to continue upholding a foreign policy of good 
neighborly diplomacy and engagement in regional cooperation.1283  
With respect to China-Vietnam relations specifically, the consensus of the Chinese leadership 
was also clear. During Hu Jintao’s first official visit to Vietnam in November 2005, the sixteen-
character principle and the “four-good” guideline articulated in the Jiang era were reiterated in full 
both in Hu’s speech at the Vietnamese National Assembly and in the joint statement issued at the 
end of the visit,1284 suggesting the continuity in Beijing’s policy line defining and managing the 
bilateral relationship.  
Below the top, the divergence of parochial interests was widening between the pro-cooperation 
and compromise-averse actors. On the one hand, Guangxi saw its own economic welfare anchor 
in the implementation of various sub-regional economic cooperation masterplans, to which 
maintaining a stable and positive Sino-Vietnamese relationship was a necessary condition. 
Building on the 2004 Vietnam-proposed “two corridors, one circle” initiative, Guangxi’s party 
chief Liu Qibao unveiled at the 2006 Beibu (Tokin) Gulf Rim Economic Cooperation Forum an 
ambitious master plan for expanding and institutionalizing sub-regional economic cooperation, 
branded as the “one axis, two wings” or the “M” strategy. This initiative included three 
components: the Nanning-Singapore Economic Corridor as the axis aiming for boosting China’s 
economic cooperation and connectivity with Southeast Asia on land (the “Mainland economic 
 
1282 Liu Weibing [刘卫兵], “Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs convenes in Beijing” [中央外事工作会议
在京举行], People’s Daily, Aug. 24, 2006. 
1283 “Bilingual full text of the 17th Party Congress report” [十七大报告全文英汉对照], China Daily, Oct. 26, 2007, 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/31/content_6220592.htm, accessed Oct. 28, 2019. 
1284 “Hu Jintao’s speech at Vietnam’s National Assembly (full text)” [胡锦涛在越南国会的演讲（全文）], Xinhua, 
Nov. 1, 2005, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/3819943.html, accessed Oct. 29, 2019; “China and Vietnam 
issue ‘China-Vietnam Joint Statement’” [ 中 越 发 表 《 中 越 联 合 声 明 》 ], Xinhua, Nov. 2, 25, 
http://vn.chineseembassy.org/chn/zt/sbzywj/t918235.htm, accessed Oct. 29, 2019. 
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cooperation”); the Pan Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation Zone as one wing aiming to 
economically integrate China’s southern region with the maritime ASEAN countries through 
seaborne transport and trade (the “Marine economic cooperation”); and the Mekong sub-regional 
cooperation as the other wing (Table 7.1).1285 In light of the China-ASEAN FTA slated for launch 
in 2010, these sub-regional cooperation initiatives, argued researchers at the Guangxi Academy of 
Social Sciences, would not only facilitate the flows of capital and trade, but would also function 
as building blocks towards a fully institutionalized China-ASEAN FTA.1286 These initiatives, with 
Guangxi in the driver seat, also presented attractive opportunities to neighboring locales including 
Yunnan, the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong, and arguably even Hainan. 
Guangxi’s formulation of the master plan, which adroitly combined Beijing’s domestic agenda 
for west development and foreign policy agenda for good neighborly diplomacy, convinced the 
central government. The “Guideline for West Development during the 11th Five-Year Plan Period” 
released by the State Council in March 2007 listed the Pan Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation 
Zone as one of the three prioritized economic zones to be developed.1287 In July, the People’s Daily 
gave an extensive coverage on the “Pan Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation Forum” in Nanning. 
Both implied that Beijing not only endorsed Guangxi’s policy agenda but indeed elevated it to a 
national strategy. 
 
1285 Liu Qibao [刘奇葆], “Advance Pan Beibu Gulf development, collaboratively building a new structure for regional 
economic development” [推动泛北部湾开发合作 构建区域经济发展新格局], People’s Daily, Ju. 21, 2006. 
1286 “‘One axis, two wings:’ building a bigger platform for regional cooperation” [“一轴两翼”: 构筑区域合作大平
台], Regional Development Institute of Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences [广西社会科学院区域发展研究所], 
Guangxi Daily, Dec. 26, 2006. 
1287 Guo Chunyuan [郭春原], “‘Guideline for West Development during the 11th Five-Year Plan period’ released” 
[《西部大开发“十一五“规划》发布], People’s Daily, Mar. 4, 2007; “Guideline for West Development during the 
11th Five-Year Plan period” [西部大开发 “十一五” 规划], National Development and Reform Commission [国家发
展和改革委员会] and State Council West Development Leading Small Group Office [国务院西部地区开发领导小
组 办 公 室 ], December 2006, 
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/fzgh/ghwb/gjjgh/200709/P020150630514150488919.pdf, accessed Oct. 27, 2019. 
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As Guangxi’s stake in a stable Sino-Vietnamese relationship continued to grow, the province 
appeared to become more explicit in its advocacy for a conciliatory policy line on the South China 
Sea disputes. Based on a review of the bilateral interstate relations and Guangxi’s relations with 
Vietnam in 2007, the 2008 annual report on Vietnam released by GASS stated: “The South China 
Sea is a major barrier in the improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Given the current situation 
in Sino-Vietnamese relations, both sides should reinforce their commitment to ‘shelving the 
disputes, pursuing joint development.’”1288 
Hainan, by contrast, persisted in its advocacy for consolidating China’s control of the South 
China Sea. In a 2005 report, the Hainan-affiliated CIRD proposed to build a three-stage “strategic 
base” structure from Hainan outward during the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010) in order 
to effectively support China’s advancement into the South China Sea in the long run. According 
to this report, the “difficult part in developing the South China Sea is in the Nansha;” and to 
facilitate development in the Spratlys, the Hainan Island should be developed into a rear base and 
the Paracels an intermediate one. As such, the “status and role” of both Hainan and the Paracels, 
as argued by the report, should be “elevated.”1289 In March 2007, the Hainan delegation to the NPC 
and CPPCC sessions proposed a long list of policies aiming for boosting Hainan’s marine economy. 
To help Hainan build a robust “blue economy,” the delegation argued that the central government 
should elevate the administrative level of the Paracels, Spratlys and Macclesfield Bank, in addition 
to permitting tourism in the Paracels, building an oil and gas exploration base in Hainan, sharing 
 
1288 Gu Xiaosong [古小松], Liu Jianwen [刘建文] and Nong Lifu [农立夫], 2008 Annual Report of Vietnam’s 
Conditions [2008 年越南国情报告] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008), p. 67. 
1289  “Plan for developing the South China Sea and constructing Hainan strategic base – (eighteen) policy 
recommendations for China’s 11th Five-Year Plan” [南海开发计划与海南战略基地建设——对我国 “十一五” 规
划的建议 (18 条)], February 2005, in Research and Recommendations on Hainan’s Reform and Development, pp. 
155-165. 
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revenues from energy development with Hainan, and authorizing Hainan to conduct independent 
and collaborative E&P in the South China Sea.1290  
The FLE South China Sea Bureau backed Hainan’s push for Sansha/Qiongsha, arguing for 
establishing Sansha/Qiongsha on the basis of strengthening the agency’s enforcement capabilities 
against illegal foreign fishing activities in Chinese waters. For instance, a political commissar at 
the FLE South China Sea bureau noted in a 2005 work report that as the number of Vietnamese 
fishermen caught illegally fishing in Chinese waters grew, the deportation procedure would impose 
an increasingly heavy burden on the fishery enforcement agency. As a result, the overwhelmed 
Chinese FLE personnel had to simply expel the Vietnamese fishermen after detaining them. The 
report argued that this “bottleneck” could be eliminated by establishing Sansha/Qiongsha, “If 
China has a city here, intruding into Chinese inner waters would be equivalent to invading China’s 
territory. Then China can indict them.” Beijing again decided to table this proposal to “avoid 
[triggering] escalatory spirals,” as noted by Li Guoqiang, then vice director of the Institute of 
Chinese Borderland Studies of CASS.1291 
Regardless, Hainan appeared to understand that without a significant deterioration in the South 
China Sea situation as a raison d'être, its advocated policy line might not get an upper hand in 
Beijing’s agenda. In August 2007, after Hanoi angrily reacted to a China Daily report that China 
would develop Hawaii-style tourist facilities on the Paracels, Beijing quickly suspended the 
tourism plan – until April 2012.1292 On Sansha, Hainan seemed also concede to the priority that 
 
1290 Tan Lilin [谭丽琳] and Huang Xiaohua [黄晓华], “A great marine province’s ‘blue’ dream” [海洋大省的 “蓝色” 
诉求], Hainan Daily, Mar. 6, 2007. 
1291 Liu and Yao, “Birth of Sansha City.” 
1292 Roger Mitton, “Vietnam blasts China’s plan for Paracels; Hanoi accuses Beijing of violating its sovereignty with 
project for the disputed islands,” Strait Times, Aug. 18, 2007; “Hainan initiates controversial trial tourism voyage to 
the Paracels” [ 海 南 启 动 有 争 议 赴 西 沙 旅 游 试 航 ], BBC, Apr. 7, 2012, 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world/2012/04/120407_china_tourism_xisha, accessed Oct. 25, 2019. 
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Beijing placed on maintaining peripheral stability and on the success of the upcoming Olympic 
Games. The 2007 NISCSS annual report on the South China Sea situation, after reviewing the 
Sansha controversies, proposed to press on with the establishment of Sansha “after the Olympics” 
at “an appropriate time” and in a “low-profile fashion.”1293 
Although there had been extensive internal discussion on the Sansha/Qiongsha plan in the 
Chinese government, the general public was barely aware of the issue at the time, which in turn 
minimized the potential popular backlash and political costs on Beijing when the Chinese decision 
makers chose to back down. A search in the CNKI core newspaper database shows that prior to 
2012, the Sansha topic was given little if any domestic media coverage. Indeed, almost all the 
information about the Sansha issue during this episode was released through the Hong Kong media. 
For several reasons, the Hong Kong media represented a unique channel to put the trial balloon 
out. First, many Hong Kong media outlets are genuinely unofficial (such as Mingpao in this 
incident) or in some cases have a nonofficial cover (such as the China Review News). Meanwhile, 
quite a few of the Hong Kong media outlets were known by China observers for being “notoriously 
unreliable.”1294 The two conditions in combination allow for easy deniability by Beijing when 
necessary. Third, after the leak by local cadres in Wenchang, restricting the coverage on Sansha 
to Hong Kong media ensured a low level of publicity on the issue in mainland China, which in 
turn contained the potential popular backlash against Beijing.  
Knowledgeable Chinese interlocutors confirmed that after approval of Sansha, Beijing 
intended to put out some information as a trial balloon to “test the wind” (放风试探), but the way 
 
1293 NISCSS, 2007 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea [2007 年南海形势评估报告], 2008, 
internal material, p. 40. Emphasis added. 
1294 Michael Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Three: The Role of the Military of the Military in Foreign 
Policy,” China Leadership Monitor, issue 36, winter 2012. 
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the scheme was leaked by local authorities in Hainan was unexpected.1295 In other words, Beijing 
seemed to have a plan to gradually put out rumors about Sansha to test the reactions of other 
disputant countries. But what Beijing had in its plan might be critically different from how the 
information was actually given out by local cadres in Wenchang, probably in terms of timing (after 
rather than before the Olympics), amount (probably much less information than what Wenchang 
had disclosed) and/or specificity (more ambiguous and briefer rather than the detailed account 
Wenchang had provided).  
International Costs Remained High: Continuing Boundary Settlement, Renewing JMSU 
During the second half of the 2000s, Sino-Vietnamese relations gained as much new momentum 
in the economic dimension as in the political dimension. After the delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf 
was completed and the implementation of the fishery agreement institutionalized, Beijing and 
Hanoi started negotiating for joint development and delimitation in the area outside the mouth of 
Tonkin Gulf.1296 In a signal of Beijing’s intentions to further improve relations with Hanoi, Hu 
Jintao in his speech at Vietnam’s National Assembly went as far as invoking Ho Chi Minh’s 
description of the warm Sino-Vietnamese relationship in 1950s and 1960s as “comrades plus 
brothers,” an expression Jiang Zemin jettisoned when codifying the “four good” guideline in spite 
of Hanoi’s request to include the description.1297  
Getting more done deals with Vietnam might also be perceived by Beijing as useful to convince 
other rivaling claimants in the South China Sea to embark on similar talks. Following Hu Jintao’s 
2005 visit, the two sides established a joint working group dedicated to negotiation on delimiting 
 
1295 Author’s interviews, Shanghai, April 2019; Haikou, April 2019. 
1296 “China and Vietnam issued ‘China-Vietnam Joint Statement’” [中越发表《中越联合声明》全文], Xinhua, Nov. 
2, 2005, http://vn.chineseembassy.org/chn/zt/sbzywj/t918235.htm, accessed Nov. 1, 2019.  
1297 Alexaner L. Vuving, “Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China Policy: A Changing Mixture of Pathways,” 
Asian Survey, vol. 46, issue 6, 2006, p. 817.  
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the areas outside the mouth of the Tonkin Gulf. When the Sansha news broke out, they had 
conducted three rounds of talks and agreed on basic working procedures of the mechanism.1298 
Premier Wen Jiabao might not be exaggerating or merely paying lip service when he told visiting 
Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Tan Dung in Nanning in October 2006 that the relationship with 
Vietnam “is among China’s most important foreign relations.”1299 The political significance that 
Beijing attached to the bilateral relationship is also evidenced by Hu Jintao’s state visit to Vietnam 
in November 2006, just one year after his 2005 visit.  
In addition to Vietnam, Beijing was also concerned that a headlong move to declare the 
establishment of Sansha might generate ramifications on the Philippine front. The tripartite JMSU, 
which was about to expire in July 2008 and up for renewal, was in a shaky position at the time 
despite the initial praise it received for its significance as a precedent of cooperation among 
disputants in the contested waters. The Arroyo government staked much of its political capital on 
the JMSU and was worried that the Sino-Vietnamese tensions would rock the boat to the extent 
that President Arroyo urged Vietnam and China to continue their participation in the project in 
August 2007.1300 From late 2007, however, Manila itself faced domestic questioning about the 
JSMU after the media began to inquire about the exact location of the JMSU-covered area, which 
had remained confidential.1301  In early 2008, Philippine’s public backlash against the JMSU 
intensified after it was revealed that the designated zone of the tripartite deal, located off Palawan 
in the southern Philippines, included a substantial part of Philippine’s “legal continental shelf.” 
 
1298 MFA, China’s Foreign Affairs 2008, p. 267-268; China’s Foreign Affairs 2009, p. 309.; the fourth round of talk 
was about to take place in Beijing in January 2008. 
1299 Guan kejiang [管克江] and Yang Ou [杨讴], “Wen Jiabao meets with leaders of Myanmar, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos 
and Thailand” [温家宝会见缅甸文莱越南老挝泰国领导人], People’s Daily, Nov. 1, 2006. 
1300 “Arroyo urges Vietnam, China to continue seismic research in Spratlys,” Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 9, 2007; 
“Philippines urges countries to take ‘next step’ over disputed Spratlys,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 10, 2007. 
1301 Stirring up the South China Sea (IV), p. 19. 
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Importantly, this area was not claimed by either China or Vietnam, and as such, constituted “a sell-
out on the part of the Philippines.”1302 In March, the Philippine Senate launched an investigation 
into the JMSU.1303 In addition, Arroyo and her husband had been under a Senate investigation for 
allegations of corruption in Philippine’s $329 million deal with China’s ZTE Corp. In November 
2007, two impeachment complaints were filed against Arroyo over the ZTE project.1304  
Beijing was worried that the tide in the Philippines’ domestic politics in general would turn 
against China. In March, the Chinese Embassy in Manila released a statement which plainly stated: 
“China is worried about certain recently-emerged tendencies in the Philippines, which may have 
a negative impact on China-Philippine friendly relations and mutually-beneficial cooperation.” 
The JMSU, the statement claimed, was “conducive to maintenance of peace and stability in the 
South China Sea and the region at large.”1305 The timing of the statement suggests that Beijing had 
been closely following the Philippines’ domestic controversies surrounding the JMSU and might 
have concluded that to launch Sansha at that point would put another nail in the coffin of the JMSU 
while further undermining Arroyo’s domestic standing.1306 
On the Southeast Asia front, the region still stood as an international audience that Beijing 
perceived as needing to be reassured not only through aggressive promotion of greater economic 
integration, but also through more active engagement and accommodations in the security arena. 
 
1302 Barry Wain, “Manila’s Bungle in the South China Sea,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan/Feb 2008, pp.45-48. 
1303 Bernard U. Allauigan and Ira P. Pedrasa, “Senate to start new probe on Spratlys exploration,” Mar. 10, 2008. 
1304 The contract with ZTE to establish a national broadband network was allegedly overpriced by $130 million to 
fund kickbacks. Arroyo cancelled the deal in October 2007. “What Went Before: The NBN-ZTE deal,” Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, Dec, 30, 2011, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/119639/what-went-before-the-nbn-zte-deal-2; Manny 
Mogato, “Manila’s Arroyo described as ‘evil’ in graft probe,” Reuters, Feb. 18, 2008, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-scandal/manilas-arroyo-described-as-evil-in-graft-probe-
idUSMAN3603920080218. Both accessed Oct. 25, 2019; “SC junks 3 petitions vs ZTE deal, says govt cancelled it,” 
GMA, Jul. 14, 2008, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/106876/sc-junks-3-petitions-vs-zte-deal-says-
govt-cancelled-it/story/, accessed Oct. 25, 2019.  
1305 “China worried about tendencies in Philippines having negative influence on ties,” Xinhua, Mar. 12, 2008; “China 
concerned over Philippine Spratly controversy,” Agence France Presse, Mar. 13, 2008. 
1306 Bogged down in legal problems and political scandals, the Arroyo administration decided not to renew the JMSU. 
The agreement expired on July 1, 2008. 
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In June 2007, driven by the imperative to mitigate surging international concerns about China’s 
lack of military transparency, Beijing sent a high-level military delegation headed by Zhang 
Qinsheng, then Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff, to the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in 
Singapore for the first time.1307 The importance that Beijing attached to the Shangri-La Dialogue 
as a means of reassuring the region was made clear in a Xinhua report. As a “platform for 
communication on security and defense affairs,” according to the report, the Shangri-La Dialogue 
had “facilitated regional strategic dialogues and consultation” and attracted significant attention 
from a number of Asia-Pacific middle powers and small states. However, “in the past five years, 
due to the absence of participation by PLA senior officials, ‘China threat theory’ rhetoric has 
permeated the dialogue.” The Chinese military’s participation in the dialogue, the report concluded, 
would enable China not only to directly counter such suspicions and build confidence with 
countries in the region, but also “to gradually shape the dialogue to China’s advantage.”1308  
On the U.S. front, China watched warily as U.S. presence and influence in Southeast Asia 
bounced back – albeit to a limited extent – under Bush’s second term as Washington responded to 
criticism at home and abroad for neglecting the region.1309 While continuing to bypass ASEAN’s 
key multilateral mechanisms,1310 Washington took steps to patch up relations with the region. Most 
 
1307  “Defense budget true and authentic,” China Daily, Jun. 2, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-
06/02/content_885793.htm, accessed Nov. 2, 2019; “China’s defense diplomacy at Shangri-La Dialogue since 2007,” 
chinamil.com.cn, May 31, 2019, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-05/31/content_9519879.htm, accessed Nov. 
2, 2019. 
1308“China-U.S. military interactions attract attention” [中美两军互动引人瞩目], Xinua-International Herald Leader 
( 新 华 社 - 国 际 先 驱 导 报 ), Jun. 11, 2007, reprinted on People.com.cn, 
http://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/42962/5851094.html, accessed Nov.2, 2019.  
1309 See, for example, Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement after 
Years of Benign Neglect,” Asian Survey, vol. 47, issue 4, July/August 2007, pp. 622-641; Elizabeth Economy, 
“China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2005, 14 (44), 
August,  pp. 409-425.  
1310 Washington was absent from the East Asia Summit (EAS) because the participation of the summit requires the 
United States to sign and ratify TAC. The “non-interference in internal affairs” clause in TAC was considered by 
Washington as constraining U.S. freedom of action on Burma. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s absence from 
the 2006 ASEAN Regional Forum was perceived by the region as a sign of a lack of American interest in the region. 
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notably, the U.S. introduced the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership in late 2005, a 
“comprehensive agenda for political, security, and economic cooperation,” and signed the pact 
with ASEAN in July 2006.1311 In November 2006, the United States proposed a “Free Trade Area 
of the Pacific” (FTAAP) at the APEC meeting that would encompass all APEC members.1312 
These moves, in combination with the rapidly improving U.S.-Vietnam relationship, alarmed 
Chinese analysts. The NISCSS in its 2006 annual report raised the issue of the U.S. “return” to 
Southeast Asia and its geopolitical implications for China: 
Over recent years, U.S. influence in Southeast Asia has weakened in relative 
terms…Facing the danger of being marginalized…the U.S. has since strengthened 
its partnership with ASEAN in political, security, economic and social development 
dimensions…the U.S. ‘return’ to Southeast Asia is intended to safeguard America’s 
longtime strategic interests, including coping with the strategic competition in the 
region created by the ‘China factor.’ This would create strategic pressures on, as 
well as an encirclement of, China.1313  
When it comes to the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral front specifically, although Chinese analysts 
seemed confident that this relationship had intrinsic limitations because of the two countries’ 
rivaling ideologies and values,1314 Beijing paid close attention as the relations between Hanoi and 
Washington improved rapidly during this period. Most notably, Vietnam’s Premier Phan Van 
Khai’s historical trip to Washington in June 2005 marked the first visit to the United States by a 
 
Rice attended the forum in 2006, but the US remained a nonparticipant to the EAS for the rest of Bush’s tenure. Green, 
By More than Providence, pp. 512-513. 
1311 Green, By More than Providence, p. 501; “The ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership,” U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington D.C., Jul. 26, 2006, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2006/69569.htm, 
accessed No. 2, 2019. 
1312 Green, By More than Providence, p. 510. 
1313 NISCSS, 2006 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea [2006 年南海形势评估报告], 2007, 
internal material, pp. 8-9. 
1314 Liu Jianwen [刘建文], Nong Lifu [农立夫] and Gu Xiaosong [古小松], 2006 Annual Report of Vietnam’s 
Conditions [2006 年越南国情报告] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2006), pp. 60-61; Zhai Kun [翟崑], 
“Vietnam: between China and the US” [越南: 在中美之间], World Affairs, issue 14, 2005, pp. 28-29. 
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Vietnamese premier since the end of the Vietnam War. A diplomat at the Chinese General 
Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City wrote that Khai’s visit demonstrated that “striking progress” had 
been made in US-Vietnam relations.1315 The relationship saw more progress over the next couple 
of years. In 2006, Washington not only signed a bilateral agreement with Hanoi to clear the way 
for Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO),1316 but also removed Vietnam’s 
designation as a “country of particular concern” as a way of acknowledging the improvement in 
Vietnam’s religious freedom and human rights records in general.1317  
China Called off the Sansha Plan and Elevated Relations with Vietnam 
Presented with the prospect of potential international audience costs clearly exceeding domestic 
audience costs, Beijing tabled the city establishment plan, dodged references to the sensitive word 
“Sansha” in official statements, and even had Hainan clean up after itself. On December 11, 2007, 
when commenting on the anti-China demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Qin Gang made a moderate remark by saying that China had a 
clear understanding that Vietnam “has different claims in different historical periods” and called 
on Hanoi to “take effective measures to prevent the situation from further escalating and the 
bilateral relations from being damaged.”1318 A week later, when commenting on the second wave 
of anti-China protests in Vietnam, Qin made an even briefer response by simply stating that “there 
 
1315 Wang Longhu [王龙虎], “Remarkable Progress for U.S.-Vietnamese Relations” [美越关系进展令人瞩目], All-
round Southeast Asia [东南亚纵横], issue 8, 2005, pp. 1-4. 
1316 Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen and Gregory B. Polling, A New Era in U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Deepening Ties 
Two Decades after Normalization, a Report of the CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies, June 2014, p. 5; 
Mark E. Manyin, William Cooper and Bernard A. Gelb, Vietnam PNTR Status and WTO Accession: Issues and 
Implications for the United States, CRS report for Congress (RL 33490), updated Aug. 2, 2006, p. 1. 
1317 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Religious Freedom in Vietnam: Assessing the Country of 
Particular Concern Designation 10 Years After its Removal, February 2017, p. 1. 
1318 “December 11, 2007 MFA spokesperson Qin Gang holds regular press conference,” Dec. 11, 2007, transcript 
retrieved at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t388977.shtml, accessed Mar. 18, 2019. 
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is no change to China’s position.”1319 Qin’s comments on both occasions stopped short of an 
explicit confirmation or denial of whether Beijing had approved the establishment of Sansha. 
When referring to the controversies, Qin indeed dodged the word “Sansha.”1320 A People’s Daily 
article published on January 6, 2008 still referred to the local administrative agency in the South 
China Sea by its old name ““Xisha, Nansha, and Zhongsha Islands Administrative Office,”1321 
indicating there was no change to the administrative status of this body. As a Chinese interlocutor 
put it plainly, “At that time, maintaining good relations with Vietnam and more broadly with the 
surrounding areas was still a priority. So once the Vietnamese protested, China backpedaled [on 
the Sansha issue].”1322 
Local officials in Hainan simply denied or sidestepped questions of whether Sansha had been 
approved and existed. Wenchang County’s party boss, who detailed the Sansha plan at the party 
committee meeting, was subject to a corruption investigation on November 27 shortly after the 
Mingpao report came out and was removed from office in December.1323 While the corruption 
charges might be valid – Chinese official information later claimed that the investigation started 
well before the Sansha row – knowledgeable Chinese interlocutors noted in private that the Sansha 
issue played a role in precipitating the investigation. 1324  On December 19, a Wenchang 
 
1319 “December 18, 2007 MFA spokesperson Qin Gang holds regular press conference,” Dec. 18, 2007, transcript 
retrieved at http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/fyrth/t391082.htm, accessed Mar. 18, 2019. 
1320 Zhang, Breaking the Deadlock in the South China Sea, p. 95. 
1321 Fu Zaichou [符载畴], Jiang Shan [江山] and Luo Changai [罗昌爱], “Fishermen in the Paracels have a better and 
better life” [西沙渔民生活越来越好], People’s Daily, Jan. 6, 2008. 
1322 Author’s interview, Shanghai, April 2019. 
1323 “Former Wenchang city party boss Xie Mingzhong to be handed over to the judiciary branch” [文昌原市委书记
谢 明 中 将 被 移 送 司 法 机 关 ], the People’s Government of Hainan Province, Jan. 31, 2008, 
http://www.hainan.gov.cn/hn/zwgk/zfjs/yfxz/200801/t20080131_361942.html, accessed Oct. 26, 2019; “The whole 
story of former Wenchang party boss Xie Mingzhong falling from grace” [海南元文昌书记谢明中落马始末: 曾逼
走 两 个 市 长 ], Nanfeng Chuang [ 南 风 窗 ], Mar. 18, 2008, reprinted on ifeng.com, 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200803/0318_17_446676.shtml, accessed Oct. 26, 2019. 
1324 “Former Wenchang city party boss Xie Mingzhong to be handed over to the judiciary branch;” Author’s interviews, 
Shanghai, April 2019; Haikou, April 2019. 
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government representative denied that there had been a plan to set up Sansha. Another Hainan 
provincial government official claimed that the provincial government had not received any 
documents from Beijing regarding designating the archipelagos as a city.1325  
In an interview with Takungpao in March 2008, Wei Liucheng, then Hainan’s party chief, 
cautiously responded to an inquiry about whether the city had been established. Instead of giving 
a clear yes-or-no answer, Wei told the reporter that the establishment of Sansha was a “very 
sensitive issue.” Given that China still had territorial disputes in the South China Sea and that 
Wenchang was merely a county-level city, according to Wei, Wenchang was not authorized to 
make the decision, not even the Hainan provincial authorities.1326 
In a move likely intended to reassure Hanoi, Beijing elevated the bilateral relationship to one 
of “comprehensive strategic partnership” during Vietnam’s communist party chief Nong Duc 
Manh’s a visit to China in June 2008, the highest level in the Chinese hierarchy of foreign 







1325 Kristine Kwok, “Plan to designate islands as a city denied; Sino-Vietnamese row takes a new turn” South China 
Morning Post, Dec. 19, 2007. 
1326 “Wei Liucheng discusses establishing Sansha City, describing the topic sensitive” [卫留成谈建三沙市称话题敏
感 ], Takungpao, Mar. 7, 2008, reprinted on Nansha.org [ 南 沙 群 岛 在 线 ], 
https://www.nansha.org/index.php/forum/9/1831, accessed Mar. 16, 2019. 
1327 “China-Vietnam joint statement (2008)” [中越联合声明 (2008 年)], Xinhua, Jun. 2, 2008, http://www.asean-
china-center.org/2008-06/02/c_13360726.htm, accessed Nov. 1, 2019; “China’s ‘partners’” [中国的  “伙伴”], 
Takungpao, May 23, 2013, http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2013-05/1630701.html, accessed Nov. 1, 2019.  
1328 “China, Vietnam issued a joint statement in Beijing on Oct. 25 (full test) [中国、越南两国 10 月 25 日在京发表
联合声明  (全文 )], Xinhua, Oct. 25, 2008, http://www.gov.cn/govweb/jrzg/2008-10/25/content_1131011.htm, 
accessed Nov. 1, 2019. 
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8. The Scarborough Shoal Standoff and the HD-981 Clash 
This chapter presents a comparison of the 2012 China-Philippine Scarborough Shoal Standoff, in 
which Beijing, after an initial impasse, engaged in a strong nonmilitary escalation that gave China 
the control of the land feature, and the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese HD-981 clash, in which, with the 
exception of fending off Vietnamese ships at sea, Beijing refrained from taking further escalatory 
measures.  
Scholars and policy analysts often portray China’s behavior in the South China Sea in the 
2010s as following a strategy of “salami slicing” or “gray zone coercion.” Some studies offer an 
alternative argument that in order to establish a reputation for resolve, China adopts a strategy of 
“killing the chicken to scare the monkey,” that is, to selectively coerce a rivaling claimant to deter 
further challenges from other claimants.1329 While these interpretations shed some light on the 
rationale of China’s employment of nonmilitary coercion, they fare poorly in explaining the 
striking difference between the two critical incidents that occurred during the post-2010 period of 
so-called new Chinese assertiveness, namely, why did Beijing tend to be tough on Manila while 
demonstrating a degree of tolerance toward the apparently undeterred Hanoi?1330 This difference 
is indeed quite counterintuitive, as one should well expect Beijing to adopt a more heavy-handed 
approach toward Hanoi, given the bloody history of Sino-Vietnamese border war and naval 
skirmishes, the geographical expansiveness of Vietnam’s claims, and the higher level of conflict 
intensity and Chinese casualties involved in the HD-981 incident. Beyond the drastic difference 
 
1329 Zhang, “Cautious Bully,” p. 138. 
1330 For a quantitative comparison of China’s handling of the Philippines and Vietnam, see, Pascal Abb, “Punish the 
Philippines, Forgive Vietnam? The South China Sea Disputes in the Eyes of Chinese Experts,” in Enrico Fels and 
Truong-Minh Vu, ed., Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Warts: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea (Cham: 
Springer International Publishing, 2016), pp. 139-157. Based on an automated content analysis of 1816 commentaries 
by Chinese foreign policy experts from CICIR, CIIS and SIIS from 2010 through 2014, Pascal Abb notes that Vietnam 
has received a “significantly more positive coverage” than the Philippines during this period; indeed, the Philippines 
has received a highly negative coverage.  
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between individual cases, different patterns of conflict also arise. As a veteran South China Sea 
researcher aptly captures the contrast: “The Sino-Vietnamese maritime conflict has in general 
demonstrated a cyclical pattern of rise and fall while the China-Philippine conflict resembled an 
upward spiral until after Philippine’s change of leadership in 2016.”1331 
Distinctly different cost trade-off calculations in the two incidents best explain why China 
opted for an escalatory response in one incident but de-escalated the other. In the Scarborough 
Shoal standoff, presented with an empowered domestic compromise-averse coalition on the one 
hand and ambivalence in the way the international community responded to the standoff on the 
other, Beijing seemed to calculate that a de-escalation might be costlier than an escalation. Again, 
unlike most incidents in the East China Sea, the prevalence of the domestic end in the Scarborough 
Shoal incident was not as clear-cut as to allow for an immediate decision to escalate at the outset 
of the incident. Rather, following an initial period of gridlock, China engaged in a strong 
nonmilitary escalation and opportunistically seized Scarborough when the trade-off between two 
levels of audience costs seemed clearer. In the HD-981 instance, Beijing’s incentive to take 
escalatory measures to punish Vietnam for its violent reactions declined as it became clear that an 
escalation would be costly both domestically and internationally. 
THE 2012 SCARBOROUGH SHOAL STANDOFF 
Beijing’s relations with Manila became strained after the latter adopted a bill in 2009 that would 
declare the country’s archipelagic baseline and define both the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and 
the Scarborough Shoal as “a regime of islands” under the Philippines. The final bill was a watered-
down version of an earlier, more assertive one which explicitly included the KIG in the baseline 
 
1331 Author’s interview, Haikou, April 2019. 
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of the Philippine territory and triggered China’s protests.1332 By framing the contested offshore 
land features as “a regime of islands,” the bill essentially excluded the KIG and Scarborough Shoal 
from the country’s archipelagic baseline. Despite protest over the bill, Beijing refrained from 
taking further actions.1333 Whereas the watering down might be one reason, China perceived the 
domestically embattled Arroyo administration as lacking the necessary political capital to block 
the bill. To Chinese eyes, the Arroyo era was still among the best periods in China-Philippine 
relations as Manila persistently “strived to avoid provoking China.”1334 
After President Benigno Aquino III assumed office in 2010, however, China-Philippine 
relations witnessed a steadfast deterioration as Aquino was perceived as being more explicit than 
his predecessor in criticizing China’s behavior in the South China Sea and more active in pushing 
for what Beijing called “multilateralizing” (国际化) the disputes.1335 In March 2011, Manila 
accused Chinese patrol ships of harassing and driving away a British-owned survey vessel which 
was operating in the Reed Bank under a contract with the Philippine government.1336 In April, the 
two countries submitted their respective Notes Verbales to the UN, staking competing claims to 
 
1332 “Beijing forces Manila retreat over Spratlys; Philippines rewords bill on disputed South China Sea Atolls,” South 
China Morning Post, Feb. 12, 2009; “China lodges stern protest over Baselines Bill of the Philippines,” Xinhua News 
Service, Feb. 18, 2009. 
1333 “Philippine leader signs law on maritime borders,” Agence France Presse, Mar. 11, 2009; “Chinese embassy 
protests Philippine law to extend territorial claim in South China Sea,” Xinhua, Mar. 11, 2009. 
1334 Cao Yunhua [曹云华] and Ju Hailong [鞠海龙], ed., Report on the Situation in the South China Sea 2011-2012 
[南海地区形势报告 (2011-2012)] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2012), p. 203. 
1335 The term “国际化” is widely used in Chinese official documents, speeches, analytical writings, and media reports 
without a clear definition. In the official Chinese discourse on the South China Sea, it is used interchangeably with 
“multilateralizing,” namely, going beyond the bilateral setting in which China negotiates with each of the other 
claimants on a one-on-one basis. Authoritative sources confirm the interchangeability between the Chinese term “国
际化” and the English term “multilateralize.” In paragraph 77 of the position paper China issued in July 2016, the 
Chinese version is “明确表示反对外部势力介入，反对南海问题国际化” and this part in the English version is 
translated as “China has expressed its clear opposition to intervention by outside forces and attempts to multilateralize 
the South China Sea issue.” “China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes 
Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic 
of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1380615.htm, Jul. 13, 2016. The Chinese version could 
be found at https://www.scio.gov.cn/wz/Document/1484047/1484047.htm. Both were accessed on Nov. 20, 2019. 
1336 “Philippines, Indonesia strengthen ties in Aquino state visit,” Business World, Mar. 9, 2011; “Philippines set for 
oil drilling amid China spat,” Agence France Presse, Mar. 23, 2011. 
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the Spratlys.1337 In June, Manila claimed that Chinese ships made at least seven major intrusions 
into the Philippine-claimed waters in the first half of 2011.1338 More to Beijing’s ire, during his 
trip to Beijing in July in preparation for Aquino’s state visit, Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert 
del Rosario proposed submitting the two countries’ rivaling claims to the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) when meeting with China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. Beijing 
quickly rejected Rosario’s proposal on the basis that the dispute should be resolved through direct 
negotiations between the claimants. 1339  Growing bilateral tensions were conspicuous also in 
Aquino’s annual State of the Nation Address at the Philippine Congress on July 25. In this speech, 
Aquino not only reaffirmed his intention to take the dispute to the tribunal but also pledged to beef 
up the country’s armed forces, signaling Manila’s resolve to defend its claims even by military 
means: “There was a time when we couldn’t appropriately respond to threats in our own backyard. 
Now, our message to the world is clear: What is ours is ours.”1340  
The two sides remained far apart on the South China Sea disputes during Aquino’s visit to 
Beijing in August. When meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Aquino told Hu that the 
disputes were “a regional problem that requires a regional solution,”1341 an approach clearly at 
 
1337  Philippine Mission to the United Nations, Note Verbale No. 000228, Apr. 5, 2011, 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_chn_2011.pdf, accessed Nov. 4, 
2019; Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale CML/8/2011, Apr. 
14, 2011, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 
accessed Nov. 5, 2019. 
1338 Carlyle A. Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive in the South China Sea,” Paper to Conference on Maritime 
Security in the South China Sea sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington 
D.C. June 20-21, 2011. 
1339 Jim Gomez, “Manila to China on spats: We’ll go to UN tribunal,” Associated Press, Jul. 11, 2011; “China rejects 
Philippine proposal on disputed sea,” Agence France Press, Jul. 12, 2011; “China reaffirms South China Sea dispute 
be resolved through negotiations,” Xinhua News Service, Jul. 12, 2011. 
1340 Christine O. Avendaño, “President Aquino: Philippines to protect ‘what’s ours’”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Jul. 
26, 2011, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/30063/president-aquino-philippines-to-
protect-%E2%80%98what%E2%80%99s-ours%E2%80%99, accessed May 3, 2019; Alastair McIndoe, “Aquino to 
take Spratly spat to UN; He pledges to defend Philippines’ claim in South China Sea,” Strait Times, Jul. 26, 2011; Jim 
Gomez, “Aquino to China: Filipinos will defend territory,” Associated Press, Jul. 26, 2011. Emphasis added. 
1341 “Aquino tells Hu S China Sea dispute not just bilateral problem,” Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 31, 2011. 
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odds with Beijing’s longstanding position that the disputes be resolved bilaterally between the 
disputants. In response, Hu reiterated China’s stance that the disputes “should be resolved 
peacefully through consultation and negotiation between the two countries concerned.”1342  
Relations between China and the Philippines continued to worsen during the months leading 
up to the standoff. In February 2012, Beijing voiced its objection to Manila’s decision to invite 
foreign oil companies to conduct energy exploration in waters northwest of Philippine’s Palawan 
Province. The Zhongsheng column of the People’s Daily warned that exploration in the disputed 
areas without China’s permission “is bound to run into trouble” and that China would “take 
necessary actions to resolve the problem when it must.”1343 In late March, tensions heightened 
again after Manila built a loading ramp and renovated a runway on the Thitu Island in the 
Spratlys.1344  
Against this backdrop of worsening ties and growing frictions at sea, a standoff erupted on 
April 10 when the Philippines Armed Force dispatched a frigate to inspect eight Chinese fishing 
boats spotted in the lagoon of the Scarborough Shoal. Philippine sailors boarded the Chinese boats 
and found large amounts of giant clams, corals and live sharks inside one of the boats. 1345 
Receiving calls from the Chinese fishing ships equipped with satellite phones and the Beidou 
position system, two CMS patrol vessels, which were reportedly on routine patrols in vicinity 
waters, responded after getting approvals from the CMS headquarters, SOA, and the Chinese 
 
1342 “China, the Philippines agree to downplay maritime disputes, enhance economic ties,” Xinhua, Aug. 31, 2011. 
1343 Zhongsheng [钟声], “The Philippines must learn to exercise self-restraint on the South China Sea issue” [菲律宾
在南海问题上须学会自我约束], People’s Daily, Feb. 29, 2012. 
1344 “Philippines to push ahead with building pier on disputed Spratly island,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 30, 
2012. 
1345  Jim Gomez, “Philippine warship in standoff with China vessels,” Associated Press, Apr. 11, 2012. The Chinese 
government and state media claimed that 12 Chinese fishing boats were involved in the incident. “China protests the 
harassment of fishermen,” Xinhua News Service, Apr. 11, 2012.  
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foreign ministry.1346  Upon arrival, the CMS ships interjected themselves between the Chinese 
fishing boats and the Philippine warship, preventing the arrests of Chinese fishermen.1347 As 
neither side was willing to budge, a tense standoff ensued.  
Philippine’s Foreign Secretary Rosario summoned Chinese Ambassador Ma Keqing to lodge 
a protest, stating that the Chinese fishermen were engaging in “illegal fishing and harvesting of 
endangered marine species.” 1348  The Chinese Embassy in Manila claimed that the Chinese 
fishermen were taking shelter in the lagoon from “harsh weather conditions” when “a Philippine 
naval gunboat blocked the entrance of the lagoon and sent 12 Philippine soldiers, six of whom 
were armed…and harassed the Chinese fishermen.”1349 Sources familiar with the marine economy 
in the South China Sea noted that the involved Chinese fishing boats, originating from Tanmen, a 
fishing town in east Hainan, were poaching rare marine species especially giant clams, which were 
highly profitable due to strong demands on the Chinese market. According to the Chinese sources, 
the Scarborough Shoal had been a particularly attractive site for Chinese fishermen because the 
marine environment in that area nurtured high-quality giant clams. Before Chinese authorities 
outlawed the sales of giant clams from 2017, giant clam processing and sales had prospered into a 
lucrative business important to the livelihood of fishermen in Tanmen and many other localities in 
Hainan.1350 
 
1346 Han Yong [韩永] and Guan Xiangdong [关向东], “Huangyan Island, Chinese Island” [黄岩岛，炎黄岛], China 
Newsweek, May 11, 2012, reprinted on Sohu.com, http://news.sohu.com/20120511/n342969585.shtml, accessed Nov. 
6, 2019. 
1347 Gomez, “Philippine warship in standoff with China vessels;” Floyd Whaley, “Philippines and China in a Standoff 
at Sea,” New York Times, Apr. 12, 2012. 
1348 “Scarborough standoff highlights tensions in the South China Sea,” BusinessWorld, Apr. 12, 2012. 
1349 “Chinese embassy urges Philippines to stop illegal activities in China’s territory,” Xinhua News Service, Apr. 11, 
2012. 
1350 Author’s interviews, Beijing, July 2017; Singapore, August 2018; Guangzhou, May 2019. 
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On April 12, in a likely move to de-escalate, the Philippines sent a coast guard ship to replace 
the naval warship. Meanwhile, China deployed an extra FLE ship to the aera.1351 Diplomatic 
negotiation deadlocked as each side demanded the other retreat first.  
Amid the heightened tensions, the Philippines kicked off the annual two-week Balikatan 
exercise with U.S. forces on April 16 near the contested South China Sea areas. In the context of 
the standoff, Beijing perceived the drills as specifically targeting China despite Washington and 
Manila’s insistence that China was not an “imaginary target” in the drills.1352 The PLA Daily 
claimed that both the Philippines and the U.S. were using the military exercise to “stir up the water 
in the South China Sea,” as the former sought to drag its powerful ally into the South China Sea 
disputes and the latter attempted to use the dispute to justify its return to Asia-Pacific.1353 
On April 17, Manila again called on Beijing to take the dispute to the ITLOS for arbitration,1354 
which Beijing dismissed on the basis that both parties had “previously agreed to deal with disputes 
through bilateral talks.” For the second time after the first summoning on April 15, China’s Vice 
Foreign Minister Fu Ying summoned Alex Chua, the charge d’affaires of the Philippines, urging 
Manila to immediately pull out its ship.1355 On April 20, China ratcheted up pressure on the 
Philippines by deploying its most advanced 2,580-ton, helicopter-capable FLE ship Yuzheng 310 
to the Scarborough.1356  
 
1351 “Philippines says warship removed from China standoff,” Agence France Presse, Apr. 12, 2012; Zhou Quanyong 
[周泉涌] and Hu Jing [胡婧], “Fishery law enforcement ship safeguards rights and protects fisherman in Huangyan 
Island” [渔政船维权护渔黄岩岛], China Fisheries News, Apr. 16, 2012. 
1352 Jim Gomez, “US, Filipino troops start drills near disputed sea,” Associated Press, Apr. 16, 2012; “Philippine, U.S. 
forces hold 1st gas field protection exercise,” Japan Economic Newswire, Apr. 22, 2012. 
1353 Xue Hao [薛皓], “What does U.S-Philippine military exercise seek to achieve” [美菲军演意欲何为], PLA Daily, 
Apr. 21, 2012. 
1354 Johanna Paola D. Poblete, “Dispute with China continues: Philippines stands firm,” BusinessWorld Apr. 18, 2012. 
1355 China Focus: China summons Philippine diplomat over Huangyan Island dispute,” Xinhua News Service, Apr. 
18, 2012. 
1356“Chinese patrol ship reaches Huangyan Islands after dispute,” Xinhua, Apr. 20, 2012. 
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The Cost Trade-off: Domestic Costs Prevailed – Marginally 
Unlike incidents in the South China Sea in the first decade of the 2000s, it appears that Beijing did 
not perceive a clear-cut audience cost trade-off at the outset of the Scarborough Shoal incident. On 
the domestic end, Beijing was facing a growing compromise-averse coalition on the South China 
Sea issue. The simultaneous flare-ups in the South and East China Seas cast doubts on China’s 
traditional foreign policy of moderation while empowering those stakeholders who support a firm 
response to perceived foreign challenges to China’s sovereignty claims. Moreover, unlike Vietnam, 
the Philippines does not have a geographical location that enables it to foster constituencies in 
China’s border provinces that prefer a stable bilateral relationship and could powerfully offset the 
compromise-averse interests. Nor does the Philippines have a shared ideology with China that 
could serve as a powerful brake on the dangerous action-reaction spiral as in the HD-981 incident. 
On the international end, China’s anticipated costs seemed ambiguous on both the U.S. and 
ASEAN fronts at the onset of the standoff. Thus, a period of gridlock on the frontline ensued in 
tandem with the pulling and hauling within China’s foreign policy community between the 
“maintaining stability” and “protecting rights” camps. As the standoff continued, America’s 
perceived reluctance to reaffirm its defense commitment to the Philippines as well as the lack of 
cohesiveness in ASEAN’s response led Beijing to believe that an escalation was unlikely to trigger 
a concerted pushback or balancing effort against China, thus tipping the tradeoff calculation 
toward the domestic end – though arguably only by a small margin. 
Domestic Costs on the Rise: Empowered Hardliners, Heightened Public Attention 
The roughly simultaneous mounting challenges to China’s maritime claims in both the East and 
South China Seas from 2010 gave rise to the calls for rethinking Deng’s formula of “shelving the 
disputes and pursuing joint development,” as detailed in Chapter 6. As the debate unfolded, 
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continued frictions on both maritime fronts rendered the traditional approach increasingly 
untenable while strengthening the hardline position.  
The 2010 fishing trawler collision in the East China Sea justified Beijing’s provision of a more 
aggressive state protection for Chinese fishermen operating in contested waters. The South China 
Sea has long been rife with fishing disputes between the claimants that have resulted in detentions 
of each other’s fishermen, confiscation of catches, exorbitant fines, and even violent clashes. While 
encouraging Chinese fishermen to operate in the contested waters as a way of asserting China’s 
sovereignty, Beijing had traditionally adopted a confrontation-averse approach. Chinese fishing 
boats operating in the contested areas were instructed to “keep a minimum distance of three 
nautical miles from islets and reefs occupied by other countries as well as from foreign oilrigs.” 
Catching endangered or protected marine species was prohibited, as this would “cause trouble for 
China’s diplomacy and damage China’s international image.” In the event of detention by foreign 
authorities, the Chinese fishermen should “patiently wait” for Chinese diplomats to provide 
necessary consular assistance and negotiate for their release.1357 While requirements for Chinese 
fishermen operating in Scarborough Shoal were not specifically articulated in open sources, 
knowledgeable Chinese interlocutors noted that China had long adopted a similar approach – until 
the standoff in which the CMS and FLE ships “unprecedentedly” intervened in an ongoing 
detention and brought the fishermen back.1358  
The fact that it was two CMS ships which first responded and intervened in Philippine’s 
detention of Chinese fishermen renders the Scarborough incident another illustration of the 
agency’s raison d'être and was used by CMS to undergird its leading role in safeguarding China’s 
 
1357 Xia Zhangying [夏章英], A History of Fisheries in the Nansha Islands [南沙群岛渔业史] (Bejing: Haiyang 
chubanshe, 2011), pp. 209-213. 
1358 Author’s interview, Guangzhou, May 2019. 
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maritime rights. A strongly worded commentary published in the SOA-run China Ocean News on 
May 4 pledged a commitment to respond firmly to foreign challenges to China’s maritime 
sovereignty and asserted the CMS’s leading role in such endeavors:  
In the waters under China’s jurisdiction, there are no off-limits areas for CMS’s 
maritime rights protection patrols…the more controversial and sensitive an area is, 
the higher priority it will be given in CMS’s patrols…To challenge CMS’s 
enforcement activity is in a sense to challenge China.1359  
When speaking with the CMS officials on the frontline at a video teleconference on June 12, Liu 
Cigui, then director of the SOA, encouraged the CMS personnel to continue the rights protection 
struggle unswervingly “until the achievement of the final victory.”1360  
On the other hand, the PLA retained a relatively restrained tone in its official statements 
regarding the standoff, which was consistent with the stated Chinese strategy of putting the military 
on the “second line” and the MLE agencies on the “first line.” The first top-level response of the 
PLA came on April 24 when China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie told media that the 
military’s action would be based on the needs of China’s diplomacy. Stressing his confidence in 
the co-management of the incident by MFA and other agencies charged with jurisdiction on 
maritime affairs, Liang stated that the standoff could be resolved through diplomatic means.1361 
Two days later, the Chinese Defense Ministry’s spokesperson Geng Yansheng stated at a press 
briefing that Chinese armed forces would work with the fishery and marine surveillance agencies 
to collaboratively defend China’s maritime rights and interests.1362 On May 12, a PLA Daily 
 
1359 Yi Yan [一言], “Firmly and unswervingly defend China’s maritime rights and interests” [坚定不移地维护国家
海洋权益], China Ocean News, May 4, 2012. 
1360 “SOA Director Liu Cigui held video conference and greeted CMS personnel on the forefront of the Scarborough 
Shoal rights protection and law enforcement opeariton” [国家海洋局刘赐贵局长视频连线慰问黄岩岛维权执法一
线海监编队], Ocean Development and Management, no. 6, 2012, p. 12. 
1361 Du Zhaoping [杜朝平] and Zhong Weidong [钟卫东], “The PLA has the capabilities to defend China’s rights and 
interests in the South China Sea” [解放军有能力捍卫南海权益], China National Defense Daily, May 1, 2012.  
1362 “Chinese army to safeguard national marine rights,” Xinhua News Service, Apr. 26, 2012. 
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commentary similarly stated that there was still room for resolving the standoff through diplomatic 
means and called for adherence to the principle of “on just grounds, to our advantage, and with 
restraint” (youli, youli, youjie) to preserve China’s “strategic initiative.”1363 When attending the 
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus in late May in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Liang did not 
dodge a meeting with Philippine’s Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin. Speaking with a relatively 
measured tone, Liang urged the Philippine military to “prioritize the broad interest” and to exercise 
restraint “in words and deeds.”1364 
The restrained official line notwithstanding, hardline voices within the PLA enjoyed plenty of 
liberty in openly calling for a resolute response to the perceived challenge from the Philippines. 
Speaking at a forum hosted by Tsinghua University on April 21, Luo Yuan, a retired Major General 
of the PLA and an international affairs pundit, urged for “wisdom and resolution to resolve the 
sovereignty disputes” as the South China Sea disputes “cannot afford further delay.”1365 A widely 
circulated essay penned by a strategist at the PLA Air Force Command College described the 
Philippines’ act in Scarborough as having “violated China’s bottom line of territorial integrity” 
such that it was time for China to “show its sword” (亮剑) to forestall further provocations by the 
Philippines and deter other claimants from following suit.1366 As the standoff continued into May, 
more senior PLA officials joined the advocacy for a firm response. Major General Jin Yi’nan, a 
strategist at the National Defense University, claimed in mid-May that the Philippines and other 
claimants were attempting to exploit China’s hope of using its “window of strategic opportunity” 
 
1363 Wen Bing [温冰], “On just grounds, to our advantage, and with restrain to win greater strategic initiative” [有理
有利有节, 赢得更大战略主动], PLA Daily, May 12, 2012. 
1364 “Liang Guanglie meets with Philippine Defense Secretary” [梁光烈会见菲律宾国防部长], PLA Daily, May 30, 
2012 
1365 Yang Chun [杨春] and Dai Lian [戴莲], “hiding our capabilities’ must be combined with ‘doing something’” [“韬
光养晦” 须和 “有所作为” 相结合], Southern Daily, Apr. 22. 2012. 
1366 Zhou Erquan [周二权], “Solving the South China Sea disputes, fight when need to” [解决南海争端，该打就打], 
China Business Herald [中国经济周刊], issue 17, Apr. 30, 2012. 
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– a 20-year period after 9/11 that Beijing envisioned as creating a stable international environment 
for China – to focus on domestic socioeconomic development. China must not compromise on 
territorial sovereignty in exchange for the window of strategic opportunity, asserted Jin.1367 Rear 
Admiral Li Shaohong, then deputy chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet, pledged that the PLAN 
“will complete the task with a strong sense of duty once the CMC makes a concrete decision on 
the Scarborough Shoal situation.”1368 Li’s remark seems also indicating that at the time Beijing 
might have yet come up with a clear cost-benefit calculation. 
Most notably, the general public emerged as an important dimension in Beijing’s increased 
domestic costs, as tensions in the South China Sea continued to ratchet up and the Chinese media 
coverage on the disputes increased significantly starting from 2011 (Figure 8.1). During the 
standoff specifically, control on media reporting of the incident was relatively loose – and 
especially so when viewed in light of the tight control on media during the HD-981 clash (Table 
8.1).  
In the context of heightened public attention, at least two moves made by the Philippines in 
the early stage of the standoff appeared to have contributed to the increased popular pressures on 
Beijing to take a firm posture. First, Manila deployed the BRP Gregorio del Pilar frigate to inspect 
and arrest the Chinese fishermen. While it is fair to say that in terms of military capabilities, the 
Philippines’ warship was an antiquated WWII-era cutter whereas the Chinese CMS and FLE ships 
were much newer, larger, and modern,1369 this grey-hull-versus-white-hull contrast not only sent a 
strong signal about Manila’s seemingly hostile intentions but also presented a striking contrast to 
 
1367 Du Zhaoping [杜朝平], “The PLA is ready to defend national sovereignty” [捍卫国家主权，解放军时刻准备
着], China National Defense Daily [中国国防报], May 15, 2012.  
1368 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
1369 For a detailed account of the modernization and capabilities of China’s MLE ships, see, Joshua Hickey, Andrew 
S. Erickson and Henry Holst, “China Maritime Law Enforcement Surface Platforms,” in Erickson and Martinson, ed., 
China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, pp. 108-132. 
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the Chinese audience. A Chinese interlocutor noted in an interview that the deployment was 
perceived as a signal of provocation: “China did not see the incident as a big deal at the outset. But 
the Philippines made the first mistake by dispatching a warship. This move led China to question: 
‘What does the Philippines intend to do by sending a frigate?’”1370 By the same token, a military 
attaché with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing noted during a close-door discussion at the PLA’s AMS 
that the deployment of the warship in effect escalated the situation.1371 On China’s part, its decision 
to respond to the Philippines’ warship with MLE ships was criticized back at home for looking 
weak.1372  
Second, Manila released a set of photos on April 11, which showed the Chinese fishing boats 
in the Scarborough Shoal being inspected by Philippine soldiers and the Chinese fishermen being  
Figure 8.1 Newspaper Article Frequency on the South China Sea 
 
Source: CNKI core newspaper database.1373 
 
1370 Author’s interview, Shanghai, April 2019. 
1371 AMS close-door meeting, Beijing, March 2019. Author’s conference notes. 
1372  Raissa Robles, Greg Torode and Teddy Ng, “Manila moves to defuse stand-off at disputed reef; Warship 
withdrawn as diplomacy continues over eight Chinese crews accused of illegal fishing,” South China Morning Post, 
Apr. 13, 2012. 
1373 I ran several rounds of theme searches, using each of the terms “South China Sea Problem” [南海问题], “South 
China Sea Disputes” [南海争端], “South China Sea Controversies” [南海争议], “South China Sea Situation” [南海
局势], “South China Sea Sovereignty” [南海主权], “Nansha Islands” [南沙群岛], “Xisha Islands” [西沙群岛], 
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Table 8.1 Chinese Media Coverage on the Scarborough Shoal Standoff and the HD-981 Clash 
 
Source: People’s Daily database;1374 Duxiu (https://www.duxiu.com/).1375 
 
“Huangyan Island” [黄岩岛] for a separate search. Because this article frequency is to gauge year-to-year changes in 
the publicity of the South China Sea in China’s domestic society rather than examine the Chinese decisionmakers’ 
and elite’s perception, I do not distinguish authoritative, quasi-authoritative and non-authoritative sources in the search.  
1374  I used the People’s Daily database for People’s Daily article counting. For the Scarborough Shoal case, I 
conducted separate rounds of full-text search using each of the words “Huangyan Island” and “the Philippines” for 
the period April 1- July 31, 2012, and I read each article to determine its relevance to the case and to exclude duplicated 
pieces; for the HD-981 case, I conducted separate rounds of full-text search using each of the words “Vietnam,” “981,” 
“drilling platform” (钻井平台) and “Triton South” (中建南) for May 1- July 31, 2014, and I read each article 
determine its relevance to the case and to exclude duplicated pieces. 
1375 For the rest of the newspapers, I used Duxiu’s newspaper database which contains more commercial media than 
CNKI core newspaper database. For the Scarborough Shoal case, I conducted full-text search using “Huangyan Island” 
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held at gunpoint. The photos were rapidly circulated on Chinese media and on the Internet 
accompanied by stories criticizing the Philippines’ way of treating the detained Chinese 
fishermen.1376 Such practice by the Philippines was not unprecedented.1377 However, that these 
photos were publicized during an ongoing tense standoff represented a critical difference from past 
instances and was unwise from the perspective of crisis containment. Regardless of whether 
Beijing purposefully allowed the domestic circulation to create the raison d’état it needed to 
undertake an assertive response or it was merely responding to genuine pressure (or both) created 
by these pictures, the photos did present a vivid and striking image of the Chinese fishermen being 
bullied by foreign military personnel in what was claimed to be China’s “ancestral sea.” The 
NISCSS noted in its annual report: “During the course of the Scarborough Shoal standoff, the 
Chinese mainland media and public opinion lopsidedly pushed for a tough response, to ‘show the 
sword’ to the Philippines so to speak.”1378  
In addition, bureaucratic interests and rivalry contributed to the heightened public attention to 
the standoff. On April 15, a few days prior to deploying Yuzheng 310 to Scarborough Shoal, FLE 
invited a news crew from Shanghai’s China Dragon TV to ride with the ship. The TV company’s 
 
for the period April 1- July 31, 2012; and for the HD-981 case, I conducted separate rounds of full-text searcher using 
each of the words “981” and “Triton south” for the period May 1- July 31, 2014. In selecting the popular commercial 
newspaper, I used as a reference the “2018 Top 100 most influential newspapers through integrated communication” 
[2018 年报纸融合传播力百强榜 ] released by the People's Daily. “2018 report on newspaper integrated 
communication index released” [2018 报 纸 融 合 传 播 指 数 报 告 发 布 ], People.com.cn, Mar. 27, 2019, 
http://media.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0327/c120837-30996998.html, accessed Nov. 3, 2019. 
1376 “High resolution: The Philippines attempt to detain Chinese fishermen in Huangyan Island” [高清：菲律宾试图
在黄岩岛抓捕中国渔民], People.com, Apr. 12, 2012, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/17637045.html, accessed 
Nov. 6, 2019. These photos were soon reprinted on other Chinese popular news portals such as the Global Times, 
Fenghuangwang, and Sina.  
1377 Two Chinese fishing boats were detained by Philippine authorities in Scarborough Shoal in 2001 for illegally 
catching sea turtles. The Chinese fishermen were ordered to hold sea turtles for pictures, which were released to media 
and sent to the Chinese Embassy. Xia, A History of Fisheries in the Nansha Islands, p. 209. 
1378 Yen Tiehlin [阎铁麟], “Assessment of the South China Sea situation in 2012” [2012 年南海情势评估], in Liu 
Fu-kuo [刘复国] and Wu Shicun [吴士存], ed., 2012 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea 
[2012 年南海地区形势评估报告] (Taipei: Institute of International Relations National Chengchi University, 2013), 
p. 13. 
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request for a media ride had been pending for two years before FLE extended the invitation. The 
FEL used this opportunity to showcase in front of camera the process of resupplying diesel, food 
and fresh water to Chinese fishing boats in the Scarborough Shoal and ritually planted the PRC 
flag on a reef in the shoal. The message was clearly articulated: “The FLE represents the 
sovereignty of the Chinese government.”1379 On June 8, the SOA’s director Liu Cigui complained 
to Xinhua that media reports on the Scarborough incident often mistook CMS vessels shown in 
video footage for FLE ships, which “shows that people do not know much about CMS despite the 
fact that it has always been at the forefront in the defense of China’s maritime rights and 
interests.”1380 
Ambivalence in US Commitment and ASEAN Response 
China’s international audience costs seemed ambiguous at the onset of the standoff. The first 
source of ambiguity came from the ambivalence of the United States with respect to the critical 
question of what treaty obligations the U.S. would be required to fulfill in the event of a clash 
between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.  
Following U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s declaration in July 2010 of American 
interests in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,1381 Chinese foreign policy 
analysts cast an increasingly wary eye as Washington and Manila moved to strengthen their 
security ties under the banner of the U.S. pivot to Asia.1382 As tensions grew in the South China 
 
1379 Zheng Wei [郑蔚] and Zhao Zhengnan [赵征南], “Flag of China planted on Huangyan Island” [五星红旗插上黄
岩 岛 ], Wenhui Bao [ 文 汇 报 ], May 17, 2012. A video footage of the ride is available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rnnS91wO9Z0, accessed Nov. 9, 2019. 
1380 “For this ‘blue national territory’” [为了这片 “蓝色国土”], Ocean Development and Management, no. 6, 2012, 
p.23. 
1381 Remarks at Press Availability, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, National Convention Center, Hanoi, 
Vietnam, Jul. 23, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm, accessed 
Nov. 13, 2019. 
1382 See, for example, Han Xudong [韩旭东], “U.S.-Philippine relations might enter a honeymoon period” [美菲军事
关系或将进入蜜月期], China National Defense Daily, Jan. 31, 2012; Zhou Fangyin [周方银], “Situation of South 
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Sea, Manila began to regularly push Washington to reaffirm is commitment to honoring the 1951 
U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), Article V of which defines scenarios covered by 
the treaty as including “an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on 
the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or 
aircraft in the Pacific.” 1383 Philippine President Aquino repeatedly called on Washington to help 
counter China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea by bolstering the Philippines’ maritime 
capabilities. 1384  In March 2011, Manila acquired a 1960s-era Hamilton-class cutter 
decommissioned from the U.S. Coast Guard. The 3,390-ton cutter, renamed BRP Gregorio del 
Pilar, became the Philippines’ largest and newest lead frigate in the South China Sea.1385 In June, 
the U.S. Ambassador to Manila Harry Thomas pledged U.S. support to the Philippines.1386  
But Washington had been reluctant to clarify its treaty obligations to the Philippines on the 
South China Sea issue as explicit and strong in a way as it did to Japan on the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute. During a joint press conference with visiting Philippine Foreign Secretary Rosario in June  
2011, when asked how America would respond in the event of a Chinese attack on Filipino forces 
in the Spratlys, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declined to discuss “hypothetical 
events.”1387  A report on U.S.-Philippine relations by the U.S. Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) released on April 5, 2012, three days prior to the outbreak of the standoff, acknowledged 
 
China Sea and China’s strategy” [南海局势演变与中国的策略选择], Annual Report on Development of Asia-Pacific 
(2012), pp.145-158; Cao and Ju, Report on the Situation in the South China Sea 2011-2012, pp. 97-98, pp. 211-217. 
1383 “Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America,” Aug. 30, 
1951, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1951/08/30/mutual-defense-treaty-between-the-republic-of-the-
philippines-and-the-united-states-of-america-august-30-1951/, accessed Nov. 13, 2019.  
1384 “Philippines wants US help to contain China,” Agence France Presse, Jun. 14, 2011. 
1385  Tom Baker, “Coast Guard Partners with Philippine Navy,” Proceedings vol. 143/5/1,371, May 2017, 
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/may/coast-guard-partners-philippine-navy, accessed Nov. 6, 2019; 
“Philippines sends newest warship to disputed waters,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 14, 2011. 
1386 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Return to Relevance: The Philippine-US Alliance,” World Politics Review Feature 
Report, Anchoring the Pivot: Updating America’s Asian Alliances, Jul. 9, 2013.  
1387 “Remarks with Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario After Their Meeting,” Hillary Rodham Clinton, 
Secretary of State, Washington DC, June 23, 2011, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/06/166868.htm, accessed Apr. 21, 2019. 
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that the MDT “may leave room for different interpretations”  and that Washington might interpret 
the treaty in a way that could limit U.S. involvement in the event of a China-Philippine clash in 
the South China Sea.1388  There seemed to be, in the words of Aquino’s spokesperson Ricki 
Carandang, “a strategic ambiguity on the part of Washington as to whether the Philippines’ claims 
to the Spratly Islands fall within the treaty” – a sharp contrast to Washington’s explicit affirmation 
of the coverage of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands under the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty.1389  
From the U.S. perspective, the ambivalence stemmed from two key factors, according to a 
former senior U.S. diplomat with firsthand experience dealing with both the East and South China 
Sea disputes. First, the legal status of the contested land features including the Scarborough Shoal 
lacks the necessary clarity to allow the U.S. to invoke the treaty, 
[I]n the case of Scarborough Shoal…there was no basis for us believing or asserting 
this was Philippine territory. We consider it being within Philippine’s EEZ, but we 
took no position on territorial claims. Nor were we absolutely certain that these 
shoals were islands, as opposed to high-tide or low-tide elevations, so the status 
under international law was unclear…the international tribunal ultimately 
concluded [in July 2016] they did not provide territorial entitlement.1390  
Second, the U.S. interlocutor acknowledged that there is a “bigger political judgment issue” on the 
part of the United States. Namely,  
[U.S.] military planners and decision-makers have a high degree of confidence in 
the sophisticated defense policy integration between the United States and Japan. 
This is a very mature alliance with a high degree of interoperability but 
also…policy coordination. The U.S.-Philippine military alliance has never reached 
quite that level of sophistication. There is always a certain degree of concern that 
 
1388 Thomas Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service), Apr. 5, 2012, p. 28. 
1389 Greg Torode, “US under pressure over sea dispute; Washington has stopped short of specifics on its position under 
a defense pact with Manila on recent incursion by China in the South China Sea,” South China Morning Post, Jun. 17, 
2011. 
1390 Author’s interview, Skype, September 2019. Emphasis added. 
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the government of the Philippines itself could take action without consultation with 
the U.S. that the U.S. consider unwise and create a situation…that would thrust the 
United States into potential conflict. So, there was a degree of caution in that 
sense.1391 
Another former U.S. senior official interviewed by the author in 2016 for a separate research 
project also pointed to the confidence issue as a major contributing factor to U.S. ambivalence.1392  
Chinese analysts were well aware of Washington’s ambivalence and its implications for a 
China-Philippine South China Sea scenario. Assessing the South China Sea situation for the year 
of 2011, a group of Southeast Asia experts at Ji’nan University in Guangzhou noted: “[T]he 
Philippines’ South China Sea policy has limited balancing effects against China’s strategic 
influence in the Asia-Pacific; the U.S. can by no means count on a country like the Philippines to 
cope with the impacts of China’s rise in the region. Thus, America’s support for and investment 
in the Philippines is bound to be limited.”1393 Based on a review of the Asia-Pacific security 
landscape in 2011, a CASS report made a similar projection that even as the United States became 
increasingly involved in the South China Sea, it would resist being dragged into a direct conflict 
with China by the Philippines or other claimants.1394  
The U.S. commitment remained unclear during the incident. An examination of the State 
Department’s daily press briefing transcripts shows that the standoff was not raised until April 23. 
Speaking at the closing ceremony for Balikatan on April 27, U.S. Ambassador to Manila Harry 
Thomas did not mention the Scarborough incident in his remarks and made what the Filipinos 
 
1391 Ibid. 
1392 Shuxian Luo, “Confluence of Two Seas: Japan’s New Strategic Relationship with the Philippines,” The United 
States and Japan in Global Context: 2016 (Washington DC: The Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, 
Johns Hopkins University, 2016), p. 77. See also footnote 37 on the same page. 
1393 Cao and Ju, Report on the Situation in the South China Sea 2011-2012, p. 217. 
1394 Zhang Jie [张洁], “Disputes of South China Sea: The Touchstone of China’s Peaceful Rise?” [南海争端: 中国和
平崛起的试金石？], in Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng, ed., China’s Regional Security Environment Review [中国周
边安全形势评估 2012] (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press China, 2012), p. 109. 
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called only “a passing reference” to an “assurance of the Mutual Defense Treaty” between the two 
allies.1395 On April 30, the U.S. and the Philippines held their first two plus two meeting in 
Washington DC. While the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta reaffirmed Washington’s treaty obligation and its objection to “any party’s threat or use of 
force in resolving the South China Sea disputes,”1396 the U.S. officials left the question of whether 
the MDT covers the Philippines’ offshore claims unclarified.1397  
The U.S. ambivalence during the incident was perceived as a positive sign – and indeed 
welcomed as a sign of U.S. “neutrality” – by China. A May 3 People’s Daily article penned by 
Shen Dingli, a security expert at Fudan University, acclaimed Washington’s neutrality on the 
sovereignty disputes as being conducive to stability in the region: “The Philippines should be 
responsible for facing the consequence of its own provocative act. The American people have no 
reason to make sacrifice for an irresponsible ally.”1398 The importance that Beijing attached to 
Washington’s “neutrality” was also clear in a meeting between Fu Ying, then China’s Vice Foreign 
Minister, and Kurt Campbell, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, on June 1 to work out a 
solution to end the standoff. According to Fu’s recently published memoir, she explicitly asked 
Campbell what role the United States played in the incident. Fu acknowledged that Campbell’s 
response that the U.S. did not play any role was “very important” because “it is related to China’s 
judgement of the incident.”1399 
 
1395  DJ Yap, “US envoy mum on Philippine-China Standoff,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, Apr. 27, 2012, 
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/35081/us-envoy-mum-on-philippine-china-standoff, accessed May 19, 2019.   
1396  “Remarks With Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and 
Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting,” Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, 
Treaty Room, Washington, DC, Apr. 30, 2012, full text transcript retrieved at https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188982.htm, accessed May 19, 2019. 
1397 Green, et all, Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, p. 110. 
1398 Shen Dingli [沈丁立], “The U.S. neutrality is helpful for stability in the South China Sea” [美国保持中立有助
南海稳定], People’s Daily (overseas edition), May 3, 2012. 
1399 Fu Ying [傅莹], See the World 2: Challenges and Choices in the Face of Changes Unseen in a Century [看世界
2：百年变局下的挑战和抉择] (Beijing: Citic Publishing House, 2021), p. 265. 
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In early June, Aquino made his first state visit to Washington in the seeking of more U.S. 
support. While pledging American support for a “strong set of international norms and rules 
governing maritime disputes in the region,” U.S. President Barack Obama avoided naming China 
or mentioning the standoff. Philippine diplomats complained that Washington had been unwilling 
to go beyond “general pronouncements” about its treaty obligations with Manila, 1400  despite 
Aquino’s attempt to reassure Washington that Manila had no intention “to embroil the United 
States in military intervention” in the region.1401 That Manila was the first to escalate the standoff 
seemed to have contributed to Washington’s low confidence, if not outright frustration. As Jeffrey 
Bader, Senior Director on Asia on the NSC from 2009-2011, told the New York Times on June 9: 
“We could have a long-term problem with China in the South China Sea. The Filipinos did not 
contribute to solving the long-term problem by falling into a short-term confrontation with the 
Chinese, in a bid to quickly resolve an unresolvable territorial issue.”1402  
The second source of Beijing’s ambiguous international audience costs came from the ASEAN 
front. Beijing appeared to be even more worried about the prospect of ASEAN countries forming 
a “united front” balancing against China than the likelihood of triggering U.S.-Philippine MDT. 
The NISCSS clearly stated in its 2010 annual report:  
Now the South China Sea has inevitably become a regional security issue that 
ASEAN pays attention to at various levels of meetings…ASEAN has not yet 
formed a unified position to China’s disadvantage. While continuing to deepen its 
friendly relationship with ASEAN, China must actively prevent ASEAN from 
forming a unified position ostensibly adverse to China’s interests.1403  
 
1400 Matthew Pennington, “Philippine leader seeks US assurance on defense,” Associated Press, Jun. 8, 2012. 
1401 Tracy Quek, “Aquino urges US backing in spat with China,” Strait Times, Jun. 9, 2012. 
1402 Mark Landler, “Obama Expresses Support For Philippines in China Rift,” New York Times, Jun. 9, 2012. 
1403 Liu Fu-kuo [刘复国] and Wu Shicun [吴士存], ed., 2010 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China 
Sea [2010 年度南海地区形势评估报告] (Taipei: Institute of International Relations National Chengchi University, 
2011), pp.65-66. 
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Similar worries about a potential increase in the geopolitical costs on the ASEAN front were also 
expressed by other Chinese foreign policy experts, although not as explicitly as in the NISCSS 
report. Zhu Feng, a scholar on international security and Director of the South China Sea center at 
Nanjing University, cautioned in 2011 that China’s good neighborly diplomacy was “at its nadir” 
since the end of the Cold War due to the  maritime disputes and growing economic frictions 
between China and its neighboring countries.1404 In March 2012, less than two weeks before the 
occurrence of the standoff, Wu Jianmin, the late Chinese Ambassador to France and former 
President of the MFA-affiliated China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU),  explicitly warned that 
an assertive posture or even resorting to military force in the South China Sea might risk “messing 
up China’s peripheral environment.”1405 
The prospect of increasing international audience costs on the ASEAN front loomed even 
larger during the initial weeks of the standoff as Manila actively sought to rally international 
support, especially by warning other claimants that this incident would not be an isolated one. In 
a message sent to media reporters on April 22, Philippine Foreign Secretary Rosario urged 
neighboring countries to take a united stand in the face of Chinese assertiveness in the South China 
Sea, warning that they too would be affected by China’s claims should they choose not to speak 
up now.1406 Two days later, Manila upped the ante as President Aquino told a forum that other 
small countries should be concerned by the way the Philippines was being treated by China 
because “perhaps the time will come when they will be treated similarly.”1407 
 
1404  Zhu Feng, “China’s Trouble with the Neighbors,” Project Syndicate, Oct. 31, 2011, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/china-s-trouble-with-the-neighbors?barrier=accesspaylog, accessed May 5, 2019. 
1405 Lai Jingchao [赖竞超] and Lei Hui [雷辉], “If China resorts to war to resolve the South China Sea issue, the 
peripheral situation would be messed up” [解决南海问题若靠打，周边局势反陷入混乱], Southern Daily, Mar. 24, 
2012. 
1406 “Other nations must take stand on China: Philippines,” Agence France Presse, Apr. 22, 2012. 
1407 Johanna Paola D. Pobelete and Antonio Siegfrid O. Alegado, “Aquino warns international community that they 
could be bullied, too,” BusinessWorld, Apr. 25, 2012. 
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Beijing’s unease about the prospect of a united ASEAN front was evidenced in a speech that 
China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo delivered on May 17 at the Chinese People’s Association 
for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Media reports and even scholarly writings widely cited 
Dai’s remark that “China would not tolerate being bullied by small countries such as the 
Philippines” as a clear sign of Beijing’s resolve to take an escalatory posture should Manila refuse 
to back down.1408 However, this remark, viewed in light of the context of the whole speech and 
the platform on which it was delivered (China’s semi-official organization dedicated to promoting 
people-to-people exchanges), implies a drastically different interpretation. In the first place, Dai 
cautioned his audience that China’s sheer size and rapid development alone were sufficient to 
galvanize suspicions and fears among other countries, and as such, China must exercise great 
caution and “remain humble” in order to mitigate their fears and threat perception. Indeed, as Dai 
put it, “[t]he stronger and more developed we are, the humbler we need to be – do not make others 
fear us. We have every reason to be proud of our achievements. But we cannot become arrogant 
for that reason. We cannot be arrogant toward small countries and poor countries, nor can we be 
arrogant toward big countries and rich countries.”1409 A comparison of Dai’s speech with his 2010 
article (which called for China’s adherence to the path of peaceful development) indeed reveals 
much similarity in their emphasis on the importance of international cooperation for China’s 
continued development and cautioning against arrogance and triumphalism. With this cautious 
tone established, Dai then proceeded to qualify his remarks by adding that China’s humility and 
caution should not be taken as a sign that it could “be bullied by small countries such as the 
 
1408 See, for example, Ryan D. Martinson, Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute 
Strategy (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 2018), p.2. 
1409 “Dai Bingguo: Being humble and cautious does not mean toleration of being bullied by other countries such as 
the Philippines” [戴秉国：谦虚谨慎不等于容忍他国欺负如菲律宾], China Daily, May 15, 2012, reprinted on 
Global Times, http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2012-05/2724027.html?agt=15422, accessed May 12, 2019. 
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Philippines.”1410 Considering also the timing of this speech, a highly plausible explanation to Dai’s 
qualification is that it was intended to ensure his speech was perceived as being politically correct. 
While moderation on territorial disputes has long been a sure recipe for nationalistic attacks,1411 
“talking tough when China has issues with its neighbors has become the politically correct practice,” 
as a number of Chinese interlocutors acknowledged in private. 1412  A former senior U.S. 
government official who personally knows Dai well gave a similar explanation for the 
qualification.1413 Another former senior U.S. government official with firsthand knowledge of the 
incident noted that while Asia hands usually pay attention to Dai’s speeches, this one did not draw 
special attention as an outstanding signal of Beijing’s intention to take an escalatory move.1414 
Dai’s worries were shared by other Chinese policy elites. Lin Limin, a CICIR researcher, 
explicitly cautioned in a May 9 article about the potential international political costs that China 
might incur in the event of making an escalatory move. While the power asymmetry between 
China and the Philippines meant a high chance of a Chinese military victory, a “simplistic, 
impulsive decision to fight” would “extremely likely destroy the environment for China’s peaceful 
rise,” Lin cautioned, because “countries who have territorial disputes with China will side with the 
Philippines, leading to a deterioration in China’s peripheral environment. Furthermore, the extent 
and means of a U.S. intervention must also be taken into consideration.”1415  Likewise, Chu Hao, 
a CICIR Southeast Asian expert, cautioned in early July that China should continue to ignore calls 
for threat or use of force to settle the South China Sea disputes. An escalatory Chinese posture 
 
1410 Ibid. 
1411 It is evident in the “New Thinking” on the East China Sea debate, and increasingly so on the South China Sea 
especially after 2010. For instance, Wu Jianmin was widely attacked and stigmatized as a “traitor” for his criticism on 
Chinese nationalism and calls for restraints in South China Sea disputes. 
1412 Author’s interviews, March, Beijing, 2019. 
1413 Author’s interview, Los Angeles, August 2019. 
1414 Author’s interview, Washington D.C., August 2019. 
1415 Lin Limin [林利民], “South China Sea standoff a test for China’s strategic wisdom” [南海对峙考验中国战略智
慧], Beijing Daily, May 9, 2012. 
- 406 - 
 
against the Philippines and Vietnam, argued Chu, would “only serve to push the two countries and 
probably all ASEAN members into the arms of the West” and leave China with a hostile 
surrounding environment.1416  
The Chinese foreign policy community, however, was ostensibly divided and heatedly 
debating during the standoff on the question of how other international stakeholders would 
interpret China’s behavior in the South China Sea as a manifestation of its strategic intentions. 
Analysts supporting a heavy-handed response began to question the value of adhering to the DOC 
and even China’s longtime policy of engagement in Southeast Asia. For example, in a China 
National Defense Daily article in mid-April, a CASS researcher called for a “resolute and firm” 
approach in defending China’s rights in the South China Sea and blamed the DOC for having 
constrained China under most circumstances and led to China’s loss of rights and interests in the 
South China Sea.
1417
 Li Jinming, a veteran Southeast Asia and international law expert at Xiaman 
University, went further by calling on China to disregard the DOC. In order to demonstrate 
effective control and administration, according to Li, China must occupy uninhabited land features 
“as soon as possible” and start “artificial construction” on shoals “before a COC could be 
implemented.”1418  
Meanwhile, this school of policy questioned the impacts that a tough response would have on 
China’s commitment to peaceful development. An April 28 People’s Daily article penned by Tian 
Wenlin, a CICIR researcher, asserted that worries that taking a hardline approach on South China 
Sea disputes would negatively impact China’s peaceful development were “unwarranted.” 
 
1416 Chu Hao, “Test for China-ASEAN ties,” China Daily, Jul. 6, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-
07/06/content_15553343.htm, accessed May 24, 2019. 
1417 Yang Danzhi [杨丹志], “Rights protection in the South China Sea needs resolution and firmness” [南海维权需
果断坚决], China National Defense Daily, Apr. 17, 2012.  
1418 Zhang Zhe [张喆], “China steps up pressure on the Philippines” [中国加大对菲律宾施压力度], Oriental 
Morning Post [东方早报], Apr. 19, 2012. 
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Suggesting a conciliatory posture could be tantamount to appeasement, Tian contended that “good 
fences make good neighbors” – only a firm Chinese posture to fend off encroaches would 
effectively stabilize the situation in the South China Sea.1419 
ASEAN’s muted response during the standoff buttressed the hardliners’ position. More than a 
week into the standoff, Manila openly complained that ASEAN had not issued “even a resolution 
of concern or of sympathy.”1420 Still, Beijing’s lingering unease about an emerging united ASEAN 
front was reflected in a Zhongsheng commentary in the People’s Daily on the eve of the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM). Warning against a derailing of the AMM caused by Manila’s 
push for a focus on the South China Sea, the commentary urged that the multilateral forum should 
focus on cooperation between ASEAN and China and not allow the broad interest of cooperation 
to be harmed by the South China Sea controversies.1421  
On July 13, the AMM failed to issue a joint communique, the first time in the 45-year history 
of ASEAN and arguably a prima facie sign of ASEAN’s inability to form a united front and impose 
a substantial geopolitical cost on China. ASEAN was internally split as Manila demanded the 
inclusion of the Scarborough Shoal episode. The drafting process of the communique was replete 
with intense discussions and disagreement over whether to include a reference to the South China 
Sea.1422 Cambodia, chair of the meeting and Beijing’s close ally, insisted the communique be 
issued without mentioning the South China Sea disputes on the basis that “the Scarborough Shoal 
issue is a dispute of sovereignty between two countries – China and the Philippines. It’s not an 
 
1419 Tian Wenlin [田文林], “China is well justified to defend its rights in the South China Sea” [中国南海维权理直
气壮], People’s Daily (overseas edition), Apr. 28, 2012. 
1420 Alastair McIndoe, “Philippines, US hold war games amid row with China,” Strait Times, Apr. 17, 2012. 
1421 Zhong Sheng [钟声], “Be alarmed at conspiracy to intervene ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meetings” [警惕干扰东
盟外长会议图谋], People’s Daily, Jul. 3, 2012. 
1422 “Vietnam, Philippines ‘bullying’ ASEAN over sea conflict: Cambodian sources,” Japan Economic Newswire, Ju. 
12, 2012; “ASEAN sharply split on South China Sea row,” Agence France Presse, Jul. 11, 2012. 
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ASEAN issue.”1423 Blaming Manila for “stirring up the mud” and “kidnapping” the AMM, Beijing 
hailed the ASEAN meeting as a “productive” event where “China’s views and positions have 
gained many countries’ appreciation and support.”1424  
A Moderately Strong Nonmilitary Escalation After an Initial Standoff 
As the standoff evolved, it gradually became clear to Beijing that the domestic calls for standing 
firm vis-à-vis the Philippines overshadowed the international pressure for demonstrating China’s 
continued peaceful intentions. Therefore, Beijing was incrementally inclined to make an escalatory 
response. Meanwhile, China’s immediate goal was to get the fishermen back; and after the 
fishermen fled the scene, the goal became, as stated in an annual bluebook published by CASS: 
“to deter the Philippines from continuing confrontation with China.”1425 There was no immediate 
fait accompli in the Scarborough to be reversed, and the possibility of the Philippines presenting 
Beijing with one through unilateral use of force was very low given the power asymmetry. On the 
other hand, Manila’s repeated threat to take the dispute to ITLOS did raise the prospect of a fait 
accompli in the diplomatic and legal dimensions. Therefore, Beijing engaged in a moderately 
strong nonmilitary escalation, which straddles restrained and forceful nonmilitary escalations as 
outlined in the taxology in chapter 2 and is comprised of imposing economic sanctions targeting 
nonessential commodities and services, intensifying MLE operations in the contested area, 
curtailing high-level diplomatic contact, and permitting anti-Philippine street protests.   
On May 2, the Chinese General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine announced that due to “bacteria problems,” the agency would tighten inspections on 
 
1423 “Cambodia rejects ASEAN ministers’ plea to issue joint communique,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jul. 13, 2012. 
1424 “China says ASEAN talks ‘productive,” Agence France Presse, Jul. 13, 2012; “Asia-Pacific countries need to 
strengthen cooperation: FM spokesman,” Xinhua News Service, Jul. 13, 2012. 
1425 Ye Hailin [叶海林], “Lessons of the ‘Huangyan Island incident’ for China’s maritime protection struggle from” 
[“黄岩岛”对中国南海维权斗争的启示], in Li Xiangyang [李向阳], ed., Annual Report on Development of Asia-
Pacific (2013) [亚太地区发展报告 (2013)] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), p. 152. 
- 409 - 
 
fruits imported from the Philippines, and that bananas and pineapples from the Philippines were 
being held at Chinese ports.1426 Data released by Philippine’s Agriculture Department showed that 
the top fruit exports to China in 2011 in terms of value were bananas, seconded by pineapples;1427 
and China had been the second largest international importer of Philippine bananas (with Japan 
being the largest).1428 Chinese authorities provided no specific information on the quantity of fruits 
being held, and figures in open sources varied greatly.1429  
Given the short duration, the nonessential nature, and the likely modest quantity of the goods 
that were affected (Figure 8.2), the tightened inspection was probably intended to be a symbolic 
warning, as opposed to be a move intended to inflict strategic costs by targeting essential 
commodities (e.g., rare earth). Quiet diplomacy between Beijing and Manila over the compounded 
bananas soon produced positive results. Manila announced on May 24 that after a joint inspection 
of the fruits by Chinese and Philippine quarantine officers, the uninfected fruits were cleared for 
entry to China while the infested part would be destroyed or shipped back to the Philippines.1430  
Information about the suspension of China’s Philippine-bound tourism began to surface after 
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying again summoned the Philippines’ charge d’affaires Alex 
 
1426 “Notice on Strengthening Inspection and Quarantine on Fruits Imported from the Philippines” [关于加强进口菲
律宾水果检验检疫有关问题的通知], General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of 
China [国家质量监督检验检疫总局 ], May 2, 2012, reprinted on http://law.foodmate.net/show-174806.html, 
accessed May 24, 2019; Teddy Ng, Alan Robles, Mimi Lau and Julian Ryall, “Manila accused of provoking public,” 
South China Morning Post, May 10, 2012. 
1427 Bettina Faye V. Roc and Aubrey E. Barrameda, “Philippines looks for alternative markets for fruit exports,” 
BusinessWorld, May 14, 2012. 
1428 Christopher Bodeen, “Trade, public anger sharpening Beijing-Manila spat,” Associated Press, May 10, 2012. 
1429 A May 11 New York Times report stated that as many as 1,200 shipments of bananas had been held at Chinese 
ports. Jane Perlez, “Dispute between China and Philippines Over Island Becomes More Heated,” New York Times, 
May 11, 2012. Another Chinese media report in mid-May put the figure at “more than 1,500 shipments.” “Philippine 
bananas being held at Dalian, Shanghai and other ports, some start to rot” [菲律宾香蕉滞留大连上海等地港口，部
分 正 在 腐 烂 ], Daily Economic News [ 每 日 经 济 新 闻 ], May 16, 2012, reprinted on ifeng.com, 
http://finance.ifeng.com/news/hqcj/20120516/6464838.shtml, accessed May 24, 2019. But on May 16, Philippine 
Foreign Secretary Rosario claimed only 15 containers was being held. “Manila urges caution about S. China Sea 
standoff rumors,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 16, 2012. 
1430  Bettina Faye V. Roc and Noemi M. Gonzales, “Agriculture dep’t addresses China’s concerns on fruits,” 
BusinessWorld, May 25, 2012. 
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Chua on May 7 – the third time since the face-off started. During her meeting with Chua, Fu 
warned that China had “made all preparations to respond to any escalation of the situation by the 
Philippine side.”1431 Travel agencies in major Chinese cities such as Guangzhou and Shanghai 
announced to postpone or cancel booked trips for “safety concerns” as Filipinos began to stage 
demonstrations at the Chinese Embassy in Manila from May 11. China’s Southern Airlines, one 
of the country’s three major airline companies, announced that it was cutting flights to the 
Philippines, citing the cancellation of “a large number of tourist groups” as the reason for the 
cut.1432 
Figure 8.2 The Philippines’ fruit exports to China by trade value (million US$) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Database (https://comtrade.un.org/data/); banana (HS 080300); pineapple (HS 080430); 
papaya (HS 080720). 
 
 
1431 Ng Tze-wei, “Beijing toughens stance on shoal; Philippines obviously does not realize it has made serious mistakes, 
deputy foreign minister warns,” South China Morning Post, May 9, 2012. 
1432 “China travel agencies suspend travel to Philippines,” Xinhua News Service, May 10, 2012; “Another Chinese 
city halts travel to Philippines,” Xinhua News Service, May 11, 2012; “Focus: Philippines, China territorial row spills 
into streets, cyberspace,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 11, 2012; “China airline cuts flights to Philippines, Xinhua 
News Service, May 15, 2012. 
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Despite claims by Chinese media including CCTV that over one million Chinese tourists travel 
to the Philippines every year and that the Chinese boycott would deal a “heavy blow” (重创) to 
the Philippines’ tourism industry,1433 data from credible Philippine sources spanning multiple 
years reveals a very different story (Figure 8.3). Not only was the number of Chinse tourists to the 
Philippines way below one million until 2017, the year-to-year changes also demonstrate a clear 
trend of growth in general from 2005-2018, with only minor drops in 2009 and 2014. The year 
2012, notwithstanding the tourism suspension, saw a modest 3-percent increase. To be sure, a 
counterfactual argument could be made that given the rapid growth in Chinese tourists since 2010 
(21 percent and 30 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively), the Philippines could have seen a much 
bigger increase in Chinese tourists in 2012 had there been no boycott. While this counterfactual 
argument might have some merit, a mere slowdown in tourist growth – and no decrease in absolute 
term – arguably had a very limited effect as an economic punishment. Moreover, in 2013 the 
Philippines saw a 70-percent spike in in-bound Chinese tourists, a fact which only confirms that 
the suspension of tourism was a symbolic rather than a substantial countermeasure in this standoff. 
In the public dimension, only a few small-scale anti-Philippine demonstrations took place and 
received modest media coverage. On May 11, a group of Chinese citizens held a rally in front of 
the Philippine Embassy in Beijing. The protesters reportedly held banners with slogans such as 
“Huangyan Island will always belong to China” and “Don’t test China’s limit on guarding 
 
1433  CCTV-The World Global Watch [央视环球视线 ], “Sea areas in the Huangyan Island will start fishing 
moratorium from tomorrow” [黄岩岛海域等明起将进入休渔期 ], reprinted on Sina.com, May 15, 2012, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-05-15/011924414759.shtml, accessed Nov 18, 2019. Similar reports were widely 
circulated in the Chinese media. See, for instance, “Experts says the Philippines will lose millions of dollars income 
if China suspends Philippine-bound tourism” [专家称若中国暂停赴菲旅游将致菲律宾损失千万美元], Global 
Times, https://world.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJvoLj, accessed Nov. 18, 2019; “Multiple travel agencies suspends 
Philippine-bound tours, probably will deal a heavy blow to the Philippine tourism” [多地旅行社暂停赴菲旅游，或
重创菲律宾旅游业], ifeng.com, May 1, 2012 http://finance.ifeng.com/news/hqcj/20120510/6442110.shtml, accessed 
Nov. 18, 2019. 
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sovereignty.” According to Xinhua, the protest was “brief” as the police quickly intervened and 
broke up the protesting group.1434 The next day, a group of Chinese protesters staged another brief 
rally at the same location.1435  
Figure 8.3 Chinese Tourist arrivals in the Philippines 
 
Source: Data for 2005-2010, JC Punongbayan, “[Analysis] Why the influx of Chinese in the Philippines?” 
Rappler, Jun. 17, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/233238-reasons-influx-chinese-philippines; 
data for 2011, Apa M. Agbayani, “Impact of China travel boycott ‘immediate but temporary,’” Rappler, May 
10, 2012, https://www.rappler.com/nation/5166-dot-chinese-travel-boycott-unfortunate; data for 2012, “4.25-M 
tourists in PH in 2012: Record high but below goal,” Rappler, Jan. 23, 2013, 
https://www.rappler.com/business/20304-4-27-m-tourists-in-ph-in-2012-record-high-but-below-goal; data for 
2013-2018, Department of Tourism, Republic of the Philippines, “Tourism Demand Statistics – Visitor Arrivals 
to the Philippines” (various years), http://www.tourism.gov.ph/tourism_dem_sup_pub.aspx. All websites 
accessed Nov. 18, 2019.  The year-to-year change rates are calculated by the author. 
 
On the frontline, FLE’s South China Bureau announced on May 14 to impose a fishing ban 
from May 16 to August 1, covering waters including the Scarborough Shoal but excluding most 
of the Spratlys. A spokesperson of the bureau asserted that foreign ships’ fishing activities in the 
banned area would be treated as a “blatant encroachment on China’s fishery resources” and warned 
that violators would face punishment such as fines, confiscations, and even criminal charges. 
 
1434 “China Voice: China-Philippines dispute should be settled through dialogue,” Xinhua News Service, May 11, 
2012.  
1435 “Protest over Huangyan Island dispute held in Beijing,” Xinhua News Service, May 12, 2012. 
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While denying the ban being related to the ongoing standoff, Chinese authorities insisted that it 
“has every right to defend its sovereignty and protect its fishery resources.”1436 Manila promptly 
reciprocated by imposing its own fishing ban in the area.1437 
In June, Washington stepped in to broker a solution to end the standoff. During the meeting 
with Fu Ying on June 1, Campbell proposed a simultaneous, mutual withdrawal of the Chinese 
and Philippine government ships from the Scarborough as a way to quickly defuse the tensions. 
According to Fu’s account of the meeting, Washington seemed earnest to end the standoff before 
Aquino started his state visit to the U.S. on June 8 such that the China-Philippine conflict would 
not be the focus of the U.S.-Philippine summit.1438 On June 16, Aquino ordered the Philippine 
coast guard ships to leave the area, using an anticipated typhoon as a good face-saving pretext.1439 
Manila’s decision seemed in a large part to be the result of U.S. pressure. In an email sent to Hillary 
Clinton on the same day, Jake Sullivan, then director of policy planning at the State Department 
and a senior policy advisor to Clinton, stated that Washington had “put a lot of pressure on the 
Phils to step back.” With respect to China, the email stated – without specification – that Beijing 
made “commitments to ‘de-escalate.’”1440  However, on June 18 when asked to comment on 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Rosario’s call on Beijing to honor its commitment to remove the 
remaining Chinese vessels from the Scarborough, the Chinese foreign ministry denied the 
existence of any commitment to a mutual withdrawal.1441 
 
1436 “China Focus: China to impose South China Sea fishing ban,” Xinhua News Service, May 14, 2012. 
1437 Noemi Gonzales, “Philippines to also implement fishing ban in Panatag shoal,” BusinessWorld, May 15, 2012. 
1438 Fu, See the World 2, p. 265. 
1439 “Philippines pulls out ships from disputed shoal,” Associated Press, Jun. 16, 2012. 
1440  From Jake Sullivan to Hillary Clinton, Date: Jun. 16, 2012, Subject: Dai, Hillary Clinton Email Archive, 
https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/20458, accessed Nov. 15, 2019. 
1441 “MFA spokesperson Hong Lei holds regular press conference June 18, 2012” [2012 年 6 月 18 日外交部发言人
洪磊举行例行记者会], Jun. 19, 2012, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zalt/chn/zgsd/t942674.htm, accessed Nov. 17, 2019. 
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Open sources and private interviews provide drastically different – in effect diametrically 
opposing – accounts with respect to whether such an agreement was actually reached at the 
Campbell-Fu meeting. 1442  Conventional wisdom contends that Beijing’s denial following 
Philippine’s June 16 withdrawal constituted an utterly bad-faith renege of what was believed to be 
a U.S.-brokered deal.1443 An alternative explanation holds that Beijing might have avoided making 
a commitment to a total pull-out during the incident; instead, a secret arrangement was made 
through back-channel diplomacy between Beijing, Manila and Washington to allow a gradual, 
face-saving Chinese pullout. According to this explanation, there were a number of crisis 
communication errors during the process of U.S. shuttle diplomacy, and Manila’s public disclosure 
on June 16-18 of this arrangement compounded the situation by putting Beijing on the defense 
domestically. To avoid being perceived as compromising on China’s territorial sovereignty, 
Beijing immediately called off the withdrawal.1444 
In addition to the two narratives, a third explanation emerged upon a revisiting of published 
information in authoritative Chinese-language sources at the time as well as in interviews with 
knowledgeable Chinese sources. First, Beijing’s initial explicit denial of any simultaneous 
withdrawal commitment came on June 6. According to a June 7 People’s Daily report, both sides 
had pulled out their government vessels from the lagoon by June 5, but the Chinese foreign 
ministry stressed on June 6 that the Chinese pull-out came two days after the Philippine’s and 
denied that this move was the result of any agreed-upon simultaneous withdrawal accord.1445 
 
1442 Fu, See the World 2, pp. 265-266; Green, et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, pp. 118-119; author’s 
interviews, Beijing, June 2019; skype interview, September 2019. 
1443  Ely Ratner, “Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reed,” National Interest, Nov. 21, 2013, 
https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons-scarborough-reef-9442, accessed Nov. 17, 2019.  
1444 Green, et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, p. 119. 
1445 “Philippines see easing of tensions with China at disputed shoal,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jun. 7, 2012; Qiang 
Wei [强薇], “MFA spokesperson states that China and the Philippines did not simultaneously withdraw their 
government ships from the Huangyan Island” [外交部发言人表示中菲并非同时从黄岩岛撤出公务船], People’s 
Daily, Jun. 7, 2012. 
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Beijing’s emphasis of the sequenced withdrawals and the consistency of its denials (before and 
after Philippine’s complete withdrawal on June 16) may be an indication that there was no 
unequivocal commitment to a simultaneous withdrawal – at least not from the Chinese perspective. 
Second, Beijing might not have objected to a sequenced pullout, but its later refusal to 
withdraw was probably due to the perception that the Philippines intended to send its ships back 
the Scarborough after the typhoon, rather than Manila’s premature disclosure. China’s domestic 
publicity on the standoff was high in April and peaked in May; but in June, media coverage 
significantly dropped by nearly two thirds (Table 8.1). This decline in publicity might have been 
intended to pave the way for a quiet, face-saving Chinese withdrawal by lowering the potential 
domestic audience costs that Beijing could incur with such a move. According to a Chinese 
interlocutor close to the foreign policy establishment, Beijing at the time did perceive the typhoon 
as a very good opportunity that could be used as a face-saving pretext. “But the Philippines 
suggested its ships might return after the typhoon, so China decided its ships would stay. After 
Philippine’s ships left during the typhoon, Chinese ships just took shelter nearby [instead of 
leaving the area].”1446  The Chinese suspicions seemed not entirely unfounded. After Aquino 
ordered the pull out, the Philippine Foreign Department’s spokesperson Raul Hernandez, without 
explicitly saying whether Philippine ships would return after the typhoon, stated that there was no 
agreement to withdraw from the area permanently. 1447  Philippine Foreign Secretary Rosario 
similarly stated, “When weather improves, a re-evaluation will be made.”1448  
On June 20, Aquino threatened to order the Philippine government ships back to the 
Scarborough Shoal once the weather improved should Chinese ships continue to remain in the 
 
1446 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
1447 “Philippine ship pull-out calms tensions: China,” Agence France Presse, Jun. 18, 2012. 
1448 “Boats leave disputed sea in typhoon season,” UPI, Jun. 18, 2012. 
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area.1449 On June 29, a spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Manila denied that China had 
expressed any intention of withdrawing its ships, simply claiming that “[t]here is no such 
commitment from China.”1450  
The strongest escalation came when China opportunistically seized full control of the 
Scarborough Shoal and presented the Philippines with a fait accompli on water. The Philippine 
Foreign Affairs Department reported on July 18, five days after the AMM failed to issue a joint 
communique, that several Chinese dinghies were tied together at the entrance of the lagoon to 
prevent Philippine vessels and fishing boats from returning.1451  
Post Crisis China-Philippine Impasse and the Galvanized “Common ASEAN Position” 
The Scarborough Shoal standoff ended with China gaining full control of the area. Despite Beijing 
and Manila’s attempt to mend ties through mutual envoy visits in the fall,1452 the bilateral relations 
deteriorated considerably after the Philippines decided in 2013 to take the dispute to a U.N. arbitral 
tribunal, which reportedly resulted in China withdrawing its invitation for Aquino to attend the 
China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning in September.1453 The relations went from bad to worse after 
another faceoff in the Second Thomas Shoal in 2013 and early 2014. Even though high-level 
exchanges between the two countries were not as completely halted thereafter as between China 
and Japan following the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization,1454 the political will and trust necessary 
 
1449 Christine O. Avendano, “PH ships to go back if Sinos don’t leave shoal,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, Jun. 21, 2012. 
1450 Jerry E. Esplanada, “China ‘relaxed’ with no PH ships in shoal,” Philippines Daily Inquirer, Jun. 29, 2012. 
1451 Michaela del Callar, “DFA: China boats blocking PHL vessels from Panatag Shoal,” GMA News Online, Jul. 18, 
2012, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/265889/dfa-china-boats-blocking-phl-vessels-from-panatag-
shoal/story/, accessed May 27, 2019. 
1452 Philippines Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas visited Beijing in September as Aquino’s special 
envoy; China’s Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying visited Manila in October as a special envoy.  Michael Lim, “Big gaps 
remain in PH-China ties,” Philippines Daily Inquirer, Sept. 24, 2012; MFA, “Vice foreign minister Fu Ying meets 
with Philippine president Aquino” [ 外 交 部 副 部 长 傅 莹 拜 会 菲 律 宾 总 统 阿 基 诺 ], Oct. 19, 2012, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676452/xgxw_676458/t980754.shtml, 
accessed Nov. 19, 2019. 
1453 Hrvoje Hranjski, “Manila says China withdraws invitation for Aquino,” Associated Press, Aug. 29, 2013. 
1454 Xi and Aquino briefly met in November 2014 when Aquino was in Beijing to attend the APEC meeting and in 
November 2015when Xi was in Manila for the APEC summit. “Xi Jinping briefly talked with Philippine President 
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to initiate serious discussions on crisis prevention and management in the South China Sea were 
completely absent at the time. 
ASEAN’s unprecedented failure to present a cohesive position on the confrontation unnerved 
its members, especially Indonesia. Jakarta promptly embarked on an intensive shuttle diplomacy 
with five ASEAN countries to mitigate the organization’s internal rift and to forge a “common 
ASEAN position” on the disputes.1455 On July 20, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a statement 
stipulating the organization’s six principles on the issue of the South China Sea. Short of naming 
any party, the statement urged for a “full implementation” of the DOC, “full respect of the 
universally recognized principles of international law,” and “continued exercise of self-restraint 
and non-use of force by all parties,” while at the same time also pledging to “intensify ASEAN 
consultation.”1456  Manila welcomed the demonstration of ASEAN unity and “centrality as a 
regional bloc” in the face of what analysts characterized as Beijing’s tactic of divide and 
conquer.1457  
Even though some international observers dismissed the six-point statement as a document that 
“simply restated the principles of the 2002 DOC,”1458 it came as an alarming sign to China of the 
surging audience costs on the ASEAN front. Importantly, the perceived ASEAN cohesiveness 
 
Aquino” [APEC 授 权 发 布 : 习 近 平 同 菲 律 宾 总 统 阿 基 诺 简 短 交 谈 ], Xinhua, Nov. 11, 2014, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2014-11/11/c_1113202778.htm; Ren Meizi [任梅子], “Xi Jinping and Aquino 
greeted each other for two minutes, Aquino thanked Xi for attending the summit” [习近平与阿基诺寒暄2分钟，阿
基诺: 感谢出席峰会], Global Times, Nov. 19, 2015, https://world.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJRBCY. Both were 
accessed Nov. 19, 2019.  
1455 “ASEAN must push on with China sea code: Indonesia,” Agence France Presse, Jul. 18, 2012. 
1456 “Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers: ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea,” Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia, Jul. 20, 2012,  
1457 Daniel C. O’Neill, Dividing ASEAN and Conquering the South China Sea: China’s Financial Power Projection 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2018); “PH welcomes Indonesia’s effort to mend rifts in Asean,” 
Philippines Daily Inquirer, Jul. 20, 2012; “China plays divide and rule with ASEAN states,” Nikkei Weekly, Jul. 23, 
2012. 
1458 Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (Lanham, MD: The 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015), 3rd edition, p.178. 
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arguably prevented China from falling back on the so-called “Huangyan model” to gain control of 
other land features in the South China Sea. The widely proclaimed “Huangyan model,” defined by 
Chinese political analysts as a tactical employment of a wide range of nonmilitary escalatory 
measures in response to a perceived foreign provocation with a goal to “turn the situation to the 
advantage of China” by opportunistically gaining partial or complete control over contested land 
features, 1459  became a buzzword in Chinese media and policy writings. 1460  However, some 
Chinese analysts were skeptical as to whether the model could be applied to the Spratlys. Zhang 
Jie, a South China Sea expert at CASS, cautioned that while only China and the Philippines claim 
the Scarborough, seven parties stake rivaling claims to the Spratlys. As such, employing the 
“Huangyan model” to the latter would likely generate “very high sensitivity and political 
externalities” as “relevant disputants and countries outside of the region would make stronger 
reactions, and probably form and strengthen a concerted position against China.”1461 As a Chinese 
interviewee candidly acknowledged in private, “The international political costs on China surged 
 
1459 Zhang Jie [张洁], “Huangyan Model and the Shift of China’s Maritime Strategy” [黄岩岛模式与中国海洋维权
政策的转向], Southeast Asian Studies [东南亚研究], issue 4, 2013, p. 28. This Huangyan model described as such 
is in essence similar to what non-Chinese analysts more commonly used characterization of the Chinese “reactive 
assertiveness.”  
1460 The term first appeared in People’s Daily in early May without specification but only referred to as an alternative 
to “direct negotiation and friendly consultation to resolve the dispute.” Qin Hong [秦宏], “We have adequate means 
in facing the Philippines” [面对菲律宾，我们有足够手段], People’s Daily (overseas edition), May 8, 2012. For 
instances of discussions in policy writings, see, Ruan Zongze [阮宗泽], “China’s diplomacy in 2012: meets the 
challenge, creates opportunities” [2012 中国外交：外界挑战，创造机遇] in CIIS, International Situation and 
China's Foreign Affairs 2013 [国际形势和中国外交 2013] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2013), pp. 191-192; 
Zhang Haiwen [张海文], “Evaluation of the trend of the evolving South China Sea dispute” [南海争端演化趋势评
估], in Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, International Strategic Situation and China’s 
National Security 2012-2013 [国际战略形式与中国国家安全 (2012-2013)] (Beijing: junshi kexue chubanshe, 2013), 
p. 112; Ge Hongliang [葛红亮], “Security situation in the South China Sea” [南海地区安全形势] in Ju Hailong [鞠
海龙], ed, Report of the Situation in the South China Sea 2013–2014 [南海地区形势报告 2013-2014] (Beijing: Shishi 
chuanshe, 2015), p. 10. 
1461 Zhang, “Huangyan Model and the Shift of China’s Maritime Strategy,” p. 29. 
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tremendously after the Huangyan Island incident, rendering the ‘Huangyan model’ essentially non-
reusable (不可复制) in the South China Sea.”1462  
The 2014 HD-981 CLASH 
Sino-Vietnamese relations did not undergo visible deterioration immediately after the 2009 
Vietnam-Malaysia joint submission, as China paid more attention to the Philippines’ baseline bill 
and the U.S. pivot to Asia over the following two years. China likely played down the impacts of 
the joint submission also because 2010 marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-
Vietnamese diplomatic relations. 
However, bilateral tensions quickly built up in 2011. In May, Hanoi accused three CMS ships 
of cutting the cables of a PetroVietnam-operated seismic survey ship in waters within Vietnam’s 
claimed EEZ.1463  Beijing responded with a statement expressing its opposition to Vietnam’s 
exploration activities which “undermined China’s interests and jurisdictional rights in the South 
China Sea and violated the consensus both countries have reached on the issue.”1464 Hanoi rebuffed 
Beijing’s statement, claiming that Beijing had “gone against the knowledge of leaders of both 
countries” and demanding China compensate for the damage caused to the PetroVietnam ship.1465 
A wave of anti-China protests was staged in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City at Chinese diplomatic 
compounds on June 5, and continued for the subsequent three weekends. Protestors demanded the 
Vietnamese government take further measures to protect the country’s sovereignty in the South 
China Sea against the perceived Chinese infringement.1466 Beijing responded with a soft tone. On 
 
1462 Author’s interview, Beijing, May 2019. 
1463 “Hanoi, Beijing in new South China Sea spat: repot,” Agence France Presse, May 28, 2011; “Vietnam protests to 
China over damage to seismic survey ship,” Dutsche Presse-Agentrur, May 29, 2011. 
1464 “China opposes Vietnam oil, gas exploration in China’s jurisdictional sea area: FM spokeswoman,” Xinhua News 
Service, May 28, 2011. 
1465 “China hits back at Vietnam over territorial spat,” Agence France Presse, May 29, 2011; “Vietnam protests to 
China over damage to seismic survey ship.” 
1466 “Rare Vietnam demo over sea dispute with China,” Agence France Presse, Jun. 5, 2011; “South China Sea: 
Vietnamese hold anti-Chinese protest,” BBC, Jun. 5, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13661779, 
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June 7, the MFA issued a statement, calling on Hanoi to “make earnest efforts” to implement the 
“important consensus” reached between the two countries “on how to appropriately handle 
maritime issues and maintain stability in the South China Sea.”1467 
Tensions further intensified following the occurrence of another incident near the Vanguard 
Bank. On June 9, Hanoi claimed that a Chinese fishing boat escorted by two Chinese patrol vessels 
harassed and rammed a PetroVietnam-chartered seismic ship operating inside Vietnam’s claimed 
EEZ. Criticizing the act of the Chinese ships as “seriously violating Vietnam’s sovereign rights,” 
Hanoi lodged an official protest with Beijing.1468 This time Beijing hit back firmly, rejecting 
Vietnam’s accusation as being false and asserting that the Chinese fishing boats were chased away 
by armed Vietnamese vessels when operating in the China-claimed sea area. During this pursuit, 
according to Beijing’s account, the fishing net of one of the Chinese boats became tangled with 
cables of the survey ship, which resulted in the fishing boat being dragged for over an hour before 
the fishermen were forced to cut the net loose and separate their boat from the survey ship.1469 In 
mid-June, both countries staged naval exercises in the South China Sea, adding a military 
component to the heightened tensions.1470  
A sign of conciliation emerged on June 22 when China’s Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai 
told the press that “China has no intention to get into military conflict with any country, Vietnam 
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- 421 - 
 
included.” Cui stopped short of naming the Philippines, with whom China’s relations also had 
been deteriorating.1471 Vietnam swiftly extended an olive branch by dispatching to Beijing its 
China-educated Vice Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son as a special envoy.1472  After a meeting 
between Son and China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo, the two sides issued a joint statement, 
pledging to “jointly safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea.” Notably, both parties 
underscored the need for “joint efforts” to “influence media reports in a positive manner and avoid 
words and deeds that would be detrimental to the friendship and mutual trust between the peoples 
of the two countries,” a clear reference to strengthening positive propaganda and censoring 
negative media coverage on the bilateral relations to avoid stoking nationalism and mutual 
antagonism, especially in the Vietnamese public. 1473  As Hanoi moved to rein in anti-China 
demonstrations, anti-China protests in Vietnam gradually petered out over July and August.1474  
The two communist countries undertook a major conciliatory thrust in late 2011 with two high-
level mutual visits. In October, General Secretary the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Nguyen 
Phu Trong made a state visit to Beijing. During his meeting with Trong, Hu Jintao called on both 
countries to maintain dialogue and negotiations regarding the dispute and to “deal with problems 
in a calm and constructive fashion and avoid affecting the relationship between the two countries 
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us/Consulate/Consulate%20General/Biography%20Consulate%20General/Pages/default.aspx, accessed Nov. 20, 
2019. 
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and parties.”1475 The two sides agreed to set up a hotline between the top leaders to deal with 
maritime contingencies – the first such hotline to be set up since the normalization of the two 
countries’ diplomatic ties in 1991.1476 Trong’s visit was reciprocated by a visit by Xi Jinping to 
Hanoi in December. Highlighting the shared ideology and stressing the need for both communist 
parties to consolidate their position as ruling parties, Xi told his Vietnamese hosts that the two 
sides should enhance their solidarity, prioritize socioeconomic development in each of the two 
countries, and properly handle their disagreement.1477 
The reconciliation, nevertheless, was soon overshadowed by Vietnam’s passage of its Law of 
Sea in June 2012, which asserted Vietnam’s sovereignty over both the Paracels and Spratlys. In 
response to the law, Beijing unveiled the prefectural-level Sansha City,1478 which represented an 
elevation from the county-level administrative ranking as reported by Hong Kong media in 
2007.1479 Chinese media accounts at the time and the swiftness of the announcement of Sansha 
confirm that Beijing probably had done most preparation work to launch the city as of 2007 but 
called it off the last minute as a result of Vietnam’s protest. Hanoi reacted strongly to the 
 
1475 “Chinese, Vietnamese party chiefs hold ‘candid’ discussion on maritime issues,” Xinhua News Service, Oct.11, 
2011. 
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up to smooth Beijing-Hanoi relations,” South China Morning Post, Oct. 16, 2011; “Basic principles guiding the 
settlement of maritime issues existing between China and Vietnam” [关于指导解决中国和越南海上问题基本原则
协 议 ], MFA, Oct. 12, 2011, 
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establishment of Sansha, defending the law as “normal legislative activity.”1480 Beijing ratcheted 
up pressure on Hanoi on June 23 with CNOOC inviting international firms to bid for exploration 
in nine blocks in the South China Sea, which Hanoi claimed were “entirely within” Vietnam’s 
EEZ and continental shelf.1481  
Tensions began to die down in October when China dispatched its State Councilor and Public 
Security Minister Meng Jianzhu to attend a Sino-Vietnamese bilateral anti-crime cooperation 
meeting in Hanoi. The report by Xinhua was only two-sentence in length on Meng’s discussion 
with his Vietnamese counterpart on anti-crime affairs,1482 contrasting the more detailed reports on 
Meng’s meetings with CPV’s General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and Vietnamese Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, respectively. During his talk with Trong, Meng stated that the Sino-
Vietnamese relationship “is not all about the South China Sea problem,” but “inappropriate 
management” of the problem could “poison the overall bilateral relationship.” Meng made a 
similar call for “properly handling sensitive bilateral issues” when meeting with Dung. 1483  
Vietnam reciprocated and dispatched Hoang Binh Quan, head of CPV’s Commission for External 
Relations,1484 as Nguyen Phu Trong’s special envoy to Beijing right after the conclusion of CCP’s 
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18th Party Congress to deliver Trong’s congratulatory message to Xi Jinping and invitation to Xi 
to visit Vietnam.1485  
The year 2013 witnessed relatively peaceful China-Vietnam relation overall. In June, 
Vietnam’s President Truong Tan Sang made his first state visit to China.1486 During Xi Jinping’s 
meeting with Sang, the leaders agreed to set up a hotline to handle fishing incidents in the disputed 
areas, in addition to the hotline designated for the management of maritime contingencies. The 
fishing incident hotline mechanism requires both sides to inform the other within 48 hours of any 
detentions involving fishermen or fishing ships.1487 During Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to 
Hanoi in October, both sides agreed to set up a work group to jointly explore the undelimited areas 
outside of the mouth of the Tonkin Gulf.1488 Indeed, Beijing seemed to be particularly appreciative 
of what it perceived as Vietnam’s restraint in light of Manila’s insistence to forge ahead with the 
arbitration. As noted in an annual report compiled by researchers at CASS, “In 2013…contrasting 
the Philippines’ use of international opinion to pressure China, Vietnam’s attitude is relatively 
friendly and restrained.”1489 
The diplomatic momentum was sustained into 2014. In February, the two countries began to 
discuss the prospect of establishing a direct line between their defense ministries, with an aim to 
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activate the line by the end of that year.
1490
 At the time China had only established such lines with 
the United States and Russia.1491 This plan, however, came to a halt as the bilateral relationship hit 
the rocks following China’s deployment of HD-981 to the Paracels. 
Crisis Prevention Failed: China’s Sudden Deployment of HD-981 to the Paracels 
In early May 2014, China’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced that the drilling 
platform HD-981 would be operating at the location of 15o29’58” N, 111o12’06” E from May 2 to 
August 15, prohibiting unrelated ships from entering the area within one nautical mile of the 
drilling site. 1492  Hanoi reacted strongly. On May 4, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry’s 
spokesperson Le Hai Binh claimed the drilling location as falling “undeniably” within Vietnam-
claimed EEZ and that Vietnam “resolutely protests any activity conducted by foreign countries in 
its waters without permission.”1493  
Unlike previous incidents in which China was reacting to other claimants’ moves, the oilrig 
deployment was not a reaction to any moves made by Vietnam in the first place. In other words, 
China’s unilateral decision to deploy HD-981 initiated the clash and likely caught the Vietnamese 
off guard. Carlyle Thayer characterized the oilrig deployment as coming “out of the blue.”1494 
 
1490 “2014 February MOD Regular Press Conference” [国防部 2014 年 2 月国防部例行记者会实录], Feb. 27, 2014, 
full-text transcript retrieved at http://news.12371.cn/2014/02/27/ARTI1393492733216128.shtml, accessed Jul. 21, 
2019; “Vietnam and China hold talks on setting up confidential direct line between the two countries’ defense 
ministries” [越中就设立两国国防部保密直通电话进行磋商], Online Newspaper of the Government of the Socialist 




gp, accessed Nov. 21, 2019. 
1491 Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, 2014 Annual Report of Vietnam’s Conditions [2014 年越南国情报告] 
(Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), p. 075.   
1492 “Navigation alert HN0033 (HYSY981 Drilling operation in South China Sea)” [琼航警 0033 (海洋石油 981 钻
井 船 南 海 钻 井 作 业 )], MSA, May 3, 2014, 
https://www.msa.gov.cn/page/wap/wap.do?action=content&channelId=D3340711-057B-494B-8FA0-
9EEDC4C5EAD9&articleId=7291b46d-ab69-4949-8a88-6c55dad815e8, accessed Jun. 8, 2019.  
1493 “Remarks by FM Spokesman Le Hai Binh on 4th May 2014,” Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140505232230, accessed on Jun. 8, 2019. 
1494 “Vietnam sea spat part of China’s larger strategy: experts,” Agence France Presse, May 10, 2014. 
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Little authoritative evidence is available at the time of this writing to provide a conclusive 
explanation to China’s motivation. The energy factor seems unlikely to be the primary driving 
force, as areas around the Paracels do not have significant known conventional hydrocarbon fields 
and thus “there is no proved or probable reserves,” according to a 2013 estimate by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration.1495 Then why did China suddenly make this move? 
Several factors might have incentivized the deployment. First, in term of goal(s), it might be 
intended to test the reactions of Vietnam and other claimants to China’s advancement into the 
energy-rich deepwater areas in the South China Sea – an explanation provided by different Chinese 
interlocutors in private communication and seemingly suggested in writings by Chinese analysts, 
including Wu Shicun, head of the Hainan-based NISCSS. 1496  Due to the lack of necessary 
financing, technology and equipment,1497  as well as the unsettled maritime disputes, Chinese 
energy E&P activity in the South China Sea had traditionally concentrated in shallow-waters off 
the coast of Hainan, Tonkin Gulf and in the Pearl River Mouth Basin. 1498  As China’s first 
indigenous semisubmersible ultra-deepwater drilling platform and given that it was commissioned 
in May 2012 at the peak of the Scarborough Shoal standoff, HD-981 was hailed for both its 
technological and political significance because it not only marked “the strategic starting point” 
for China’s advancement into deepwater energy production but also represented one of the “swords” 
 
1495 “Counties Analysis: South China Sea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, last update: Feb. 7, 2013, 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=SCS, accessed Jan. 6, 2019. 
1496 Author’s interviews, Beijing, June and July 2019; Wu Shicun [吴士存], “Current Situation and Future Trend of 
the South China Sea” [南海问题的起源、发展及演变] in Xue Guifang [薛桂芳], ed., Law of the Sea Review [海洋
法学研究], issue 3, 2018, pp. 95-96. 
1497 Prior to the commissioning of HD-981, China’s oil companies lacked in-house capability to drill deeper than 300 
meters. “China’s first deepwater drilling platform HYSY 981 makes its first successful drill” [我国首座深水钻井平
台“海洋石油981”首钻成功], Xinhua, May 9, 2012, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-05/09/content_2132907.htm, 
accessed Nov. 21, 2019. 
1498 Li Guoqiang [李国强], “Policy adjustment to oil and natural gas exploration in the South China Sea” [南海油气
资源勘探开发的政策调试 ], China International Studies [ 国际问题研究 ], issue 6, Nov. 20, 2014, 
http://www.ciis.org.cn/gyzz/2014-11/20/content_7385361.htm, accessed Feb. 4, 2020. 
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China now wielded to safeguard its maritime interests.1499 In November, Hu Jintao in his report to 
the 18th Party Congress articulated the goal of establishing China as a maritime power, giving top 
priority to the enhancement of China’s capacity for exploiting marine resources.1500 With the 
state’s policy support and necessary equipment in place, China was ready to foray into the 
deepwater of the South China Sea. 
Second, in terms of the location choice, interviews with former government officials, analysts 
in the Chinese energy sector and in government-affiliated think tanks revealed a shared view that 
the Paracels were chosen over the Spratlys due to China’s complete control over the land features 
in the area. Moreover, the drilling site was 17 nautical miles from the Triton Island and thus fell 
in the contiguous zone of the land feature. Considering these two factors, Beijing could make a 
case that the oilrig was operating in “uncontested” areas. Also, given that multiple states claim the 
sovereignty of the Spratlys whereas the Paracels are only contested by Vietnam (and Taiwan), 
drilling in the latter was expected to cause fewer controversies than in the Spratlys.1501  
Third, in terms of the timing, a plausible explanation is the climate. Activities in the South 
China Sea, according to a knowledgeable Chinese source, is generally concentrated in the first half 
of the year when weather is conducive to fishing and exploration activities.1502  The weather 
explanation is consistent with what a Crisis Group report calls “the cycle of tension and calm” in 
the South China Sea. 1503  
 
1499 Gui Junsong [桂俊松], “‘981’ unveiled at the right timing” [“981” 亮相适逢其时], China Energy News, May 14, 
2012. 
1500  “Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress,” Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm, accessed Nov. 21, 2019. 
1501 Author’s interviews, Haikou, April 2019; Beijing, June and July 2019; Zhu Feng [朱锋], “New Trend in the South 
China Sea Disputes: Strategic Competition among Great Powers and Interests Game of Small Countries – A Case 
Study of the Oil Rig 981 Friction in South China Sea” [南海主权争议的新态势：大国战略竞争与小国利益博弈
——以南海“981”钻井平台冲突为例], Northeast Asia Forum [东北亚论坛], no. 2, 2015, p. 6.  
1502 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
1503 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (III), p. 8. 
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The last contributing factor is that Beijing apparently underestimated Hanoi’s resolve to push 
back, and thus the prospect of a confrontation at sea as well as the intensity of the resulting clash. 
Chinese interlocutors, some with firsthand knowledge on the incident, acknowledged that while it 
was predictable that Hanoi would react, the ferocity of Vietnam’s response took Beijing by 
surprise.1504 A probable contributing factor to Beijing’s underestimation was its insensitivity to the 
timing and situation in Vietnam, as 2014 marked the 40th anniversary of the 1974 Paracel skirmish. 
In January, for the first time ever Hanoi permitted commemoration activities, which were covered 
by the Vietnamese state media.1505 This neglect, as suggested by a Crisis Group study, was mostly 
attributable to Chinese decision makers’ lack of consultation with Vietnam hands in the foreign 
policy community.1506  
Physical clashes at sea between Chinese and Vietnamese ships reportedly started from May 3. 
Beijing accused Hanoi of dispatching dozens of armed ships to the drilling site which dropped 
fishing nets and “large obstacles” in the waters and rammed Chinese vessels up to 171 times 
between May 3-7.1507 Hanoi, on the other hand, claimed that Chinese ships rammed and used water 
cannons on Vietnamese coast guard ships during encounters on May 4, leaving multiple 
Vietnamese sailors injured.1508  
 
1504 Author’s interviews, Haikou, April 2019; Beijing, May and June 2019. 
1505 “Vietnam marks 40th anniversary of China’s invasion of Paracel Islands,” South China Morning Post, Jan. 19, 
2014, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1409007/vietnam-marks-40th-anniversary-chinas-invasion-paracel-
islands, accessed Nov. 27, 2019. 
1506 Frances Yaping Wang and Brantly Womack, “Jawing through Crises: Chinese and Vietnamese Media Strategies 
in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 28, no. 119, 2019, pp. 722-723; International Crisis 
Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (III), p. 10. 
1507 “China Focus: China urges Vietnam to respect its sovereign rights over Xisha Islands,” Xinhua News Service, 
May 9, 2014. 
1508 Gerry Mullany and David Barboza, “Vietnam Navy Squares Off With Chinese in Disputed Seas,” New York Times, 
May 8, 2014; Louise Watt, “China insists it has right to put rig off Vietnam,” Associated Press, May 8, 2014; Jane 
Perlez and Rick Gladstone, “China Flexes Its Muscles in Dispute With Vietnam,” New York Times, May 9, 2014. 
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Amid the continued clashes,  Beijing announced on May 5 to expand the radius of the no-entry 
zone surrounding HD-981 to three nautical miles. 1509  Information released by Vietnamese 
authorities described the Chinese fleet which escorted the oilrig as being deployed in three 
concentric rings: the inner ring comprising of 10-15 ships at 1-1.5 nautical miles from the rig, the 
middle ring consisting of 40-45 ships at 4.5-5 nautical miles from the rig, and the outer ring 
including 25-35 ships at 10-12 nautical miles from the oil rig.1510 Chinese civilian and military 
researchers specified that naval warships were deployed on the inner ring while civilian vessels 
were on the outer rings as a way of containing the intensity of clashes and minimizing the potential 
of militarizing the conflict.1511 One interlocutor also noted that Chinese personnel were given a 
clear order of “no exchange of fire on the frontline.”1512 
Working-level diplomatic communication channels remained open, while Beijing persistently 
avoided direct communication at the top level. At “an extremely early” stage of the incident, Hanoi 
requested several times to arrange top-level telephone dialogues between Xi and either CPV party 
chief Nguyen Phu Troung or President Truong Tan Sang, as well as to dispatch an envoy to Beijing. 
Beijing persistently turned down Vietnam’s requests, only consenting to have a telephone talk 
between Vietnam’s Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh and Chinese 
State Councilor Yang Jiechi.1513 When speaking on the phone on May 6, Minh demanded China 
completely withdraw the drilling rig and escort vessels.1514 Yang rebutted Minh’s demand and 
 
1509 “Navigation alert HN0034 (HYSY981 Drilling operation in South China Sea)” [琼航警 0034 (海洋石油 981 钻
井 船 南 海 钻 井 作 业 )], MSA, May 5, 2014, 
https://www.msa.gov.cn/page/wap/wap.do?action=content&channelId=D3340711-057B-494B-8FA0-
9EEDC4C5EAD9&articleId=9e65dcfc-e838-45f6-bde6-f858a62323eb, accessed Jun. 8, 2019.   
1510 Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Contents of the International Press Conference on developments in the East 
Sea June 5th, 2014,” http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/tcbc/ns140609024213, accessed Jun. 8, 2019. 
1511 Author’s interviews, Beijing, June 2019. 
1512 Author’s interviews, Haikou, April 2019; Beijing, June 2019. 
1513 “China rejects top-level dialogue with Vietnam amid territorial rows,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jun. 10, 2014. 
1514 “Vietnam demands China withdraw from territorial waters.” 
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instead called on Vietnam to “stop disturbing Chinese companies’ normal work in the Xisha 
Islands.”1515 Unsurprisingly, as neither party was willing to back down, the phone talk produced 
little progress in containing the clashes at sea. 
The first wave of anti-China demonstrations broke out on May 11 when hundreds of 
Vietnamese protestors staged a big rally outside the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and another 1,000 
took to the streets in Ho Chi Minh City.1516 The protests quickly degenerated into violent riots 
targeting Chinese-looking businesses and the Chinese diaspora in Vietnam. Some 19,000 
Vietnamese workers participated in protests near Ho Chi Minh City on May 13-14 and burned 
down dozens of foreign-owned factories displaying signs in Chinese.1517 By May 15, at least two 
Chinese nationals had been killed and over 100 were hospitalized as a result of the riots.1518  
Amid these fatal anti-China riots, Vietnam dispatched its Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Xuan 
Son to China on May 13-15 but this trip did not produce any breakthrough. Beijing again refused 
to open higher-level talks.1519 While Beijing denied that it refused to have top-level dialogue with 
Hanoi,1520 both civilian and military interlocutors close to the policy-making process confirmed 
Beijing’s rigid refusal to engage in dialogue – for two potential reasons. First, Beijing was 
optimistic at the outset about its ability to cope with a maritime contingency vis-à-vis Vietnam. 
Second, at the early stage of the incident, Chinese decision makers simply did not perceive such 
 
1515 “China urges against Vietnamese interference in territorial water exploration,” Xinhua News Service, May 7, 2014. 
1516 “Large protests in Vietnam over China oil rig,” Agence France Presse, May 11, 2014; Chris Brummitt, “Vietnam 
allows anti-China protest over oil rig,” Associated Press, May 11, 2014. 
1517 Many damaged businesses were indeed owned by Taiwanese, Singaporeans, Japanese and South Koreans. “China 
issues Vietnam tourist warning after riots,” May 15, Agence France Presse, May 15, 2014; “Vietnam authorities 
confirm Chinese casualties in anti-China riots,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 15, 2014; Chris Buckley, Chau Doan 
and Thomas Fuller, “China Targeted by Vietnamese in Fiery Riots,” New York Times, May 15, 2014.  
1518 “2 Chinese killed, over 100 hospitalized in Vietnam’s riot,” Xinhua News Service, May 15, 2014. 
1519 “China rejects top-level dialogue with Vietnam amid territorial rows.” 
1520 Beijing also claimed that China had communicated through diplomatic channels with Vietnam more than 30 times 
“at various levels” as of June 13. Li Xiaokun, “Beijing denies refusing dialogue with Hanoi,” China Daily, Jun. 14, 
2014.  
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dialogue as useful given the incompatibility of the two sides’ demands – Vietnam wanted China 
to withdraw the oilrig, which China would undoubtedly refuse to do; conversely, China demanded 
Vietnam immediately stop disrupting the platform’s operation, which Vietnam would certainly 
reject. 1521  On May 15, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke on the phone again with 
Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, accusing Vietnam of having “an inescapable 
responsibility for the violent attacks of lawbreakers against Chinese enterprises and staff.” Minh 
informed Wang that over 1,000 suspects had been arrested while reiterating Hanoi’s demand that 
China immediately withdraw the drilling rig and escort vessels.1522  
Beijing issued Vietnam travel warnings on May 15. The Chinese Embassy in Hanoi urged local 
Chinese nationals to take safety precautions and minimize unnecessary outings.1523 Two days later, 
China evacuated over 3,000 Chinese nationals from Vietnam through chartered flights and vessels, 
with another 1,000 Chinese nationals crossing borders to take shelter in Cambodia.1524 On May 18, 
Beijing announced to suspend part of Sino-Vietnamese bilateral exchange plans, citing fatal anti-
Chinese violence as the major concern.1525 As of May 21, the death toll of Chinese nationals had 
risen to four.1526  
The Cost Trade-off: International Costs Loom Large 
The HD-981 incident represented a much graver situation than the 2012 Scarborough Shoal 
standoff in that the latter neither triggered physical clashes at sea nor resulted in fatalities. In the 
 
1521 Private conversation, Beijing, July 2019; Author’s interview, Nanjing, June 2019 
1522 “Anti-China protests continue in Vietnam, over 1,000 arrested,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 16, 2014. 
1523 Denise Tsang, “China protests prompt travel warning,” South China Morning Post, May 15, 2014; “China issues 
Vietnam tourist warning after riots.”  
1524 “China evacuates its nationals from Vietnam after deadly unrest,” Agence France Presse, May 17, 2014; “Over 
3,000 Chinese nationals evacuated from Vietnam after deadly violence,” Xinhua News Service, May 17, 2014. 
1525 “The Chinese side suspends part of Sino-Vietnamese bilateral exchange plans” [中方暂停中越部分双边交往计
划], Xinhua Daily Telegraph [新华每日电讯], May 18, 2014. 
1526 “China firm says Vietnam riot killed four employees,” Agence France Presse, May 21, 2014; Gerry Mullany, 
“Vietnam: Chinese Company Says Strife Killed 4,” New York Times, May 22, 2014. 
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bilateral context, the clash was by all measures the most dangerous crisis since China and Vietnam 
normalized their relations. 
The unprecedented mass mobilization in Vietnam adds a new dimension to China’s cost 
calculation, that is, the security of the CPV regime. While mobilizing street protests to demonstrate 
resolve and force the adversary to concede appeared to be a common strategy of the CCP and CPV 
regimes in their crisis bargaining playbook, the prospect that the popular protests in Vietnam might 
turn against the CPV and trigger a color revolution in one of the few remaining socialist countries 
seemed to have created an incentive for Beijing to avoid boxing the CPV into a corner. Moreover, 
the factional politics within the CPV leadership between pro-China conservatives and pro-western 
reformists further heightened the risk of the former’s political credentials being undermined in the 
event of an escalation. Therefore, there was likely a consensus emerging among Chinese decision 
makers amidst the clash that China needed to refrain from escalating the incident which could 
undermine the CPV’s regime legitimacy and put the CPV conservatives in a vulnerable position. 
Below the top leadership, the still divergent domestic interests prevented the formation of a strong 
compromise-averse coalition among elites. In the Chinese public, media coverage of the incident 
was subject to tight control, which effectively minimized popular pressure on Beijing to retaliate 
against Vietnam and suggested a leadership consensus prioritizing crisis containment was in place. 
On the international end, by the time the HD-981 incident took place, China found itself facing 
a geopolitical landscape and international public opinion which were drastically different from 
what it confronted during the Scarborough Shoal standoff – a perfect storm of international 
audience costs was in the making. In the bilateral setting, Vietnam quickly drew close to the 
Philippines as well as to the U.S. and Japan while mulling over the option of joining the arbitration 
against China. In the multilateral setting, ASEAN swiftly formed a united front by releasing a joint 
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statement expressing concerns about the clash. Boosted U.S. presence in the region and an explicit, 
firm U.S. commitment to this region only made unmistakably clear the potential costs to China 
should it choose to further escalate the incident. 
Low Domestic Costs: Strong Consensus, Divided Stakeholders, and Controlled Publicity 
A major component that lowered potential domestic costs on Beijing’s decision to de-escalate was 
the belief shared by Chinese leaders and a substantial portion of the elites that Vietnam’s anti-
China riots, once out of control, would critically damage the CPV’s legitimacy and probably even 
trigger a color revolution in Vietnam, which in turn could generate major repercussions for the 
CCP regime itself. A convenient excuse as it might sound, Beijing’s ideology-based rationale must 
be understood within the broader context of how Vietnam walked a tightrope between using 
nationalist protests as a signal of resolve in crisis bargaining and fearing that such activity could 
turn the public frustration against the CPV regime itself. Although this dissertation project 
scrutinizes China’s decision-making rationale in maritime disputes, the Vietnamese domestic 
political dynamic and nationalist activism and the way in which the Chinese leaders and elites 
assess these factors provide critical insights into understanding China’s otherwise seemingly 
archaic and hypocritical ideology-based assertion. 
Anti-China nationalism in the Vietnamese public is genuine, strong, and deeply rooted in 
historical grievance.1527 An intriguing point which repeatedly arose in Chinese-language sources 
and in the author’s conversations with Chinese Vietnam experts is the analogy drawn between 
Vietnam’s anti-Chinese emotions and China’s anti-Japanese sentiments. For Sino-Vietnamese 
relations, the burden of history is heavy.1528 The burden has its root in multiple sources, many of 
 
1527 For a great reference on the history of China-Vietnam relations, see, Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The 
Politics of Asymmetry (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
1528 Zhang, Breaking the Deadlock in the South China Sea, p. 109. 
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which can be dated back to the ancient Chinese tributary system. In the contemporary era, the 1974 
Paracel conflict, the 1979 border clash, and the 1988 Spratly skirmish are the most recent causes 
of popular anti-China sentiments.1529 The 1979 border skirmish, in particular, was framed by the 
CPV as “a fierce struggle between national independence and socialism on the one hand and 
aggression, expansionism, chauvinism on the other.”1530 The anti-Chinese nationalism is so strong 
that it “has become part of Vietnam’s national narrative and identity.”1531 This popular nationalism 
flourished throughout the 2000s roughly in tandem with a boom in the use of the Internet and 
social media in Vietnam, which soon became the key tool used to mobilize anti-China protests 
from 2007 (against the Sansha plan) onwards as the South China Sea drew growing attention from 
the Vietnamese public.1532 A Pew opinion survey taken during April to early May in 2014 reported 
that 78 percent of Vietnamese respondents held “unfavorable” views on China.1533  
The agenda of anti-China nationalism, although on the surface triggered by the South China 
Sea dispute, has its roots in “the deep and complex problems facing Vietnam after two decades of 
market reform without corresponding political reform” as well as the “corrupt and oppressive 
[CPV] regime” which is seen as ideologically and economically “kowtowing to China.”1534 In this 
sense, the anti-Chinese protests and riots represented a double-edged sword to the CPV: on the 
one hand, by initially taking a permissive approach towards the protests, Hanoi signaled its resolve 
to oppose what it saw as China’s violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty and demonstrated that the 
regime had the whole country united behind it on this issue; on the other hand, however, the CPV 
harbored an instinctive fear that the mass mobilization could easily turn against the regime itself, 
 
1529 Author’s interview, Haikou, April 2019. 
1530 Tuong Vu, “The Party v. the People: Anti-China Nationalism in Contemporary Vietnam,” Journal of Vietnamese 
Studies, vol. 9, no. 4, fall 2014, p. 39. 
1531 Author’s interview, Guangzhou, May 2019. 
1532 Vu, “The Party v. the People,” pp.42-43. 
1533 Wang and Womack, “Jawing through Crises,” p. 717. 
1534 Vu, “The Party v. the People,” pp. 44-45. 
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especially once the protests degenerated into violent riots.1535 On May 15, when asked about “acts 
of sabotage” emerging in the riots, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry confirmed that some 
individuals “took advantage of the protests to provoke disorders.”1536 On the same day, Hanoi 
began to curb the domestic chaos by sending out text messages warning against “illegal 
demonstrations that could cause social and security disorder.”1537  
With the shared ideology, similar one-party authoritarian political systems, and the common 
desire to boost regime legitimacy by delivering economic growth and stoking nationalism, Beijing 
is no stranger to Hanoi’s playbook – and predicament. An internal lecture transcript dated 2007, 
which was prepared for a CCP Politburo group study session on the status of foreign communist 
parties, notes that after withstanding the shocks from the collapse of the socialist bloc, the 
remaining communist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and Cuba have faced extraordinary 
difficulty in balancing economic development with national security priorities and have tended to 
prioritize domestic stability. But as internal and external pressure on the communist regimes to 
carry out political reforms continued to grow, as stated in this lecture, the simultaneous 
achievement of both economic development and social stability would only become more 
challenging.1538  
 
1535 Nhung T. Bui, “Managing anti-China nationalism in Vietnam: evidence from the media during the 2014 oil rig 
crisis,” The Pacific Review, vol. 30, no. 2, 2017, p. 180; Wang and Womack, “Jawing through Crises,” p. 718. 
1536 Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Regular Press Briefing by MOFA’s Spokesperson Le Hai Binh On May 
15, 2014,” http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140516233943, accessed Jun. 8, 2019 
1537 “China defiant as US warns over deadly Vietnam riots,” Agence France Presse, May 16, 2014; Jane Perlez, 
“Vietnam Issues Stern Warning on Protest Violence Amid Standoff with China,” New York Times, May 18, 2014; 
“Vietnam groups call for more anti-China protests,” Agence France Presse, May 17, 2014. 
1538 Chai Shangjin [柴尚金], “Status and outlook of communist parties in foreign countries” [国外共产党现状及前
景], Central Politburo Group Study Materials, Tsinghua University History Lectures, Peking University Chinese 
Studies Lecture [中央政治局集体学习资料、清华大学历史讲座、北京大学国学讲座], Compiling and editing 
group of internal talks and reports and Zhongnanhai lectures on history and culture [《内部讲座及专题报告》、
《中南海历史文化讲座》编辑组], September 2007, vol. 2, internal materials, p. 774. 
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In Beijing’s perception – and Hanoi’s alike – the threat to the CPV’s regime security loomed 
large as the riots heightened the risk of the situation being opportunistically used by political 
dissidents in Vietnam for anti-regime agendas.1539 Even though ideology is no longer the sole or 
the most important factor in post-Mao China’s foreign policy making, it remains “a fundamental 
issue that needs to be taken into consideration” when formulating China’s policies toward its 
ideological allies. As a Chinese military analyst put it plainly, “Recall the ‘four good’ principle 
that defines the Sino-Vietnamese relationship – good neighbors, good friends, good comrades, and 
good partners. The term ‘good comrades’ captures the special orientation of the relationship, 
meaning ideology remains a major pillar…Beijing wants to prevent a color revolution in Vietnam 
no less earnestly than the CPV itself.”1540 Meanwhile, the CCP’s growing sensitivity under Xi 
Jinping to its own regime legitimacy reinforced the imperative to prioritize the survival of an 
ideological ally.1541  As noted by a knowledgeable Chinese source, “With the CPV being one of 
the few ruling communist parties, it would be a serious shock to the CCP itself should Vietnam 
undergo a regime change; and indeed, look at the way China orders the three pillars of its core 
interests – the security of the political system comes first, territorial integrity and sovereignty 
second.”1542 Therefore, maritime disputes notwithstanding, Beijing does not see a regime collapse 
in Vietnam as being in the core interests of the CCP regime either. According to Cheng Hanping, 
a Vietnam expert at Nanjing University’s South China Sea Center, in making its decisions during 
the HD-981 incident, Beijing sought to strike a balance between the goals of “effectively protecting 
 
1539  Bui, “Managing anti-China nationalism in Vietnam,” p. 180; John D. Ciorciari and Jessica Chen Weiss, 
“Nationalist Protests, Government Reponses, and the Risk of Escalation in Interstate Disputes,” Security Studies, Vol. 
25, 2016, p. 578; author’s interviews, Haikou, April 2019; Beijing, May, June and July 2019; Guangzhou, May 2019. 
1540 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
1541 Suisheng Zhao, “The Ideological Campaign in Xi’s china: Rebuilding Regime Legitimacy,” Asian Survey, vol. 56, 
issue 6, 2016, pp. 1168-1193. 
1542 Author’s interview, Guangzhou, May 2019. 
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China’s maritime sovereignty and rights” on the one hand and “preventing the situation in Vietnam 
from spinning out of control to an extent that the CPV regime would be toppled” on the other.1543 
On the premise of ensuring the CPV’s regime survival, Beijing also needed to prevent the pro-
China conservatives from being seriously weakened as a result of the clash. In other words, 
factional politics within the CPV leadership was at play in shaping the Chinese leadership’s 
consensus that the crisis must be contained. Beijing learned the ramifications of the CPV’s 
factional politics for Sino-Vietnamese relations the hard way. The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border 
skirmish not only stoked lasting anti-China sentiments in Vietnam and prompted rampant 
repression against people of Chinese descent but also led to a massive purge within the CPV. 
According to one account, some 20,000 known and perceived pro-China conservatives were 
purged from the party and the government.1544 A Chinese military scholar summarized the lesson 
Beijing learned from this episode of history, “Worsening China-Vietnam relations would put the 
pro-China faction in a highly vulnerable position, and we saw such a situation happened before. 
That took a huge toll on the relationship.”1545 Not until the end of the Cold War were the two 
countries able to normalize their relations. Since then Beijing appears to have viewed the pro-
China faction as a political asset that China needs to sustain and support. More importantly, by the 
time the clash took place, the CPV’s 12th Party Congress was less than two years away, should 
China choose to continue to exert pressure on Vietnam, it might put the pro-China faction in a 
difficult situation. According to Carlyle Thayer, China’s withdrawal of the HD-981 “should 
 
1543 Gu Qi [谷齐], “What is China’s trump card in countering Vietnam?” [中国反制越南的王牌是什么？], Shanghai 
Observer, Sept. 24, 2014, https://www.jfdaily.com/news/detail?id=1593, accessed Jun. 30, 2019. 
1544 Pierre Asselin, Vietnam's American War: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 243. 
1545 Author’s interviews, Beijing, Jun. 2019. 
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strengthen the hands of the ‘pro-China’ or accommodationist faction with the Vietnam Communist 
Party.”1546 
Concerns about CPV’s regime security and factional politics within the CPV considerably 
limited China’s policy options. Amid the clash, a commentary published in late June by the 
Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) acknowledged that this ideological concern had 
“placed significant constraints on the countermeasures China can employ against Vietnam.”1547 
This point of view is consistent with information from interviews with Chinese analysts from both 
civilian and military institutions. As noted by a PLA researcher, “We have a set of policy tools and 
can pick whatever we think is most effective when taking countermeasures against the Philippines. 
But in the case of Vietnam, our hands are tied in the sense that not every tool is useable given the 
ideological consideration and our desire not to squeeze the CPV to the point of a regime 
collapse.”1548 Likewise, a civilian Vietnam expert observed that “the goal of preventing a color 
revolution [in Vietnam] has considerably reduced the countermeasures China can use.”1549  
On the whole, the PLA maintained a restrained approach during the clash, occasionally 
peppered with seemingly hardline rhetoric. On May 15, at a joint press conference in Washington 
with U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Martin E. Dempsey, then PLA’s Chief of the General 
Staff Fang Fenghui stated, “What we are going to do is to make sure the safety of the oilrig and 
ensure the operation keep going on…and not be interfered or disrupted by external factors.” China, 
 
1546 Carl Thayer, “4 Reasons China Removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 Sooner Than Planned,” The Diplomat, Jul. 22, 2014, 
https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-than-planned/, accessed Jun. 30, 
2019. 
1547  “Where does Vietnam’s courage comes from?” [ 越 南 的 底 气 何 在 ？ ], Jun. 24, 2014, 
http://en.siis.org.cn/Research/Info/1159, accessed Jun. 30, 2019. Emphasis added. 
1548 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
1549 WeChat message correspondence, July 2019. 
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Fang added, “cannot afford to lose even an inch [of its territory].”1550 Equally notable that day was 
the PLA’s swift rebuttal of rumors that the alert level of Chinese troops in the China-Vietnam 
border areas had been raised to combat readiness.1551 Four days later, when meeting with his 
Vietnamese counterpart in Naypyidaw, China’s Defense Minister Chang Wanquan called on 
Vietnam to “bear in mind the overall interests of the Sino-Vietnamese friendship, and stop making 
mistakes one after another that could eventually culminate in a disaster.”1552 Although Chang’s 
remarks may sound like a message of warning, the appeal to “the broad interests of the Sino-
Vietnamese friendship” (中越友好大局) subtly contrasts the unspecified reference to “the broad 
interests” (大局) that Chang’s predecessor Liang Guanglie used when meeting with Philippine’s 
Defense Secretary Gazmin during the Scarborough incident.  
Provincial stakeholders, especially Hainan and Guangxi, remained far apart with respect to the 
South China Sea. For Hainan, expanding offshore energy E&P in the area was not only key to the 
sustained growth of its pillar industries, but also instrumental to the province’s aspiration of 
establishing itself as a Hawaii-style resort tourism island, a development strategy launched in 2010. 
To achieve this goal, clear energy, primarily natural gas, will have to be increased to count for 50 
percent of the island’s total energy consumption by 2020. 1553  These ambitious goals 
 
1550 “News Transcript: Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin E. Dempsey and People's Liberation Army of 
China Chief of the General Staff General Fang Fenghui,” May 15, 2014, 
https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5432, accessed Jun. 21, 2019. 
1551 “Official Weibo of the PLA Daily: That PLA troops in China-Vietnam border areas raised the alert level to combat 
readiness is false information” [军报官微: 解放军在中越边境部队进入三级战备为假消息], China Daily, May 15, 
2014, https://world.chinadaily.com.cn/2014-05/15/content_17510954.htm, accessed Nov. 26, 2019; “Report: PLA 
troops in the China-Vietnam border area raised the alert level to combat readiness” [報道: 中越邊境解放軍三級戰
備 ], Mingpao [ 明 報 ]. May 15, 2014, 
https://news.mingpao.com/ins/%E5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8/article/20140515/s00004/1400121909193/%E5%A0%
B1%E9%81%93-%E4%B8%AD%E8%B6%8A%E9%82%8A%E5%A2%83%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%B
B%8D%E4%B8%89%E7%B4%9A%E6%88%B0%E5%82%99, accessed Nov. 26, 2019. 
1552  “Chang Wanquan meets with Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Army and Vietnam’s Defense Minister 
respectively” [常万全分别会见缅甸国防军总司令、越南国防部长], PLA Daily, May 20, 2014. 
1553 From 2005-2015, the average ratio of clean energy in the province’s total energy consumption is 28.5 percent. 
From 2010-2013, the ratio of natural gas floated between 20-25 percent. “Guideline for Hainan’s international tourism 
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notwithstanding, Hainan had been facing a growing shortage of natural gas supplies that critically 
constrained its simultaneous pursuit of industrial development and a clean-energy driven tourism 
economy. In 2011, Hainan’s total consumption of natural gas reached five billion cubic meters 
(bcm), supplied mostly from offshore gas fields in the vicinity of the province. This quantity was 
still insufficient to meet the demands of industrial consumption. The province projected that 
consumption would climb to eight bcm by 2015, creating a three-bcm shortage even if supplies 
remained stable.1554 As a result, Hainan had long forcefully lobbied the central government for 
greater support for its energy agenda regarding the South China Sea.1555 In a set of policy proposals 
that the Hainan delegation submitted to the NPC plenum in March 2013, the first item on the list 
was a request to accelerate and expand energy E&P in both “uncontested sea areas” and China’s 
“effectively controlled areas” in the South China Sea.1556 In the province’s 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015), the reference to the Paracels and Spratlys was more explicit as the provincial 
authorities outlined the objective to “proactively and steadfastly develop tourism in the Paracels, 
construct the Paracel fishery logistical base…[and] strive to explore (争取开发) deep-sea oil and 
gas resources.”1557 
 
island construction and development planning (2010-2020) (executive summary)” [海南国际旅游岛建设发展纲要 
(2010-2020) ( 摘 要 )], Department of Finance of Hainan Province, Feb. 2, 2013, 
http://mof.hainan.gov.cn/czt/zwxx/jhgh/201302/t20130225_911896.html; “Historical development energy industry 
as in energy efficiency leading the new fashion” [能源事业历史性发展节能降耗引领新风尚], Hainan Provincial 
Bureau of Statistics, Sept. 21, 2019, http://stats.hainan.gov.cn/tjj/tjfx/ztfx/201909/t20190920_2675299.html. Both 
accessed Nov. 27, 2019. 
1554 Liang Zhenjun [梁振君] and Wei Mengjun [韦孟君], “E&P in the South China Sea badly needs to be accelerated” 
[南海油气资源开发亟待提速], Hainan Daily, Aug. 15, 2012. 
1555 See, for example, “Plan for developing the South China Sea and constructing Hainan strategic base,” pp. 155-165; 
Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV), p. 9. 
1556 Du Ying [杜颖] and Li Yahui [李亚辉], “A review of the seven key words in Hainan delegation’s policy proposals 
in 2013” [2013 海南代表团议案建议七大关键词], Hainan Daily, Mar. 2, 2014. 
1557 “Material: full text of Hainan Province’s ‘12th Five-Year plan’ (2011-2015)” [资料: 海南省“十二五”规划纲要
全 文  (2011-2015 年 )], ce.cn [ 中 国 经 济 网 ], Jun. 11, 2012, 
http://district.ce.cn/zt/zlk/bg/201206/11/t20120611_23397296_5.shtml, accessed Nov. 27, 2019.  
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Apart from its growing appetite for natural gas, Hainan’s push for enhancing offshore E&P 
was driven by its increasingly drained fiscal resources as a result of the province’s expanding 
maritime rights protection responsibilities in the South China Sea. Shortly after the HD-981 
incident, Hainan articulated its plan to officially appeal to the NPC for a greater share of tax 
revenues generated by offshore E&P activities in the sea areas administered by the province. 
Hainan perceived the establishment of Sansha in 2012 as consolidating its administration over the 
South China Sea and relevant land features. To fulfill its maritime administration and rights 
protection responsibilities, argued the provincial authorities, Hainan had “established relevant 
institutions, conducted administrative and law enforcement management to maintain order in the 
sea areas under the province’s jurisdiction, as well as provided supplies and services to troops and 
enterprises.” However, under the current central-local revenue sharing system, “Hainan lacks 
stable resources to cover its expenditures on maritime administration.” Therefore, Hainan 
concluded, the locality should be entitled to a larger share of tax revenues generated from offshore 
E&P activities in the sea areas under Hainan’s jurisdiction.1558 
While CNOOC has long allied with Hainan in the advocacy for expanding and accelerating 
E&P in the South China Sea, the energy sector’s attitude during the clash appeared to be mixed at 
best. Aside from being Hainan’s longtime key investor and major supplier of natural gas, CNOOC 
was closely connected with Hainan politically – through the party-state nomenklatura system.1559 
 
1558 “Hainan delegation plans to submit a proposal to NPC, calling for resource tax revenues generated in Hainan-
administered sea areas going to the locality” [海南代表团拟向大会提交建议，将海南所辖海域油气田资源税划
归地方收入], Hainan Daily, Mar. 5, 2015. 
1559 A prime case is Wei Liucheng, Hainan’s governor and party chief from 2003-2011, was the CEO of CNOOC 
before being appointed to head the province and had worked on E&P in the South China Sea from 1982-1993. By the 
time Wei retired from the provincial position, CNOOC ‘s investment in Hainan had reached 40 billion RMB.  “Resume 
of Comrade Wei Liucheng” [ 卫 留 成 同 志 简 历 ], last updated February 2007, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9684/2148321.html; “Construction of Hainan’s 3 million-ton per 
year LNG kick off” [ 海 南 300 万 吨 / 年 LNG 项 目 开 工 ], Chinanews.com, Nov. 3, 2011, 
http://www.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2011-08-03/165064.html;“Wei Liucheng bowed three times in an emotional 
farewell to his eight-year career in Hainan” [卫留成三次鞠躬动情告别八年海南生涯], ifeng.com, Aug. 25, 2011, 
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In May 2012, CNOOC staged a grand celebration for the commissioning of HD-981, which the 
company hailed as a “mobile national territory” at sea to protect China’s sovereignty.1560 Despite 
CNOOC’s ownership of the platform, it was CNPC that leased the oilrig for this specific drilling 
operation near the Triton island.1561 Thus, CNPC was financially liable for any platform damages 
that occurred during the deployment. Amid the clash, CNPC was “very nervous” that it would bear 
huge economic costs if the one-billion-U.S. dollar platform was damaged.1562 What probably made 
the HD-981 gambit look even more cost ineffective and commercially imprudent was the fact that, 
as noted earlier in this section, the Paracel area was not promising in terms of hydrocarbon resource 
reserves. As a Chinese source affiliated with a government think tank put it, “The deployment was 
not a business decision – there is not much energy resource in that area.”1563  
On the other hand, Guangxi (and Yunnan although to a lesser extent) stood out as the primary 
provincial beneficiary of the booming economic ties between China and ASEAN in the first decade 
of the 21st century and thus represented a staunch protagonist for a stable Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship. For Guangxi, the China-ASEAN FTA enacted in 2010 presented it with another great 
opportunity to boost the local economy. In its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), the province laid 
out a development strategy to transform itself into China’s southwestern economic hub and a 
gateway to Southeast Asia. Guangxi clearly understood the importance of Vietnam in this strategy 
 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/dangweihuanjie/content-3/detail_2011_08/25/8686923_0.shtml. All 
accessed Nov. 25, 2019. 
1560 Cheng Yujie [程宇婕], “HYSY 981 made its first successful drilling in the South China Sea” [“海洋石油 981” 
南海首钻成功], China Energy News, May 14, 2012. 
1561 Zhang Liangfu [张良福], “Mainland China’s South China Sea policy and implementation” [中国大陆的南海政
策作为], in Liu Fu-kuo [刘复国] and Wu Shicun [吴士存], ed., 2014 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South 
China Sea [2014 年南海地区形势评估报告 ] (Taipei: Institute of International Relations National Chengchi 
University, 2015), p. 29; Zhang Jie [张洁], “China’s Regional Security Enrivonment : Change, Construction and 
Challenges” [中国周边安全形势：变化、构建与挑战], in Zhang Jie., ed., China’s Regional Security Environment 
Review: 2015 [中国周边安全形势评估 (2015)], p. 020. 
1562 Author’s interviews, Beijing, June 2019. 
1563 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
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in the sense that “to integrate with ASEAN requires good integration with Vietnam in the first 
place.”1564 Vietnam remained Guangxi’s top trading partner. The two-way trade between Guangxi 
and Vietnam in 2013 hit a historical high at more than $10 billion, counting for 80 percent of 
Guangxi’s total trade with ASEAN. Over 90 percent of the Guangxi-Vietnam trade was small-
scale border trade.1565  
Conversely, when Sino-Vietnamese relations soured, Guangxi was the first to bear the brunt. 
Amid the bilateral tensions surrounding HD-981, Guangxi’s border trade with Vietnam witnessed 
“a serious cooling.” Guangxi’s trade volume for May 2014 – the first month of the clash – dropped 
by more than eight percent from April.1566 What made the China-Vietnam tensions appear more 
concerning to Guangxi was the fact that the province was in the final phase of a decade-long 
preparation for two cross-border economic cooperation zones (CBEZs), the construction of which 
was slated to start in the second half of 2014.1567  
While Guangxi avoided openly complaining about the negative impacts of the oilrig incident, 
there were signs of a quiet push for avoiding further disruption and restoring the trade flow to 
normal levels. At the Pan Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation Forum in Nanning on May 16, 
Guangxi highlighted the CBEZs initiative as an innovation that “upgraded” the China-ASEAN 
FTA while showcasing Sino-Vietnamese friendship, developing the frontier, and enriching the 
 
1564 “Material: full text of Guangxi Province’s ‘12th Five-Year plan’ (2011-2015)” [资料: 广西“十二五”规划纲要全
文  (2011-2015 年 )], ce.cn, http://district.ce.cn/zt/zlk/bg/201206/05/t20120605_23382822_5.shtml, Jun. , 2012, 
accessed Nov. 28, 2019; Pan Yuyue [盘聿月], “For Guangxi, to integrate with ASEAN requires integration with 
Vietnam in the first place’ [广西对接东盟先要对接好越南], Guangxi Daily, Dec. 14, 2010. 
1565 2014 Annual Report of Vietnam’s Conditions, p. 078. 
1566 “China-Vietnam border trade cools amid bilateral tension,” Xinhua News Service, Jun. 12, 2014. 
1567 The CBEZ mechanism was initially proposed in 2005 by border city authorities in Guangxi and elevated to a 
provincial initiative in 2007. Progress was slow due to the need to clear policy issues such as border controls and 
foreign currency regulations that were under the central government’s purview. During Li Keqiang’s 2013 visit to 
Hanoi, national governments of both countries agreed to accelerate the CBEZ initiative.  2014 Annual Report of 
Vietnam’s Conditions, pp. 082-083; China-ASEAN Research Institute of Guangxi University [广西大学中国-东盟
研究院], “Opportunities and Challenges for China-Vietnam CBEZ and solutions” [中越跨境经济合作区建设的机
遇、挑战及对策分析], Apr. 17, 2014, http://cari.gxu.edu.cn/info/1087/1789.htm, accessed Nov. 29, 2019. 
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people in the frontier regions.1568 In mid-June, the province applauded the central government’s 
approval of a pilot program in Dongxing, one of Guangxi’s border ports participating in the CBEZs. 
This pilot program was designed to facilitate border trade by allowing locally registered Chinese 
businesses and individuals to exchange Renminbi and Vietnamese Dong without being subject to 
China’s foreign currency purchasing restrictions.1569 As Womack noted in an earlier study on 
China-Vietnam border trade, by transforming the border areas into interconnected economies and 
by creating an asset and a constituency, thriving border trade between the two countries had served 
as a stabilizing force even though it was “not yet a strong enough factor to predetermine bilateral 
relations.”1570 
Guangxi seemed to also have allies in at least three key central government bureaucracies that 
were directly involved in the management of the HD-981 clash. First, the Central Propaganda 
Department that oversaw the country’s media propaganda was at the time headed by Liu Qibao, 
who pushed through several major economic cooperation initiatives between Guangxi and 
Vietnam during his term as the deputy party chief and later party chief of Guangxi from 2000-
2007, as detailed in chapter 7. Second, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) which 
weighed in on May 16 when the Commerce Minister Gao Hucheng, formerly a vice governor of 
Guangxi from 2002-2003, met with his Vietnamese counterpart and urged Hanoi to repair 
economic and trade cooperation.1571 Third, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) was then headed 
by Guo Shengkun, who, like Liu and Gao, had substantial experience in Guangxi as the province’s 
 
1568 Jian Wenxiang [简文湘], “Trade spearheads regional cooperation – a recap of the Pan Beibu Gulf trade and 
investment seminar” [区域合作贸易先行——泛北贸易与投资专题研讨会综述], Guangxi Daily, May 20, 2014. 
1569 Huang Xingzhong [黄兴忠], “Renminbi and Vietnamese Dong special exchange program launched in Dongxing 
experimental zone” [人民币与越南盾特许兑换试水东兴试验区], Guangxi Daily, Jun. 10, 2014.  
1570 Brantly Womack, “Sino-Vietnamese Border Trade: The Edge of Normalization,” Asian Survey, vol. 34, no. 6 (Jun. 
1994), p. 512. 
1571 “Chinese ministry condemns violence in Vietnam,” Xinhua News Service, May 16, 2014. 
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deputy party chief and later party chief from 2004-2012. Guo weighed in on May 17, telling his 
Vietnamese counterpart that whether this incident could be handled effectively would be a test of 
the long-term close cooperation between the two countries’ public security ministries.1572 It is 
equally noteworthy that the MPS had de facto control over the Chinese coast guard after the 2013 
consolidation, as detailed in Chapter 3. 
Quite notably in the propaganda arena, contrasting its permissive approach toward domestic 
media coverage on the Scarborough Shoal standoff, Beijing tightened control over the coverage of 
the HD-981 incident in both state and popular commercial media (Table 8.1). The restricted media 
coverage and the resulting low publicity of the clash considerably reduced popular attention and 
potential backlash should Beijing decide to put up with the fatalities and de-escalate the tensions. 
On May 22, Nikkei disclosed that China’s domestic media was instructed by the authorities to “be 
cautious” in the coverage of the confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese ships while “no 
such directives regarding the Philippines” had ever been issued.1573 This report is consistent with 
information unearthed in later scholarly writings. According to Wang and Womack, between May 
7-18 the Chinese propaganda authorities issued four policy directives instructing domestic media 
to strictly adhere to the official tone by using only information from Xinhua or MFA. News editors 
and administrators were instructed to “tone down their voice” on hardline articles and delete online 
posts discussing the anti-China riots.1574  
 
1572 “Guo Shengkun talks with Vietnam’s public security minister on phone, demanding Vietnam to severely punish 
law breaks, and protect the safety of China’s businesses and personnel in Vietnam” [郭声琨与越南公安部部长通话
要求越方严惩不法分子确保我在越企业和人员生命财产安全], People’s Public Security Newspaper [人民公安
报], May 18, 2014. 
1573 Shimada Gaku, “China tests US mettle in South China Sea,” Nikkei Asian Review (Japan), May 22, 2014. 
1574 Wang and Womack, “Jawing through Crises,” p.721. 
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At the same time, Philippine’s arrest of eleven Chinese fishermen in the Half Moon Shoal on 
May 7 provided a fortuitous distraction from the clash and riots.1575 With the restrictions on 
covering the HD-981 clash, the hardline voices then focused on the Philippines. 1576  Indeed, 
between May 9-13 – the peak of the anti-China riots in Vietnam – both the People’s Daily and the 
PLA Daily unleashed harsh criticism on the Philippines, labeling the country the “well-deserved 
No.1 pot-stirrer in the South China Sea.”1577 
International Audience Costs Running High in both Bilateral and Multilateral Settings 
On the international stage, the HD-981 incident occurred at a time when China was clearly facing 
surging audience costs that stemmed from both the bilateral and multilateral settings. In the 
bilateral setting, the traditional approach of compartmentalizing the South China Sea issue from 
the overall Sino-Vietnamese relations became increasingly shaky in the shadow of the fatal anti-
China riots as well as the drop in border trade. The prospect that Vietnam might join the Philippines 
in seeking an international arbitration represented a particularly alarming sign to Beijing about the 
potentially huge diplomatic and reputational costs. Vietnam’s first warning came on May 22 when 
its Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung openly stated during his visit to Manila that Hanoi was 
“considering various defense options, including legal actions in accordance with the international 
law.”1578 A week later, when speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Vietnam’s Defense Minister 
General Phung Quang Thanh demanded that China remove the oilrig immediately, adding that a 
 
1575  Carmela Fonbuena, “PH arrests 11 Chinese fishermen off Palawan,” Rappler, May 7, 2014, 
https://www.rappler.com/nation/57456-missing-chinese-fishermen-half-moon-shoal, accessed Nov. 26, 2019. 
1576 Gaku, “China tests US mettle in South China Sea.” 
1577 Li Bin [李斌], “The Philippines has overplayed its hands with bluffing” [菲律宾狐假虎威过了头], PLA Daily, 
May 11, 2014; Hou Yi [侯毅], “Who is destroying peace and orders in the South China Sea” [谁在破坏南海和平秩
序], PLA Daily, May 13, 2014; Su Xiaohui [苏晓晖], “The Philippines should not expect China to swallow the bitter 
fruit” [菲律宾别指望中国会吞苦果], People’s Daily (overseas edition), May 13, 2014. 
1578 Jim Gomez, “Vietnam threatens legal action against China,” Associated Press, May 22, 2014. 
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legal move would be a “last resort.”1579 Shortly after Thanh’s speech, Vietnam’s Deputy Defense 
Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh told media that Beijing requested Hanoi avoid taking the bilateral 
maritime dispute to an international tribune.1580  
Evaluating the Sino-Vietnamese communication regarding Hanoi’s threat to initiate an 
arbitration is difficult due to a scarcity of open-source information on this issue. Interviews with 
civilian and military analysts confirmed that Beijing was disturbed by Vietnam’s threat. As a PLA 
analyst noted, “After the Philippines initiated the arbitration, China began to pay close attention to 
international public opinion. Because Nguyen Tan Dung sounded quite unyielding when making 
the threat [of initiating an arbitration], China took great pains to prevent Vietnam from pursuing 
that path.”1581 Even though there was a lingering optimism that “Vietnam as a socialist country 
might consider more factors than the Philippines and would probably not go so far as to resort to 
international arbitration,” Beijing could not simply dismiss such a possibility; instead, “preventive 
measures” were taken, according to a civilian analyst.1582  
What appeared even more worrisome to Beijing than the prospect of a Vietnam-initiated 
arbitration was the mounting costs on the ASEAN and the U.S. fronts. Sharply contrasting its 
failure to even deliver a joint communique during the Scarborough Shoal standoff, ASEAN this 
time made a quick, powerful pushback. On May 10, ASEAN foreign ministers convening in 
Naypyidaw issued a joint statement expressing “serious concerns over the on-going developments 
in the South China Sea.”1583 This statement was the first stand-alone joint statement ASEAN had 
issued on the South China Sea dispute since the last one which was issued following the 1995 
 
1579  Chua Chin Hon, “Vietnam: Taking China to court ‘last resort,’” Strait Times, Jun. 1, 2014, 
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/vietnam-taking-china-to-court-last-resort, accessed Jul. 21, 2019. 
1580 Kristine Kwok, “China keen to avoid court, says Vietnam,” South China Morning Post, Jun. 2, 2014. 
1581 Private conversation, Beijing, July 2019. 
1582 Author’s interview, Haikou, April 2019. 
1583 “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea,” May 10, 2014, Nay 
Pyi Taw, https://asean.org/asean/asean-structure/asean-summit/#99eddc04cd6d2f250, accessed May 22, 2019. 
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Mischief Reef incident.1584 The next day, the leaders of the ASEAN countries issued the Nay Pyi 
Taw Declaration after the summit, explicitly stating the common goal to boost ASEAN unity and 
solidarity and to strengthen the organization’s “central role in maintaining and promoting peace, 
stability, harmony and prosperity in the region.”1585 
The prompt ASEAN pushback was also a reflection of the repercussions of the East China Sea 
ADIZ in the context of the South China Sea disputes. In addition to reaffirming commitment to 
freedom of navigation, the May 10 ASEAN foreign ministers’ joint statement underscored the 
importance of maintaining freedom of overflight above the South China Sea – a principle that was 
endorsed in the DOC but had not loomed large as a real issue in the South China Sea context until 
the East China Sea ADIZ was declared.1586 Beijing’s seemingly open-ended approach toward the 
prospect of a South China Sea ADIZ only intensified ASEAN’s unease.1587 The first pushback 
from ASEAN against a potential South China Sea ADIZ came even earlier than the May 10 joint 
statement. In December 2013, less than a month after Beijing declared the East China Sea ADIZ, 
Tokyo held a special summit with ASEAN countries to mark the 40th anniversary of Japan-ASEAN 
friendship. The summit gave a high priority to promoting “[f]ree and safe maritime navigation and 
aviation” and strengthening Japan-ASEAN cooperation to ensure the freedom of overflight.1588 
 
1584 Zhang Liangfu [张良福], “The Mainland China’s South China Sea policy and act” [中国大陆的南海政策作为], 
in Liu Fu-Kuo [刘复国] and Wu Shicun [吴士存], ed., South China Sea Regional Situation Assessment Report 2014 
[2014 年南海地区形式评估报告] (Taipei: Taiwan Center for Security Studies, 2015), p. 32. 
1585  “Nay Pyi Taw Declaration on Realization of the ASEAN Community by 2015,” May 11, 2014, 
http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/24th-NPT-Declaration.pdf, accessed May 22, 2019. 
1586 “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea.” 
1587 When asked if a South China Sea ADIZ was under consideration during a press conference on November 27, 2013, 
Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Qin Gang stated, “China would establish other ADIZs at the right time after 
relevant preparation work is completed.” On December 9, when commenting on Japan and Philippine’s concerns 
about China establishing a South China Sea ADIZ, Chinse Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Hong Lei claimed that 
Beijing was “determined to safeguard national security” and that “no country should make comments on this matter.” 
“MFA spokesperson Qin Gang holds press conference November 27, 2013” [2013 年 11 月 27 日外交部发言人秦刚
主持例行记者会 ], MFA, http://ge.china-embassy.org/chn/fyrth/t1103134.htm, accessed Jun. 8, 2019; “China 
dismisses Japan’s opposition to South China Sea ADIZ,” Xinhua News Service, Dec. 9, 2013. 
1588 “Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit ‘Hand in hand, facing regional and global 
challenges,’” Dec. 15, 2013, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page3e_000132.html, accessed Jun. 8, 2019. 
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The summit, as some Chinese analysts perceived it, represented “Japan’s attempt to use ASEAN 
to balance against China.”1589  
ASEAN’s demonstration of its growing unity in balancing China in the South China Sea was 
highly alarming for Beijing because “even though a cooperative ASEAN is of limited use, an 
uncooperative ASEAN could be very destructive.”1590 On May 10, in response to the ASEAN 
foreign ministers’ joint statement, the Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson Hua Chunying 
reiterated Beijing’s position that the South China Sea is not an issue in China-ASEAN relations 
and criticized unspecified “one or two countries” for attempting to use the issue to harm the 
“overall friendship and cooperation between China and the ASEAN.”1591 On May 19, in criticizing 
ASEAN Secretary General Le Luong Minh’s vow to “get China out of the [Vietnamese] territorial 
waters,” Beijing again explicitly urged ASEAN not to take sides in the Paracel controversy but “to 
stay neutral and take practical actions to protect and maintain the development of the China-
ASEAN relationship.” 1592  The strong rhetoric notwithstanding, the Chinese foreign policy 
community was anxious about the emerging united front of ASEAN. NISCSS highlighted the 
concern in its 2014 annual report:  
This is the first time that ASEAN has reached a consensus on the South China Sea 
issue. In a sense, the statement on the South China Sea demonstrates ASEAN’s 
support for Vietnam…[and] has far-reaching implications. This statement has also 
demonstrated the internal unity of ASEAN in facing growing tensions in the South 
 
1589 Zhao Yi [赵毅], “Assessment of the trend in ASEAN’s internal and external relations” [东盟内外关系走向评
估], in Qin Tian [秦天] and Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed. International Strategic Relations and China’s National 
Security 2013-2014 [国际战略形势与中国国家安全 2013-2014] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2014), p. 73. 
1590 Zhang Jie [张洁] and Zhu Bing [朱滨], “The South China Sea factor in China-ASEAN relations” [中国-东盟关
系中的南海因素], Contemporary World [当代世界], issue 8, 2013, p. 52. 
1591  “MFA spokesperson Hua Chunying answers reporter’s question regarding the ASEAM foreign ministers’ 
statement on the South China Sea issue” [外交部发言人华春英就东盟外长会发表南海问题声明答记者问], May 
10, 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/chn/fyrth/t1154605.htm, accessed Nov. 30, 2019. 
1592 “China demands ASEAN neutrality over South China Sea,” China Daily, May 19, 2014; Rachel Chang, “China 
slams Asean sec-gen for remarks on sea spat; It accuses the official from Vietnam of ‘violating Asean’s neutrality,’” 
Strait Times, May 20, 2014. 
- 450 - 
 
China Sea, suggesting a minimalist ‘united front’ has been established against 
unilateral actions in the South China Sea taken by the mainland [China].1593 
This assessment resonated with evaluations by other research institutions. CICIR noted in its own 
annual report that “there is a burgeoning tendency among littoral states of the South China Sea to 
‘coalesce against China’ (联合对华).”1594 The PLA’s NDU annual analysis similarly noted that it 
was “extremely rare for ASEAN as a regional organization to attempt to play a role in the China-
Vietnam Paracel dispute;” 1595  and the fact that ASEAN’s attention extended from maritime 
domain to include the airspace underscored “the unspoken worry that ASEAN countries have 
about China’s South China Sea policy.” 1596  
For Beijing, ASEAN’s emerging internal unity also underscored Malaysia’s changed attitude. 
As one of the founding countries of ASEAN, Malaysia had traditionally been viewed by Beijing 
as politically useful in China’s diplomacy toward ASEAN.1597 Even after the 2009 Malaysia-
Vietnam joint submission to UNCLCS, China and Malaysia had managed to maintain an overall 
positive relationship and had kept the ramifications of their conflicting claims in the South China 
Sea at bay.1598 In 2013-2014, however, Chinese analysts came to see Kuala Lumpur quietly drifting 
 
1593 Sun Kuo-Hsiang [孙国祥], “ASEAN’s policy toward South China Sea” [东协的南海政策作为], South China 
Sea Regional Situation Assessment Report 2014, p. 81.  
1594 He Sheng [何胜], Lou Chunhao [楼春豪], et al., “‘Competitive cooperation’ in the maritime domain intensifies” 
[海洋领域 “竞合” 态势加剧] in Ji Zhiye [季志业], ed., Strategic and Security Review 2014/2015 [国际战略与安全
形势评估 2014/2015] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2015), p. 172. 
1595 Li Mingjiang [李明江] and Lin Qingrui [林庆瑞], “The strategic trend in the South China Sea disputes” [南海争
端的战略走势], in Qin Tian [秦天] and Ren Tianyou [任天佑], ed, International Strategic Relations and China’s 
National Security 2014-2015 [国际战略形势与中国国家安全] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2015), p. 78. 
1596  Zhao Yi [赵毅], “Assessment of ASEAN’s strategic trend” [东盟战略走向分析], International Strategic 
Relations and China’s National Security 2014-2015, p. 168. 
1597 Luo Yongkun [骆永昆], “Developments and characteristics of Malaysia’s foreign policy strategy” [浅析马来西
亚外交战略的发展及其特点], Peace and Development, issue 5, 2013, p. 100. 
1598 Ju Hailong [鞠海龙], “South China Sea policies of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei” [马来西亚、印尼、文莱的
南海政策], 2012 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea, p. 89; Ju Hailong, “Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Brunei’s Policies and positions on the South China Sea” [印尼、马来西亚、文莱的南海政策立场], in Liu Fu-
kuo [刘复国] and Wu Shicun [吴士存], ed., 2011 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea [2011
年南海地区形势评估报告] (Taipei: Institute of International Relations National Chengchi University, 2012), p. 100. 
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from its longstanding position as “some of China’s bolder acts” raised Malaysia’s eyebrows.1599 
In particular, in March 2013 a four-ship PLAN flotilla conducted an oath-taking ceremony at the 
contested James Shoal – 43 nautical miles off the coast of Malaysia.1600 While the PLAN and 
China’s MLE ships had conducted similar ceremonies in this area in the past,1601 the 2013 one 
made an unprecedented front-page story in the People’s Daily.  
Malaysia’s response, though slow in arriving, was powerful to China. In September 2013, 
when speaking at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib 
Razak made an extremely rare blunt remark (in the context of China-Malaysia relations) that 
Beijing needed to handle the maritime disputes with its neighbors “more as a problem between 
friends rather than a conflict with one another.” Beijing would soon realize it “need[s] friends” 
and could no longer afford to alienate, added Najib, given that China already had problems with 
Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Korea, should it also have problems with Malaysia, then “the 
world will begin to wonder that all these countries can’t be wrong.”1602 Kuala Lumpur backed its 
words with deeds. In October, Malaysia made a highly publicized announcement that it would 
build a new naval base in Bintulu, Sarawak, 54 nautical miles from James Shoal, and that a new 
 
1599 Sun Kuo-hsiang [孙国祥], “Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei’s South China Sea policies” [马来西亚、印尼、文
莱的南海政策作为], in Liu Fu-kuo [刘复国] and Wu Shicun [吴士存], ed., 2013 Assessment Report on the Situation 
in the South China Sea [2013 年南海地区形势评估报告] (Taipei: Institute of International Relations National 
Chengchi University, 2014), p. 98. 
1600 Bai Ruixue [白瑞雪] and Gan Jun [甘俊], “Naval flotilla stage an oath swearing ceremony in Zengmu Ansha” 
[海军编队在曾母暗沙宣誓], People’s Daily Mar. 27, 2013. 
1601 The earliest People’s Daily report on the PLAN’s activity in James Shoal available in the newspaper’s database 
is dated July 1983. FLE and CMS had thereafter conducted similar activities in this area. But none had appeared in 
the front page. Information released by the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) in April 2013 noted that from 
2008-2012, 35 ships belonging either to the PLAN or Chinese MLE agencies were observed in Malaysia’s EEZ. 
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Malaysia Walks Tightrope on China and the South China Sea,” China Brief, vol. 14, issue 
6, Mar. 20, 2014, https://jamestown.org/program/malaysia-walks-tightrope-on-china-and-the-south-china-sea/, 
accessed Dec. 2, 2019. 
1602  “Najib: Tackle territorial claims as a problem between friends,” The Star, Sept. 28, 2013, 
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2013/09/28/najib-tackle-territorial-claims-as-a-problem-between-friends/, 
accessed Dec. 2, 2019. 
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marine corps with amphibious capabilities would also be created for deployment to the South 
China Sea.1603  
In January 2014, another PLA fleet comprised of three naval ships conducted another oath-
taking ceremony in James Shoal. The mysterious disappearance of MH 370 in March and the 
resulting popular Malaysia-bashing in China only further cooled down the bilateral relations. In 
April, during U.S. President Barak Obama’s historical visit to Kuala Lumpur, the two countries 
issued a joint statement reaffirming “the importance of safeguarding maritime security and 
ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region…the importance of all 
parties concerned resolving their territorial and maritime disputes through peaceful means, 
including international arbitration…[and] avoiding the use of force, intimidation, or coercion.”1604 
This joint agreement, as Chinese analysts evaluated it, reflected Malaysia’s growing unease about 
the South China Sea dispute.1605 The ASEAN foreign ministers’ joint statement on the HD-981 
clash and the Nay Pyi Taw Declaration sent an even stronger signal about Malaysia’s changing 
attitude. As the NISCSS annual report noted, “During the clash between China and Vietnam over 
the operation of HD-981, Malaysia’s demonstrated tilt toward Vietnam testified to the importance 
[that Malaysia] placed on [the need of] underscoring ASEAN as a whole.”1606  
In an attempt to repair the relations and keep Malaysia from drifting further away, China staged 
a grand celebration of the 40th anniversary of two countries’ normalization in late May. During 
Malaysian Prime Minister Najib’s six-day trip to Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted a 
 
1603 Parameswaran, “Malaysia Walks Tightrope on China and the South China Sea.” 
1604 “Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Najib of Malaysia,” White House, Apr. 27, 2014, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/27/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-
minister-najib-malaysia-0, accessed Dec. 2, 2019.   
1605 Zhang Longyan [章龙炎], “Malaysia’s South China Sea policy” [马来西亚南海政策], in in Ju Hailong [鞠海龙], 
ed, Report of the Situation in the South China Sea 2014–2015 [南海地区形势报告 2014-2015] (Beijing: Shishi 
chuanshe, 2016), p. 193. 
1606 Wang Kuan-Hsiung [王冠雄], “Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei’s South China Sea policies and activities” [马来
西亚、印尼、文莱的南海政策行为], in 2014 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea, p.142. 
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private dinner for Najib, which Malaysian officials hailed as “a rare honor” showing that “China 
values its ties with Malaysia.”1607 Beijing was ostensibly endeavoring to reassure Kuala Lumpur, 
as Xi told Najib that China “will react in the necessary way to the provocation of countries 
involved,” and added that China and Malaysia should maintain “sound communication” and 
strengthen cooperation in regional economic initiatives.1608 As a South China Sea expert put it 
plainly, “Malaysia has always been the rivaling claimant that China endeavors to draw over to our 
side; and that is also because Malaysia has much influence on Brunei.”1609 
In addition, two major events coinciding with the HD-981 reinforced China’s evaluation of the 
rising international audience costs. First, on May 14, the Philippines announced that China had 
been dredging and reclaiming land at the Johnson South Reef since January.1610 In early June, 
Manila claimed that more Chinese reclamation activity had been spotted near the Gavin and 
Cuarteron Reefs.1611 Zhang Jie, a Southeast Asia expert at CASS, voiced the worry during a June 
7 interview that China’s land reclamation activity would only deepen Southeast Asian countries’ 
mistrust of China.1612 Second, in addressing foreign leaders at a summit in Shanghai on May 21, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping urged that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.”1613 
The timing of the speech, as a senior researcher at a government-affiliated think tank noted in 
private, “could not have been worse.”1614 Chinese analysts were worried that the idea of “Asia for 
 
1607 Kor Kian Beng, “Malaysia a ‘trusted friend’ of China: Xi; Both leaders commit to deepening ties, maintaining 
regional peace,” Strait Times, May 31, 2014. 
1608 “China, Malaysia pledge South China Sea stability,” Xinhua News Service, May 30, 2014. 
1609 Author’s interview, Beijing, May 2019. 
1610 Jim Gomez, “Manila says China reclaiming land in disputed sea,” Associated Press, May 15, 2014. 
1611 Raul Dancel, “Chinese ‘land reclamation’ ships at reef: Aquino,” Strait Times, Jun. 6, 2014. 
1612 Kristine Kwok and Minnie Chan, “China plans to make disputed reef a vast island,” South China Morning Post, 
Jun. 7, 2014. 
1613 “New Asian Security Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation: Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the 
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia By H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's 
Republic of China,” May 21, 2014, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/yzxhxzyxrcshydscfh/t1159951.shtml, accessed Jun. 20, 2019. 
1614 Private conversation on the sideline of a conference on maritime security at Peking University, Beijing, June 2019. 
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Asians,” as advocated in this speech, only served to validate the growing suspicions in the 
neighborhood that China was seeking to assert its own version of the Monroe Doctrine1615 – 
namely, to “dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere.”1616  
As of mid-June, Chinese foreign policy elites began to explicitly caution against the rising 
international costs China would face on the ASEAN front should it choose to persist. An article 
published on the eve of Yang Jiechi’s June 18 trip to Hanoi penned by Xue Li, director of the 
International Strategy Department under the Institute of World Economics at CASS, provided a 
long list of the potential geostrategic ramifications for China: ASEAN countries would rally with 
each other more closely and speak with a more unanimous voice – a trend already illustrated by 
the ASEAN foreign ministers’ joint statement; ASEAN claimants would move closer to powers 
outside the region especially the United States and Japan; Vietnam would follow the suit of the 
Philippines in resorting to international arbitration against China; and the view that ‘China is 
changing the status quo’ would gain more currency in the international community. In that event, 
Xue warned, China’s good neighborly diplomacy would face a major setback in Southeast Asia 
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative might encounter a debacle.1617 
The increasingly clear and strong U.S. position opposing China’s behavior in the South China 
Sea represented the third source of Beijing’s perceived increase in the potential geopolitical costs. 
For the most part of 2013, Beijing saw a relatively stable situation in the South China Sea, while 
tensions in the East China Sea as well as between China and the U.S. flared up again over the 
 
1615 Author’s interview, Beijing, May 2019. 
1616 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, vol. 3, 2010, p. 389. 
1617 Xue Li [薛力], “Five possible solutions to the Sino-Vietnamese ‘981’ controversy” [解决中越“981”事件的五种
可能], Financial Times (Chinese version), Jun. 17, 2014, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001056782?full=y&archive, 
accessed Jun. 19, 2019. 
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declaration of the ADIZ in November.1618 China perceived a visible hardening in the U.S. attitude 
in 2014. In February, when testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistant 
Secretary of State in East Asian Affairs Daniel Russel outlined a list of Chinese actions in both the 
East and South China Seas as instances of intimidation and coercion that Washington “firmly 
oppose[s].” These actions, said Russel, “have raised tensions in the region and concerns about 
China’s objectives in both the South China and the East China Seas.”1619 Russel also rejected 
Beijing’s nine-dash line as lacking “basis under international law,” and thus China’s use of the 
nine-dash line to claim maritime rights “would be inconsistent with international law.”1620  The 
message regarding the nine-dash line was strong because it was the very first time that a U.S. 
government official explicitly rejected China’s nine-dash line as the legal basis for staking 
maritime claims. 1621  In the Chinese perception, Russel’s testimony marked a departure by 
Washington from its traditional position of not taking side and a direct U.S. challenge to China by 
“explicitly denying China’s basis for its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and by issuing 
political warnings against China’s maritime rights defense activity.” This change in attitude, as 
 
1618 CIIS, International Situation and China’s Foreign Affair (2014) [国际形势和中国外交 (2014)] (Beijing: Shijie 
zhishi chubanshe, 2014), pp. 279-280; Ye Hailin [叶海林], “Changes in relevant parties’ intensions and tactics on the 
South China Sea issue” [南海问题有关各方的意图变化及策略转换], in Li Xiangyang [李向阳], ed., Annual Report 
on Development of Asia-Pacific (2014) [亚太地区发展报告] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014),  pp. 
161-173. 
1619 These Chinese actions include the continued restrictions on access to Scarborough; pressure on the Philippine 
presence at the Second Thomas Shoal; opening hydrocarbon blocks in disputed waters; announcing the Sansha city; 
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of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,” Feb. 5, 2014. 
1620 Ibid. 
1621 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia, p. 173. 
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Chinese analyst perceived it, indicated that the U.S. had shifted from behind-the-scenes 
interference in the South China Sea to overt involvement.1622 
Obama’s visit to Japan, the Philippines, and Malaysia in April only reinforced Beijing’s 
conviction that Washington was turning against China’s vital interests in the strategic waters 
within the first island chain. In Tokyo, Obama explicitly reiterated that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty would be applicable to “all territories under Japan’s administration, including the 
Senkaku Islands.”1623 Beijing was alarmed by Obama’s remark as it was the first time a sitting U.S. 
president had clarified America’s treaty obligations with respect to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands,1624 although the reiteration did  not change Washington’s position on this issue.1625 In 
Manila, Obama and Philippine President Aquino signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (EDCA), which would  provide a legal framework for an increased rotational presence 
of U.S. forces in the Philippines.1626 This agreement, as Chinese analysts argued, came as “an 
important step for the U.S. military to return to Asia” and would consequently exacerbate the 
external environment China was facing in the South China Sea.1627 Likewise, Obama’s visit to 
 
1622 Wang Guanghou [王光厚], “U.S. South China Sea Policy” [美国的南海政策], in Ju Hailong [鞠海龙], ed., 
Report on the Situation in the South China Sea 2014-2015 [南海地区形势报告] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2016), 
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1623 White House, “Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan,” Akasaka Palace, 
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conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan, accessed Dec. 4, 2019. 
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1625 Author’s phone interview, August 2019. 
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Kuala Lumpur, the first one by a sitting U.S. president in 48 years, was watched warily by Chinese 
analysts as a sign of two countries drawing closer to balance China.1628 
Shortly after the Sino-Vietnamese clash over the deployment of HD-981 began, Washington 
made clear its opposition to China’s actions with a string of strong messages, sharply contrasting 
the slow-to-come and ambivalent U.S. response during the Scarborough Shoal standoff. On May 
6, the U.S. State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki criticized the oilrig deployment as an act that 
was “provocative and unhelpful to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.”1629 The 
next day, the State Department put out a strongly worded statement which described China’s 
“unilateral action” as an indication of “a broader pattern of Chinese behavior to advance its claims 
over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability in the region.”1630 This 
statement was followed by a flurry of remarks from senior U.S. officials similarly calling out China. 
On May 8, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russell, who was visiting Hanoi, reiterated 
Washington’s opposition to “any act of intimidation by vessels particularly in disputed areas.”1631 
Four days later, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry again stressed Washington’s concerns about 
“the Chinese challenge to the Paracel Islands.”1632 On May 15, then U.S. Vice President Joe Biden 
 
1628 Chen Xiangmiao [陈相秒], “Evaluation of Malaysia’s South China Sea policy in 2014” [2014 马来西亚南海政
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retrieved at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/05/225687.htm, accessed Jun. 19, 2019. 
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Spokesperson, Washington DC, May 7, 2014, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225750.htm, accessed 
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raised Washington’s concerns about China’s “unilateral actions” in the Paracels during a meeting 
with the visiting PLA Chief of General Staff Fang Fenghui.1633  
Washington sent further strong signals on the eve of the U.S.-China Security & Economic 
Dialogue. On July 8, a senior U.S. official traveling with John Kerry to Beijing for the meeting 
described the ambiguity in China’s South China Sea claim as “problematic.” In a likely suggestion 
that more pressure would be exerted on Beijing during the meeting, the official stated that the 
conversation would be conducted in a “very direct, candid, and constructive way.”1634  
For Beijing, all these U.S. moves and statements sent a clear signal: “the United States is taking 
sides, and it is not impartial” – in the words of Sun Jianguo, the deputy chief of the General Staff 
of the PLA.1635  By the same token, Fu Mengzi, an expert on U.S.-China relations and vice 
president of CICIR, stated that the U.S. “in both words and deeds” was not merely “taking sides 
against China” but was “clearly trying to contain it.”1636 
China De-escalated 
Presented with a clear domination of international audience costs over domestic audience costs, 
China chose to de-escalate the HD-981 clash in an incremental, face-saving fashion. Beijing began 
to signal its intention to reduce tensions in early June. On June 8, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
released a position paper on the oilrig clash. Despite once again blaming Vietnam’s “illegally and 
forcefully disrupting the Chinese operation,” the paper avoided employing strong rhetoric that 
were commonly used in Chinese government documents issued during the period on maritime 
disputes, most notably the white paper on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the position paper on 
 
1633 “Readout of the Vice President’s Meeting With Chinese People’s Liberation Army Chief of General Staff Fang 
Fenghui,” White House, Office of the Vice President, May 15, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/05/15/readout-vice-president-s-meeting-chinese-people-s-liberation-army-chief-, accessed Jun. 22, 2019. 
1634 “Beijing’s South China Sea claim ‘problematic’: US official,” Agence France Presse, Jul. 8, 2014. 
1635 Simon Denyer, “U.S.-China relations sour as tensions spiral in Asia,” Washington Post, Jul. 8, 2014. 
1636 Fu Mengzi, “Heart-to-hear for healthy ties,” China Daily, Jul. 9, 2014.  
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the arbitration.1637 Instead, the statement highlighted Beijing’s patience and minimalist approach 
of employing “necessary preventive measures” in managing the clash. The position paper 
suggested Beijing’s willingness to talk with Hanoi by stating explicitly that “[t]he channel of 
communication between China and Vietnam remains open” and that “China will continue its effort 
to communicate with Vietnam in order to properly address the current situation.”1638  
The softening tone was also reflected in the content published by media outlets that 
traditionally adopt a more nationalist tone. For instance, the nationalist tabloid Global Times 
published a commentary on June 11, calling on China-Vietnam relations to “get back on track.” 
Appealing to the two countries’ shared ideology, this commentary asserted that Vietnam “has 
always been one of the most important countries in China’s neighborhood diplomacy” and 
attributed the anti-China riots to instigations by “hostile forces resenting the Sino-Vietnamese 
friendship, the CPV’s rule, and the socialist paths that both countries insist on.”1639 
On June 18, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited Hanoi for an annual meeting between 
the Chairs of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation. Yang’s visit 
marked the highest-level exchange between the two communist neighbors since the conflict started 
in early May. The decision to send Yang to Hanoi, as noted by a knowledgeable PLA researcher, 
 
1637 Regarding the Scarborough Shoal standoff, China’s position paper on the South China Sea arbitration states, “the 
Philippines sent on 10 April 2012 a naval vessel to the waters of China’s Huangyan Dao to seize Chinese fishing boats 
together with the Chinese fishermen on board. In the face of such provocations, China was forced to take response 
measures to safeguard its sovereignty.” In the Chinese version of the document, the term “countermeasure” (反制) 
was used. Both the position paper on the arbitration and the white paper on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands made similar 
assertions of China’s “unshakable resolve and will” defend China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights. State 
Council Information Office of PRC, “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,” September 2012, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043212.htm, accessed Dec. 3, 2019; 
“Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China 
Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” MFA, Dec. 7, 2014, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm, accessed Dec. 3, 2019. 
1638 “HD-981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position” [981 钻井平台作业：越南的挑衅和中国
的立场], MFA, Jun. 8, 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/snhwtlcwj/t1163255.htm, accessed Jul. 7, 2019. 
An English version of the position paper was published in China Daily, Jun. 8, 2014. 
1639  Zhu Zhenming, “China-Vietnam should get back on track,” Global Times, Jun. 11, 2014, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/864903.shtml, accessed Jul. 7, 2019. 
- 460 - 
 
was in itself a signal that “China was prepared to soften its posture.”1640 Equally notable was the 
fact that the bilateral Steering Committee, a communication and coordination mechanism 
established in 2006 with an annual senior-level meeting,1641 in effect served as a face-saving venue 
for Beijing – or an “umbrella” as characterized by Wang and Womack – by giving Yang’s trip an 
appearance of routine business.1642 
Tensions lingered throughout Yang’s meetings with his counterpart, Vietnam’s Foreign 
Minister and Vice Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh. Yang seemed to lay the blame solely on 
Vietnam and demanded Hanoi immediately stop disrupting the oilrig’s operation. 1643  Minh 
criticized that China’s deployment of the oilrig not only violated international law but also 
threatened navigation safety and stability in the region in addition to “putting negative impacts on 
the co-operation between the two countries.”1644 This meeting reportedly made “no progress.”1645 
A similar exchange of accusations took place during Yang’s subsequent meeting with Vietnam’s 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Dung asserted that Vietnam was ready to defend its sovereignty 
by “peaceful measures in line with international law,”1646  a statement that echoed the Prime 
Minister’s earlier statement during his trip to Manila and suggested that Hanoi was serious with 
 
1640 Private conversation, Beijing, July 2019. 
1641 “The China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation holds its meeting in Hanoi” [中越双边合作
指导委员会首次会议在河内举行], People.com, Nov. 11, 2006, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/5027277.html, 
accessed Dec. 3, 2019.  
1642 Wang and Womack, “Jawing through Crises,” p. 724. 
1643 “Yang Jiechi holds Chairs Meeting of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation with 
Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister” [杨洁篪同越南副总理举行中越双边合作指导委员会团长会晤], Xinhua, Jun. 
18, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2014-06/18/content_2703500.htm, accessed Jul. 13, 2019. 
1644  “Deputy PM Minh holds talks with Chinese State Councilor,” Nhan Dan, Jun. 18, 2014, 
https://en.nhandan.org.vn/politics/item/2591602-party-state-leaders-meet-with-voters.html, accessed Jul. 13, 2019. 
1645 “Vietnam, China make no progress in oil rig talks,” Associated Press, Jun. 18, 2014. 
1646 “Vietnam PM meets Chinese Yang Jiechi, urges China to withdraw oil rig and ships,” Vietnam News Agency, 
Jun. 18, 2014, http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam-pm-meets-chinese-yang-jiechi-urges-china-to-
withdraw-oil-rig-and-ships-27399.html, accessed Jul. 12, 2019. Emphasis added. 
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the threat of taking legal actions. Unsurprisingly, neither meeting seemed to have produced a 
breakthrough. 
Contrasting the tensions during the two meetings, the atmosphere of the meeting between Yang 
and the CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, a conservative who Beijing viewed as having 
a pragmatic approach toward China, was conspicuously more genial, indicating the great 
importance both sides had attached to the party ties as as the mainstay of the bilateral relationship 
and as a key channel for effective negotiation. Without blaming Vietnam this time, Yang told 
Trong that the bilateral relationship was facing “serious difficulty” but the two sides must 
“stabilize the situation as soon as possible” and bring the relations back on track “no matter how 
difficult it is.”1647 Trong concurred with Yang and called on both sides to create “a premise for 
basic and long-term solutions to sea-related issues.” In addition, Trong offered an explicit 
reaffirmation of Vietnam’s “consistent policy of treasuring the friendship and cooperation with 
China.”1648 This meeting, according to Vietnam expert Carlyle Thayer, was “especially significant” 
because it produced “an informal understanding to find a mutually acceptable way out of the 
current impasse.”1649 
The next day, on the frontpage of the People’s Daily (overseas edition) published a 
commentary penned by Su Xiaohui, Deputy Director of the International and Strategic Studies at 
the MFA-affiliated CIIS, who claimed in the article that Yang’s trip “adequately demonstrates 
 
1647 “Yang Jiechi meets CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong” [杨洁篪会见越共中央总书记阮富仲], Xinhua, 
Jun. 19, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2014-06/19/content_2703907.htm, accessed Jul. 12, 2019. It appeared 
that Yang’s meeting with Trong came the last, following meetings with Pham the first and Dung the second. This 
order is deducted from the times that the official news reports posted on the Chinese government website: Yang’s 
meeting with Pham was posted around 4 pm on June 18; meeting with Dung at 12:35 am on June 19; and meeting 
with Trong at 8:30 am on June 19. 
1648  “Party chief affirms consistent policy on China relations,” Vietnam News Agency, Jun. 18, 2014, 
https://en.nhandan.org.vn/politics/external-relations/item/2591802-party-chief-affirms-consistent-policy-on-china-
relations.html,  accessed Jul. 12, 2019. 
1649 Thayer, “4 Reasons China Removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 Sooner Than Planned.” 
- 462 - 
 
China’s sincerity, good faith…[and] willingness to solve the problem through dialogue and 
communication.”1650 Su’s article was followed up by another English commentary on the website 
of the People’s Daily on June 20 which explicitly stated that “China has extended an olive branch 
to Vietnam, and Vietnam should seize the opportunity and make the right response.”1651 Four days 
later, Beijing announced that Hanoi made an “initial payment” of $7 million to compensate some 
140 Chinese companies that suffered losses during the anti-China riots.1652 
On July 15, following a CPV Politburo meeting during which the Politburo members voted 9 
to 5 approving a proposal to proceed with international arbitration,1653 Beijing announced that the 
drilling operation was completed, and that the oilrig was removed from the Paracel waters as a 
strong typhoon was expected to enter the South China Sea.1654 
Throughout the HD-981 incident, China refrained from imposing economic sanctions on 
Vietnam, although there were speculations that the deaths of Chinese nationals “will create an 
opening for Beijing to harden its stance.”1655 The tourism warning issued during the incident had 
legitimate safety concerns considering the anti-Chinese violence in Vietnam and the resulting 
deaths of Chinese nationals. In mid-June, information surfaced that Vietnam’s lychee exports to 
China had ceased and that Hanoi was scouring the world for alternative export destinations while 
encouraging domestic consumption of the excessive lychee.1656  Unlike the rare earth embargo 
 
1650 Su Xiaohui [苏晓晖], “Vietnam should return to the right track ASAP” [奉劝越南早回头], People’s Daily 
(oversea edition), Jun. 19, 2014, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2014-06/19/content_1442844.htm, 
accessed Jul. 13, 2019. 
1651  “China extends olive branch to Vietnam on sea disputes,” People’s Daily online, Jun. 20, 2014, 
http://en.people.cn/n/2014/0620/c98649-8744156.html, accessed Jul. 13, 2019. 
1652 Pu Zhendong, “Hanoi urged to fully compensate Chinese firms,” China Daily, Jun. 26, 2014. 
1653  Carl Thayer, “Vietnam, China and the Oil Rig Crisis: Who Blinked?” The Diplomat, Aug. 4, 2014, 
https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/vietnam-china-and-the-oil-rig-crisis-who-blinked/, accessed Jul. 20, 2019. 
1654 “Chinese Foreign Ministry confirms drilling off Xisha completed,” Xinhua News Service, Jul. 15, 2014; Chris 
Brummitt, “China moves oil rig out of waters Vietnam claims,” Associated Press, Jul. 16, 2014. 
1655 Kristine Kwok, “Deadly anti-China riots in Vietnam play into the hands of Beijing’s hawks,” South China 
Morning Post, May 16, 2014. 
1656  “Vietnam not importing Chinese litchi, says Minister,” Vietnamnet, Jul. 3, 2014, 
https://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/106596/vietnam-not-importing-chinese-litchi--says-minister.html, 
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evident in trade data and the banana sanction openly announced by the Chinese General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, there was neither trade data 
(Figure 8.4) nor any Chinese government announcement indicating Beijing’s employment of 
sanctions on Vietnamese lychee.  
Figure 8.4 Vietnam’s fruits and rice exports to China by trade value (million US$) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Database; rice (HS 1006); pineapples and mangoes (HS 0804); longan, lychee, dragon 
fruits (HS 0810); durian (HS 081060); coconuts (HS 080119). 
Post-Crisis Learning: Reparations with Hanoi and ASEAN 
Following the oilrig clash, Beijing moved quickly to reassure ASEAN and mend fences with Hanoi. 
Notably, as a major measure of reassurance, Beijing for the first time endorsed a “dual-track” 
approach (双轨思路) on the South China Sea issue that would consign a greater role to ASEAN. 
 
accessed Dec. 4, 2019; “Exports to China encountered barriers, Vietnam calls on its people to eat lychee” [出口中國
遇阻越南號召全民吃荔枝],  Wenweipo, Jul. 2, 2014, http://news.wenweipo.com/2014/07/02/IN1407020055.htm, 
accessed Nov. 4, 2019; “Vietnam seeks to diversify its economy and reduce dependence on China” [越南寻求经济
多 元 化 ， 摆 脱 对 华 依 赖 ], VOA, Jun. 27, 2014, https://www.voachinese.com/a/vietnam-china-econ-
20140626/1945891.html, accessed Nov. 4, 2019; “Vietnam Bac Giang lychee marches to markets around the word” 
[ 越 南 北 江 省 荔 枝 进 军 世 界 各 国 市 场 ], Nhandan (Chinese language version), Jun. 23, 2014, 
https://cn.nhandan.com.vn/hotnews/item/2131201-%E8%B6%8A%E5%8D%97%E5%8C%97%E6%B1%9F%E7%
9C%81%E8%8D%94%E6%9E%9D%E8%BF%9B%E5%86%9B%E4%B8%96%E7%95%8C%E5%90%84%E5%
9B%BD%E5%B8%82%E5%9C%BA.html, accessed Nov. 4, 2019. 
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This position was first articulated by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the China-ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Naypyidaw on August 9, and reaffirmed by China’s Premier Li 
Keqiang in November at the ASEAN-China summit. According to Beijing’s definition of this 
approach, while disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime boundaries would still be 
addressed by claimants through bilateral negotiation, issues pertaining to “maintaining peace and 
stability in the South China Sea” including the negotiation and conclusion of a COC would be 
conducted in the multilateral China-ASEAN setting. 1657  The endorsement of the dual-track 
approach, as some Chinese analysts contend, marks a significant shift in China’s approach on how 
the South China Sea issue was to be managed. For example, Zuo Xiying, a scholar on international 
relations at Renmin University, claims that China was “partially compromising” by adopting “a 
bilateral plus multilateral negotiation” such that the non-claimant countries could play a bigger 
role in the South China Sea issue.1658  
Meanwhile, Beijing and Hanoi took steps to restore high-level political exchanges. Le Hong 
Anh, Standing Secretary of Secretariat of the CPV Central Committee and a Politburo member, 
visited Beijing as a special envoy of the CPV party chief Nguyen Phu Trong from August 26-27 
to “exchange views with Chinese leaders on measures to ease the situation [and] prevent the 
recurrence of recent tenses.”1659 Hanoi also announced a plan to provide humanitarian assistance 
for Chinese workers victimized in the riots and dispatch a Vietnam-China Friendship Association 
 
1657 “China support ‘dual-track’ approach to resolve South China Sea issue: Chinese FM,” Xinhua News Service, Aug. 
9, 2014; “Remarks by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China at the 17 th 
ASEAN-China Summit,” Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Nov. 13, 2014, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1212266.shtml, accessed Jul. 20, 2019. 
1658 Zuo Xiying, “Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute strategies,” in Huiyun Feng, Kai He and Yan Xuetong, 
ed., Chinese Scholars and Foreign Policy: Debating International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2019), pp. 160-
162.  
1659 “Remarks by MOFA's Spokesman Le Hai Binh on 25th August 2014,” Press and Information Department - 
Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 25, 2014, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140825093826, 
accessed Jun. 8, 2019. 
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delegation to China to visit families of the victims.1660 In meeting with Anh, China’s President Xi 
Jinping called on both communist parties to “increase high-level exchanges, conduct timely and 
in-depth communication on major issues…[and] especially make correct political judgment at 
critical moments.” 1661  A commentary published by the People’s Daily on August 27, while 
cautioning that the two countries should not allow the South China Sea issue to “contaminate” 
their relations, highlighting the inter-party ties as an important channel to maintain communication, 
lower tensions, and repair relations when the bilateral relationship was tested.1662 Following Anh’s 
visit, high-level exchanges were soon restored (Figure 8.5), culminating in Xi Jinping’s state visit 
to Hanoi in November 2015. 
The military-to-military ties represented another major dimension in which bilateral relations 
were quickly repaired. During Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh’s three-day 
high-profile visit to Beijing in October, the two sides picked up the unfinished business of 
establishing a hotline between the countries’ armed forces. 1663  The two sides launched their 
Defense Telephone Link (DTL) in late 2015.1664  
While the withdrawal of the oilrig by no means reflects a modification of China’s claims or 
acceptance of those of Vietnam, Beijing seems to have learned from this incident. When HD-981 
 
1660 Ibid. 
1661 Liu Hua [刘华], “Xi Jinping meets with Le Hong Anh, envoy of CPV Central Committee General Secretary” [习
近平会见越共中央总书记特使黎鸿英 ], Xinhua, Aug. 27, 2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-
08/27/c_1112255473.htm, accessed Jul. 21, 2019. 
1662 Hua Yisheng [华益声], “Don’t let the South China Sea problem tarnish the big picture of China-Vietnam relations” 
[别让南海问题搅了中越大局], People’s Daily (overseas edition), Aug. 27, 2014. 
1663 Carlyle Thayer, “Why the Upcoming China-Vietnam Defense Ministers Meeting is Immensely Important,” The 
Diplomat, Oct. 17, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/why-the-upcoming-china-vietnam-defense-ministers-
meeting-is-immensely-important/, accessed Jul. 21, 2014. 
1664  “China-Vietnam and China-ROK Defense Telephone Links officially activated with opening telephone 
conversations” [中越、中韩国防部之通电话正式开通并举行首次通话], Ministry of Defense of PRC, Dec. 31, 
2015, http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2015-12/31/content_4638418.htm, accessed Jul. 21, 2019. 
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was redeployed to the South China Sea in June 2015, it stayed away from the disputed waters.1665 
While the Vietnamese maritime law enforcement forces claimed to “have kept a close watch on 
the rig’s movement” since the discovery of the redeployment, this episode ended quietly without 





1665 Greg Poling at CSIS utilized information released by China’s MSA on the coordinates (17°03’75” N, 109°59’05” 
E) of the oilrig and located the site.  Ankit Panda, “China’s HD-981 Oil Rig Returns, Near Disputed South China Sea 
Waters,” The Diplomat, Jun. 27, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/chinas-hd-981-oil-rig-returns-to-disputed-
south-china-sea-waters/, accessed Jul. 21, 2019. 
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9. The Luconia Standoff and the Natuna Confrontation 
Following the highly violent HD-981 episode, Beijing took steps to dial down tensions with Hanoi 
and Sino-Vietnamese relations witnessed a relatively stable period. On the other hand, as Chinese 
presence in waters close to Malaysia and Indonesia increased, both of which had traditionally 
adopted a low-profile approach and avoided an overtly confrontational posture against China on 
the South China Sea issue, Beijing’s relationships with both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta became 
strained from around 2014. 
In a rare tough gesture, Malaysia’s naval and coast guard ships confronted a Chinese coast 
guard ship in June 2015 near the contested Luconia Shoals/Qiongtai Jiao (hereafter “Luconia”). 
Likewise, Indonesia hardened its approach toward Chinese fishing activity in the undelimited 
Natuna sea areas following the inauguration of President Joko Widodo in October 2014. In March 
2016, a confrontation between vessels of CCG and Indonesia’s Ministry of Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries ensued near the Natuna Islands as the former attempted to block the latter from arresting 
Chinese fishermen and confiscating their fishing boat which were found operating in the 
undelimited waters near Natuna.  
Despite the growing tensions, China refrained from undertaking escalatory moves and limited 
itself to diplomatic protests in the face of rapidly surging international audience costs, which 
created powerful incentives for China to deescalate.  
2015 LUCONIA STANDOFF 
Situated between the Spratly Islands and James Shoal, the Luconia Shoals are roughly 84 nautical 
miles from the coast of Malaysia’s oil-rich Sarawak (Map 9.1). Unlike the hotly contested Spratlys, 
the Luconia Shoals represented a relatively “new frontier” to the South China Sea disputes in the 
sense that an area within the shoals only recently became an elevation visible above the water at  
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Map 9.1 The Luconia Shoals 
 
hightide – that is, a land feature which claimants may argue is an island as defined by UNCLOS.1666 
In October 2009, a team from the Chinese National Geography magazine on a mission to document 
the marine environment and assert China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea found the Luconia 
Shoals had emerged as a small land feature above the water. The team reported in their article that 
they had discovered China’s southernmost land territory – as opposed to James Shoal which is 
traditionally claimed as China’s southernmost tip but is submerged below the water. The magazine 
 
1666 Article 121 of UNCLOS, which contains three clauses, defines and qualifies the regime of islands. First, an island 
is defined as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” Second, the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ and the continental shelf of an island are “determined in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.” Third, “rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm, accessed May 22, 2020. Therefore, 
claimants can contend that the Luconia is an island as defined by the first clause of Article 121, although whether it 
should be considered as being capable of sustaining human habitation and thus entitled to EEZ or continental shelf as 
defined in the second and third clauses would be open to more controversies. 
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article ended with a call on Chinese authorities to claim sovereignty over the islet and develop it 
into a coral park for tourism.1667 This “discovery” seemed to be the trigger for the subsequent 
China-Malaysia rivalry in the Luconia Shoal.  
In September 2013, a CCG patrol ship anchored in the Luconia Shoals and maintained a nearly 
constant presence in the region. The CCG ship reportedly started chasing away Malaysian 
fishermen from the area, which prompted the Sarawak local authorities and the fishermen in the 
city of Miri to call on the Malaysian authorities to take actions. Kuala Lumpur’s initial response 
was apparently cautious, avoiding open discussion or complaint. It was not until March 2014 that 
the Najib government first raised this matter in Parliament.1668 
In early June 2015, Kuala Lumpur released photos of the CCG ship, declaring that Malaysia’s 
naval and maritime law enforcement vessels had been deployed to the area to monitor the Chinese 
vessel on a 24/7 basis. Noting an increased Chinese presence in Malaysia-claimed waters since 
September 2014, Malaysia’s Navy Chief Abdul Aziz Jaafar said that the Malaysian ships had been 
“shadowing the [Chinese] vessel continuously” and attempted to warn the CCG ship that it was in 
Malaysian waters but got no response. Malaysia’s National Security Minister Shahidan Kassim 
stated that Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak would raise the issue directly with Chinese President 
Xi Jinping.1669 
 
1667 “Landing on Qiongtai Jiao: an erstwhile underwater atoll has grown into China’s southernmost land territory” [登
上琼台礁：原暗礁已生长为中国最南端陆地领土], Chinese National Geography [中国国家地理], Oct. 13, 2010, 
http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/detail_2010_10/13/2765837_0.shtml, accessed Feb. 2, 2020. For English-language on the 
Chinese adventure and the legal significance of the Luconia Shoals emerging as an island which is visible above the 
water at hightide, see, Andrew Chubb, “Luconia Breakers: China’s ‘new southernmost territory’ in the South China 
Sea?” Southseaconversations, https://southseaconversations.wordpress.com/2015/06/16/luconia-breakers-chinas-
new-southernmost-territory-in-the-south-china-sea/, Jun. 16, 2015, accessed Feb. 10, 2020; Part VIII, REGIME OF 
ISLANDS, Article 121 Regime of islands, UNCLOS. 
1668  Elina Noor, “Malaysia: Recalibrating its South China Sea Policy?” CSIS-AMTI, Jan. 8, 2016, 
https://amti.csis.org/malaysia-recalibrating-its-south-china-sea-policy/, accessed Feb. 2, 2020.  
1669  Jenifer Laeng, “China Coast Guard vessel found at Luconia Shoals,” Borneo Post, Jun. 3, 2015, 
https://www.theborneopost.com/2015/06/03/china-coast-guard-vessel-found-at-luconia-shoals/, accessed Feb. 1, 
2020; Jason Ng and Trefor Moss, “Malaysia Toughens Stance With Beijing Over South China Sea; National security 
minister says Malaysia will protest ‘intrusion’ of Chinese Coast Guard vessel,” Wall Street Journal, Jun. 8, 2015; 
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The decision to go public, as perceived by some analysts in Malaysia and other Southeast Asian 
countries, seemed to imply a departure from Kuala Lumpur’s typically low-key approach to the 
South China Sea disputes.1670 The deployed Malaysian vessels and the CCG ship were involved in 
what Chinese media sources described as a “standoff”, 1671  though short of sparking a tense 
confrontation similar to the Scarborough Shoal or the HD-981 incident. 
Beijing avoided making a direct response to the incident. When asked to comment on the 
faceoff during a press conference on June 8, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Hong 
Lei responded that he was “not unfamiliar with” Malaysia’s assertation that a Chinese ship was 
anchored at Luconia Shoals.1672 The press conference transcript later released by the MFA did not 
even contain Hong’s remark on the Luconia episode.1673  
The Cost Trade-off: International Audience Costs Dominated 
When the Luconia confrontation became an issue between China and Malaysia, a primary goal for 
Beijing’s diplomacy with Malaysia was, as expressly stated in an evaluation of Malaysia’s South 
China Sea policy by an NISCSS researcher, to “effectively eliminate the potential challenges posed 
by ASEAN, a possible Philippines-Vietnam-Malaysia or a U.S.-Malaysia coalition” through the 
leverage of China’s “hard power” and “soft power” with Kuala Lumpur.1674 This desire to prevent 
 
“Malaysia to protest over China Coast Guard ‘intrusion”: navy chief,” Agence France Presse, Jun. 9, 2015; Prashanth 
Parameswaran, “Malaysia Responds to China’s South China Sea Intrusion,” The Diplomat, Jun. 9, 2015, 
https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/malaysia-responds-to-chinas-south-china-sea-intrusion/, accessed Feb. 1, 2020. 
1670 Noor, “Malaysia: Recalibrating its South China Sea Policy?” Oh Ei Sun, “Subtle shift in KL’s policy over the 
South China Sea dispute,” The Nation, Jun. 30, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/media-highlight/idss/subtle-shift-in-kls-
policy-over-the-south-china-sea-dispute/#.XlghK0p7k2w, accessed Feb. 27, 2020. 
1671 “Chinese and Malaysian vessels staged a standoff near Qiongtai Shoal in the South China Sea” [中国和马来西
亚 舰 艇 在 南 海 琼 台 礁 附 近 发 生 对 峙 ], Takungpao [ 大 公 网 ], Jun. 4, 2015, 
http://news.takungpao.com/world/roll/2015-06/3019500.html, accessed Feb. 2, 2020. 
1672 Ng and Moss, “Malaysia Toughens Stance With Beijing Over South China Sea.” 
1673 “Malaysian official: Chinese navy exercise in James Shoal, prodding the Malaysian side to change its strategy” 
[马官员：中国海军在曾母暗沙演习，促马方改策略], Sina, Jun. 11, 2015, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2015-06-
11/0729832824.html, accessed Feb. 3, 2020. 
1674 Chen, “Evaluation of Malaysia’s South China Sea policy in 2014,” p. 75. 
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Malaysia from siding with what Beijing viewed as the rivaling bloc in the South China Sea, along 
with the objective of preserving the still robust China-Malaysia relations, served as a major source 
of international costs by making a deterioration in the bilateral relationship prohibitively costly for 
Beijing. In the multilateral setting, China’s audience cost tradeoff calculation was also clearly 
tilting toward the international end as a result of a string of preceding high-profile incidents in the 
area, the ongoing arbitration, and China’s land reclamation activities.  
Domestically, the compromise-averse coalition was relatively weak as key stakeholders had 
vital interests in maintaining stable China-Malaysia relations. In addition, as Beijing moved to 
reign in domestic attention to the South China Sea (Figure 8.1) after the Scarborough Shoal faceoff, 
a strong grassroots backlash on a decision to deescalate the standoff appeared unlikely. 
Low Domestic Audience Costs on Malaysia 
Beijing has traditionally placed a high stake on maintaining Kuala Lumpur as a friendly voice 
toward China not only on the South China Sea disputes specifically but also on broader ASEAN-
China relations. Seeing Kuala Lumpur quietly shift its position in 2013-2014, Beijing took pains 
to placate its longtime friend and arrest the trend of drifting, as already elaborated Chapter 8. 
Below the top leadership, an escalatory posture toward Malaysia did not seem to have garnered 
much support from key domestic stakeholders. To begin with, the PLA, despite its growing 
activities in waters off Malaysia’s coast and the high-profile oath-taking ceremonies, had an 
institutional stake in securing a positive China-Malaysia relationship to expand its port access in 
maritime Southeast Asia. The PLAN officials first visited Kota Kinabalu, the state capital of Sabah 
and a port situated at a central location on the southern edge of the South China Sea, in August 
2013. Later that year, Malaysia’s Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein invited his Chinese 
counterpart Chang Wanquan to visit a Malaysian naval base in Sabah, where the two military 
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leaders launched direct contact between Malaysia’s Naval Region Command 2 and China’s South 
Sea Fleet Command. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Malaysia in October 2013, Sabah was even 
initially included as part of his itinerary, indicating Beijing’s interest in gaining access to north 
Borneo. In April 2015, China opened a new consulate in Kota Kinabalu.1675  
The geostrategic importance of gaining naval access in Sabah is supported by information 
contained in Chinese-language sources. An assessment of the security landscape in the South 
China Sea between 2015-2016 by a group of Southeast Asia experts at Ji’nan University 
underscores the importance of gaining access to Kota Kinabalu. Located between the Subic Bay 
in the Philippines and the Changi naval base in Singapore, according to this assessment, this port 
chokes “the East mouth of the Malacca Strait.” Should China be able to gain access to the geo-
strategically important port, this would “choke” the U.S. in the region and perhaps even force 
Washington to adjust its South China Sea strategy.”1676  That said, in private communication 
Chinese interlocutors including a former PLA researcher noted that Kota Kinabalu’s strategic 
value to the PLA might be overstated, because this location is “too close to China.”1677 
Second, China’s energy sector, along with Shanghai which is a major consumer market for 
Malaysia-originated liquefied natural gas (LNG), had vital interests in maintaining cordial 
relations with Malaysia, China’s third largest international LNG supply source.1678 A major LNG 
project between China and Malaysia was a 25-year sale and purchase agreement (SPA) signed in 
2006 between Shanghai LNG and Malaysia’s state oil company Petronas, primarily supplying the 
 
1675 Sabah was later quietly removed from Xi’s itinerary probably due to its political sensitivity for Kuala Lumpur. 
Geoff Wade, “Sabah, the PLA Navy and Northern Australia,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI), Nov. 18, 2015; Geoff Wade, “Xi Jinping and the Sabah Enigma,” The Strategist, ASPI, Oct. 24, 2013. 
1676 Zou Xinmei [邹新梅], “Malaysia’s South China Sea Policy” [马来西亚的南海政策], in Ju Hailong [鞠海龙], 
ed., South China Sea Situation Report 2015-2016 [南海地区形势报告 2015-2016] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2018), 
p. 204. 
1677 Private correspondence via social media, February 2020. 
1678 U.S. Energy Information Administration, International energy data and analysis-China, full report, last updated: 
May 14, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN, accessed Feb. 3, 2020, p. 26. 
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Shanghai market. Shanghai LNG was a joint venture of CNOOC, which owns 45 percent of the 
company, and Shenergy Group Ltd., which is solely owned by Shanghai Municipal SASAC and 
holds the remaining 55 percent of Shanghai LNG’s ownership. Per the SPA, starting in 2009 
Malaysia supplies Shanghai with an annual total of 3 million metric tons of LNG (approx. 4 billion-
cubic-meter natural gas).1679 The annual amount of LNG acquired through this SPA seems to have 
comprised Shanghai’s single largest natural gas supply source. According to Shanghai’s twelfth 
Five-Year (2011-2015) Plan released in late 2011, the city had five major natural gas supply 
sources plus an emergency reserve source: Shanghai LNG 3.9 billion-cubic-meter natural gas; 
WEP I 2.37 billion-cubic-meter natural gas; WEP II 2 billion-cubic-meter natural gas; East 
Sichuan 1.9 billion-cubic-meter natural gas; East China Sea 0.3 billion-cubic-meter natural gas; 
and 50 million-cubic-meter emergency reserve natural gas from Wuhaogou LNG. 1680  The 
importance of Malaysia’s LNG to Shanghai’s energy consumption, along with the joint venture 
arrangement of Shanghai LNG, meant both CNOOC and the Shanghai authorities had a stake in 
securing stable LNG supplies from Malaysia.1681 
 
1679 “Shanghai and Malaysia signed 25-year LNG import contract” [上海与马来西亚签署 25 年进口液化天然气合
同 ], Gov.cn, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-10/30/content_427596.htm, accessed Feb. 2, 2020; 
“CNOOC finalized Malaysian LNG supply source, will be Shanghai’s primary natural gas supply source” [中海油敲
定 马 来 西 亚 LNG 气 源 ， 将 成 上 海 主 力 气 源 ], Sina, Sept. 19, 2006, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20060919/00002926038.shtml, accessed Feb. 1, 2020; “Malaysia to supply 
LNG to Chinese for 25 years – Business – International Herald Tribune,” New York Times, Oct. 30, 2006, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/business/worldbusiness/30iht-energy.3330556.html, accessed Feb. 5, 2020; 
“UPDATE1- Malaysia’s Petronas announces China LNG deal,” Reuters, Jan. 19, 2007, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/energy-malaysia-china-idUKKLR24140620061030, accessed Feb. 5, 2020; “Malaysia 
seas $25bn China gas deal,” Aljazeera, Oct. 31, 2006, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/10/2008410115128842473.html, accessed Feb. 5, 2020; “CNOOC Shanghai 
terminal will receive its first shipment of LNG” [中海油上海 LNG 接收站将于 9 月接受第一船 LNG], Reuters, 
Sept. 8, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/idCNCHINA-570220090908, accessed Feb. 3, 2020. 
1680 “Shanghai Municipality’s gas development for the twelfth Five-Year Plan period” [上海市燃气发展“十二五”规
划 ], Dec. 28, 2011, 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node25307/node25455/node25459/u21ai569505.html, accessed Feb. 
5, 2020. 
1681 Shanghai’s interest in sustaining Malaysia’s LNG supply is illustrated in the signing of another 12-year supply 
pact between Shenergy and Petronas in January 2020. Shazni Ong, “Petronas formalizes 12-year LNG deal with 
China’s Shenergy,” The Malaysian Reserve, Jan. 21, 2020, https://themalaysianreserve.com/2020/01/21/petronas-
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LNG imports from Malaysia, however, should not be overstated or equated to Malaysia’s 
importance to China’s overall energy security interests. As of 2014, natural gas counted for only 
5 percent of China’s total energy consumption. A further disaggregation of natural gas supplies 
shows that a majority of China’s natural gas imports through onshore pipelines from Central Asia, 
Myanmar and Russia (1133 bcf/year), outstripping LNG imports (957 bcf/year). Even among the 
imported 957 bcf LNG, Malaysia counts for only 15 percent, whereas Qatar (34 percent), Australia 
(19 percent) and Indonesia (12 percent) make up a great majority.1682 In other words, Malaysia as 
an energy supplier is important but not indispensable. Interviews with Chinese interlocutors 
confirm that Malaysia’s LNG supply is not seen as critical or indispensable as natural gas supplies 
from Central Asia or Russia.1683 In other words, energy might be a factor but unlikely the most 
critical one that contributed to China’s restraint. 
Third, China’s huge commercial interests in Malaysia seemed to have generated additional 
parochial interests that preferred a stable relationship with Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia had since the 
1990s forged a close partnership with China in developing a regional railway network.1684 As 
China started in the 2010s to export its high-speed railway (HSR) technologies, Southeast Asia 
became a major overseas market where China had to compete hard with other countries especially 
Japan to win contracts.1685 In Malaysia, Beijing’s cultivation of ties with then Prime Minister Najib 
Razak was key to China’s commercial ambitions there. Especially starting from 2015, China 
 
formalises-12-year-lng-deal-with-chinas-shenergy/, accessed Feb. 5, 2020; “Shanghai adds new natural gas supply 
source, Shenergy signs a long-term heads of agreement with Petronas” [上海再添新气源，申能与马石油签署 LNG
供 应 采 购 长 协 ], Sina, Jan. 21, 2020, 
https://cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/3267440072/c2c12dc800100yb7q?from=finance, accessed Feb. 5, 2020. 
1682 U.S. Energy Information Administration, International energy data and analysis-China, full report, last updated: 
May 14, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN, accessed Feb. 3, 2020, pp. 21-26. 
1683 Author’s interviews, Beijing, May 2019; private communication via WeChat, February 2020. 
1684 David M. Lampton, Selina Ho and Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast 
Asia (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2020), p. 104. 
1685 Ibid, pp. 190-198. 
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actively leveraged its connections with Najib to secure infrastructure projects in Malaysia. In May 
2015, China was about to compete with Japan for a planned HSR project connecting Kuala Lumpur 
with Singapore.1686 Meanwhile, Beijing was the process of negotiating an under-the-table deal 
with Najib to bail out 1MDB, a financially problematic Malaysian state fund that Najib co-founded 
and chaired, in exchange for contracts of several major infrastructure projects including the East 
Coast Rail Link (ECRL), a Kuala Lumpur-Bangkok HSR, a trans-Sabah gas pipeline, and the 
development of an offshore financial hub.1687 Some Chinese interlocutors suggested that to secure 
the huge commercial interests, while pouring money into Najib’s “financial black hole,” Beijing 
also adopted a “more tolerant” approach toward Malaysia on the South China Sea issue.1688  
Finally, China depends on Malaysia also as a major supplier of natural rubber. China became 
the world’s largest natural rubber importer in 2002. According to a 2012 MOFCOM assessment, 
China imported 80 percent of the natural rubber it consumed every year.1689 Unlike its relatively 
more diversified oil and natural gas supply portfolio, China’s natural rubber supply sources are 
highly concentrated in Southeast Asia. The top three suppliers – Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
– accounted for 80 to 90 percent of China’s total natural rubber imports (Figure 9.1). The 2012 
MOFCOM assessment elevated the importance of natural rubber to the same level as oil and iron 
 
1686 “Malaysian Prime Minister invites Japan to bid for HSR project, China and Japan’s HSRs will have another round 
of competition” [ 马 来 总 理 邀 日 竞 标 高 铁 项 目 ， 中 日 高 铁 将 再 次 交 手 ], China Daily, 
https://caijing.chinadaily.com.cn/2015-05/26/content_20822168.htm, May 26, 2015; “Malaysia welcomes Chinese 
companies to bid for Kuala Lumpur-Singapore HSR” [马来西亚欢迎中国企业竞标马新高铁], Renminwang, Apr. 
23, 2015, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0423/c157278-26893912.html. Both accessed Feb. 22, 2021. 
1687 Lampton, Ho and Kuik, Rivers of Iron, p. 124; “Malaysia’s 1MDB sells power assets to China firm for 2.3 billion,” 
Reuters, Nov. 23, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-1mdb/malaysias-1mdb-sells-power-assets-to-
china-firm-for-2-3-billion-idUSKBN0TC0PT20151123, accessed Feb. 22, 2021; “1MDB scandal: Najib Razak 
offered projects to Beijing in exchange for help to resolve debt, says former aide at trial,” South China Morning Post, 
Sept. 3, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3025633/1mdb-scandal-jho-low-promised-
najib-razaks-aides-boss-will, accessed Apr. 18, 2021. 
1688 Author’s interview, Guangzhou, May 2019. 
1689 MOFCOM Bureau of Industry Injury Investigation [商务部产业损害调查局], “Current situation of natural 
rubber imports and impacts on downstream rubber consuming industries” [天然橡胶进口现状及对下游用胶行业的
影响], International Business Daily [国际商报], Jun. 7, 2012. 
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ore as “strategic commodities in short supply” (紧缺战略性物质), highlighting China’s high 
vulnerability to potential supply disruption and price fluctuation. In particular, MOFCOM 
cautioned against the “potential negative impacts” of an “overreliance” on natural rubber imports, 
“[i]f export countries intentionally manipulate, restrict natural rubber exports to China, it will deal 
a heavy blow to China’s tires manufacturing, auto-parts manufacturing, machinery parts 
manufacturing, shoes manufacturing and other industries to the extent that these industries may 
not even be able to sustain normal operations.”1690 The importance of the trade in rubber (along 
with palm oil), was expressly underscored in the latest joint statement which was issued during 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s August 2018 trip to China, whereas LNG was not 
included.1691 
Figure 9.1 China’s Rubber Imports from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand 
 




1691 “Joint statement by the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia” [中华人民共和国和马来西亚联合声明], 
Beijing, Aug. 20, 2018, http://my.china-embassy.org/chn/zmgx/t1586632.htm, accessed Feb. 9, 2020. 
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The natural rubber industry seems to have also served as an incentive for cooperation for 
Hainan, the staunch compromise-averse provincial stakeholder on the South China Sea issue. As 
China’s largest domestic provincial supplier of natural rubber, rather than viewing Malaysia as a 
strong competitor, Hainan appeared to see the country as a major partner with whom it can 
cooperate in making overseas investment to secure natural rubber production and acquiring related 
agricultural technologies.1692 
At the grassroots level, despite the outpouring of anger in China over Malaysia’s handling of 
the MH370 search, Beijing managed to curtail the ramifications of the popular resentment on the 
broader bilateral relationship. The populist tabloid Global People put out an op-ed calling on the 
Chinese public to avoid venting anger towards the Malaysian people, stating that while it was 
“reasonable” for the Chinese public to be dissatisfied with the way the Malaysian government 
handled this incident, “venting anger toward the Malaysian people” and calling for a boycott of 
Malaysian products and tourism to Malaysia was “by no means a wise move.”1693 The worsening 
popular perception of Malaysia in China following the MH370 incident did not seem to have 
spilled over into the South China Sea issue. 
High and Still Growing International Costs: Keep Malaysia as a Friend  
On the international end, the traditionally positive bilateral ties between China and Malaysia 
placed a powerful constraint on Beijing’s response to Kuala Lumpur’s publicity of the faceoff in 
 
1692 Xing Min [邢民], “Improving rubber seeds and sprouts is the foundation of Hainan’s rubber production” [橡胶种
苗建设是海南橡胶生产的根本], World Tropical Agriculture Information [世界热带农业信息], issue 6, 2012, pp. 
1-2; Wang Yi [王翊], “Research and analysis of China’s natural rubber industry ‘going out’ strategy” [中国天然橡
胶行业“走出去”发展策略研究与分析], China Rubber, issue 13, 2013, pp. 15-18; Li Guanping [李关平], “Hainan 
Nongken inks cooperative deal with Malaysian Rubber Board” [海南农垦“牵手”马来西亚橡胶局], Hainan Daily, 
Aug. 21, 2018. 
1693 Yu Jinghao [于景浩], “Please don’t vent anger on Malaysian people” [请不要迁怒于马来西亚民众], Global 
People [环球人物], Apr. 3, 2014, http://news.sina.com.cn/zl/world/2014-04-08/14421258.shtml, accessed Feb. 9, 
2020. 
- 479 - 
 
the Luconia. The constraint stemmed from four dimensions. First, despite the fact that China’s 
assertiveness on the South China Sea issue had led Kuala Lumpur to recalibrate its tactics in 
diplomacy and security,1694 Malaysia still demonstrated a strong interest in maintaining a positive 
relationship with China and had taken a measured approach toward the faceoff. Even though Kuala 
Lumpur’s response came as a “firmer and more public” one than what Beijing would expect from 
Malaysia’s traditional quiet diplomacy, Kuala Lumpur avoided publicly condemning Beijing’s 
actions “to a level that would prompt an escalatory Chinese response.”1695 Meanwhile, Malaysia 
reportedly deployed its vessels with built-in mechanisms to prevent escalation. When shadowing 
Chinese ships, the Malaysian ships usually tend to “issue orders for the Chinese ships to leave but 
avoid making aggressive maneuvers.”1696 
Moreover, as ASEAN’s chairman in 2015, Malaysia carefully balanced the need to respond to 
vocal ASEAN members’ demand for a more explicit and critical position on China with its own 
intention to avoid a confrontational relationship with China, while at the same time using the 
multilateral platform to secure its interests in the South China Sea. The chairman statement issued 
following the ASEAN Summit in April, in addition to outlining Kuala Lumpur’s sharing of “the 
serious concerns expressed by some leaders on the land reclamation being undertaken in the South 
China Sea,” called for “urgently address[ing] this matter constructively under the various ASEAN 
frameworks such as ASEAN-China relations.”1697 While asserting that Malaysia’s expression of 
concerns revealed that it had “sided with the Philippines” on the South China Sea issue, Chinese 
 
1694 Prashanth Parameswaran, Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the 
United States, Center for a New America Security Maritime Strategy Series, Feb. 2015, pp. 6-9. 
1695 Parameswaran, “Malaysia Responds to China’s South China Sea Intrusion.” 
1696 Parameswaran, Playing It Safe, p. 8; Parameswaran, “Malaysia Responds to China’s South China Sea Intrusion.” 
1697  “Chairman’s Statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur & Langkawi,” Apr. 27, 2015, 
http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/26th-Chairman-Statement-of-the-26th-ASEAN-Summit.pdf, accessed 
Feb. 5, 2020, p. 10. 
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analysts approvingly highlighted Malaysia’s “moderate attitude” and “soft wording,” which was 
evidenced in the absence of explicitly naming China in the land reclamation clause.1698 
Second, as in the case of Vietnam, Beijing was probably worried by the prospect of Malaysia 
supporting the Philippines’ arbitration. In March 2015, stories surfacing in the Philippine media 
reported that Manila would probably accommodate Kuala Lumpur on the two countries’ bilateral 
dispute over the sovereignty of North Borneo in exchange for the latter’s support for the South 
China Sea arbitration.1699 This offer was reportedly made in a Note Verbale that the Philippine 
Foreign Affairs Department delivered through the Malaysian Embassy in Manila a week after 
Malaysia’s Defense Minister Dato Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein visited the Philippines. 
Although both Manila and Kuala Lumpur denied the making of such an offer,1700 the fact that the 
NISCSS paid attention to the news indicates that China was watching closely.1701 
Apart from the arbitration, Beijing seemed equally troubled by the prospect of a Malaysia-
Philippine or even a Malaysia-Philippine-Vietnam collaboration in light of Malaysia’s South 
China Sea diplomacy. In January 2014, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Anifah Aman reportedly 
made an unannounced visit to Manila to discuss the South China Sea disputes with his Philippine 
counterpart and both sides agreed to reject China’s nine-dash line. In February, diplomats from the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam held a trilateral meeting to coordinate their policies toward 
 
1698 Zou, “Malaysia’s South China Sea Policy,” pp. 198-199. 
1699  On the Malaysia-Philippines dispute over the sovereignty of north Borneo, see, Paridah Abd. Samad and 
Darusalam Abu Bakar, “Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue of Sabah,” Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 6, Jun. 1992, 
pp. 554-567. 
1700 “Philippines offers Sabah to win Malaysia’s support for UN case vs China,” Philippine Star, Mar. 29, 2015, 
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/03/29/1439007/philippines-offers-sabah-win-malaysias-support-un-case-
vs-china, Feb. 6, 2020; “DFA: Philippines maintains claim on Sabah,” Philippine Star, Mar. 30, 2015, 
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/03/30/1439178/dfa-philippines-maintains-claim-sabah, accessed Feb. 6, 
2020. 
1701 “Philippine Media: the Philippines give up its claims to Sabah in exchange for Malaysia’s support for the South 
China Sea arbitration” [ 菲媒：菲放弃索讨沙巴，以换取马国支持南中国海仲裁 ], Mar. 31, 2015, 
http://www.nanhai.org.cn/info-detail/22/947.html, accessed Feb. 5, 2020. 
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China on the disputes and code of conduct in the South China Sea.1702 These moves were cited by 
China’s Southeast Asia experts as worrisome signs of Malaysia’s growing tendency to collaborate 
and coalesce with the Philippines and Vietnam.1703  
Third, the concern that a firm Chinese response might strengthen the hardliners in Malaysia’s 
domestic politics loomed large in Beijing’s cost calculation. As observed by Tang Siew Mun, a 
senior researcher at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, the growing Chinese presence in waters off 
Malaysia’s coast had generated greater political awareness on the South China Sea issue, 
especially in East Malaysian regions including Sarawak and Sabah, which consequently made it 
increasingly difficult for Kuala Lumpur to remain inactive or silent.1704 An annual evaluation by 
China’s MSS-affiliated CICIR warned of Malaysia’s changing domestic political climate: 
“Malaysia and Indonesia’s South China Sea policies have traditionally been moderate and neutral. 
But the two countries’ suspicions about China in maritime affairs have been deepening…There is 
an increase of voices among Malaysian legislators and the military personnel demanding a hardline 
approach.”
1705
 Ji’nan University’s annual assessment similarly noted the growing hardline voices 
in Malaysia’s domestic politics, cautioning that “should the voices advocating for a firm approach 
toward China continue to grow, it would generate even greater negative impacts on Malaysia’s 
South China Sea policy.”1706 
 
1702  Suart Grudgings, “China’s assertiveness hardens Malaysian stance in sea dispute,” Reuters, Feb 26, 2014, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/malaysia-china-maritime/chinas-assertiveness-hardens-malaysian-stance-in-sea-
dispute-idINDEEA1P0GL20140226, accessed Feb. 7, 2020. 
1703 Chen, “Evaluation of Malaysia’s South China Sea policy in 2014,” p. 77. 
1704 Tang Siew Mun, “Why M’sia is adopting a tougher S. China Sea stance,” TODAY (Singapore), Mar. 21, 2016. 
1705 He Sheng [何胜], Lou Chunhao [楼春豪], et al., “Adjustment in maritime orders accelerates” [海洋秩序加速调
整], in Ji Zhiye [季志业], ed., Strategic and Security Review 2015/2016 [国际战略与安全形势评估 2015/2016] 
(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2016), pp. 167-168. 
1706 Zou, “Malaysia’s South China Sea Policy,” p. 208. 
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Fourth, it might be part of Beijing’s calculation that an assertive response to the Luconia 
faceoff would further push Malaysia toward the United States. Malaysia’s traditional position on 
the South China Sea – which supported the Chinese preference not to internationalize the disputes, 
emphasized the central role of ASEAN in negotiating a COC with China in a nonconfrontational 
manner, and opposed strident interference by powers external to the region – represented a source 
of fundamental difference between Kuala Lumpur and Washington. 1707  China viewed this 
disagreement between Malaysia and the U.S. as an effective check on the latter’s influence in 
ASEAN,1708 and this in turn made Kuala Lumpur’s hardening posture all the more worrisome for 
Beijing. In a move which risked enraging Beijing, Malaysia invited U.S. P-8 maritime patrol 
aircraft to operate out of the country’s eastern area in late 2014, which gave the U.S. planes greater 
proximity to the South China Sea compared to taking off from other areas in the region such as the 
Kadena air base in Japan.1709 Worried that Malaysia’s decision would effectively strengthen U.S. 
reconnaissance capabilities in the South China Sea, Chinese analysts cautioned that a hardening 
Malaysia would play into Washington’s rebalancing strategy.1710 
China Avoided an Escalation 
Presented with potentially substantial international audience costs but limited domestic audience 
costs, Beijing downplayed the Luconia incident by sidestepping an open response to Kuala 
 
1707  Prashanth Parameswaran, Playing It Safe; Bruce Vaughn, Malaysia: Background and U.S. Relations, 
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1708 Zou, “Malaysia’s South China Sea Policy,” pp. 200-201; Jiang Li [姜丽], Fan Xiaoting [范晓婷], et al., “Analysis 
of Malaysia’s Strategic Interests in the South China Sea” [马来西亚在南海的战略利益分析], Journal of Guangdong 
Ocean University [广东海洋大学学报], vol. 34, no. 2, Apr. 2014, p. 32; Gong Xiaohui [龚晓辉], “An Analysis about 
Malaysia’s Security Policy in South China Sea” [马来西亚南海安全政策初探], Southeast Asian Affairs [南洋问题
研究], no. 3, 2012, p. 62. 
1709 Jane Perlez, “Malaysia Risks Enraging China by Inviting U.S. Spy Flights,” New York Times, Sept. 13, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/world/asia/malaysia-risks-enraging-china-by-inviting-us-spy-flights.html, 
accessed Feb. 7, 2020.  
1710 Zou, “Malaysia’s South China Sea Policy,” pp. 202-203; Chen, “Evaluation of Malaysia’s South China Sea policy 
in 2014,” p. 83. 
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Lumpur’s complaint while keeping the CCG ships in the area – perhaps out of considerations about 
face. The two countries opted for quiet diplomacy. In October 2015, Sarawak Region Maritime 
Chief Enforcement First Admiral Ismaili Bujang Pit announced that the Luconia standoff issue 
was being handled by the Prime Minister’s Department “in a diplomatic way” with the “hope that 
there will be a solution” while the Malaysian Navy and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement 
Agency (MMEA) would continue to monitor the CCG vessel.1711 
The CCG ship departed the Luconia Shoal in late November during the ASEAN meetings in 
Kuala Lumpur, perhaps as a result of a deal reached between China and Malaysia. In earlier that 
month, Wu Shengli, commander of the PLAN and a CMC member, visited Malaysia and secured 
a final agreement from Malaysia for the PLAN to use the port of Kota Kinabalu as a “stopover 
location.”1712 Later, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made an official visit to Malaysia where he 
attended ASEAN meetings.1713  
Notably, the China-Malaysia joint statement issued during Li’s visit dropped the language on 
the South China Sea issue which was contained in the joint communique issued during Najib’s 
May 2014 China trip and stated that “the intervention or involvement of parties not directly 
concerned could be counter-productive” – an all-too-clear reference to the U.S.1714 Instead, the 
November 2015 joint statement used the standard, more vaguely worded reference that the parties 
 
1711 “China’s Presence at Luconia Shoals Being Monitored – Ismaili,” Malaysia General News, Oct. 28, 2015.  
1712  “Kota Kinabalu offered as port of call to Chinese naval ships – RMN,” Borneo Post, Nov. 10, 2015, 
https://www.theborneopost.com/2015/11/10/kota-kinabalu-offered-as-port-of-call-to-chinese-naval-ships-rmn/, 
accessed Feb. 3, 2020; “PLA Navy gains use of port in Malaysia close to Spratly islands,” South China Morning Post, 
Nov. 21, 2015, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1881300/pla-navy-gains-use-port-
malaysia, accessed Feb. 3, 2020. 
1713 Noor, “Malaysia: Recalibrating its South China Sea Policy?” 
1714 “Joint communique of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Establishment of the Diplomatic Relations 
between the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia” [中华人民共和国和马来西亚建立外交关系 40 周年联合
公报], Beijing, May 31, 2014, http://my.china-embassy.org/chn/zmgx/t1161638.htm, accessed Feb. 9, 2020. 
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should “avoid actions that escalate or complicate the situation.”1715  By dropping the pointed 
language that Beijing might consider as more desirable, Malaysia was perhaps signaling its 
dissatisfaction over the increasing Chinese presence in waters off the Malaysian coast. Equally 
notable was the fact that this pointed language was again contained in the joint statement issued 
during Najib’s visit to China in November 2016.1716 It was also during Najib’s visit that China and 
Malaysia inked the contract to award the ECRL, Malaysia’s largest infrastructure project and an 
important component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, to China Communication Construction 
Company (CCCC), a Chinese SOE which was involved in – and would be sanctioned in 2020 by 
the U.S. for – constructing China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea.1717  
However, CCG ships retuned to the Luconia area in December 2016 and maintained a constant 
presence in the area for 60 days,1718 a move which Kuala Lumpur likely perceived as implying that 
Beijing did not soften its stance in any substantive way.  
THE 2016 CHINA-INDONESIA FACEOFF IN NATUNA 
Indonesia claims an EEZ that overlaps with China’s nine-dash line northeast of the Natuna Islands 
(Map 9.2) but is not a party to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Despite its concerns 
about China’s behavior in the region and the growing division within ASEAN over the South 
China Sea issue as illustrated during the Scarborough Shoal Standoff, Indonesia has traditionally 
stressed its identity as a non-claimant to the sovereignty disputes and avoided overtly confronting 
China in the South China Sea. Officially objecting to China’s nine-dash line as lacking 
 
1715 “Joint statement by the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia” [中华人民共和国和马来西亚联合声明], 
Kuala Lumpur, Nov. 23, 2015, http://my.china-embassy.org/chn/zmgx/t1318244.htm, accessed Feb. 9, 2020. 
1716 “Joint statement by the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia” [中华人民共和国和马来西亚联合声明], 
Beijing, Nov. 3, 2016, http://my.china-embassy.org/chn/zmgx/t1412765.htm, accessed Feb. 9, 2020. 
1717 Susan Heavey, Daphne Psaledakis and David Brunnstrom, “U.S. targets Chinese individuas, companies amid 
South China Sea dispute,” Reuters, Aug. 26, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-southchinasea-
companies-idCAKBN25M1O6, accessed Feb. 22, 2021. 
1718 “Tracking China’s Coast Guard Off Borneo,” CSIS-AMTI, Apr. 5, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/tracking-chinas-
coast-guard-off-borneo/, accessed Feb. 1, 2020. 
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international legal basis and “tantamount to upset[ting] the UNCLOS 1982,”1719 Jakarta conceived 
itself as an “honest broker” advocating for peaceful negotiations among the disputants as well as 
for an early conclusion of a COC in the region.1720 
Map 9.2 The Overlapping Area between Indonesia’s EEZ around Natuna and the Nine-Dash Line 
 
Source: Adapted from Felix K. Chang, “Even Indonesia: Concerns over China’s Reach in the South China Sea,” 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Oct. 18, 2014, https://www.fpri.org/article/2014/10/even-indonesia-concerns-
over-chinas-reach-in-the-south-china-sea/, accessed Feb. 16, 2020. 
 
The undelimited area off the Natuna Islands – which is rich in marine resources – has been a 
source of constant fishing disputes between Indonesia and China, a problem only further 
intensified as China’s near seas became depleted of fish stock and Chinese fishermen started 
 
1719  Indonesia’s Note No. 480/POL-703/VII/10, Jul. 8, 2010, 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf, accessed 
Feb. 18, 2020.  
1720 Aaron L. Connelly, Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going it alone, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Dec. 
2016, p. 4; Prashanth Parameswaran, “No, Indonesia’s South China Sea Approach Has Not Changed,” The Diplomat, 
Mar. 26, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/no-indonesias-south-china-sea-approach-has-not-changed/, accessed 
Feb. 17, 2020. 
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venturing into more distant waters.1721 In June 2009, Beijing lodged a diplomatic protest over 
Jakarta’s detention of 75 Chinese fishermen for illegally fishing in the EEZ of the Natuna Islands 
and seizure of eight fishing boats.1722 In June 2010, a Chinese FLE ship prevented the detention of 
a Chinese boat caught illegally fishing in the Natuna waters by an Indonesian patrol ship. The FLE 
ship reportedly pointed a large-caliber machine gun at the Indonesian vessel to force it to release 
the Chinese fishing boat. This incident prompted Jakarta to lodge a protest against Beijing’s nine-
dash line claims in July.1723 In March 2013, a similar incident occurred in the same area when a 
FLE ship confronted and forced an Indonesian patrol ship to release nine detained Chinese 
fishermen.1724  
The overlapping claims and frictions over fish resources notwithstanding, Jakarta and Beijing 
had managed to maintain genial interactions during Indonesian President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s two terms (2004-2014). During his state visit to Indonesia in October 2013, China’s 
President Xi Jinping unveiled the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” – the maritime leg of his 
signature Belt and Road Initiative.1725 During Xi’s visit, the two sides also signed an MOU to 
establish a bilateral partnership in fishery, pledging close cooperation in a number of policy areas 
including the eradication of illegal fishing.1726 The MOU was followed up by a three-year bilateral 
 
1721 Mallory, China, Global Governance, and the Making of a Distant Water Fishing Nation, pp. 128-131, pp. 144-
145. 
1722  Zhang Xin, “Indonesia told to release 75 Chinese fishermen,” China Daily, Jun. 26, 2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-06/26/content_8324509.htm, accessed Feb. 28, 2020. 
1723 Scott Bentley, “Mapping the nine-dash line: recent incidents involving Indonesia in the South China Sea,” The 
Strategist, ASPI, Oct. 29, 2013, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/mapping-the-nine-dash-line-recent-incidents-
involving-indonesia-in-the-south-china-sea/, accessed Feb. 17, 2020; “Indonesia enters the fray with China,” Bangkok 
Post (Thailand), Apr. 4, 2014; Sun, “Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei’s South China Sea policies,” in Liu and Wu, ed., 
2013 Assessment Report on the Situation in the South China Sea, pp. 116-117; Do Thanh Hai, Vietnam and the South 
China Sea: Politics, Security and Legality (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 183-184. 
1724 Bentley, “Mapping the nine-dash line: recent incidents involving Indonesia in the South China Sea;” “Indonesia 
enters the fray with China.” 
1725  “Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament,” Oct. 2, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia, 
http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm, accessed Feb. 17, 2020. 
1726  “Indonesia-China sign MoU on fishery sector,” Antara News, Oct. 3, 2013, 
https://en.antaranews.com/news/90991/indonesia-china-sign-mou-on-fishery-sector, accessed Feb. 18, 2020; 
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implementation agreement signed into effect on October 14, 2014 – less than a week prior to the 
inauguration of Yudhoyono’s successor Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”). 1727  Under the agreement, 
Chinese fishermen were allowed to fish in Indonesian waters provided that they form a joint 
venture with Indonesian companies and own no more than 49 percent of the stakes.1728 
In November 2014, Indonesia’s newly elected president Jokowi unveiled his Global Maritime 
Fulcrum strategy at an ASEAN summit. Jokowi laid out five priorities encompassed in his 
signature doctrine: 1) maritime defense and security; 2) maritime diplomacy and sovereignty; 3) 
maritime infrastructure, connectivity, and industries; 3) maritime resources with a focus on 
building marine food sovereignty; and 5) maritime culture.1729  
For the Jokowi administration, one of the top maritime security challenges confronting 
Indonesia was illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the country’s claimed waters. 
Jokowi claimed that at least 5,500 boats had engaged in illegal fishing in Indonesia’s waters and 
caused the country an economic loss of 300 trillion Indonesian Rupiah (approx. $2.2 billion US 
dollars) every year. Jokowi vowed to toughen up against foreign ships engaging in IUU fishing in 
Indonesia’s claimed waters: “[D]o not nab the foreign fishing boats poaching in Indonesian waters. 
If needed, sink them straightaway.”1730 In December, Indonesia’s Marine and Fisheries Ministry 
 
“Indonesia, China sign MoU on fishery partnership,” Jakarta Post, Oct. 3, 2013, 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/10/03/indonesia-china-sign-mou-fishery-partnership.html, accessed Feb. 
18, 2020. 
1727  Tama Salim and Bagus T. Saragih, “Indonesia takes on China,” Jakarta Post, Jan. 25, 2015, 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/25/indonesia-takes-china.html, accessed Feb. 18, 2020; Ministry of 
Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China, “China-Indonesia sign implementation arrangements on fishing 
cooperation” [ 中 印 尼 签 署 捕 捞 合 作 执 行 安 排 ], Oct. 15, 2014, 
http://jiuban.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/gjjl/201410/t20141015_4105841.htm, accessed Feb. 18, 2020.  
1728 Zhang Hongzhou, “Indonesia’s War on Illegal Fishing: Impact on China,” RSIS Commentary, no. 192, Sept. 9, 
2015. 
1729  Rendi A. Witular, “Jokowi launches maritime doctrine to the world,” Jakarta Post, Nov. 13, 2014, 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html, accessed Feb. 17, 
2020; Lyle J. Morris and Giacomo Persi Paoli, A Preliminary Assessment of Indonesia’s Maritime Security Threats 
and Capabilities (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018), p. vii, p. 17. 
1730 “Indonesia vows tougher crackdown on illegal fishing,” Antara News, Nov. 25, 2014. 
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signed an MOU with the Indonesian Navy to jointly increase patrols on the sea as part of Jokowi’s 
campaign to combat IUU fishing.1731 In January 2015, Jakarta revoked the three-year fishing 
cooperation agreement with China on the grounds that Indonesia’s newly introduced ban on large 
fishing operations by foreign vessels had affected previous partnerships with various countries.1732  
It should be clarified that the Jokowi administration’s crackdown on IUU was, in and of itself, 
not a measure specifically targeting China or reflecting a hardening Indonesian response to China’s 
behavior in the South China Sea. By-country data shows that Vietnam, Thailand, and the 
Philippines had the largest numbers of fishing boats sunk by Jakarta for engaging in IUU fishing 
activities in Indonesia’s claimed sea areas. According to a report by Indonesia’s official news 
agency Antara News on March 18, 2016 – the day before the China-Indonesia Natuna 
confrontation, among the 151 foreign ships sunk by Jakarta since the inauguration of Jokowi for 
engaging in IUU fishing activities in Indonesia’s claimed EEZ, 50 were from Vietnam, 43 from 
the Philippines, 21 from Thailand, 20 from Malaysia, and only one from China.1733 
On March 19, a standoff between a CCG vessel and an Indonesian fisheries ministry patrol 
ship ensued near the Natuna Islands when the Indonesian ship was towing a Chinese fishing boat 
found illegally operating in the area. The CCG vessel reportedly collided with the fishing boat to 
 
1731 “Fishery Ministry, Navy sign MoU for joint sea supervisory activities,” Antara News, Dec. 1, 2014. Indonesia’s 
MLE system also struggled with the problem of fragmentation and overlapping of responsibilities due to the plethora 
of MLE agencies, which is further compounded by these agencies’ weak capabilities, the country’s vast archipelagic 
water body, and by other maritime security challenges such as piracy and terrorism. Thus, Indonesia had heavily relied 
on its navy for performing constabulary functions in its waters. Morris and Paoli, A Preliminary Assessment of 
Indonesia’s maritime Security Threats and Capabilities, pp.21-27, 33-44; “Illegal fishing – govt’s task force to focus 
on border regions,” Antara News, Nov. 3, 2015. 
1732 Salim and Saragih, “Indonesia takes on China.” For a list of the new regulations and bans adopted in the early 
years of the Jokowi administration, see, Budy P. Resosudarmo and Ellisa Kosadi, “Illegal Fishing War: An 
Environmental Policy during the Jokowi Era?” Journal of Southeast Asian Economies, vol. 35, no. 3, Dec. 2018, p. 
373. 
1733 “Bilateral, multilateral cooperation needed to fight illegal fishing,” Antara News, Mar. 18, 2016. 
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prevent the boat from being towed away. The Indonesian ship let the fishing ship go but kept eight 
Chinese fishermen in detention.1734  
Over the next few days, Indonesia’s foreign ministry and fisheries ministry respectively 
summoned the Chinese Embassy’s charge d’affaires Sun Weide to lodge rare strong protests. 
Jakarta raised three interrelated issues that it perceived as being involved in this incident: first, the 
CCG vessel’s violation of Indonesia’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its EEZ and continental 
shelf; second, the CCG ship’s violation against Indonesia’s law enforcement activities in its own 
EEZ and continental shelf; third, the CCG ship’s violation of Indonesia’s territorial waters.1735 
Indonesia’s Fisheries and Marine Affairs Minister Susi Pudjiastuti, the hardcore supporter and 
major implementer of the crackdown on IUU fishing, claimed that the Chinese fishing boat was 
caught illegally fishing in the overlapping area off Natuna and that the CCG vessel’s interception 
of the Indonesian ship occurred when the latter had already towed the fishing boat into Indonesia’s 
territorial waters.1736 
For China, Indonesia’s decision to go public about the fishery dispute and openly lodge 
diplomatic protests was new and contrasted its low-key approach to handling the earlier 
incidents.1737 In response, Beijing asserted that the Chinese fishing boat was “harassed” by the 
Indonesian ship while operating in “traditional Chinese fishing grounds,” insisting that the CCG 
 
1734 “Indonesia to summon Chinese envoy after boat confrontation,” Agence France Presse, Mar. 20, 2016; “Indonesia 
protests China’s retrieval of illegal fishing ship,” Associated Press, Mar. 21, 2016. 
1735 “Indonesia protests China over boat incident,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 21, 2016; “Indonesia summons 
Chinese diplomat over fishing boat incident,” Japan Economic Newswire, Mar. 21, 2016; “RI asks China to Respect 
Int’l Law of Sea,” Antara News, Mar. 21, 2016. 
1736 “Indonesia protests China over boat incident.” 
1737 Zhu Feng [朱锋], “China’s peripheral security situation: what new changes are we facing?” [中国周边安全局势
——我们正在面临什么样的变化?], Contemporary World [当代世界], issue 4, 2016, p. 14; Connelly, Indonesia in 
the South China Sea, p. 5. 
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ship did not enter Indonesian territorial sea during the incident.1738 Jakarta rebuffed Beijing’s 
“Chinese traditional fishing ground” narrative as being “baseless,” announcing that the eight 
detained Chinese fishermen would be subject to Indonesia’s legal process. Jakarta also explicitly 
linked its subsequent actions on the South China Sea issue to China’s response to this incident. 
Calling the incident a “sabotage” of Indonesia’s “years-long efforts and work to promote peace in 
the South China Sea,” Susi warned that Jakarta was considering filing a case to an international 
tribunal over the incident. 1739  Likewise, Indonesia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abdurrahman 
Mohammad Fachir implied a possible hardening of Jakarta’s position on the South China Sea, 
stating that Indonesia’s “next course of action would depend on China’s official clarifications to 
its protest.”1740 
The Cost Trade-off: International Audience Costs Dominated 
This confrontation occurred only a few months prior to the international arbitration brought about 
by the Philippines against China. During this period, Beijing was anxiously watching the process 
and regional reaction to the ruling while simultaneously embarking on an international PR 
campaign to garner support for its own position on the South China Sea. As such, it was clear to 
Beijing that China’s international audience costs would rise further still should it respond firmly 
to Indonesia at the time. Domestically, the Chinese leadership and foreign policy elites seemed to 
share a position which attached great importance to the necessity of keeping Jakarta as a relatively 
 
1738  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on March 21, 2016,” MFA, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1349416.shtml, accessed Feb. 22, 
2020. 
1739 “Fisheries minister deplores China’s unilateral claim over waters,” Antara News, Mar. 21, 2016; “Indonesia 
assures safety of detained Chinese fishing boat crew,” Antara News, Mar. 22, 2016; “China urges Indonesia to release 
crew as sea row escalates.” 
1740 Francis Chan, “Fishing spat won’t hurt Beijing ties, says Jakarta; Indonesian officials insist the incident near the 
Natuna Islands is not a border dispute,” Straits Times, Mar. 24, 2016. 
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moderate party to the disputes and saw more continuity than change as defining Indonesia’s South 
China Sea policy under Jokowi. 
Moderate Domestic Audience Costs 
As with Malaysia, China viewed a neutral, moderate Indonesia as a diplomatic asset in the South 
China Sea disputes and sought to prevent it from leaning toward the more vocal disputants. A 2014 
CASS assessment underscored the need to differentiate ASEAN members’ variegated positions 
on the South China Sea issue so as to better tailor China’s policies toward each of them, noting 
that Indonesia and Malaysia – in contrast to Vietnam and the Philippines – had reservations about 
deeper U.S. intervention in regional affairs. Therefore, China should prioritize the strengthening 
of its bilateral relations with Indonesia, which was striving to regain its status as ASEAN’s leading 
state and had “actively lobbied the Philippines to move forward toward an early conclusion of a 
COC,” according to the CASS assessment.1741 An 2015-2016 assessment of the South China Sea 
situation by Southeast Asia experts at Ji’nan University underscored that the Jokowi 
administration’s heavy-handed approach in handling maritime security challenges should not be 
interpreted as a sign of fundamental change in Indonesia’s maritime security goals. Instead, 
according to this report, China should “fully understand” that Indonesia’s ultimate goal of 
safeguarding its maritime rights had remained unchanged to “correctly evaluate” Indonesia’s 
South China Sea policy and “avoid creating new problems or even confrontations between the two 
countries.”1742 
 
1741 Zhang, “Constructing new-type China-ASEAN relations and the South China Sea problem,” in Zhang, ed., 
China’s Regional Security Environment Review 2014, p. 124. 
1742 Gong Xiaohui [龚晓辉], “Indonesia’s South China Sea policy” [印度尼西亚的南海政策], in Ju Hailong [鞠海
龙], ed, Report of the Situation in the South China Sea 2015–2016 [南海地区形势报告 2015-2016] (Beijing: Shishi 
chuanshe, 2018), pp. 220-222. 
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Throughout 2015, Beijing meticulously avoided alienating the new Jokowi administration. In 
March, during his trip to Japan and just a few days ahead of his first state visit to China, Jokowi 
told Yomiuri Shimbun that China’s nine-dash line claim had “no basis in any international law.”1743 
While Jokowi’s words were consistent with Indonesia’s official position as articulated in its 2010 
Note Verbale, making such a remark in Japan on the eve of a trip to China could be interpreted by 
Beijing as a challenge. However, Beijing remained silent. Only after Jokowi distanced himself 
from this remark the next day by declaring that “Indonesia is not siding with any party involved in 
the dispute”1744 did Beijing make an open comment in an apparent endeavor to keep a positive 
tone for Jokowi’s upcoming visit. Describing Indonesia as “a country of great influence in 
ASEAN,” MFA’s spokesperson Hua Chunying expressed Beijing’s hope that Jokowi’s visit would 
give a boost to the bilateral cooperation and advance the two countries’ strategic partnership.1745 
In November, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal and Security Affairs Luhut 
Panjaitan stated that Indonesia could take China to an international court should their overlapping 
claims in the Natuna area not be settled through dialogue.1746 In response, Beijing reiterated its 
position that China had no objection to Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands and called 
on the two countries to keep cooperating in advancing their partnership, dodging a reference to 
Indonesia’s threat to initiate the legal process.1747  
 
1743 “Indonesian president says China’s main claim in South China Sea has no legal basis,” Reuters, Mar. 23, 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea/indonesian-president-says-chinas-main-claim-in-
south-china-sea-has-no-legal-basis-idUSKBN0MJ04320150323, accessed Feb. 21, 2020. 
1744  “Jokowi distances himself from South China Sea comments,” Todayonline, Mar. 24, 2015, 
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1745  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on March 25, 2015,” MFA, 
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Moreover, enhancing maritime security in the Malacca Strait remained a strong incentive for 
China to maintain robust military cooperation with littoral countries including Indonesia, giving 
the PLA an institutional interest in a stable China-Indonesia relationship. In 2011, special forces 
from the PLA and the Indonesian Armed Force kicked off an annual counterterrorism exercise 
dubbed “Sharp Knife,” which was hailed by Hou Shusen, then deputy chief of staff of the PLA, as 
a move that “explored a new channel and area for exchange.”1748 In early 2013, the two militaries 
established an annual navy-to-navy consultation mechanism. 1749  Since 2014, the PLAN has 
participated in the Indonesia-led multilateral Komodo military exercise.1750 According to a 2018 
RAND study, Indonesia was one of the Southeast Asian countries with which China had most 
often conducted combined military exercises during the period from 2002 through 2014.1751 
Following the Natuna confrontation incident, Beijing refrained from cancelling the PLA’s planned 
participation in the Komodo exercise. On March 26, a PLAN missile frigate and a submarine 
rescue ship departed for Indonesia to participate in the exercise slated to start in mid-April.1752 
In the economic dimension, in addition to being an important international supplier of natural 
rubber (Figure 9.1) and LNG for China, Indonesia, like Malaysia, was a key market for China’s 
campaign to export its HSR technologies. This had the effect of expanding the domestic 
constituencies in China favoring a stable relationship with Indonesia. Notably, the timing of the 
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confrontation coincided precisely with a critical stage in the construction of a HSR project 
connecting Jakarta to Bandung. This five-billion-dollar flagship project, which China won after a 
tough price war with Japan, was to be built by a joint venture comprised of China Railway 
International – an overseas subsidiary of China Railway Group Limited which is China’s major 
railway builder and one of the largest Chinese SOEs – and a consortium of four Indonesian 
companies. What made the Jakarta-Bandung project even more important was the prospect of 
building another rail connecting Jakarta to Surabaya across the Java.1753  
The Jakarta-Bandung HSR project came to a halt in January 2016 when the Indonesian 
Transportation Ministry declined to issue a construction permit due to “unresolved issues and 
incomplete paperwork.” At the time, the joint venture held a permit only for building the first five 
kilometers of the railway.1754 In addition, the project came under strong criticism in Indonesia as 
much from the general public and provincial representatives for being too costly and unfair to less-
developed regions as it was from the military because the railway route would cut into an air force 
base.1755 On March 18, the project received its operation permit but the construction permit was 
still pending.1756 In a move likely designed to further sweeten the deal and accelerate the issuance 
of the construction permit, China Railway International announced that it would lower the project 
price from $5.5 billion to $5.1 billion, meaning that the construction phase of the project would be 
 
1753 Lampton, Ho and Kwik, Rivers of Iron, p. 144. 
1754 Kristine Kwok, “China’s high-speed railway project in Indonesia suspended over incomplete paperwork,” South 
China Morning Post, Jan. 27, 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1906307/chinas-
high-speed-railway-project-indonesia-suspended, accessed Feb. 22, 2020. 
1755 Amy Chew, “Discontent in Indonesia over high-speed rail project jointly developed with China may turn the 
current impasse into a more protracted one,” South China Morning Post, Feb. 19, 2016, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/1913995/discontent-indonesia-over-high-speed-rail-project-
jointly, accessed Feb. 22, 2020. 
1756 Liu Zhen, “Back on track: China’s high-speed railway project in Indonesia to resume soon as permit granted,” 
South China Morning Post, Mar. 19, 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/1927471/back-track-chinas-high-speed-railway-project-indonesia, accessed Feb. 22, 2020. 
- 495 - 
 
almost unprofitable for this SOE.1757 A thinly veiled push for proceeding with the project came on 
March 24 when the joint venture kicked off the construction of the first five kilometers of railway. 
In a news release about the start of construction, China Railway International extolled the symbolic 
and economic significance of the Jakarta-Bandung railway as the first overseas contract won in 
the “going out” campaign of China’s HSR technologies. The SOE also hailed the project as “an 
important achievement” in aligning China’s BRI with Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum 
strategy, the standard lexicon that Beijing used to underscore the point that China and Indonesia’s 
maritime geostrategies and economic interests had greater convergence than divergence.1758 
High International Audience Costs 
On the international end, China was facing three major sources of potential audience costs when 
the Natuna confrontation took place. In the bilateral setting, Beijing was alarmed by the growing 
hawkish push in Indonesia against China, especially within the Indonesian armed forces. In the 
multilateral setting, the prospect that Indonesia would be drawn closer to the U.S. and that Jakarta 
might opt for an international legal process on the overlapping waters represented the other two 
sources.  
While China-Indonesia relations by and large remained stable, signs of hardening perceptions 
of China within Indonesia especially in the armed forces – which indeed had emerged prior to 
Jokowi taking office – were identified by Chinese observers as a source of potential costs that 
China might incur in the bilateral setting. In March 2014, Commodore Fahru Zaini, assistant 
deputy to Indonesia’s chief security minister for defense strategic doctrine, reportedly stated that 
 
1757 Lu Bingyang [路炳阳], “Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway lower price again, making the construction phase 
almost unprofitable” [ 雅万高铁造价再降，基建阶段近无利润 ], Caixin [ 财新网 ], Mar. 17, 2016, 
http://companies.caixin.com/2016-03-17/100921484.html, accessed Feb. 23, 2020. 
1758 China Railway International Group [中铁国际集团有限公司], “Construction of the first segment of the Jakarta-
Bandung high-speed railway commences” [ 印 尼 雅 万 高 铁 先 导 段 开 工 ], Mar. 25, 2016, 
http://www.crecgi.com/?newshow/tp/222/id/272.html, accessed Feb. 22, 2020. 
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China’s “arbitrary claim...will have a large impact on the security of Natuna waters.”1759 In April, 
Gen. Moeldoko, commander in chief of Indonesia’s armed forces, wrote in the Wall Street Journal 
that being “dismayed” by China’s inclusion of parts of the Natuna Islands within the nine-dash 
line, Indonesia was drawing up a plan to deploy fighter jets to this region. Moreover, Moeldoko 
warned that China’s actions in the South China Sea would “define broader perceptions of its 
intentions as a rising power.” Namely, an “assertive China that rewrites the status quo through 
displays of military strength” would lead its smaller neighbors to lose their confidence that 
“Beijing indeed does believe in peaceful development.”1760 Citing these remarks as alarming signs 
on the Indonesian side, Chinese analysts warned that a firm Chinese posture vis-à-vis Indonesia in 
the South China Sea might shore up the haws’ position.1761  
A string of moves by the Indonesian armed forces after Jokowi took office deepened China’s 
concern that the military’s hawkish approach and Jokowi’s firm position on maritime security 
issues would converge and reinforce each other. In a 2015 assessment of the South China Sea 
situation, Chinese analysts noted that Jokowi’s heavy-handed approach toward IUU fishing and 
firm position on boosting Indonesia’s maritime security had “helped him win over senior officials 
in the Indonesian armed force.”1762 In September 2015, Indonesia’s Defense Minister Ryamizard 
Ryacudu announced the decision of deploying two thousand military personnel to Natuna and 
upgrading infrastructure including a runway on the Natuna Islands for additional warplanes and 
 
1759  Leo Suryadinata, “South China Sea: Is Jakarta no longer neutral?” Strait Times, Apr. 24, 2014, 
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/south-china-sea-is-jakarta-no-longer-neutral, accessed Feb. 26, 2020. 
1760 Moeldoko, “China’s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, Apr. 24, 2014, 
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accessed Feb. 24, 2020. 
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地区形势报告 2014-2015] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2016), pp. 235-236. 
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drones to be deployed to the area. Making clear the linkage of these moves with the South China 
Sea situation, Ryacudu added that “when matters escalate over the South China Sea, Indonesia 
should not remain silent.”1763 In November, the Indonesian Navy deployed seven warships to 
patrol the Natuna waters and combat IUU fishing activities.1764  
To be sure, the Natuna issue and IUU fishing were not the only factors contributing to the 
Indonesian military’s hardening stance on the South China Sea. Chinese analysts acknowledged 
that China’s land reclamation activity in the South China Sea, which commenced in late 2013 and 
was publicized in 2014, considerably aggravated Indonesia’s threat perception. A NISCSS analyst 
noted in an interview with the author, “China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea might 
have generated even greater psychological shocks to Indonesia and Malaysia than individual 
instances of conflict at sea, because the [reclaimed] islets are on their doorsteps…and thus have 
created great pressure on the two countries’ security.”1765 Likewise, noting a growing convergence 
of ASEAN countries’ positions on the South China Sea issue in 2015, a CASS evaluation warned 
that ASEAN’s criticism of China’s land reclamation activities should be seen as an indication of a 
consensus among its member states rather than an outcome of this organization being held hostage 
by a few vocal members, namely, the Philippines and Vietnam.1766 These observations by Chinese 
analysts are corroborated by a recent CSIS interview with former Indonesian Ambassador to the 
U.S. and former Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister Dino Djalal, who said that Indonesians found 
 
1763 “Indonesia’s Defense Ministry to focus on improving infrastructure in Natuna,” Antara News, Sept. 21, 2015, 
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it “very weird that a country that we studied in the book to be situated way, way up North, now is 
actually a next-door neighbor.” 1767 
In the multilateral setting, while Beijing remained confident that Indonesia’s traditional 
nonalignment policy and emphasis on the central role of ASEAN in regional affairs would 
continue to keep Jakarta from aligning with Washington,1768 Indonesia, like other Southeast Asian 
countries, hedged its bets. An increasingly close U.S.-Indonesia relationship, especially against 
the backdrop of the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia, made Beijing uneasy as this could come at the 
expense of China’s geopolitical interests in Indonesia. Even prior to Jokowi’s inauguration, 
Chinese analysts had warned that the Obama administration was actively seeking to reinvigorate 
relations with Jakarta so as to “use Indonesia’s influence…in the Southeast Asia to balance against 
China” and that a closer U.S.-Indonesia relationship would put China-Indonesia relations in 
jeopardy as “great powers outside the region…would seek to suppress or contain positive China-
Indonesia maritime cooperation.”1769 Noting that Washington sent Secretary of State John Kerry 
to attend President Jokowi’s inaugural ceremony in October 2014 – a stark contrast to 
Yudhoyono’s inauguration to which the Bush administration did not send any cabinet members, a 
report by Ji’nan University interpreted Washington’s “sudden elevation of the Indonesian 
president’s status” as a manifestation of Washington’s growing interest in encouraging Indonesia 
to play a more active role in line with the U.S. rebalancing strategy.1770  
 
1767 CSIS, “Talking Indonesia with Dr. Dino Djalal,” Feb. 25, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/talking-indonesia-
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[印度尼西亚南海政策分析], in Ju Hailong [鞠海龙], ed., South China Sea Situation Report 2012-2013 [南海地区
形势报告 2012-2013] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2013), pp. 232-233. 
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After Jokowi took office, Indonesia’s growing cooperation with the United States, in particular 
in the security dimension, only increased China’s unease. In April 2015, U.S. and Indonesian naval 
forces conducted a joint maritime air patrol exercise in the Natuna area. Whereas Indonesia 
attempted to underplay the significance of the exercise by describing it as “routine” and not related 
to the South China Sea, the U.S. unambiguously characterized it as “part of the Pacific 
rebalance.” 1771  After the exercise, Indonesia Navy spokesman Manahan Simorangkir stated 
Indonesia’s intention to hold regular military exercises with the United States near the Natuna 
Islands.1772 In evaluating Indonesia’s evolving policy toward the South China Sea issue, some 
Chinese observers noted that Jakarta’s growing collaboration with the U.S. in both multilateral and 
bilateral military exercises in “sensitive areas of the South China Sea” was of particular concerns 
to China.1773  
The strengthening U.S.-Indonesian military collaboration may have appeared all the more 
worrisome to Beijing given the fact that “Sharp Knife,” China’s bilateral counterterrorism drills 
with Indonesia, had quietly ceased from 2015.1774 Private communication with Chinese military 
analysts implied that Indonesia’s leadership change and shifting maritime security policies might 
have led to the suspension. Ruling out the possibility that the Komodo exercise was used as a 
substitute for “Sharp Knife,” a former PLA analyst stated candidly, “[F]or a bilateral military 
exercise which has been institutionalized over the course of four years, a sudden suspension may 
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come as a result of a clear instruction from senior leaders or be caused by other important 
situational factors, because [holding] such an exercise itself has significant positive impacts [on 
the relationship]. Given the fact that there was no leadership change on the Chinese side and China 
has traditionally paid great attention to [keeping on good terms with] Indonesia, which is the 
leading state of ASEAN, it is unlikely that the suspension was a move made on China’s part.”1775 
The worry that Indonesia might go beyond verbal threats and initiate an arbitration on the 
Natuna issue represented an additional source of potential diplomatic costs for Beijing. In an article 
published in April 2016, Zhu Feng, head of the South China Sea center at Nanjing University, 
warned that once the arbitral tribunal made a ruling, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia might also 
submit their disputes for international arbitrations. 1776  A 2015 CICIR assessment of China’s 
security environment, referring to Jokowi and his cabinet members’ rejection of the nine-dash line 
and threat to initiate an arbitration on the Natuna issue, cautioned that Indonesia and Malaysia 
“have demonstrated a tendency to side with Vietnam and the Philippines.”1777 
Both Beijing and Jakarta Backed Down 
China’s cost tradeoff calculation over the Natuna incident was ostensibly dominated by the 
international end, which, along with Indonesia’s willingness to curtail the adverse effects of the 
confrontation on the bilateral relationship, set the stage for both parties to swiftly dial down 
tensions. 
On April 13, Indonesia’s Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung stated that Jakarta considered the 
confrontation “a misunderstanding,” adding that priority would be given to “peace efforts” to settle 
 
1775 Author’s private correspondence via social media, February 2020. 
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the incident, not the involvement of “those outside the region.” 1778  In late April, Indonesia 
dispatched its Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security Affairs Luhut Panjaitan to 
attend the deputy-prime-minister-level China-Indonesia dialogue in Beijing. Jokowi reportedly 
underscored to Panjaitan that China was “a friend of Indonesia;” and upon his return to Indonesia, 
Panjaitan told the media that the two countries would seek to cooperate in fisheries around 
Natuna.1779 In return, China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited Jakarta in May to attend the 
China-Indonesia High-Level Economic Dialogue. When speaking with the media, Yang reiterated 
Beijing’s position that there were “extensive strategic converging points” between China’s 
Maritime Silk Road initiative and Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum doctrine.1780 During Yang’s 
visit, China’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture Yu Kangzhen met with Indonesia’s Fisheries 
Minister Susi Pudjiastuti. In what was a clear shift from her previous tough tone to a more 
conciliatory one, Susi described the two countries as still having “very good” cooperation because 
Indonesia’s fishery processing industry was still “open to all countries, including China” – 
although the catch fishery sector was for Indonesian fishermen only.1781  
Two subsequent incidents between the two countries testified to both parties’ propensity to 
avoid escalating fishing disputes. In late May, only a few weeks after the exchange of high-level 
visits, an Indonesian frigate fired shots at a Chinese fishing trawler which was suspected of fishing 
illegally in the Natuna Sea and refused to stop operation despite the Indonesian vessel’s warning. 
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The Indonesian navy detained eight Chinese fishermen along with the Chinese fishing ship.1782 
This time nearby CCG ships did not intervene, even though a CCG vessel approached the 
Indonesian ship and inquired about the firing. After being told that the Chinese fishing boat was 
caught in violation of Indonesia’s law, the CCG ship left without intervention.1783 Beijing was also 
sure to carefully word its remarks on this incident. Instead of referring to the area as “China’s 
traditional fishing grounds,” the MFA’s spokesperson Hua Chunying described China and 
Indonesia as having “different opinions on the waters where the incident took place,” adding that 
the two sides were consulting with each other on how to handle this incident.1784 
A similar incident occurred in mid-June when an Indonesian warship fired at and seized 
another Chinese fishing boat poaching in the Natuna waters. Seven Chinese crew members were 
detained. 1785  Nearby CCG ships again refrained from confronting the Indonesian ship or 
attempting to prevent the detention. Perhaps out of frustration with Jakarta’s repeated use of force 
against Chinese fishermen as well as out of the concern that Indonesia was exploiting China’s 
diplomatic vulnerability in the shadow of the arbitration ruling, Beijing’s reaction was relatively 
stronger this time as compared to the restrained statement in May, though both sides still avoided 
going beyond verbal criticism. Referring to the Natuna waters as “China’s traditional fishing 
grounds,” the Chinese foreign ministry criticized the Indonesian warships for firing at and injuring 
one of the Chinese fishermen, urging Jakarta to “handle the fishing issue at sea in a constructive 
way.”1786 In response, the Jokowi administration defended its use of force, but at the same time 
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made it clear that Indonesia did “not want any dispute with China.”1787 In August, Jakarta quietly 
called off a plan to sink impounded Chinese fishing boats on its Independence Day.1788 
Post Arbitration Reconciliation and Negotiations toward a COC 
The South China Sea issue represents a case which falls in the “borderline” area of the audience 
costs tradeoff calculation model. The lack of an immediately clear tradeoff between the domestic 
and international audience costs has led to a high frequency of standoffs at sea and diplomatic 
gridlocks. Beijing’s evolving and often ad hoc audience costs tradeoff calculations best explains 
its seemingly confusing vacillation between “safeguarding rights” and “maintaining stability.” In 
a nutshell, the audience costs tradeoff calculations have created incentives for Beijing to punish 
the Philippines, tolerate Vietnam, and placate Malaysia and Indonesia (as well as Brunei). 
The leadership transition in the Philippines in 2016, which roughly coincided with the ruling 
of arbitration, opened a window of opportunity for Beijing to undertake a rapid face-saving 
rapprochement with Manila – a tactic China employed with Japan in 2006 following Koizumi’s 
departure – and to temporarily curtail its growing international costs. Aquino’s successor Rodrigo 
Duterte responded positively to Beijing’s outreach, setting aside the arbitration ruling.  
On the other hand, China moved to repair and stabilize relations with ASEAN. Some progress 
toward crisis prevention and management mechanisms in the South China Sea was made at the 
ASEAN-China Summit in September 2016. The first achievement was the approval of guidelines 
for establishing hotlines among China and ASEAN countries’ foreign ministries, which would be 
utilized to facilitate communication and coordination in “maritime emergencies that require 
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immediate policy level intervention.”1789 The second was an agreement to apply the safety and 
communication procedures as prescribed in CUES to regulate encounters of naval ships and naval 
aircraft in the South China Sea.1790 Positive signs notwithstanding, neither the proposed hotlines 
nor CUES represent new mechanisms for the region. Outstanding problems vital to crisis 
prevention and management remain unaddressed, namely, the issues of regulating and curbing the 
behavior of various actors interacting on the forefront of the disputes, securing the necessary 
political will and wiggle room within each party to allow for quick deescalation, and developing 
domestic institutions to facilitate the implementation of these mechanisms.  
Negotiations between China and ASEAN on a COC is still a work in progress at the time of 
writing. A Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text (SDNT), comprised 
of proposals from China and eight ASEAN countries (Laos and Myanmar did not make any 
proposals), was put forward in 2018. The SDNT incorporates existing rules of road as stipulated 
in the COLREGs and CUES for incident prevention and reaffirms the imperative to utilize hotlines 
for crisis management.1791  
Beijing set the goal in 2018 of concluding the negotiation in three years, that is, by the end of 
2021. But the prospect of achieving this goal seems small. Apart from the delay in negotiations 
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due to the Covid-19 pandemic, countries still disagree on fundamental issues regarding the COC. 
For example, countries disagree on the geographical scope of the COC – China prefers one that 
corresponds to the “nine-dash line” while ASEAN countries prefers a smaller one. The parties also 
disagree on which land features the COC should cover, as Vietnam wants the Paracel Islands, the 
Philippines wants Scarborough Shoal, and China wants only the Spratly Islands. It remains also 
unresolved as to whether the COC should be “legally binding.” Moreover, China wants to craft 
the terms of the COC in a way that it can restrict the U.S. and other external countries’ military 
and commercial cooperation with ASEAN countries, which would not be accepted by ASEAN 
countries who leverage such cooperation to counterbalance China.1792 Even with a successful 
conclusion of a COC on paper, existing issues with the current crisis prevention and management 
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Yellow Sea: The Dominance of Deescalation 
 
“The China-ROK Fishery Agreement…is of significance to the maintenance of 
fishing operation orders in the Yellow Sea, the construction of stable fishery 
relations between the two countries, and to the development of a healthy bilateral 
relationship…since the China-ROK Fishery Agreement took effect, violations of 
regulations by Chinese fishing ships have been rampant…fishery law enforcement 
agencies at all levels must pay great attention and take forceful measures to 
concretely reduce such violations.”1793 
– Niu Yushan 
Director of FLE Yellow-Bohai Sea Regional Bureau 
 
 
“[T]he China-ROK Fishery Agreement has the serious problem…Due to this 
agreement, China has suffered huge losses of maritime economic rights and 
interests in the overlapping area with South Korea in the Yellow Sea. It has also 
hurt Chinese fishermen in the coastal area…China must review and reconsider this 
fishery agreement as it has seriously undermined our national interests.”1794 
– He Xin 
Member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
 
 
 “South Korea is as much a vital strategic leverage in moderating and controlling 
the situation on the Korean Peninsula as an important power in shaping the future 
of the peninsula. As China-ROK economic and trade ties deepen…China-ROK 
strategic relations are also moving in a positive direction. China should embrace 
this change and ceaselessly expand the scope of bilateral security cooperation while 
developing economic ties.”1795 
– National Defense University of the PLA 
International Strategic Situation and China’s National Security 2012-2013   
 
1793 Niu Yusan [牛玉山], “A Discussion on Strengthening Fishing Management Related to Foreign Waters” [关于进
一步加强涉外渔业管理工作的探讨], Modern Fisheries Information [现代渔业信息], vol. 20, no. 1, January 2005, 
pp. 5-6. 
1794 “He Xin: the origin of China-ROK fishing disputes and the unbelievable China-ROK fisheries agreement” [何新：
中 韩 渔 争 的 由 来 与 匪 夷 所 思 的 《 中 韩 渔 业 协 定 》 ], Guancha.cn, Dec. 18, 2011, 
https://www.guancha.cn/Science/2011_12_18_63204.shtml, accessed Mar. 8, 2020. 
1795 Luo Jiangchuan [罗江川], “Security situation on the Korean Peninsula and China’s policy options” [朝鲜半岛安
全形势与中国政策选择], Institute of Strategic Studies of National Defense University, International Strategic 
Situation and China’s National Security 2012-2013 [国际战略形势与中国国家安全 ] (Beijing: Junshi kexue 
chubanshe, 2013), p. 154.  
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10. China-South Korea Fishing Clashes in the Yellow Sea  
During the first two decades of the 21st century, the Yellow Sea has witnessed an upsurge of violent 
and even fatal clashes, primarily between Chinese fishermen and the South Korean Coast Guard. 
Compared with the East and South China Seas, however, the Yellow Sea stands out as a unique 
case in that the risk of escalation and the level of crisis intensity have remained the lowest in 
China’s three near seas, despite this area having recorded a much higher frequency of fatal clashes. 
The Yellow Sea falls in the “propensity to deescalate” area below the 45-degree borderline in 
the audience cost trade-off model, where international audience costs ostensibly prevail over 
domestic audience costs under most circumstances (Figure 10.1). On the domestic end, Beijing 
faces little compromise-averse pressure on the disputes. At the top, the Chinese leadership have 
persistently prioritized the maintenance of robust ties with South Korea and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula. Elites in general share the prioritization of broader China-ROK relations and stability 
in China’s northeast frontier, notwithstanding occasional calls for renegotiating the terms of the 
fishery agreement. At the grassroots level, the Chinese public generally harbor a much more 
positive perception of South Korea than of other rivaling claimants.1796 The only disgruntled 
grassroots interest group that would prefer a firm Chinese position on the Yellow Sea are the 
fishermen whose livelihood has been substantially compromised as a result of the fishery 
agreement. Although China retaliated against South Korea for the deployment of Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2016 and the Chinese popular perceptions of South Korea 
underwent a severe downturn, Beijing managed to insulate the handling of the Yellow Sea disputes 
from the THAAD controversies. The preoccupation with the potential international audience costs, 
 
1796 For scholarly discussion of the “Korean wave” and its impacts on the bilateral relations, see, for example, Soo 
Hyun Jang, “The Korean Wave and Its Implications for the Korea-China Relationship,” Journal of International and 
Area Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, December 2012, pp. 97-113. 
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combined with the manageable domestic audience costs under most circumstances, has 
incentivized China to opt for a de-escalatory response to contingencies in the Yellow Sea.  
This chapter illustrates the effects of the audience costs tradeoff calculation on China’s 
decision to deescalate local incidents in the Yellow Sea since the implementation of the bilateral 
fishery agreement.  
Figure 10.1 The Yellow Sea in the “Propensity to Deescalate” Area 
 
THE CHINA-ROK FISHERY AGREEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The Yellow Sea has for centuries been an important fishery resource for fishermen in the region. 
Pending a final settlement on their maritime boundary, China and South Korea concluded a 
provisional fishery agreement in 2000, which took effect from 2001 and has been renewed 
annually since 2006. This agreement carved a Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) in the Yellow 
Sea, in which fishing operations were to be co-managed by a joint fishery committee with each 
country having jurisdiction only over its own nationals and fishing vessels. On both sides of the 
PMZ, two Transitional Fishing Zones (TFZ/TZ) were set up (Map 10.1). Both parties agreed to 
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gradually reduce fishing in the other’s TFZ over a period of four years and in mid-2005, the TFZs 
were incorporated into the respective countries’ EEZs. With respect to EEZ management, China 
and South Korea allow reciprocal fishing access to their own EEZs by the other party and are 
entitled to “take necessary actions” against the other party’s fishermen to enforce marine 
conservation. Quotas of allowable catches, number of fishing vessels licensed to operate in each 
other’s EEZ, fishing period, and operational areas are negotiated bilaterally every year.1797 
Map 10.1 Agreed China-ROK Fishery Zones 
 
Although the China-ROK fishery agreement adopted institutional arrangements similar to 
those laid out in China’s two other bilateral fishery agreements with Japan and Vietnam, the 
number of Chinese fishing ships seized by South Korea surged considerably after the 
implementation of the China-ROK agreement (Table 10.1). The number of Chinese fishing ships  
 
1797 The Fisheries Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. 
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Table 10.1 The Number of Chinese Fishing Vessels Seized by South Korea 
 
Sources: Vessel data for 1996-2005 from Korea Coast Guard 2006 White Paper [2006년 해양경찰백서], p. 
61; vessel data for 2006 and 2007 from Korea Coast Guard 2008 White Paper [2008년 해양경찰 백서], p. 
66; bond/fine data for 2002-2007 from Suk Kyoon Kim, “Illegal Chinese Fishing in the Yellow Sea: A Korean 
Officer’s Perspective,” Journal of East Asia and International Law, vol. 5, no. 2, 2012, p. 467; vessel and 
bond/fine data for 2008 from Korea Coast Guard 2013 White Paper [2013년 해양경찰 백서], p. 45; vessel 
and bond/fine data for 2009-2013 from Korea Coast Guard 2014 White Paper [2014년 해양경찰 백서], p. 
19; vessel and bond/fine data for 2014-2018 from 2019 Korea Coast Guard Annual Report 2019 [2019 
해양경찰백서], p. 380.  
* Average fine per seized vessel is calculated by the author.  
 
seized by the KCG in the Yellow Sea appears particularly significant when compared to data 
covering the same period following the signing of the China-Japan Fishery Agreement. From 2003  
to 2017, a total of merely 35 Chinese fishing ships were detained by the JCG for illegally operating 
in Japan’s EEZ or territorial sea. 1798  The total number of Chinese fishing vessels seized by 
 
1798 The total of detained Chinese fishing ships by JCG is 0 from 2003-2006, 11 from 2007-2012, and 24 from 2013-
2017. The 2003-2006 data is from Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2008, 
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Japanese authorities is still small even after adding the data from the Japan Fisheries Agency (JFA), 
which seized a total of 25 Chinese fishing ships from 2009-2017.1799 
Decreasing Fishing Grounds and Disgruntled Chinese Fishermen 
Fish disputes between China and South Korea have increased in both number and level of violence. 
This is likely as a result of – rather than in spite of – the bilateral fishery agreement. Three major 
institutional arrangements made in the agreement seem to have created economic and emotional 
incentives for Chinese fishermen to engage in illegal fishing in the ROK-administered waters and 
violent resistance when encountering the KCG enforcement. 
First, an immediate impact of the agreement was the considerable shrinking of China’s 
available fishing grounds in the Yellow Sea and the massive squeeze-out of Chinese fishing ships. 
The Yellow Sea traditionally sees a high concentration of Chinese fishing ships due to its 
geographical proximity to China. As noted by Suk Kyoon Kim, former Commissioner General of 
the KCG, the relatively longer distance of the East China Sea from China’s coast discourages 
Chinese fishermen and thus Chinese fishing ships usually operate within the Sino-Japanese PMZ, 
which has effectively reduced the number of violations and seizures.1800 As such, the China-ROK 
fishery agreement, once implemented, generated more significant socioeconomic impacts than the 
 
https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2008/honpen/p052.html; the 2007-2012 data is from Japan Coast 
Guard Annual Report 2013, https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2013/html/honpen/1_05_1_chap3.html; 
the 2013-2017 data is from Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2018, 
https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2018/html/honpen/2_05_chap4.html. All accessed Mar. 9, 2020. 
1799 The total of seized Chinese fishing vessels y JFA is 12 from 2009-2013, 13 from 2014-2017. The 2009-2013 data 
is from JFA [水産庁], “Results of crackdown on foreign fishing ships in 2013” [平成 25 年の外国漁船取締実績に
ついて], Jan. 31, 2014, https://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/kanri/torishimari/attach/pdf/pressrelease-39.pdf, accessed Mar. 
10, 2020; the 2014-2017 data is from JFA [水産庁], “Results of crackdown on foreign fishing ships in 2018”  [平成
30 年の外国漁船取締実績について], Jan. 30, 2020, https://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/kanri/190130.html, accessed 
Mar. 10, 2020. The data for 2003-2008 is not available on JFA official website. However, based on the JCG data 
which shows that zero Chinese fishing ship was detained from 2003-2006 and the figure only slowly increased 
thereafter, it is reasonable to expect that the number of Chinese fishing ships seized by JAF during 2003-2008 should 
be small – and quite likely smaller than the figures from the subsequent years. 
1800 Kim, “Illegal Chinese Fishing in the Yellow Sea,” p. 467. 
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China-Japan fishery agreement on China’s fishery sector. Within one year of the agreement’s 
implementation, Zhejiang Province, particularly its major fishing port Zhoushan, lost 30 percent 
of its traditional fishing grounds, and its fishermen’s operations were subject to “tightened 
restrictions” in another 25 percent. This tremendous shrinkage in fishing grounds squeezed over 
3,000 fishing ships out of their traditional operation areas and forced some 30,000 fishermen to 
either find alternative fishing grounds or reallocate to other economic sectors. 1801  Shandong 
Province reported a loss of 40 percent of its fishing grounds. Whereas over 10,000 fishing ships 
from this province used to operate in waters surrounding South Korea, only a total of some 1,000 
fishing boats were allowed to operate in South Korea-administered and Japan-administered waters 
after the China-ROK and China-Japan fisheries agreements took effect, forcing the rest of the 
fishing ships to return to the already seriously depleted coastal waters.1802 Liaoning lost 41 of its 
102 traditional fishing grounds, a loss of over 40 percent.1803 According to a Chinese analyst 
affiliated with CIIS, the loss of traditional fishing grounds created “strong emotions” among the 
Chinese fishermen.1804 
Second, Chinese fishermen’s allowable catch quotas and the numbers of Chinese fishing 
vessels permitted to operate in the South Korean EEZ – negotiated by the two sides annually – had 
been gradually reduced to equal South Korea’s catch quotas and vessel numbers permitted in 
China’s EEZ (Figure 10.2). Consequently, the number of Chinese fishing vessels permitted to 
 
1801 Bureau of Ocean and Fisheries of Zhejiang Province [浙江省海洋与渔业局], “Combining prevention with 
guiding to actively advance fishermen’s reallocate to other industries and sectors” [堵疏结合，积极推进捕捞渔民
转产转业], Chinese Fisheries Economics, no. 6, 2002, p. 6. 
1802 Li Gongshan [李公善], Chu Minsheng [褚民生] and Yang Youyi [杨友义], “Problems and solutions in the 
administration of fishing ships operating in foreign waters” [浅析涉外渔船管理中存在的问题与对策], Shandong 
Fisheries, vol. 22, no. 6, 2005, p. 38. 
1803 Lin Yuejiao [林月娇] and Liu Haiying [刘海映], “Influence of implementing Fishery Agreement between China 
and Korea to Liaoning Province’s fishery” [《中韩渔业协定》的实施对辽宁省渔业的影响及对策], Chinese 
Fisheries Economics [中国渔业经济], no. 4, 2006, p. 71. 
1804 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
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operate in the South Korean EEZ was cut by nearly 40 percent from 2003 (2531 vessels) to 2017 
(1540 vessels), and Chinese fishermen’s allowable catch quotas by 38 percent from 2003 (93,000 
metric tons) to 2017 (60,000 metric tons).1805 During this period, the quotas and the numbers of 
South Korean fishing vessels permitted to operate in the Chinese EEZ remained largely constant. 
The squeeze effect on the Chinese side was further magnified by the huge gap in fishing capacities 
between China, which had 515,000 marine fishing vessels when the implementation of the 
agreement started, and South Korea, which had roughly 86,000, according to a CIIS report.1806 
Figure 10.2 The Number of Permitted Fishing Vessels and Allowable Catch Quotas  
 
Source: China Fisheries Yearbook [中国渔业年鉴], various years (2003-2018). 
 
The fact that both the Chinese side of the Yellow Sea and the PMZ were heavily fished and 
increasingly depleted of stocks further exacerbated the Chinese fishermen’s economic 
hardship.1807 The way that the TZs and PMZ were delineated was criticized by Chinese analysts 
 
1805 China Fisheries Yearbook 2004, p. 22; China Fisheries Yearbook 2018, p. 27. 
1806 Dong Manyuan [董漫远] and Su Xiaohui [苏晓晖], Assessment of China’s Peripheral Security Environment and 
Policy Options 2010-2020 [中国周边安全环境评估及政策选择 2010-2020] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2015), 
p. 153. 
1807 Mallory, China, Global Governance and the Making of a Distant Water Fishing Nation, p.156; Guo Rui [郭锐] 
and Wang Xiaoke [王箫轲], “Issues in China-ROK maritime disputes and China’s solutions” [中韩海洋权益纠纷问
题与我国的应对之策], Journal of International Relations [国际关系研究], issue 2, 2013, pp. 139-140. 
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and officials for surrendering the “golden fishing grounds” of the Yellow Sea to South Korea while 
leaving China the much poorer portion with depleted fish stocks. Moreover, some Chinese 
strategists criticized that the delineation in effect conformed to South Korea’s position of 
equidistance in delimiting China-ROK maritime boundary and thus undermined China’s 
traditional position that “equitable principles” be applied.1808  Information from some Chinese 
sources indicated that China perceived the agreement as a result of Korean espionage during the 
negotiation. In a 2011 bill submitted to the CPPCC calling on Beijing to review the agreement, He 
Xin, a CPPCC member, explicitly identified Li Bin, a former senior Chinese diplomat participating 
in the negotiation and China’s ambassador to South Korea from 2001-2005 who was later 
convicted for corruption, as being responsible for tricking Beijing into signing this agreement 
despite it being detrimental to China’s marine economic interests.1809 In a 2011 speech, Major 
General Jin Yi’nan, a strategist at the PLA’s National Defense University, stated that Li Bin was 
the most senior-level Chinese diplomat involved in espionage and was seen as a big scandal by 
Beijing.1810 A Chinese interlocutor affiliated with a government think tank noted that Li Bin 
“revealed China’s bottom-line in negotiations with ROK, resulting in an agreement whose terms 
are very unfavorable to China.”1811  
Third, the absorption of the respective TZs into China and South Korea’s EEZs in mid-2005 
further squeezed the fishable sea area for Chinese fishermen in the Yellow Sea, creating incentives 
 
1808 Dong and Su, Assessment of China’s Peripheral Security Environment and Policy Options 2010-2020, p. 135; 
Dong Jiawei [董加伟], “On the Protection of Traditional Fishing Rights under the Framework of China-Korea and 
China-Japan Fishing Agreements” [论中韩、中日渔业协定框架下的传统捕鱼权保障], Northeast Asia Forum [东
北亚论坛], no. 4, 2014, p. p. 42; Guo and Wang, “Issues in China-ROK maritime disputes and China’s solutions,” p. 
139. 
1809 “He Xin: the origin of China-ROK fishing disputes and the unbelievable China-ROK fisheries agreement.”  
1810 “Jin Yinan discusses the CCP’s spy crisis” [金一南谈中共的间谍危机], Aug. 27, 2011, speech video available 
on Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIOvDetXSug, accessed Mar. 8, 2020. 
1811 Author’s interview, Beijing, June 2019. 
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for intrusions into and illegal fishing in the South Korean EEZ.1812 The number of Chinese fishing 
ships seized by the KCG peaked in 2005 and remained high thereafter (Table 10.1). In response, 
South Korea beefed up its law enforcement in the area and toughened punitive measures against 
illegal fishing, including the imposition of higher fines and imprisonment of crews. According to 
Suk Kyoon Kim, who formerly supervised the KCG, Seoul increased the ceilings of fines in 2006 
to deter Chinese illegal fishing activities and in 2008 set the maximum permissible fine at 200 
million won (approx. $177,780 USD) in addition to the confiscation of catches.1813  
Table 10.2 The Occurrence of Violent Resistance and Resulting Casualties  
 
Source: Occurrence, ROK victims, and Chinese crewmen imprisonment from 2002 through 2015 from Kim, 
Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia, pp.134-135; occurrence and ROK victims from 2016 through 2019 from 
Korea Coast Guard 2020 Annual Report [2020 해양경찰 백서], p. 117, p. 355. 
MD: missing data. 
 
 
1812 Lin and Liu, “Influence of implementing Fishery Agreement between China and Korea to Liaoning Province’s 
fishery,” p. 72; China Fisheries Yearbook 2006, p. 43. 
1813 Suk Kyoon Kim, Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia: Regional Challenges and Cooperation (Leiden, Boston: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2017), pp. 137-138. 
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These arrangements, taken together, stimulated deep grievance among Chinese fishermen over 
their loss of available fishing grounds and deterioration in livelihood, whereas the severe economic 
punishment created strong incentives for the fishermen to escape and violently resist Korean 
enforcement. Al though the number of Chinese fishing vessels seized by South Korea have been 
declining since 2005, incidents of violent resistance against the KCG and resulting fatalities have 
since increased (Table 10.2).  
An additional factor that has further complicated the China-ROK fishing conflict is the 
growing activity of Chinese fishermen in the overlapping area – referred to as the “DPRK-ROK 
sensitive waters” (朝韩敏感水域) in Chinese writings – between the Northern Limit Line (NLL), 
unilaterally drawn by the United Nations Command at the end of the Korean War in 1953, and the 
DPRK maritime border line, unilaterally announced by Pyongyang in 1999 (Map 10.2). This area 
has long been highly sensitive due to its potentially serious ramifications for the stability on the 
Korean Peninsula, as evidenced by the sinking of the ROK naval corvette Cheonan and the 
bombardment of the Yeonpyeong Island, both of which occurred near the NLL in 2010.1814  
Despite the absence of a formal fishery agreement between Beijing and Pyongyang to regulate 
fishing activities in North Korean waters, North Korea has sold fishing rights to Chinese fishermen 
– reportedly since 2004 – in waters north of the NLL as a way of earning hard cash.1815 Taking 
advantage of the political sensitivity of this overlapping area, Chinese fishing ships reportedly 
 
1814 Terence Roehrig, ‘North Korea and the Northern Limit Line,’ North Korean Review, vol. 5. No. 1, spring 2009, 
pp. 8-22; International Crisis Group, North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea, Asia Report No. 198, Dec. 23, 
2010; Darcie Draudt and John K. Warden, ‘The Strategic Rationale for Maritime Tension Reduction in the Yellow 
Sea,’ The Washington Quarterly, vol. 40, issue 4, 2017, pp. 183-197. 
1815 South Korean sources vary greatly on the specific figures. Koran media clams that the North earns about $75 
million USD per year from the sale of its fishing rights to China. “N. Korea sold fishing rights in East Sea to China: 
gov’t source,” The Korea Herald, Aug. 11, 2016, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160811000184, 
accessed Mar. 15, 2020. Suk Kyoon Kim, former head of the KCG, cites information from South Korea’s National 
Intelligence Service’s report, which puts the North’s annual earning at $30 million from its sale of fishing rights to 
1,500 Chinese fishing vessels. Kim, Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia, p. 136.  
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often fish illegally in waters south of the NLL and flee to the north of the line when discovered 
and chased by the KCG, which handles Chinese fishing ships operating in this area in a “very 
restricted manner” and must have permission from the navy to engage in a crackdown on Chinese 
ships.1816 Likewise, Chinese fishing boats illegally operating in the DPRK waters often cross the 
NLL to escape enforcement by the North Korean patrol boats, which, like the KCG, typically 
refrain from entering this sensitive zone.1817 The opportunistic Chinese fishing activity heightened 
the risk of triggering conflict in this area. 
Map 10.2 The Inter-Korean Water and NLL in the Yellow Sea 
 
Absence of Compromise-Averse Allies for Fishermen 
The maritime boundary dispute in the Yellow Sea and associated fishery conflict had traditionally 
been put on the back burner in Beijing’s foreign policy agenda with South Korea, with priorities 
clearly given to the more pressing security issues on the Korean Peninsula as well as to bilateral 
 
1816 Roehrig, “North Korea and the Northern Limit Line,” p. 12; Kim, Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia, pp. 134-
136. 
1817 Shawn Ho, “Tensions in the Yellow Sea: Crabs and the Inter-Korea Border Dispute,” RSIS Commentary, no. 172, 
Jul. 11, 2016; International Crisis Group, North Korea, p. 18. 
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economic cooperation, as reflected in all the PRC-ROK joint statements and communiques issued 
in the 21st century (Table 10.3). Out of the seven bilateral documents, only three contain references 
to the Yellow Sea issue. In the 2008 joint statement, both sides for the first time briefly agreed to 
“accelerate coordination” for an early settlement to the maritime boundary issue.1818 The 2012 
joint press release, issued shortly after a KCG officer was fatally stabbed by a Chinese fisherman 
in November 2011, is the only document that contains a clause specifically on the fishing conflict. 
In this document, the two sides pledged to enhance cooperation and communication between their 
fishery enforcement and diplomatic bureaucracies so as to “properly handle fishery issues.”1819 In 
the 2014 joint statement, both countries agreed to initiate boundary negotiations in 2015.1820  
Table 10.3 Major Issues Addressed in PRC-ROK Joint Statements/Communiques in 21st Century 
 
In this context of prioritizing stability and cooperation in China-ROK relations, adventurous 
Chinese fishermen confronting and clashing with KCG officers in the Yellow Sea were seen more 
as unruly actors creating diplomatic problems for Beijing rather than “patriots” on the frontline 
defending China’s maritime rights in contested waters – a narrative typically in the depiction of 
Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea. As such, disgruntled Chinese fishermen in the Yellow 
 
1818  “PRC-ROK joint communique” [ 中 韩 联 合 公 报 ], in Seoul, Aug. 25, 2008, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/t486674.shtml, accessed Mar. 16, 2020. 
1819 “PRC-ROK Joint Press Release” [中韩联合新闻公报], Jan. 11, 2012, http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-
01/11/content_24375586.htm, accessed Mar. 16, 2020. 
1820  “PRC-ROK joint statement” [ 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 和 大 韩 民 国 联 合 声 明 ], Jul. 4, 2014, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676524/1207_676536/t1171408.shtml, 
accessed Mar. 16, 2020. 
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Sea did not garner much support from other domestic stakeholders – not even from the interest 
groups who supported strong state protection for Chinese fishing activities in the East and South 
China Seas. The absence of a compromise-averse coalition on the fishing conflict in the Yellow 
Sea had in general provided Beijing with adequate diplomatic leeway to quickly contain local 
incidents even when fatalities were involved.  
First, the Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement Bureau, though sympathetic of the fishermen’s 
economic hardship, distanced itself from the fishermen from the very beginning of the 
implementation of the China-ROK fishery agreement. Speaking at a grand ceremony in July 2001 
for the implementation of the fishery agreement and the commencement of FLE patrols 
accordingly, Qi Jingfa, then China’s Vice Minister of Agriculture, called on local authorities and 
fishermen to “consider the broad interests [of China-ROK relations]” and fully abide by 
regulations stipulated in the agreement, while acknowledging that the loss of fishing grounds 
would immediately squeeze out 3,500 Chinese fishing ships and reduce fishermen’s gross income 
by 1.8-2 billion RMB (approx. 250-280 million USD) each year. Qi also called on authorities in 
coastal provinces of the Yellow Sea to accelerate the restructuring of local economy and the 
reallocation of displaced fishermen to other industries to maintain socioeconomic stability.1821 As 
such, a primary target of FLE’s enforcement operations in the Yellow Sea had been Chinese fishing 
ships attempting to venture into the South Korea-administered waters and the sensitive inter-
Korean sea area. A 2006 article penned by Niu Yushan, then head of the FLE Yellow-Bohai Sea 
Bureau, stressed the need to step up patrols in areas west of the South Korea EEZ and near the 
sensitive inter-Korean water and to intercept Chinese fishing boats attempting to enter the area. 
Niu also called for stricter punishments on fishing boats violating the regulations and for the 
 
1821 Li Ming [李明], “China’s marine fishery administration take a new step forward” [中国海洋渔业管理迈出崭新
一步], China Ocean News [中国海洋报], Jul. 6, 2001. 
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“timely notification of the Korean side about the [said] punishments” in order to “establish a good 
image of [China] being responsible.”1822 
Even when FLE became more vocal in the 2010s in its advocacy for fishing protection patrols 
as part of China’s maritime rights protection operations, the agency still distinguished its missions 
in the Yellow Sea from those in the East and South China Seas. In a speech delivered at the FLE 
national work conference in 2013, Zhao Xingwu, then head of the FLE, underscored that the 
agency’s primary tasks in the Yellow Sea were to “strictly monitor and control Chinese fishing 
boats, keep an eye on our own ports, carefully regulate our own ships, and do our best to prevent 
major diplomatic incidents caused by operations of Chinese fishing ships in the sensitive inter-
Korean waters or by unlicensed operations in the South Korea-administered waters” – a stark 
contrast to the agency’s vow to step up fishing protection and maritime rights protection patrols in 
the East and South China Seas.1823 
Second, the political sensitivity surrounding the disputed inter-Korean waters in the Yellow 
Sea have created an institutional incentive for the Chinese military to discourage adventurous 
Chinese fishing activity in the area. During a meeting with his South Korean counterpart in 2013, 
the PLAN commander Wu Shengli promised to ask the Chinese coast guard to cooperate with the 
KCG in curtailing illegal Chinese fishing activities near the inter-Korean waters and in preventing 
clashes between Chinese fishermen and KCG officers, a rare direct comment on fishing conflict 
by the PLA. 1824  The PLA’s position also stems from China’s broader strategic interests in 
 
1822 Niu Yushan [牛玉山], “Clearly recognize the situation, seize the opportunity, comprehensively improve fishery 
administration work” [认清形势、抓住机遇、全面提高渔业管理水平], China Fishery News, Jun. 5, 2006. 
1823 “Strengthen construction, protect fishing activities and safeguard maritime rights, strictly enforce laws, and 
improve fishery enforcement work: FLE director Zhao Xingwu’s speech at national fishery work conference” [强化
建设、护渔维权、严格执法、推动渔政工作大发展: 农业部渔业局局长赵兴武在全国渔政工作会议上的讲话], 
China Fisheries Daily, Mar. 11, 2013. 
1824 “China, S. Korea to cooperate on fisheries control in Yellow Sea,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jul. 12, 2013; 
“South Korean navy urges China to curb fishing activities near NLL” [韩海军敦促中国管制北方界线一带捕捞行
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maintaining stability on its northeast periphery. Cooperation with Seoul is seen by Chinese 
strategists as key to shaping the security landscape in this region. A 2013 assessment of China’s 
security environment by the PLA’s National Defense University characterized South Korea as ‘a 
vital strategic leverage in moderating and controlling the situation on the Korean Peninsula,’ 
urging Beijing to ‘ceaselessly expand the scope of bilateral security cooperation.’1825 In addition, 
the Yellow Sea is also seen as a strategic buffer for north China, the stability of which has a direct 
impact on the security of Beijing. The fishing conflict, on the other hand, represented a competition 
for marine economic interests that must be co-managed with Seoul to better safeguard China’s 
strategic interests in the Yellow Sea.1826  
Third, coastal provinces of the Yellow Sea, in grappling with the loss of tax revenues and the 
potential socioeconomic challenges caused by unemployment in the fishery sector,1827 prioritized 
aquaculture, marine product processing industries, and distant water fisheries as ways of relocating 
displaced fishermen and relieving socioeconomic pressure.1828 This move aligned with the central 
government’s policy goal of restructuring China’s fishery sector to bring it in line with the 
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国亚太再平衡战略与黄海争端], Social Science Reviews, vol. 31, no. 2, February 2016, pp. 81-82. 
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agreement on island public security” [中韩渔业协定对海岛公安工作影响之思考], Journal of Zhejiang Police 
College [浙江公安高等专科学校学报], no. 5, Oct. 2001, pp. 52-53. 
1828  “Employment and sectorial relocations benefit both short and long term: work conference on fishermen 
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sustainable development concepts embodied in the emerging global marine governance system, 
which China had been pursuing since the mid-1990s.1829 In addition, the thriving local economy 
in the these provinces was probably a contributing factor to the provincial authorities’ preference 
for relief measures, as the local economy not only provided the necessary industrial basis to absorb 
the displaced fishing population but also the necessary fiscal resources to assist the transition. On 
top of a 270-million-RMB central-government annual funding from 2002 for three consecutive 
years, which was too small in scale to compensate for fishermen’s losses nationwide,1830 provincial 
funding was substantial. Zhejiang, for instance, allocated an annual funding of over 200 million 
RMB from 2001 for three years to subsidize the development of aquaculture, distant water fisheries, 
the decommissioning of fishing vessels, and tax cuts for fishermen.1831 Shandong allocated nearly 
100 million RMB between 2002 and 2005 to pay local fishermen for decommissioning 2830 
fishing vessels.1832 
Taken together, there is a clear absence of a compromise-averse coalition that would back the 
disgruntled Chinese fishermen and press for a firm Chinese posture in the event of fishing conflict 
with South Korea. This absence, in turn, leaves Beijing with adequate room for quick deescalation 
– even in the face of immediate but brief popular backlashes. 
 
1829 Mallory, China, Global Governance and the Making of a Distant Water Fishing Nation, pp. 123-131. 
1830 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
1831  Bureau of ocean and fisheries of Zhejiang Province, “Blocking up with dredging to advance transferring 
fishermen’s job.” 
1832 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of Cina, ‘Shandong sheng jianchuan zhuanchan 
gongzuo wenbu tuijin’ [Shandong Province steadily proceed with ship decommissioning and fishermen relocation], 
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Situation (1986-2005)/ part 4 Agricultural resources and environmental protection expenditure], https://shandong-
chorography.org/database/g0/section/6/article/59/. 
- 523 - 
 
VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN CHINESE FISHERMEN AND THE KCG 2000-2016 
From 2000 through 2016, there were six fatal clashes between Chinese fishermen and KCG 
personnel (Table 10.2). For most of the 2000s, frictions between Chinese fishermen and the KCG 
were on the rise but low in fatalities. The only fatal incident occurred in September 2008 when a 
KCG officer was injured and accidentally drowned during a raid against two Chinese fishing boats 
suspected of illegally fishing in South Korean waters.1833 Five fatal clashes occurred in the 2010s, 
a period when China was widely perceived to have demonstrated growing assertiveness in its 
conduct of diplomacy. Yet not one of the five fatal incidents escalated into a major diplomatic 
crisis between Beijing and Seoul. The clear domination of international audience costs, especially 
those derived from the bilateral setting, explains China’s strong propensity to quickly contain 
maritime incidents with South Korea in the Yellow Sea. 
2010 Fatal Collision between Chinese Fishing Boat and Korean Coast Guard Vessel 
On December 18, 2010, the KCG responded to some 50 Chinese fishing ships spotted illegally 
fishing in South Korean waters. During the violent resistance that ensued, a Chinese fishing boat 
rammed into an approaching KCG vessel to allow other fishing boats to sail back to the Chinese 
waters and capsized after collision. One Chinese crew member died, and another went missing. 
Four fishermen on the Chinese trawler were rescued – with one dying in a Korean hospital the 
following day – and detained by the KCG for hampering the crackdown. The South Korean foreign 
ministry expressed regret over the deaths of the Chinese fishermen in a phone call to the Chinese 
embassy in Seoul.1834  
 
1833 “South Korea seeks arrest warrants for Chinese fishermen,” BBC, Sept. 28, 2008. 
1834 Kim Kwang-tae, “China fishing boat capsizes in scuffle; 1 dead,” Associated Press, Dec 19, 2010; “China demands 
compensation over collision in Yellow Sea, Japan Economic News, Dec. 21, 2010; “S. Korea frees three Chinese 
fishermen after protest,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 25, 2010. 
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While part of the Chinese public reportedly saw the clash as an even more serious provocation 
than the fishing trawler collision with JCG in September and urged Chinese authorities to punish 
South Korea,1835 Beijing refrained from making any official comment until three days after the 
incident. On December 21, the Chinese foreign ministry called on South Korea to “spare no efforts 
in searching and rescuing missing Chinese crew members, punish perpetrators to the full extent of 
law, compensate for casualties and loss of property on the Chinese side.”1836 Seoul countered 
Beijing’s claim that the Korean side was responsible for the collision and stated that South Korea 
had a video footage showing the Chinese fishing trawler deliberately ramming the KCG ship.1837  
This brief trade of mutual accusations notwithstanding, the tension quickly deescalated as both 
sides refrained from taking further escalatory moves. On December 23, Seoul emphasized that 
both countries shared the stance that the situation should be managed calmly and cautiously “so as 
not to incite emotional public reactions in their own country.”1838 Two days later, the KCG released 
the three detained Chinese fishermen, citing their active cooperation in the investigation and lack 
of active involvement in the incident,1839 whereas Beijing ceased to openly press for Korean 
compensation. 
Three factors underscored the domination of international audience costs in Beijing’s decision 
to avoid an escalation of the fish conflict and to contain bilateral tensions. First, by the time the 
clash occurred, Beijing’s ties with Seoul had already been severely strained as a result of China’s 
refusal to support an international censure on North Korea’s sinking of the South’s frigate Cheonan 
 
1835 “China web users irate over deadly S. Korea collision,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 20, 2010. 
1836  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on December 21, 2010,” MFA, 
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and bombing of Yeonpyeong Island. 1840  Assessments by Chinese government think tanks 
described the China-ROK relationship as having “fallen to its lowest point” following the two 
incidents and warned that the souring bilateral relationship had undermined China’s push to reopen 
talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,1841 the top security priority in Beijing’s Korean 
Peninsula agenda.  
Second, and closely related to the first point, Beijing ostensibly harbored deep concerns that 
continued tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula would be exploited by the United States to 
expand its military presence in the region. From the Chinese perspective, the U.S. had been the 
party benefiting most from the tensions instigated by the Cheonnan and Yeonpyeong incidents. 
The U.S.-ROK military drills in the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan in 2010, which were intended to 
deter recurring North Korean provocations, were perceived by Chinese analysts as targeting China. 
The geographical proximity of the Yellow Sea to Beijing – “the doorstep of China” as 
characterized by Chinese strategists – unsurprisingly deepened China’s suspicions and anxiety. 
Seoul’s decision to postpone transfer of the wartime operational control of the Korean military 
from the U.S. to South Korea was seen as still another victory for Washington in its attempt to use 
the incidents to boost the U.S.-ROK alliance as part of the rebalancing strategy.1842  
 
1840 For scholarly analysis of the implications of Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents for China-ROC relations, see, 
Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, “Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North Korea’s 
Provocations,” RUSI Journal, vol. 156, no. 2, April/May 2011, pp. 74-81. 
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Asia Pacific: Asia-Pacific Region Development Report 2012  [亚太蓝皮书-亚太地区发展报告 2012] (Beijing: 
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2012), pp. 193-196. 
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[是中国反应过度，还是美国无端指责], PLA Daily, Aug. 13, 2010; Yang Yi, “The U.S. military on China’s 
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Third, North Korean provocations and the consequent deterioration of China-ROK relations 
also facilitated trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. On 
December 6, a trilateral foreign ministerial meeting of the three countries unanimously rejected 
China’s call for resuming the six-party talks. Meanwhile, Japan-ROK bilateral cooperation also 
improved markedly, as Japan sent SDF officers to observe U.S.-ROK military drills for the first 
time in July and South Korea likewise unprecedentedly sent military observers to U.S-Japan 
military exercises in early December.1843 To Chinese eyes, the improved U.S.-Japan-ROK military 
ties prognosticated an “emerging mini multilateral security cooperation mechanism that would 
threaten China’s national security” and a “return to the Cold War.”1844 
Given the worsening China-ROK relationship, the heightened risk of instability on the Korean 
Peninsula, and improved U.S.-Japan-ROK security cooperation, Beijing likely concluded that 
additional bilateral frictions over the fishing boat collision would only do more harm to China’s 
geostrategic interests by driving Seoul to lean further toward the U.S. and Japan. 
2011 Fatal Stabbing of KCG Official and 2012 Fatal Shooting of Chinese Fisherman 
Following the rapid worsening of bilateral relations in 2010 and the fishing boat collision, China 
and South Korea moved to repair their relationship in 2011. 1845  However, the process of 
improvement was disrupted on December 12 when a KCG officer was fatally stabbed by a Chinese 
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skipper who was suspected of illegally operating in South Korean waters. All nine Chinese 
fishermen including the captain on the Chinese fishing boat were arrested. On the same day, the 
South Korean Foreign Ministry summoned the Chinese ambassador in Seoul to lodge a strong 
protest, demanding Beijing “strictly clamp down on illegal fishing.”1846  The Chinese foreign 
ministry responded that it would “cooperate closely” with South Korea to settle the incident while 
calling on Seoul to “fully guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese fishermen.” 
Beijing also stated that actions had been taken to “better educate fishermen and strengthen 
administration on out-bound fishing boats in a bid to prohibit cross-border fishing.”1847 
The incident and Beijing’s initial response, which was perceived as lacking an apology, 
sparked outrage in the South Korean public. On December 13, over 100 Koreans protested at the 
Chinese embassy in Seoul, during which one protestor rammed his car repeatedly into a police bus 
guarding the embassy compound and several others defaced a Chinese flag. On the same day, the 
Blue House threatened that President Lee Myung-bak’s scheduled state visit to China might be 
reconsidered “if the case is not smoothly resolved.” Meanwhile, the KCG announced that it would 
use firearms “more aggressively” in future enforcement rather than as a last resort.1848  
In a likely signal of accommodation, Beijing’s second response on December 13 came with an 
expression of regret over the injury and death of the KCG personnel. Calling the incident an 
unfortunate event, MFA’s spokesperson Liu Weimin stated that China would “cooperate actively” 
with South Korea to settle the issue “appropriately.”1849 The Chinese media’s coverage on the 
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incident steered clear of a nationalistic tone. For instance, China Newsweek, a popular magazine 
run by China News Service, wrote in a December 15 article, “Given that the fishermen were 
engaging in illegal operations, their behavior can by no means be described as ‘heroic 
resistance’…it is not a correct way to describe the recent fatal stabbing of the KCG officer as an 
instance of ‘bravely resisting South Korean provocation.’”1850 
On January 9, 2012, Lee Myung-bak took his trip to China as planned. The next day, South 
Korean prosecutors charged the Chinese skipper with murder. The other detained Chinese 
fishermen were charged with obstructing enforcement.1851 Beijing underscored the incident as “an 
isolated case” and called on Seoul to “appropriately handle this incident.”1852 On January 11, a 
joint press release issued at the conclusion of Lee’s trip included a clause in which the two 
countries explicitly pledged to strengthen cooperation and communication between their fishery 
enforcement agencies to “properly manage issues in the fishery sector” and maintain order in 
fisheries. Both sides also agreed to explore coordination mechanisms incorporating diplomatic and 
fisheries bureaucracies.1853 This inclusion marked the first time since the implementation of the 
bilateral fishery agreement that fisheries conflict was expressly addressed in a bilateral document 
coming out of a China-ROK leadership summit.  
A week later, China’s Ministry of Agriculture sent an official letter to the South Korean 
embassy in Beijing detailing China’s stepped-up supervision and punishment against illegal 
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Chinese fishing activities. In the letter, the MOA stated that it had dispatched two teams to surveil 
fishing activity in the Yellow Sea, strengthened regulations of Chinese fishing boats, and ordered 
provincial authorities to adopt effective measures to monitor and regulate Chinese fishing activities. 
Seoul characterized this move as a sign that China had been “considering the adverse effects the 
issue of illegal fishing is having on diplomatic relations between the two countries.”1854 
In April, a Korean court in Incheon sentenced the Chinese skipper to a 30-year prison term and 
the other indicted Chinese fishermen to jail terms ranging from 18 months to five years.1855 Beijing 
protested the verdict on the grounds that given the undelimited China-ROK maritime boundary in 
the Yellow Sea, South Korea’s “unilateral application of its law on EEZ” on Chinese fishermen 
was unacceptable to China.1856 As in the 2010 fishing trawler collision in the East China Sea, 
Beijing sought to block the subjection of Chinese nationals detained in contested areas to a rivaling 
claimant’s domestic laws, which, in the Chinese perception, would create a legal precedent 
negatively biased toward its claims. But Beijing refrained from taking any countermeasures this 
time. Nor did China reiterate its objection to the application of South Korean domestic law on the 
Chinese fisherman after the Koran high court in Seoul made a ruling in September which reduced 
the skipper’s prison term to 23 years.1857 
Within a month after the ruling of the case of the Chinese skipper, fishing conflict flared up 
again in October when a Chinese fisherman was fatally shot by the KCG personnel with a rubber 
bullet during a crackdown on illegal fishing, with another 14 Chinese crew members being 
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1855 “China fisherman gets 30 years for S. Korea murder.” 
1856  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Regular Press Conference on April 19, 2012,” 
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detained. The KCG claimed that the fisherman fought the officers with a handsaw.1858 The Chinese 
foreign ministry made “stern representations” with Seoul over the KCG’s “violent law-
enforcement,” demanding Seoul “bring the perpetrator to justice” and “take credible measures to 
end violent law-enforcement.”1859 Seoul insisted that the firing of the rubber bullet was done 
“according to formal crackdown guidelines,” but offered official condolences on what Seoul 
described as the “accidental” death of the Chinese fisherman. Meanwhile, South Korea urged 
Beijing to curb “emotional conflicts among the public or diplomatic tension between the two sides” 
and reduce illegal Chinese fishing activity in Korean waters, describing both as “fundamental 
solutions.”1860 This incident quickly deescalated with Beijing no longer openly insisting on its 
previous demands. 
Three factors likely contributed to China’s reactions to the two incidents. First, the imperative 
of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula during North Korea’s leadership transition 
following Kim Jong-il’s death on December 17, 2011 overwhelmingly preoccupied Beijing’s 
agenda for its relations with the two Koreas at the time. In phones calls with his South Korean, 
U.S., Japanese and Russian counterparts on December 20, China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi 
called for joint efforts to stabilize the situation on the peninsula following Kim Jong-il’s death.1861 
However, inter-Korean tensions rose again when Seoul announced that only authorized 
delegations could travel to North Korea to pay condolence, despite Pyongyang’s earlier 
announcement that all South Korean delegations wishing to travel to north to mourn its late leader 
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would be accepted. 1862  In response to Seoul’s decision, North Korea’s Defense Commission 
released its first policy statement under Kim Jong-un, accusing Seoul of attempting to use Kim 
Jong-il’s death to foster “system change” in the north and asserting Pyongyang’s unchanging 
refusal “to engage with traitor Lee Myung-bak and his group.”1863 During Lee Myung-bak’s visit, 
Hu Jintao again called on all parties to “do more things conducive to peace and stability on the 
peninsula.”1864  
Second, the incidents occurred against the backdrop of South Korea’s upcoming presidential 
election in December 2012. With the election approaching, Chinese analysts stressed the need to 
take the domestic political dimension into consideration when handling relations with Seoul and 
to bolster ties with the Korean progressives who were perceived as being more pro-North Korea 
and pro-China – as opposed to the conservatives who were seen as being pro-U.S. and anti-North 
Korea.1865 In the 2012 election specifically, the conservative contender was Park Geun-hye of the 
ruling Grand National Party and the progressive candidate was Moon Jae-in of the main opposition 
Democratic Party. A CASS study expressed the concern that although Park would likely distance 
her North Korea policy from Lee Myung-bak’s hardline approach, her ability to make substantial 
policy modifications would likely be constrained by her party’s policy line. In contrast, Moon, 
who worked for former President Roh Moo-hyun and was a core supporter for Roh’s “Sunshine 
Policy,” was seen as having more political leeway in making great strides toward a détente with 
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Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the CASS study projected that Park was unlikely to call off the GSOMIA 
negotiation with Japan, whereas it was “hopeful” that Moon would “completely scratch it” and be 
more attentive to China’s security concerns in the Yellow Sea. 1866  As such, from Beijing’s 
perspective, adopting an assertive posture on the incident would likely reinforce Korean 
conservatives who supported a strong U.S.-ROK military alliance while undermining the 
progressives in the election.  
Besides the obvious bilateral factors, the tensions in the East China Sea in 2012 following 
Ishihara Shintaro’s announcement to purchase the Diaoyu/Senkakus was likely the third factor 
which contributed to Beijing’s tendency to avoid escalating conflict with South Korea, which – as 
detailed in Chapter 6 – China saw as a diplomatic ally in the face of Japan. 
2014 Fatal Shooting of Chinese Fisherman 
On October 10, 2014, the KCG fatally shot a Chinese skipper during a crackdown on Chinese 
fishing boats illegally operating in the Korean EEZ. A KCG statement claimed that the Chinese 
captain wielded knives and beer bottles in resisting the KCG’s inspection of his boat. One of the 
KCG officers fired several rounds after warning shots failed to stop his resistance. The Chinese 
skipper died shortly after being transported to a hospital in Mokpo, a port city in southwestern 
South Korea.1867 Beijing reacted strongly to this incident. MFA’s spokesperson Hong Lei told the 
press that China was “appalled by the violence that South Korea uses to enforce law,” and 
demanded that Seoul “bring to justice those accountable for the captain’s death.”1868 
 
1866 Wang Junsheng [王俊生], “Situation on the Korean Peninsula like walking on thin ice” [如履薄冰的朝鲜半岛
局势], in Bluebook of Asia Pacific: Asia-Pacific Region Development Report 2013 [亚太蓝皮书-亚太地区发展报告 
2013] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2013), pp. 180-183. 
1867 “S. Korea coast guard kills Chinese fisherman in Yellow Sea,” Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 10, 2014; Kim 
Tong-Hyung, “S. Korean coast guard kills Chinese boat captain,” Associated Press, Oct. 10, 2014; “S. Korea 
coastguard shoot dead Chinese fishing boat skipper,” Agence France Presse, Oct. 10, 2014. 
1868 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on October 10, 2014” [2014 年 10 月 10
日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会], Oct. 10, 2014, http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/fyrth/t1199309.htm, 
accessed Mar. 19, 2020. 
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China’s vocal posture, however, did not persist and tensions soon subsided. The imperative of 
a rapid containment of the contingency likely stemmed from two sources. First, the China-ROK 
relationship at the time was, in the words of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, enjoying “its best 
phase in history”, with pressing issues both in the security and economic dimensions requiring 
close bilateral cooperation.1869 After Kim Jong-un succeeded Kim Jong-il in late 2011, China 
became increasingly frustrated by the string of missile and satellite launches that North Korea 
conducted in violation of UN sanctions. 1870  In particular, the nuclear test in February 2013 
outraged Beijing and shattered China’s hopes that Kim Jong-un would embrace economic reforms. 
In addition, Kim Jong-un’s purge and execution of Jang Sung-taek in late 2013 – his uncle and 
Beijing’s “most trusted interlocutor” for trade and economic affairs with Pyongyang – was viewed 
as a “provocative and unfriendly message to China.” 1871  Against this backdrop, China-ROK 
relations gained fresh momentum following the inauguration of Park Geun-hye in early 2013, who 
actively reached out to Beijing to enhance cooperation. Park took a “trip of heart and trust” to 
China in June.1872 Chinese President Xi Jinping made a reciprocal visit to South Korea in July 
2014, marking a historical departure from the tradition that PRC leaders visit Pyongyang before 
going to Seoul.  
 
1869 “China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi: China-South Korea relationship in its best phase in history” [中国外长王
毅 ： 中 韩 关 系 处 于 历 史 最 好 时 期 ], Chinanews.com [ 中 新 网 ], May 27, 2014, 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/05-27/6218508.shtml, accessed Mar. 31, 2020. 
1870  Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2013, accessed Mar. 31, 2020. 
1871 Zhu Feng and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Purge of Jang Song-Taek and its Impact on China’s Policy toward 
North Korea,” in Gilert Rozman, ed., Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Korea Economic Institute of America, vol. 
25, 2014, p. 256; Joseph R. DeTrani, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
Jun. 5, 2014. 
1872 Jaeho Hwang, The ROK’s China Policy under Park Geun-hye: A New Model of ROK-PRC Relations, Brookings 
Institute, Aug. 14, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-roks-china-policy-under-park-geun-hye-a-new-
model-of-rok-prc-relations/, accessed Mar. 31, 2020.  
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At the same time, China and South Korea were in the homestretch to cement a bilateral FTA. 
According to analysis by MOFCOM and other Chinese political economy experts, Beijing saw the 
conclusion of the China-ROK FTA as having a ripple effect on other ongoing FTA talks, in 
particular by prodding Japan and Taiwan to accelerate negotiations on a China-Japan-ROK FTA 
and a cross-strait trade-in-goods agreement, respectively. Beijing also perceived the China-ROK 
FTA as potential leverage in balancing against the geo-economic implications of the U.S.-led 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).1873 In light of the obviously high security and trade stakes, an 
escalation of a fishing dispute in the Yellow Sea, which might risk derailing broader bilateral 
relations, was too costly for China to pursue.  
Second, and related to the Yellow Sea dispute, during Xi’s 2014 visit to Seoul, China and 
South Korea agreed for the first time to launch formal bilateral negotiations in 2015 to settle their 
maritime boundary. 1874  Given the fact that the Yellow Sea involved no issues of territorial 
sovereignty, a bilateral settlement appeared achievable. Meanwhile, Beijing harbored the hope that 
a China-ROK boundary settlement in the Yellow Sea would set another example of peaceful 
bilateral solutions – as opposed to drawing third parties into the disputes – following the 2000 
Sino-Vietnam settlement in the Gulf of Tonkin.1875 From the Chinese perspective, a settlement on 
the boundary might also profoundly mitigate, albeit not necessarily eliminate, fishing conflict in 
 
1873 Song Zhiyong [宋志勇], “Analysis of the Impact of Sino-ROK FTA on the Regional Pattern of East Asia” [中韩
FTA 对东亚区域格局的影响分析], Northeast Asia Forum, no. 1, 2015, pp. 11-20. Song’s study was conducted as 
part of a MOFCOM project on FTA and China’s industrial opening and development strategy. Song was the head of 
Asia and Africa Studies Institute at MOFCOM’s CAITEC. Chen Zhiheng [陈志恒], et al., “The Trend of Northeast 
Asian Regional Cooperation Strategy and China’s Strategic Choice” [全球区域合作新动向与东北亚面临的新挑
战], Northeast Asia Forum, no. 5, 2014, pp. 42-59; Xu Chunxiang [徐春祥], “Pushing Forward China-Japan-Korea 
FTA is the Sole Regional Strategic Choice of China” [推进中日韩自贸区建设是中国在亚洲唯一区域战略选择], 
Northeast Asia Forum, no. 3, 2014, p. 77. 
1874 “PRC-ROK joint statement” (2014). 
1875 “The Chinese side: hope China-ROK maritime boundary delimitation talks set an example for the solution of other 
similar disputes” [ 中方：希中韩海域划界谈判为解决类似问题树立典范 ], Xinhua, Apr. 21, 2016, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/21/c_128918760.htm, accessed Mar. 31, 2020.   
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the Yellow Sea by disincentivizing South Korea from asserting sovereign control over contested 
waters through aggressive enforcement actions.1876  
2016 Clashes and the KCG’s Use of Firearm 
On September 29, 2016, three Chinese fishermen died in a fire that broke out on their boat during 
a confrontation with KCG officers who were trying to detain them for illegal fishing. The fire was 
reportedly caused by flashbang grenades thrown by the Korean officers into the wheelhouse where 
the fishermen were hiding, resulting in their suffocation.1877 Beijing demanded South Korea “carry 
out comprehensive, objective and unbiased investigations in collaboration with China.”1878 Less 
than two weeks after the clash, another incident occurred when a Chinese fishing ship rammed and 
sank a KCG patrol boat during a pursuit in the Yellow Sea, prompting Seoul to announce that 
KCG officers would thereafter be authorized to use firearms, including their onboard cannons, 
against illegal Chinese fishing vessels should the situation be deemed threatening.1879 Though 
accusing Seoul of “abusing law enforcement power,” Beijing promised to punish the Chinese 
fishermen who were responsible for ramming and sinking the KCG patrol boat, a posture 
characterized by some Korean observers as a “placatory gesture.”1880 A third incident occurred on 
November 1 when KCG officers fired 700 machine gun rounds at a fleet of 30 Chinese fishing 
ships which were fishing illegally in Korean waters. Though the incident did not result in any 
 
1876 Ding Duo [丁铎], “Potential risks and solutions to China-ROK fishery disputes” [中韩渔业纠纷的隐忧与出路], 
NISCSS, Apr. 2, 2019, http://www.nanhai.org.cn/review_c/355.html, accessed Mar. 31, 2020.  
1877  “Three Chinese fishermen killed in confrontation with South Korea coastguard,” Reuters, Sept. 30, 2016, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-fishermen/three-chinese-fishermen-killed-in-confrontation-
with-south-korea-coastguard-idUSKCN1200DQ; “Chinese fishermen killed in S. Korea coastguard clash,” BBC, Sept. 
30, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37516098. Both were accessed Mar. 20, 2020. 
1878  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on September 30, 2016,” MFA, 
http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/mfasr/t1402904.htm, accessed Mar. 20, 2020. 
1879  Ju-min Park, “South Korea vows greater force against Chinese fishing boats,” Reuters, Oct. 11, 2016, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-fishermen-idUSKCN12B09O, accessed Apr. 3, 2020. 
1880  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on October 12, 2016,” 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1405200.shtml, accessed Apr. 5, 2020; Yi Whan-
woo, “China trying to avoid conflict over illegal fishing,” Korea Times, Oct. 20, 2016, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/06/113_216496.html, accessed Apr. 4, 2020. 
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casualties, it was the first time the KCG had opened fire on Chinese fishing boats.1881 Beijing 
responded with a statement expressing “strong dissatisfaction” with South Korea’s use of force 
and called on Seoul to refrain from employing “extreme measures” on Chinese fishermen.1882 
This series of clashes represents a prima facie challenge for the audience costs trade-off thesis. 
Given the fact that these incidents occurred in the context of rapidly deteriorating China-ROK 
relations following Seoul’s decision to deploy THAAD in July and involved the deaths of multiple 
Chinese fishermen, Beijing potentially faced greater domestic pressure to be tough on South Korea 
and a quick containment might be politically more costly than usual. Moreover, China appeared 
to have become less reluctant to engage in escalation against South Korea at the time, as evidenced 
by Beijing’s quick and forceful retaliation following Seoul’s THAAD announcement. Therefore, 
we would expect Beijing to have hardened its position on these fishing disputes. However, there 
is little evidence of China’s verbal protests being followed up by escalatory measures specifically 
related to the fishery disputes. 
Chinese sources on this series of fishing conflicts are extremely limited, which constrains the 
strength of the explanations that can be drawn. One explanation – in line with the theory presented 
in this study – is that Beijing used its escalatory response to THAAD to lift a certain amount of 
the domestic pressure for a firm posture on the fishing conflict. Popular outcries in the Chinese 
public calling for the boycotting of K-pop stars and products in response to the THAAD 
deployment emerged in July and August. An online poll on Weibo in August, which drew the 
participation of over 280,000 netizens, reported that over 86 percent of the respondents supported 
a government ban of K-pop stars, with the hashtag “no idols prioritized over the country” (国家面
 
1881 Bryan Harris and Charles Clover, “South Korea coast guard opens fire at Chinese fishing boats,” Financial Times, 
Nov. 2, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/171caf3c-a0c6-11e6-86d5-4e36b35c3550, accessed Apr. 3, 2020. 
1882  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on November 2, 2016,” 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1412330.shtml, accessed Apr. 3, 2020. 
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前无偶像) trending on Weibo and Chinese fans unfollowing their South Korean idols on social 
media.1883 Another opinion poll released in November by Genron NPO reported that 61.1 percent 
of Chinese respondents saw South Korea as “untrustworthy,” almost doubling the figure of the 
previous year (36.8 percent).1884 During this period, a growing number of events featuring K-pop 
stars were cancelled, despite Beijing’s denial of a ban being in place.1885 Meanwhile,  Beijing 
began to suspend bilateral exchanges with South Korea at both local and national level, most 
notably those between the two countries’ senior defense officials. Neither country held events on 
August 24 to celebrate the 24th anniversary of the normalization of their bilateral relations – a 
deviation from the usual practice.1886 After South Korea’s conglomerate Lotte Group and the ROK 
Ministry of National Defense agreed in November to set up the THAAD on a Lotte-owned golf 
course in Seongju, Lotte reported in early December that its business operations in China were 
subject to fire, safety, and tax investigations by Chinese authorities, without being given any 
specific reason. Information also surfaced that China’s tax and customs agencies were conducting 
tax audits and tightening customs clearance toward a growing number of Korean businesses.1887 
 
1883 Li Ruoshan, “S. Korea boycott calls grow,” Global Times, Jul. 27, 2016; Bai Tiantian, “Public backs K-pop ban: 
poll,” Global Times, Aug. 4, 2016; “‘No Idol before country’: Korean stars’ activity face restrictions in China” [“国
家 面 前 无 偶 像 ” 韩 星 在 华 活 动 面 临 限 制 ], BBC, Aug. 2, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2016/08/160802_guangdian_korea, accessed Apr. 7, 2020. 
1884 “Chinese grow frustrated at South Korea amid security row: poll,” Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 2, 2016. 
1885 “K-pop a target in China-S. Korea missile row,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 5, 2016; Christopher Bodeen and 
Youkyung Lee, “Pop stars, diplomacy victims of cooling China-Korea ties,” Associated Press, Aug. 10, 2016; Zhao 
Yusha, “Korean stars cut from reality show broadcast,” Global Time, Aug. 24, 2016; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on November 21, 2016,” 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1417190.shtml, accessed Apr. 6, 2020. 
 1886  Jun Ji-hye, “Beijing ignores Seoul’s invitation to defense forum,” Korea Times, Sept. 6, 2016; “THAAD 
deployment halts all S. Korea-China high-level defense talks,” Korea Times, Nov. 6, 2016; Li Yongchun [李永春], 
“China-ROK relations in transition” [转型期的中韩关系 ], in Bluebook of Asia Pacific: Annual Report on 
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Given China’s strong response to the THAAD deployment, it is possible that Beijing was 
hoping to use these countermeasures to demonstrate resolve and let off domestic pressure for 
getting tough on South Korea while also avoid stirring up the Yellow Sea dispute specifically, as 
China was still striving to lower the temperature on its maritime frontier following the South China 
Sea arbitration in July. Moreover, by single-mindedly focusing on the THAAD, Beijing was 
unmistakably signaling the unnegotiability of the THAAD issue, which in the Chinese perception 
would fundamentally compromise China’s strategic security interests.1888 On the other hand, the 
fishery issue was of secondary importance to China’s strategic interests in the region and would 
probably be linked to the bilateral maritime boundary talks (as in the case of the Tonkin Gulf). As 
such, by avoiding hardening China’s position, Beijing was able to retain the necessary latitude 
should concessions be needed to facilitate a mutually acceptable settlement in the Yellow Sea. 
Institutionalizing Domestic Disincentives  
Since the implementation of the China-ROK fishery agreement, fishing conflict has become a 
persistent irritant in bilateral relations. China has long relied on the use of economic incentives to 
encourage aquaculture and distant water fishery as ways of reducing the number of Chinese fishing 
boats operating in the overlapping waters and mitigating the risk of conflict occurring at sea. 
Economic and administrative disincentives have recently become institutionalized at provincial 
level to discourage fishermen from engaging in illegal fishing and violent resistance. 
Notably, Shandong Province adopted a new directive, effective from 2016, which specifically 
addresses Chinese fishing ships operating in the overlapping waters with South Korea. In addition 
to the requirement that all Chinese ships install and keep operational positioning systems including 
Automatic Identification System (AIS), this directive mandates the ships to install and run video 
 
1888 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on South Korea’s Deployment of THAAD,” China Leadership Monitor, 
issue 52, winter 2017. 
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recording cameras when operating in ROK-administered waters – a measure seemingly intended 
to deter both Chinese fishermen from violent resistance and KCG personnel from excessive use of 
force. Unauthorized removal or suspension of operation of the tracking and recording equipment 
would result in the suspension of the relevant fishing license, in addition to a fine of up to 5000 
RMB (approx. $700 USD). Chinese ships operating in the ROK EEZ without a license, intruding 
into South Korean territorial sea, or operating in the restricted NLL areas would be penalized with 
a fine of up to 50,000 RMB (approx. $7000), confiscation of equipment, cancellation of subsidies 
for the year, revocation of permit, and even blacklisting. Crew members engaging in violent 
resistance would be subject to criminal proceedings. In addition, the directive also holds 
prefectural governments, which are responsible for installing, testing, and inspecting the tracking 
and recording systems, accountable for violations by linking the fishing quota that a prefecture 
receives each year to the number of violations by fishing boats registered in that prefecture.1889 
Despite this endeavor by Shandong to institutionalize economic and administrative 
disincentives, other coastal provinces of the Yellow Sea have yet to adopt similar mechanisms. 
The fact that at least half of the fatal incidents have involved Shandong-originated fishing ships 
may have prodded the province into introducing a more vigorous disincentive mechanism.1890 
CONCLUSION 
The dominance of international audience costs has created incentives for China to persistently de-
escalate incidents arising from is maritime boundary disputes with South Korea in the Yellow Sea. 
 
1889 Wang Yongwei [王永卫] and Liu Donghui [刘冬惠], “Shandong’s new regulatory measures on fishing ships in 
waters related to South Korea will be implemented” [山东涉韩入渔渔船管理新规将施行], China Fishery News, 
Dec. 28, 2015; “Notice by Shandong provincial ocean and fishery department on the circulation of ‘Shandong 
Province administration methods of fishing ships permitted in waters related to South Korea’” [山东省海洋与渔业
厅 关 于 印 发 《 山 东 省 涉 韩 入 渔 渔 船 管 理 办 法 的 通 知 》 ], Mar. 2, 2018, 
http://gb.shandong.gov.cn/art/2018/3/2/art_107862_76071.html, accessed Apr. 6, 2020. 
1890 The 2011 fatal stabbing, 2012 and 2014 fatal shootings all involved fishing ships registered in Shandong. 
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For most of the time, fishing disputes – even those involving Chinese fatalities – alone do not 
mobilize parochial interests in China into forming a strong compromise-averse coalition, creating 
a permissive domestic political environment that enables Beijing to pursue a quick de-escalation. 
This stands in stark contrast to Beijing’s inability to pursue a de-escalatory approach after Seoul 
decided to deploy THAAD, which mobilized powerful compromise-averse stakeholders in the 
Chinese security apparatus as well as grassroots nationalistic pressure and thus overwhelmed the 
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11. Conclusion and Implications 
 
In handling incidents and challenges arising from its maritime disputes, China has a strong 
propensity to escalate when the potential domestic costs of backing down outweigh the anticipated 
international costs of escalation. When the anticipated international costs exceed the potential 
domestic political costs, China has tended to deescalate to avoid derailing relations with the 
adversary and/or precipitating third-party counterbalancing. In the absence of a clear calculation 
one way or the other, Chinese decision makers may allow a gridlock to set in before coming up 
with a clearer trade-off calculation that enables them to decide whether to escalate or deescalate. 
In cases where escalation takes place, China tends to launch a strong military escalation when it 
confronts a fait accompli that cannot be reversed through negotiations. These decisions are 
typically within the purview of decision-making bodies at the top of the Chinese party-state, 
namely, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, but lower-level actors can initiate frontline 
actions and/or lobby against compromise that in effect decrease Beijing’s room for maneuver and 
rapid deescalation.  
Four main findings emerge from this study of China’s handling of its maritime disputes. First, 
contrary to what many policy analysts and international relations theorists have predicted, China 
has not been invariably prone to taking an escalatory posture in maritime disputes as its power 
continues to grow over the past two decades. By expanding the scope of the study to examine 
China’s behavior in all of its maritime disputes (as opposed to focus on one particular geographical 
area, e.g. the South China Sea) and the period of the study to encompass the first two decades of 
the 21st century (as opposed to focus on the post-2010 period when China’s maritime disputes 
became a more salient regional issue partly because of China’s rising power), this study refines 
Iain Johnston’s earlier argument that China has not demonstrated an across-the-board increase in 
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assertiveness.1891 As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, The East China Sea remains 
the area where a prompt deescalation is most difficult for Beijing to pursue due to the dominance 
of domestic political costs. In the Yellow Sea, incentivized by high security and economic stakes 
in maintaining positive relations with South Korea and enabled by a permissive domestic political 
climate, China has persistently deescalated maritime clashes with South Korea, making this area 
seemingly the most promising low-hanging fruit for a boundary settlement. In the South China 
Sea, China faces a more ambiguous cost trade-off calculation than in the East China Sea and the 
Yellow Sea, thus leading to a high frequency of standoffs as well as to China’s constant vacillation 
between moderation (“maintaining stability”) when such costs are perceived to be on the rise and 
assertiveness (“safeguarding rights”) when the costs are seen to be tolerable or manageable. This 
ambiguity in effect makes the South China Sea the area where collective counterbalancing and 
third-party intervention most needed and promising in shaping China’s behavior by tipping its cost 
trade-off calculation. Table 11.1 summarized the empirical cases. 
Second, and counterintuitively, smaller countries can have substantial leverage over rising 
great powers, contrasting the long-enshrined Thucydides dictum that “the strong do what they have 
the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” China cares as much about its 
reputation for resolve as its image of nonbelligerency. In the South China Sea, China’s concerns 
about undermining its peaceful development narrative as well as being balanced against by 
ASEAN states often prevail over its unease about potential domestic backlash and thus explain the 
great majority of China’s decisions to deescalate in the area. While the U.S. return to Asia since 
2010 provides another important leverage for smaller countries to balance the Chinese influence, 
China demonstrably accommodated its smaller neighbors on the South China Sea in  
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the first decade of the 21st century, when the U.S. was preoccupied with its war on counterterrorism 
and thus maintained a relatively weak presence in the region. Likewise, cooperation with South 
Korea on security and geo-economic priorities dominated China’s cost calculation when handling 
incidents in the Yellow Sea. In contrast, despite being the strongest claimant that China faces in 
its maritime disputes, Japan often has very limited leverage with China in motivating a quick 
deescalation in the East China Sea. The U.S.-Japan alliance, albeit effective in deterring China 
from resorting to brute force over the dispute, has not been as effective in deterring or countering 
a Chinese escalation that fall short of military conflict – escalations within the gray zone, so to 
speak. 
Third, economic and commercial stakes that create concentrated parochial interests may 
neutralize compromise-averse impulses in times of crisis. Concentrated parochial interests can be 
created in particular localities or economic sectors. Border trade and development initiatives in 
China’s hinterland, for example, gave southwestern provinces especially Guangxi a major stake in 
advocating for stable relations and sub-regional cooperation with Vietnam. On the other hand, the 
multiple mega high-speed railway projects that China had won in Indonesia and Malaysia created 
vested interests in the Chinese railway construction sector, which was a major beneficiary from – 
and thus a supporter for – cordial ties with the two countries.  
Finally, faits accomplis that leave no room for negotiation can create strong incentives for 
China to engage in risky military escalation to compel for a reversal or compensate for its perceived 
losses. China has demonstrated a high sensitivity to the prospect of being presented with a fait 
accompli that would irreversibly undermine its maritime claims. The East China Sea disputes 
illustrate how China has calibrated its escalatory responses in the face of a fait accompli or a likely 
one. China undertook a strong escalation in both the military and nonmilitary dimensions amid the 
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Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization in an attempt to force a reversal of the island purchase, and after 
Japan made it clear the purchase could not be reversed, to compensate for its (China’s) irreversible 
losses by creating the East China Sea ADIZ. In the 2010 fishing trawler collision, China undertook 
a forceful escalation in the nonmilitary dimension to deter Japan from creating a fait accompli in 
the legal dimension, as subjecting the Chinese skipper to Japanese domestic laws would have set 
a precedent which legally undermined China’s claims to the Diaoyu/Senkakus. During the 2004-
2008 Chunxiao controversy, China undertook a restrained military escalation when Japan engaged 
in a fait accompli tactic by permitting a Japanese company to drill in the contested waters but 
signaled the negotiability of the fait accompli by continuing bilateral gas talks. 
PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
This study has broad implications for the study of crisis prevention and management, as well as 
for international relations. 
Implications for Crisis Prevention and Management  
Effective crisis prevention and management requires decision makers to address each stage in the 
development of a crisis, namely, crisis prevention, containment, management, and post-crisis 
institutionalization.  
First, there are domestic origins that lead to the failure of crisis prevention. The conventional 
approach toward crisis prevention hinges largely upon two layers of interstate arrangements: 1) 
multilateral “one-size-fits-all” mechanisms setting general rules of the road such as the Convention 
on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), the Code for 
Unexpected Encountered at Sea (CUES), and the supposedly forthcoming South China Sea Code 
of Conduct (COC); 2) bilateral arrangements regulating behavior and communication for maritime 
- 547 - 
 
(and air) encounters. These interstate mechanisms undoubtedly matter but are insufficient in 
preventing or disincentivizing crisis-triggering behavior.  
Findings in this study suggest that impulsive, incident-prone actions by non-state and sub-state 
actors have had a major bearing on the occurrence of maritime incidents in the past two decades, 
highlighting the imperative need for preventive mechanisms that incorporate intrastate 
arrangements to discourage and hold accountable crisis-triggering actors. Intrastate arrangements 
could be politically difficult to institutionalize and implement in large part because China – and in 
some sense other claimants as well – has tied its hands with persistently tough posturing and 
rhetoric, trapping itself into a rigid position domestically. A practical starting point for China is to 
curtail propaganda against other claimants – especially Japan – which has made it difficult for 
Beijing to pursue a quick deescalation in the event of a maritime incident. On the part of other 
claimants, they also need to explore domestic political and legal options to restrain subnational 
and non-state actors from taking actions that may provoke a maritime crisis. Such intrastate 
mechanisms, albeit realistically unable to eliminate competitive interactions between claimants or 
prevent all maritime incidents, can reduce occurrence of incidents by holding overzealous frontline 
actors accountable and by altering domestic narratives which have often portrayed impulsive 
behavior in a positive light as manifestations of patriotism. 
A related implication is that disputants must prioritize crisis avoidance and strengthen 
preventive cooperation to avoid a common danger in contested areas such as the East China Sea 
where there is a high risk of escalation due to the clear dominance of domestic political costs. 
Potential solutions such as creating entry-restricted buffering zones or co-managed conservancies 
surrounding these areas are often discussed.1892 These proposed solutions, however, are unlikely 
 
1892 See, for example, Godfrey Baldacchino, “Diaoyu Dao, Diaoyutai or Senkaku? Creative solutions to a festering 
dispute in the East China Sea from an ‘Island Studies’ perspective,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 57, no. 1, April 2016, 
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to be accepted without a significant reduction in the hostility and distrust between the rivaling 
claimants. Alternatively, in the short-to-medium term, the claimant states should probably aim for 
more realistic and less ambitious preventive mechanisms. Specifically, each claimant should 
require its own vessels to strictly follow existing collision avoidance protocols when operating in 
proximity in disputed areas and make it clear to domestic actors that violators would be held 
accountable.  
Meanwhile, the United States as a key third party also has a vital, dual-deterrence role to play 
in crisis prevention. On the one hand, while revitalizing America’s alliance architecture in Asia 
and reassuring its allies that the commitment of the United States to its treaty obligations remains 
unchanged, Washington should encourage its allies such as Japan and the Philippines to better 
discipline their own domestic actors, avoid unprovoked unilateral actions, and make it clear that 
the U.S. does not expect to be dragged into a dangerous confrontation with China over the unsettled 
maritime disputes. On the other hand, while reassuring Beijing that the United States will remain 
neutral on the maritime sovereignty and boundary disputes, Washington should make it clear that 
aggressive, provocative Chinese moves in these disputes is not in China’s best interests in the sense 
that it will erode China’s credibility in the region as a peaceful rising power and will be met with 
firm, concerted pushback from the U.S. and its allies and security partners. 
Second, should crisis prevention fail, factors in both the bilateral and multilateral contexts can 
help shape the incentives of disputants to contain a local incident. Bilaterally, relations which 
simultaneously have multiple contentious, hard-to-solve issues may considerably limit either or 
 
pp. 16-26; John W. McManus, Kwang-Tsao Shao and Szu-Yin Lin, “Toward Establishing a Spratly Islands 
International Marine Peace Park: Ecological Importance and Supportive Collaborative Activities with an Emphasis 
on the Role of Taiwan,” Ocean Development & International Law, issue 41, 2010, pp. 270-280; Susan Thornton, 
“Averting Conflict in the South China Sea: Steps to Restore Rules and Restraint,” in Ryan Hass, et al., ed., The Future 
of U.S. Policy toward China: Recommendations for the Biden administration, Johns L. Thornton China Center, 
Brookings Institute, and Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School, November 2020, pp. 46-51. 
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both parties’ ability to achieve a quick containment. Decision makers of both parties must 
compartmentalize the incident from – and at the same time avoid intensifying – other contentious 
issues to mitigate the problem of interdependence of commitment. Leaders of each party must also 
be very sensitive to the possibility that some of their statements and actions at this stage will 
influence the other party’s domestic political climate in ways that hamper the other party’s crisis 
containment efforts and abilities. In particular, leaders should think about the unintended 
consequences when resorting to assertive rhetoric and actions intended for the consumption of 
their own constituencies – the domestic audience of the other party also is almost certainly listening 
and watching.  
Multilaterally, third-party intervention has shown mixed results. In disputes such as the East 
China Sea where China (and Japan alike) is preoccupied by potential domestic backlash, third-
party intervention often has a difficult time in shaping China’s crisis behavior by tipping its cost 
trade-off calculation. Even in disputes such as the South China Sea where China’s cost trade-off 
calculation is more ambiguous and susceptible to changes in the external environment, empirical 
evidence suggests that effective third-party intervention should consist of two legs. A swift and 
concerted multilateral pushback by smaller regional players can create disincentives for China to 
escalate by engendering a sense of isolation, signaling the potential international reputational costs 
on China as a trustworthy status-quo player, and by warning of an imminent collective 
counterbalancing effort. Meanwhile, other major powers especially the United States can throw 
their weight behind such a multilateral response to bolster the credibility of balancing efforts and 
provide the necessary guarantee for deterrence.  
Third, should an incident not be contained quickly, the parties need to manage the crisis at 
hand. Operational principles in existing crisis management literature such as those proposed by 
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Alexander George and by Michael Swaine et al. are still of great relevance. For example, each 
party need to maintain informed control over lower-level actors who can take actions that limit 
negotiating room, slow down when making moves to allow the other side sufficient time for 
evaluating the situation and calibrating responses and choose diplomatic-military moves which are 
consistent in signaling a willingness to negotiate for a solution. When exchanging communications, 
both parties should avoid principled lock-in positions that limit bargaining room, preserve the 
adversary’s option to backdown in a “face-saving” manner, and be wary of the unintended 
consequences of one’s words and deeds.1893 
Moreover, my findings suggest that given what is at stake in maritime territorial and boundary 
disputes, faits accomplis, physical ones or otherwise, rarely go unresisted. The employment of fait 
accompli tactics by one party tends to make the other party more risk acceptant and precipitate an 
escalation along both nonmilitary and military dimensions, thus opening the door to further spirals 
of hostility and miscalculation. As such, decision makers must resist the temptation to employ such 
a tactic and be cautious in taking moves that may be perceived by the other side as threatening a 
fait accompli.  
Lastly, in the post-crisis stage, it is essential that the disputants and other regional stakeholders 
internalize and institutionalize lessons learned from crisis experiences. As Alexander George 
cautions, knowledge gained from the management of past crises is virtually worthless unless it can 
be internalized by each party.1894  
 
1893 Alexander George, “A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management,” in George, ed., Avoiding War, p. 25; Michael 
Swaine, “Understanding the Historical Record,” in Swaine, et al., ed., Managing Sino-American Crises, pp. 4-10. 
1894 Alexander L. George, “Findings and Recommendations,” in George, ed., Avoiding War, p. 565. 
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Implications for International Relations 
Beyond adding to the existing crisis studies literature, this study has several implications for the 
field of international relations and security studies in general. First, China’s crisis behavior in 
maritime disputes supports the theory of domestic audience costs, which claims that leaders would 
be punished for betraying “national honor” should they back down in interstate crises. This study 
provides further support for this proposition by demonstrating how it applies to non-democracies 
in one important subject in contemporary international security studies, i.e., maritime territorial 
and boundary disputes. Extending the logrolling coalition theory, this study also illuminates the 
microfoundations of domestic audience costs in authoritarian states where voting publics are 
absent.  
On the other hand, China’s sensitivity to and calculation of international audience costs cast 
doubts on arguments for credibility and demonstration of resolve in interstate conflict. Such 
arguments see states as being inclined to establish a reputation for resolve to deter future challenges 
from rivaling claimants.1895 Facing multiple contestants in the South China Sea, wide variation in 
China’s propensity to escalate maritime incidents raises questions around this line of reasoning, 
and implies that states’ understanding of reputation is often two-pronged – namely, reputation for 
resolve and that for nonbelligerency – and that decision makers tend to strike a balance between 
the two aspects. Meanwhile, China does seek to demonstrate resolve in maritime disputes where 
it perceives an interdependence of commitment – for example, the East China Sea disputes, in 
which the target of Chinese assertiveness was a rivaling party with whom China simultaneously 
has multiple salient bilateral issues.  
 
1895 Zhang, “Cautious Bully;” Barbara F. Walter, “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” International 
Studies Review, vol. 5, no. 4, Dec. 2003, pp. 137-153. 
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Second, this study offers a refined perspective of the connection between economic 
interdependence and interstate stability. According to the school of interdependence liberalism, 
states are deterred from initiating dyadic conflict against important trading partners for fear of 
incurring losses of benefits generated from trade. This theory also claims that interdependence 
may constrain state leaders from pursuing destabilizing foreign policies by creating vested interests 
at home who benefit from expanded economic ties and would push for stable foreign relations.1896 
As illustrated in this study, concentrated pro-cooperation interests in particular sectors or localities 
generated by deepening economic ties can act as strong countervailing forces against hawkish 
pressure for escalatory responses. In China’s disputes with Vietnam in the South China Sea, the 
multiple sub-regional economic cooperation initiatives have created pro-cooperation interests 
concentrated in the border provinces, in particular Guangxi, which balanced against pushes from 
compromise-averse actors in times of crisis. Likewise, when China’s frictions with Indonesia and 
Malaysia in the South China Sea were on the rise, the enormous commercial interests that China’s 
infrastructure construction sector – especially the high-speed rail industry – has in the two 
countries generated stabilizing forces. By contrast, when tensions ratcheted up in the East China 
Sea, the high level of Sino-Japanese economic interdependence and sheer volume of bilateral trade 
alone seemed to have generated very limited countervailing forces against compromise-averse 
pressure. 
Third, China’s pattern of escalation and deescalation in its maritime disputes underscores the 
importance of moving beyond a singular focus on great power competition and adding smaller 
regional stakeholders to the equation when studying implications of rising powers for regional 
 
1896 Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignment (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989); Solomon William Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
vol. 24, no. 1, Mar. 1980, pp. 57-78. 
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stability and international peace. The thesis of power transition and hegemonic stability asserts 
that as the gap between a rising power and the established powers closes, the former will 
increasingly tend to challenge the dominance of the latter. 1897  However, while consistently 
escalating incidents in the East China Sea, China has been more selective in escalating incidents 
in the South China Sea and invariably shunned escalation in the Yellow Sea, despite the growing 
power parity between China and the United States especially in the Western Pacific over the past 
two decades. Granted, U.S. policy toward Asia does provide the strategic context that Beijing can 
never ignore in its calculations, but simply treating the maritime controversies as one aspect in the 
U.S.-China competition and leaving out the role of smaller players can be misleading and even 
backfire. Indeed, as demonstrated in this study, much of China’s cost-benefit calculation and the 
resulting response is conditioned by who the other party in a particular incident is and the prospect 
of an escalation altering weaker regional players’ perception of threat from China.  
CHINA AND ASIA-PACIFIC’S MARITIME FUTURE 
The potential for crises and frictions over China’s maritime disputes will remain for several 
reasons. To begin with, it is unlikely that these disputes will be settled in the short-to-medium term, 
given the strategic, economic, and symbolic importance of the contested sea areas to all the 
disputants. Even though the Yellow Sea appears to be the most promising low-hanging fruit,1898 it 
may well take years if not decades to reach an agreement modeled on the Tokin Gulf delimitation 
precedent which took Beijing and Hanoi almost 30 years to reach a final settlement in 2000. 
Moreover, as China aggressively pursues its ambition of becoming a “strong maritime power,”1899 
 
1897 On power transition and rising powers in general, see, for example, A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: 
Knopf, 1968), 2nd ed.; A. F. K. Organski, and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
1898 “Why China Would Compromise in the Yellow Sea,” Stratfor Analysis, Dec. 2015. 
1899 “Hu Jintao’s work report at the 18th CPC National Congress” [胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上
的报告], People’s Daily, Nov. 8, 2012, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151-1.html; “Xi Jinping: 
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this discourse appears to have significantly increased the political salience of the maritime disputes. 
By raising popular expectations on Beijing to assert more effective control of China’s maritime 
frontier and enhance state protection for Chinese nationals operating at sea, the “strong maritime 
power” narrative may inadvertently embolden these actors’ behavior and – in the event of a local 
incident – increase Beijing’s domestic political costs.  
Beijing’s decisions in 2018 to incorporate the CCG into the PAP and in 2021 to adopt the coast 
guard law have left significant uncertainty around the question of how these changes will alter the 
CCG’s behavior in future maritime incidents and the agency’s capability in shaping China’s 
domestic discourse. A silver lining here is that these changes streamline and standardize the 
operations of the CCG while opening up additional opportunities to push for the application of 
existing rules of the road in the region to regulate coast guard ships. Thus, the centralization of 
China’s maritime law enforcement agencies could work in two countervailing directions: it could 
be destabilizing by enhancing China’s capacity to coerce its small neighbors as much as it could 
be stabilizing by mitigating Beijing’s problem of institutional fragmentation. Ultimately, the net 
effect hinges on the goals toward which China employs its coast guard. 
Looking forward, the maritime Asia-Pacific – increasingly crowded with military and 
nonmilitary actors from a number of regional stakeholders – will likely remain volatile and the 
potential for confrontations and clashes can never be overstated. The outstanding maritime 
disputes will undoubtedly have long-term implications for China and the rest of the region. They 
will also almost certainly shape the role of the U.S. in the area and its response to the changing 
 
pay more attention to the sea, learn about the sea, manage and plan the sea, and push forward the building of a maritime 
power to make new achievements” [习近平：进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略海洋，推动海洋强国建设不断取得
新成就], People’s Daily, Aug. 1, 2013, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c64094-22402107.html. “Full text of 
Xi Jinping’s work report at the 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, Nov. 4, 2017, 
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security landscape in the face of China’s growing power. All parties’ interests will be well served 
by successful prevention and management of crises. This study sheds new light on the factors that 
influence China’s decisions about escalating or deescalating maritime incidents and how these 
factors can be shaped by other stakeholders in the region for the purpose of successful crisis 
prevention and management in future. 
EXTENSIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this study, I tested my framework against empirical evidence drawn exclusively from China, as 
the number and diversity of cases enables me to avoid selection bias by analyzing both events of 
occurrence (escalation) and nonoccurrence (no escalation) while controlling for other confounding 
variables.  
The theoretical framework developed in this study can be extended for future research in 
several directions. One direction is to add more recent cases of Chinese behaviors in maritime 
disputes to evaluate the extent to which the framework holds as China’s decision-making process 
becomes more centralized under Xi Jinping and as great power competitions intensify under the 
Trump and Biden administrations. 
Adding cases outside of China and conducting cross-country comparisons will also yield 
important results. Beyond China, Asia is replete with maritime disputes – such as the Malaysia-
Philippine dispute over the sovereignty of north Borneo and the Singapore-Malaysia dispute over 
their maritime boundary – and thus offers fertile soil for research into crisis prevention and 
management. Vietnam offers another good case for an examination of how authoritarian states 
handle incidents arising from its multiple maritime disputes. Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are 
valuable cases of Asian democracies which can be used to test my theories. In addition, India, 
especially its protracted boundary dispute with Pakistan and its willingness to peacefully settle the 
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boundary disputes with Bangladesh and Myanmar through international arbitration, offers a useful 
within-case comparison to analyze incentives for rising powers to deescalate – and eventually 
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